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At least 1,603 records · Page 89

EARLY ULTRAVIOLET/OPTICAL EMISSION OF THE TYPE Ib SN 2008D

We propose an alternative explanation for the post-breakout emission of SN 2008D associated with the X-ray transient 080109. Observations of this object show a very small contrast of 0.35 dex between the light-curve minimum occurring soon after the breakout, and the main luminosity peak which is due to radioactive heating of the ejecta. Hydrodynamical models show that the cooling of a shocked Wolf-Rayet star leads to a much greater difference ({approx}> 0.9 dex). Our proposed scenario is that of a jet produced during the explosion which deposits {sup 56}Ni-rich material in the outer layers of the ejecta. The presence of high-velocity radioactive material allows us to reproduce the complete luminosity evolution of the object. Without outer {sup 56}Ni it could be possible to reproduce the early emission purely from cooling of the shocked envelope by assuming a larger progenitor than a Wolf-Rayet star, but that would require an initial density structure significantly different from what is predicted by stellar evolution models. Analytic models of the cooling phase have been proposed reproduce the early emission of SN 2008D with an extended progenitor. However, we found that the models are valid only until 1.5 days after the explosion where only two data of SN 2008D are available. We also discuss the possibility of the interaction of the ejecta with a binary companion, based on published analytic expressions. However, the binary separation required to fit the early emission should be {approx}< 3 R{sub Sun }, which is too small for a system containing two massive stars.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Physico-chemical investigation of clayey/cement-based materials interaction in the context of geological waste disposal: Experimental approach and results

Within the concepts under study for the geological disposal of intermediate-level long-lived waste, cement-based materials are considered as candidate materials. The clayey surrounding rock and the cement-based material being considered differ greatly in their porewater composition. Experiments are conducted on the diffusion of solutes constituting those porewaters in a confined clay/cement composite system using cells. The test temperature was set at 25 {sup o}C and 2, 6 and 12 months. Results supply new information: carbonation is low and not clog the interface. Such absence of carbonation allows for the diffusion of aqueous species and, thus, for the degradation of the cement paste and the illitisation of illite/smectite interstratifications. The cement material is subjected to a decalcification: portlandite dissolution and a CaO/SiO{sub 2} reduction in the calcium silicate hydrate. The sulphate in diffusion induces non-destructive ettringite precipitation in the largest pores. After 12 months, about 800 {mu}m of cement material is concerned by decalcification.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Study of activation of metal samples from LDEF-1 and Spacelab-2

The activation of metal samples and other material orbited onboard the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF) and Spacelab-2 were studied. Measurements of the radioactivities of spacecraft materials were made, and corrections for self-absorption and efficiency were calculated. Activation cross sections for specific metal samples were updated while cross sections for other materials were tabulated from the scientific literature. Activation cross sections for 200 MeV neutrons were experimentally determined. Linear absorption coefficients, half lives, branching ratios and other pertinent technical data needed for LDEF sample analyses were tabulated. The status of the sample counting at low background facilities at national laboratories is reported.

Laird, C. E.↗

Special Analysis for the Disposal of the Materials and Energy Corporation Sealed Sources at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site

This special analysis (SA) evaluates whether the Materials and Energy Corporation (M&EC) Sealed Source waste stream (PERM000000036, Revision 0) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the M&EC Sealed Source waste meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The M&EC Sealed Source waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

RCT: Module 2.08, Radiological Source Control, Course 8774

radioactive source is material used for its emitted radiation. Sources are sealed or unsealed and are classified as accountable or exempt. Radioactive sources are used for response checks, functional checks, and the calibration of instruments and monitors to traceable standards. To ensure the safety and welfare of all personnel, it is important to maintain control of radioactive sources to minimize the potential for the spread of contamination, unnecessary exposure to personnel, loss or theft, and improper disposal. This course will prepare the student with the skills necessary for RCT qualification by passing quizzes, tests, and the RCT Comprehensive Phase 1, Unit 2 Examination (TEST 27566) and will provide in-the-field skills.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 561: Waste Disposal Areas, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1

CAU 561 comprises 10 CASs: (1) 01-19-01, Waste Dump; (2) 02-08-02, Waste Dump and Burn Area; (3) 03-19-02, Debris Pile; (4) 05-62-01, Radioactive Gravel Pile; (5) 12-23-09, Radioactive Waste Dump; (6) 22-19-06, Buried Waste Disposal Site; (7) 23-21-04, Waste Disposal Trenches ; (8) 25-08-02, Waste Dump; (9) 25-23-21, Radioactive Waste Dump; and (10) 25-25-19, Hydrocarbon Stains and Trench. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure of CAU 561 with no further corrective action. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill the following data needs as defined during the DQO process: (1) Determine whether COCs are present; (2) If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent; and (3) Provide sufficient information and data to complete appropriate corrective actions. The following contaminants were determined to be present at concentrations exceeding their corresponding FALs: (1) No contamination exceeding FALs was identified at CASs 01-19-01, 03-19-02, 05-62-01, 12-23-09, and 22-19-06. (2) The surface and subsurface soil within the burn area at CAS 02-08-02 contains arsenic and lead above the FALs of 23 milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg) and 800 mg/kg, respectively. The surface and subsurface soil within the burn area also contains melted lead slag (potential source material [PSM]). The soil within the waste piles contains polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) above the FALs. The contamination within the burn area is spread throughout the area, as it was not feasible to remove all the PSM (melted lead), while at the waste piles, the contamination is confined to the piles. (3) The surface and subsurface soils within Trenches 3 and 5 at CAS 23-21-04 contain arsenic and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) above the FALs of 23 mg/kg and 0.74 mg/kg, respectively. The soil was removed from both trenches, and the soil that remains at this CAS does not contain contamination exceeding the FALs. Lead bricks and counterweights were also removed, and the soil below these items does not contain contamination that exceeds the FAL for lead. (4) The concrete-like material at CAS 25-08-02 contains arsenic above the FAL of 23 mg/kg. This concrete-like material was removed, and the soil that remains at this CAS does not contain contamination exceeding the FALs. Lead-acid batteries were also removed, and the soil below the batteries does not contain contamination that exceeds the FAL for lead. (5) The surface soils within the main waste dump at the posted southern radioactive material area (RMA) at CAS 25-23-21 contain cesium (Cs)-137 and PCBs above the FALs of 72.9 picocuries per gram (pCi/g) and 0.74 mg/kg, respectively. The soil was removed from the RMA, and the soil that remains at this CAS does not contain contamination exceeding the FALs. (6) The surface and subsurface soils at CAS 25-25-19 do not contain contamination exceeding the FALs. In addition, lead bricks were removed, and the soil below these items does not contain contamination that exceeds the FAL for lead. The following best management practices were implemented: (1) Housekeeping debris at CASs 02-08-02, 23-21-04, 25-08-02, 25-23-21, and 25-25-19 was removed and disposed of; (2) The open trenches at CAS 23-21-04 were backfilled; (3) The waste piles at CAS 25-08-02 were removed and the area leveled to ground surface; and (4) The remaining waste piles at the main waste dump at CAS 25-23-21 were leveled to ground surface. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: (1) No further action for CASs 01-19-01, 03-19-02, 05-62-01, 12-23-09, and 22-19-06; (2) Closure in place with an FFACO use restriction (UR) at CAS 02-08-02 for the remaining PAH-, arsenic-, and lead-contaminated soil, and the melted lead PSM. The UR form and map have been filed in the NNSA/NSO Facility Information Management System, the FFACO database, and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files; (3) No further corrective action at CAS 23-21-04, as the lead bricks and counterweights (PSM) have been removed, and the COCs of arsenic and PCBs in soil have been removed; (4) No further corrective action at CAS 25-08-02, as the COC of arsenic in soil has been removed, and the lead-acid batteries have been removed; (5) No further corrective action at CAS 25-23-21, as the COCs of Cs-137 and PCBs in soil have been removed, and the cast-iron pipes have been removed and disposed of; (6) No further corrective action at CAS 25-25-19, as the lead bricks (PSM) been removed; (7) A Notice of Completion to the NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 561; and (8) Corrective Action Unit 561 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A comparison of machine learning methods to classify radioactive elements using prompt-gamma-ray neutron activation data

The detection of illicit radiological materials is critical to establishing a robust second line of defence in nuclear security. Neutron-capture prompt-gamma activation analysis (PGAA) can be used to detect multiple radioactive materials across the entire Periodic Table. However, long detection times and a high rate of false positives pose a significant hindrance in the deployment of PGAA-based systems to identify the presence of illicit substances in nuclear forensics. In the present work, six different machine-learning algorithms were developed to classify radioactive elements based on the PGAA energy spectra. The model performance was evaluated using standard classification metrics and trend curves with an emphasis on comparing the effectiveness of algorithms that are best suited for classifying imbalanced datasets. We analyse the classification performance based on Precision, Recall, F1-score, Specificity, Confusion matrix, ROC-AUC curves, and Geometric Mean Score (GMS) measures. The tree-based algorithms (Decision Trees, Random Forest and AdaBoost) have consistently outperformed Support Vector Machine and K-Nearest Neighbours. Based on the results presented, AdaBoost is the preferred classifier to analyse data containing PGAA spectral information due to the high recall and minimal false negatives reported in the minority class.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Applying Technology and Experience to Ensure Safe In Situ Decommissioning - 19587

Permanent entombment of a radioactively contaminated facility as a decommissioning option (In Situ Decommissioning, ISD) has been completed for DOE facilities at the Savannah River Site (P and Reactors, HWCTR reactor), Hanford (U Canyon) and Idaho (CP-601/604),and is currently being considered for implementation at a limited number of selected DOE facilities as well as for the NPD and WR-1 reactors in Canada and various facilities in the United Kingdom. A general description of an ISD project encompasses an entombed facility which in some cases is limited to just the below-grade portion of a facility with the above-ground portion being decommissioned, packaged and disposed in a conventional manner. The entombed portions of the facility are of robust construction, generally of reinforced concrete exterior, that provides a migration barrier between internal contamination and the environment with significant internal void spaces backfilled or grouted. The scope of entombment may include ancillary equipment and structures and may contain radioactive and hazardous materials and contamination within the facility and waste imported from outside the facility. ISD is most often a permanent decommissioning end-state although in some instances (e.g. the U.K.) there may be a need to revisit the ISD facility after 300 years to effect traditional decommissioning. The defined completion (the end-state) of the decommissioned facility is therefore project-specific and in conformance with environmental approval processes and planned future activities. In all cases however, the final condition is passive, meaning that there are no requirements for ongoing operational systems or equipment within the decommissioned facility. ISD projects in the USA are presumed to be under indefinite institutional control of the U.S. Government. The regulatory framework in the U.S. is currently in place to provide assurance that the risk posed by an ISD facility is within regulatory acceptance criteria. (The framework in the U.K. and Canada is evolving towards that in the USA). Special emphasis is placed on the fact that an entombed facility is not considered a waste disposal facility; rather it is a decommissioning end-state option. ISD does not eliminate the need for effective and careful management of contaminated materials and structures, nor does it serve to abandon contaminated buildings in place. Further, ISD is safe and cost-effective for a relatively small number of facilities across the DOE Complex. This paper explores the current programmatic considerations and technical aspects of the ISD process and discuss the measures taken to ensure that an 'entombed' facility is safe for both site workers and the general population. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Enhancement of Thermal Conductivity of Bentonite Buffer Materials with Copper Wires/Meshes for High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

In high-level radioactive waste disposal, a heat-generating waste canister is generally encased with a layer of bentonite-based buffer material acting as an engineered barrier to limit water percolation and radionuclide release. The low thermal conductivity of bentonite (~0.5 W/m∙K) combined with a high thermal loading waste package may result in a high surface temperature on the package that can potentially impact the structural integrity of the package itself as well as the surrounding buffer material. We show in this paper that the thermal conductivity of bentonite can be effectively enhanced by embedding copper wires/meshes across the buffer layer to form fully connected high heat conduction pathways. A simple calculation based on Rayleigh’s model shows that a required thermal conductivity of 5 W/m∙K for effective heat dissipation can be achieved simply by adding ~1 vol % of copper wires/meshes into bentonite. As a result, the peak surface temperature on a large waste package such as a dual-purpose canister can be reduced by up to 300°C, leading to a significant reduction in the surface storage time for waste cooling and therefore the overall cost for direct disposal of such waste packages. Because of the ensured full thermal percolation across the buffer layer, copper wires/meshes turn out to be much more effective than any other materials currently suggested (such as graphene or graphite) in enhancing the thermal conductivity of buffer material. Furthermore, the embedded copper wires/meshes can help reinforce the mechanical strength of the buffer material, thus preventing the material from a potential erosion by a possible intrusion of dilute groundwater.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Engineering-Scale Development/Demonstration of Zirconium Recovery from Used Duel Cladding

Recognizing that the zirconium (Zr) in used nuclear fuel (UNF) cladding is the second largest mass in UNF assemblies, process development studies for the recovery and purification of Zr were initiated and have been in progress at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for the last several years as a major element of waste minimization for advanced nuclear fuel recycle. Together with uranium recovery and recycle, Zr recovery would divert >90% (wt.) of the UNF assemblies from emplacement in a geologic repository by converting the Zr to low-level waste or reuse/recycle.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Purification of Zirconium Tetrachloride (ZrCl{sub 4}) from UNF Cladding - A Progress Report

Zirconium-based cladding materials that surround used nuclear fuel (UNF) rods represent a significant fraction of the total amount of high level waste that must be disposed of in long term geological repositories. The decontamination and/or recovery and reuse of these materials would significantly reduce the amount of high level waste associated with light water nuclear energy reactors and could provide a new source of hafnium free zirconium for the fabrication of new nuclear components. A step in a strategy to recycle zirconium from used cladding materials is the direct, high yield chlorination reaction that produces zirconium tetrachloride (ZrCl{sub 4}). The ZrCl{sub 4} so obtained is contaminated with other metal chloride species (FeCl{sub 3}, NbCl{sub 5}, NbOCl{sub 3}, SnCl{sub 4}, CsCl, SbCl{sub 5}, etc.) that originate from the alloying metals present initially as well as contaminants from oxide layers on the cladding, trace fission products, fuel residues, activation byproducts, and tritium. The suggested strategy to remove the metal chloride impurities is based on sublimation at atmospheric pressure combined with chemical treatments influencing volatility of the impurities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Biochemical process of low level radioactive liquid simulation waste containing detergent

Research of biochemical process of low level radioactive liquid waste containing detergent has been done. Thse organic liquid wastes are generated in nuclear facilities such as from laundry. The wastes that are cotegorized as hazard and poison materials are also radioactive. It must be treated properly by detoxification of the hazard and decontamination of the radionuclides to ensure that the disposal of the waste meets the requirement of standard quality of water. This research was intended to determine decontamination factor and separation efficiensies, its kinetics law, and to produce a supernatant that ensured the environmental quality standard. The radioactive element in the waste was thorium with activity of 5.10{sup −5} Ci/m{sup 3}. The radioactive liquid waste which were generated in simulation plant contains detergents that was further processed by aerobic biochemical process using SGB 103 bacteria in a batch reactor equipped with aerators. Two different concentration of samples were processed and analyzed for 212 hours and 183 hours respectively at a room temperature. The product of this process is a liquid phase called as supernatant and solid phase material called sludge. The chemical oxygen demand (COD), biological oxygen demand (BOD), suspended solid (SS), and its alpha activity were analyzed. The results show that the decontamination factor and the separation efficiency of the lower concentration samples are higher compared to the samples with high concentration. Regarding the decontamination factor, the result for 212 hours processing of waste with detergent concentration of 1.496 g/L was 3.496 times, whereas at the detergent concentration of 0.748 g/L was 15.305 times for 183 hours processing. In case of the separation efficiency, the results for both samples were 71.396% and 93.465% respectively. The Bacterial growth kinetics equation follow Monod’s model and the decreasing of COD and BOD were first order with the rate constant of 0.01 hour{sup −1}.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Radioactivity Calculator for Research and Test Reactor Neutron-Activated Materials

The Idaho National Laboratory Nuclear Science User Facilities program is proposing to launch a new online expert system that will assist users in planning experiments and writing proposals. The Combined Materials Experimentation Toolkit (CoMET) will include two nuclear calculators. The first of these, the Neutron Damage Calculator, will assist users in selecting reactor positions in order to obtain desired material damage in Damage Per Atom (DPA) and provide the required irradiation time to reach the damage levels. The second, the Radioactivity Calculator, will estimate the post-irradiation radioactivity levels of sample materials, which will inform technical staff of examination facility requirements and any potential scheduling delays. Both of these calculators were designed to simplify the information needed from users in order to properly plan and execute awarded proposals. This paper presents the primary purpose and methodologies implemented by these two calculators.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

General approach to the long-term management at a former radium production site in Olen, Belgium

The paper describes the methodology that ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials, in consultation with the metallurgical company who aims the Olen-site, is developing and wants to apply to arrive at a safe and sustainable long-term solution in Olen. The complex problematic in Olen and how this does fit in the legal missions of ONDRAF/NIRAS is also presented. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Investigation of a “Sharps” Incident

Special nuclear material research, process development, technology demonstration, and manufacturing capabilities are provided at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility. Engineered barriers provide the most effective protection from radioactive and hazardous materials. The Worker Safety Security Team augments these passive safety feature by investigating incidents to identify appropriate prevention and mitigation measures. “Learning Teams” facilitate employee feedback loop and integration toward process improvement. Here, this article reports an investigation of a “Sharps” incident and reviews a case study of a technician that cuts his left thumb while making a gasket. Causal analysis of the sharps incident uncovered contributing factors that created the environment in which the incident occurred. Finally, latent organizational conditions that created error-likely situations or weakened defenses were identified and controlled. Effective improvements that reduce the probability or consequence of similar sharps incidents were implemented.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

PROTEC TM TEAR-OFFS: RESULTS OF LONG TERM TESTING

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has completed a series of tests (Phases 1 and 2) to assess the potential use of a Mylar{reg_sign} tear-off system as a primary or secondary protective barrier to minimize acid etching ('frosting'), accidental scratching, and/or radiation damage for shielded cells, glovebox, and/or chemical hood windows. Conceptually, thin, multi-layered sheets of Mylar (referred to throughout this report as the ProTec{trademark} tear-off system) can be directly applied to the shielded cell, glovebox, or hood sash window to serve as a secondary (or primary) barrier. Upon degradation of visual clarity due to accidental scratching, spills/splatters, and/or radiation damage, the outer layer (or sheet) of Mylar could be removed refreshing or restoring the view. Due to the multilayer aspect, the remaining Mylar layers would provide continued protection for the window from potential reoccurrences. Although the concept of using a tear-off system as a protective barrier is conceptually enticing, potential technical issues were identified and addressed as part of this phased study to support implementation of this type of system in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). Specific test conditions of interest to the DWPF included the performance of the tear-off system exposed to or under the following conditions: (1) acid(s) (concentrated (28.9 M) HF, concentrated (15.9M) HNO{sub 3}, 6M HCl, and 0.6M H{sub 3}BO{sub 3}); (2) base (based on handling of radioactive sludges with pH of {approx}12-13); (3) gamma radiation (due to radioactive sources or materials being used in the analytical cells); (4) scratch resistance (simulating accidental scratching with the manipulators); and (5) in-situ testing (sample coupons exposed to actual field conditions in DWPF). The results of the Phase 1 study indicated that the ProTec tear-off concept (as a primary or secondary protective barrier) is a potential technical solution to prevent or retard excessive damage that would result from acid etching, base damage (as a result of a sludge spill or splatter), gamma radiation damage, and/or accidental scratching (due to manipulator/tool contact). Although identified as a potential solution, the Phase 1 testing was relatively short-term with exposure times up to 1-2 months for the acid and gamma radiation tests. Phase 2 testing included longer exposure times for the acid resistance (up to 456 days) and gamma radiation exposure (700 days with a cumulative gamma dose of {approx}3.1 x 10{sup 5} rad) assessments. The tear-off system continued to perform well in these longer-term acid resistance testing and gamma exposure conditions. Complete removal of the tear-offs after these long-term exposure times indicate that not only could visual clarity be restored but the mechanical integrity could be retained. The results also provided insight into the ability of the ProTec tear-off system to withstand the chemical and physical abuses expected in off-normal shielded cells operations. The conceptual erasing of scratches or marks by excessive manipulator abuse was demonstrated in the SRNL Shielded Cells mock-up facility through the removal of the outer layer tear-off with manipulators. In addition, the Phase 2 testing included an in-situ assessment of a prototype tear-off system in the DWPF Sampling Cells where the system was exposed to actual field conditions including radioactive sources, acidic and basic environments, dusting, and chemical cleaning solutions over a 5-6 month period. DWPF personnel were extremely satisfied with the performance (including the successful removal of 3 layers with manipulators) of the ProTec tear-off system under actual field conditions. The successful removal of the outer layer tear-offs with the manipulator, using tabs not specifically designed for remote operations, demonstrates that the system is 'manipulator-friendly' and could be implemented in a remote environment. The ability to remove the outer layer tear-off not only regains visual clarity but also reduces waste disposal volumes (i.e., disposal of a thin sheet of Mylar which is 'collapsible' versus the bulk disposal of a rigid Lexan{reg_sign} sheet (alpha shield) or glovebox/sash window) which is more cost effective. The tear-off system could also reduce the number of cell entries needed to replace the Lexan sheet and increase the time interval between glovebox/sash window replacements, which can be costly and time consuming. Although the primary focus of this study addresses the application of the ProTec tear-off system to shielded cells windows, the concept is also potentially applicable to glovebox and hood sash windows. In fact, the tear-off concept is potentially applicable to any system where visual clarity is compromised given the environmental conditions of the test. In addition, the tear-offs could be applied to walls or shelves where a protective barrier would reduce deterioration or discoloration.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Packaging and Transportation Initiatives at the Idaho National Laboratory - 18551

A wide variety of radioactive and hazardous materials are handled, packaged and transported at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), operated by the Battelle Energy Alliance (BEA) for the US Department of Energy (DOE). The INL Packaging and Transportation (P and T) organization, contracted to AREVA Federal Services LLC (AFS), provides professional skilled staff to coordinate and support packaging and transportation activities at the INL. This includes subject matter expertise in packaging engineering and licensing, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR), and Department of Transportation (DOT) Hazardous Material regulations. This paper demonstrates and provides examples of the advantages of the organizational and technical methodologies used for P and T at the INL. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Ruthenium Volatiliazation During Dissolution of Spent Nuclear Fuels in H-Canyon Dissolvers

During nuclear material processing, many radioactive elements form volatile species under certain process conditions which may allow release to the environment unless they are removed from offgas streams. Ruthenium, a product from the fission of U, will form a volatile compound (RuO 4 ) under highly oxidizing conditions which may be released during spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dissolution. The principal Ru isotopes of concern are 103 Ru and 106 Ru with half-lives of 39.27 and 372.6 days, respectively. Ruthenium-103 will decay to less than 1% of its initial activity within one year; therefore, its presence is not a concern for fuel cooled more than one year after discharge. However, the half-life of 106 Ru is sufficiently long that it will persist for many years at levels of concern. The isotope does not decay to less than 1% of its initial activity until approximately 6.8 years. Therefore, the dissolution of SNF cooled for less than approximately 7 years is defined as processing short-cooled fuel as it relates to Ru volatilization.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗