The False Dilemma: Rethinking AF Science and Technology Officer Talent Management
In 2019, Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) Heather Wilson launched the 2030 Science and Technology (S&T) Strategy by stating, “The advantage will go to those who create the best technologies and who integrate and field them in creative operational ways that provide military advantages.” In 2021, 15% of Air Force general officers responsible for creating and integrating this technological edge had a science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) graduate degree, and less than 1% of generals had a STEM doctorate. As one point of comparison, at least 32% and 13% of founding CEOs of Fortune 500 technology companies had a master’s and doctoral STEM degree, respectively. The gulf is larger when you consider that these CEOs used their technical degrees throughout their careers whereas most general officers do not. In large organizations, if the leader does not possess technical knowledge, it is difficult to drive innovation systems and connect ideas to reality. The evidence for this disconnect is abundant in acquisition challenges for high-tech systems, significant pushback to the “revolution in military affairs”, and failure of the “Third Offset” to take hold and deliver capabilities to offset Chinese and Russian capabilities. Indeed, when the former Air Force and Space Force Chief Software Officer, Nicolas M. Chaillan, offered his resignation, one of the main reasons for leaving was “the failure of OSD and the Joint Staff to deliver on their own alleged top ‘priority’, JADC2 – they couldn’t ‘walk the walk.’” Senior leaders have recognized this disconnect, and several inquiries and studies regarding STEM competency have been conducted. Many have posed a false dilemma: a large, STEM-cognizant or small, STEM-expert force. However, current and future STEM human capital needs are managed at the unit and functional area level. This leads to “silos” and the tactical “needs of the present” dominating the strategic “needs of the future”, highlighted by only two functional areas systematically tracking future STEM needs. Therefore, the decision on force structure appears to have been historically made by default through these and other perceived structural realities, and a vast majority of recommendations have focused on the small STEM community – an exercise in diminishing returns. In essence, the solution often boils down to finding unicorns – officers that have chartered the unforgiving pathway through the traditional “gates” to general officer while obtaining sufficient STEM proficiency along the way. Fortunately for the Air Force, these officers exist, albeit at a rate below what the evidence would suggest is necessary. However, this approach fundamentally limits the ability to develop a deep pool of officers with the ability to create and integrate technologies and ensures the Dunning-Kruger effect is prevalent. The Dunning-Kruger effect is a cognitive bias where those with limited knowledge in an area lack the expertise necessary to recognize their lack of expertise and consequently are prone to overestimate their knowledge and performance. In short, we need less leaders overestimating their STEM knowledge and more with hard-earned STEM competency required to “walk the walk” to create and integrate technologies for military advantage. This will not be accomplished by restricting the emphasis to the traditional scientists and engineering (S&E) career fields – the pool, only 10% of line officers, and general officer progression is just too small. Fortunately, the recent SECAF’s Management Initiatives and Chief of Staff’s (CSAF) Action Orders, both containing emphasis on organic expertise to “accrue advantage in military-technological competition,” present an opportunity to truly develop a framework for the force of the future.