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2020 Vision for Tank Waste Cleanup (One System Integration) - 12506

The mission of the Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (ORP) is to safely retrieve and treat the 56 million gallons of Hanford's tank waste and close the Tank Farms to protect the Columbia River. The millions of gallons of waste are a by-product of decades of plutonium production. After irradiated fuel rods were taken from the nuclear reactors to the processing facilities at Hanford they were exposed to a series of chemicals designed to dissolve away the rod, which enabled workers to retrieve the plutonium. Once those chemicals were exposed to the fuel rods they became radioactive and extremely hot. They also couldn't be used in this process more than once. Because the chemicals are caustic and extremely hazardous to humans and the environment, underground storage tanks were built to hold these chemicals until a more permanent solution could be found. The Cleanup of Hanford's 56 million gallons of radioactive and chemical waste stored in 177 large underground tanks represents the Department's largest and most complex environmental remediation project. Sixty percent by volume of the nation's high-level radioactive waste is stored in the underground tanks grouped into 18 'tank farms' on Hanford's central plateau. Hanford's mission to safely remove, treat and dispose of this waste includes the construction of a first-of-its-kind Waste Treatment Plant (WTP), ongoing retrieval of waste from single-shell tanks, and building or upgrading the waste feed delivery infrastructure that will deliver the waste to and support operations of the WTP beginning in 2019. Our discussion of the 2020 Vision for Hanford tank waste cleanup will address the significant progress made to date and ongoing activities to manage the operations of the tank farms and WTP as a single system capable of retrieving, delivering, treating and disposing Hanford's tank waste. The initiation of hot operations and subsequent full operations of the WTP are not only dependent upon the successful design and construction of the WTP, but also on appropriately preparing the tank farms and waste feed delivery infrastructure to reliably and consistently deliver waste feed to the WTP for many decades. The key components of the 2020 vision are: all WTP facilities are commissioned, turned-over and operational, achieving the earliest possible hot operations of completed WTP facilities, and supplying low-activity waste (LAW) feed directly to the LAW Facility using in-tank/near tank supplemental treatment technologies. A One System Integrated Project Team (IPT) was recently formed to focus on developing and executing the programs that will be critical to successful waste feed delivery and WTP startup. The team is comprised of members from Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), Washington River Protection Solutions LLC (WRPS), and DOE-ORP and DOE-WTP. The IPT will combine WTP and WRPS capabilities in a mission-focused model that is clearly defined, empowered and cost efficient. The genesis for this new team and much of the 2020 vision is based on the work of an earlier team that was tasked with identifying the optimum approach to startup, commissioning, and turnover of WTP facilities for operations. This team worked backwards from 2020 - a date when the project will be completed and steady-state operations will be underway - and identified success criteria to achieving safe and efficient operations of the WTP. The team was not constrained by any existing contract work scope, labor, or funding parameters. Several essential strategies were identified to effectively realize the one-system model of integrated feed stream delivery, WTP operations, and product delivery, and to accomplish the team's vision of hot operations beginning in 2016: - Use a phased startup and turnover approach that will allow WTP facilities to be transitioned to an operational state on as short a timeline as credible. - Align Tank Farm (TF) and WTP objectives such that feed can be supplied to the WTP when it is required for hot operations. - Ensure immobilized waste and waste recycle streams can be received by the TF when required to support 2016 production of immobilized low-activity waste (ILAW). - Ensure the required baseline and additional funding is provided beginning in fiscal year 2011. - Modify TF and WTP contracts to adequately address this vision. The 2020 Vision provides a summary of strategies and key actions that optimize the approach to startup, commissioning, and turnover of WTP facilities. This vision focuses on the legally enforceable requirement to achieve the Consent Decree milestones of starting radioactive operations in 2019, and achieving initial WTP operations in 2022. (authors)

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Aging Behavior of Viton{sup R} O-Ring Seals in the 9975 Shipping Package - 12594

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is storing plutonium (Pu) materials in the K-Area Materials Storage (KAMS) facility. The Pu materials were packaged according to the DOE-STD-3013 standard and shipped to the SRS in Type B 9975 packages. The robust 9975 shipping package was not designed for long-term product storage, but it is a specified part of the storage configuration and the KAMS facility safety basis credits the 9975 design with containment. Within the 9975 package, nested stainless steel containment vessels are closed with dual O-ring seals based on Viton{sup R} GLT or GLT-S fluoro-elastomer. The aging behavior of the O-ring compounds is being studied to provide the facility with advanced notice of nonconformance and to develop life prediction models. A combination of field surveillance, leak testing of surrogate fixtures aged at bounding service temperatures, and accelerated-aging methodologies based on compression stress-relaxation and oxygen consumption analysis is being used to evaluate seal performance. A summary of the surveillance program relative to seal aging behavior is presented. The aging behavior of fluoro-elastomer seals based on Viton{sup R} GLT and GLT-S is being studied to develop life prediction models in support of long-term storage of plutonium materials in the 9975 shipping packages at the Savannah River Site. Field surveillance data in combination with accelerated-aging data suggest a significant lifetime for the seals. Typical storage conditions are not anticipated to challenge the leak-tightness of the seals for many years. Early life prediction models based on compression stress relaxation indicate a seal lifetime of ∼12 years at the maximum service temperature predicted (93 deg. C). Seal lifetimes at lower, more realistic conditions are likely significantly longer. Service life predictions based on CSR data are thus far conservative relative to predictions based on time to leakage failure. Surveillance data on packages examined after 6 years in storage show only minor compression set of the O-rings and no significant degradation. Surveillance and testing will continue as needed to validate and refine life prediction models. (authors)

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Iodine Speciation Across the Length of the Hanford 200-UP-1 Operable Unit Radioiodine Plume and Biogeochemical Drivers of Speciation - 17270

In 1943, construction began on the first of nine nuclear reactors at the Hanford Site to produce plutonium for the development of atomic weapons for the Manhattan Project during World War II and throughout the Cold War. Over a production period lasting from 1944 to 1987, approximately 110,000 tons of nuclear fuel was processed. During the production period, billions of gallons of liquid nuclear waste and millions of tons of solid waste were produced. Approximately 4.7 Ci of radioiodine (I-129) was discharged to liquid disposal sites, during disposition of the waste. Following percolation of the liquid waste through the vadose zone, three large I-129 groundwater plumes have formed beneath Central Plateau Facilities including both 200 East and 200 West Areas. Analysis of I-129 plumes in the 200-ZP-1 Operable Unit (OU) (200 West Area) showed iodine speciation that was dominated by iodate even though iodide was thought to be dominant species in waste. Experimental results demonstrated that iodate interacts with calcite via a co-precipitation and/or adsorption mechanism. From sorption experiments performed on Hanford sediments, iodate interacted more strongly than iodide during adsorption experiments. These results would indicate that iodate migration would be retarded compared to iodide, but results from groundwater samples obtained from eight wells in the 200 ZP-1 OU did not support this hypothesis. Due to different chemical processes used during plutonium processing, iodine species in other plumes such as in the 200-UP-1 OU (200 West Area) may be different. In addition, species distribution may change longitudinally between the source area and the distal end of the plume. Groundwater samples will be taken at a location near the source, in the middle of the plume and at the distal end of the plume. These samples will be analyzed for iodine speciation using ion chromatography coupled to an inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometer. Results from the different samples will be compared to give an initial determination of species distribution at different locations along the plume. Data generated from these samples can then be used to inform the conceptual model that is being developed for iodine as part of an evaluation of remediation options for the 200-UP-1 OU. (authors)

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Long-term stewardship - surveillance and maintenance at Hanford - 15155

In FY 2015, Hanford's Long-Term Stewardship (LTS) Program is tasked to complete the required entries into five cocooned plutonium production reactors (105-C, 105-D, 105-F, 105-H and 105-N), which sit adjacent to the Columbia River. The first reactor entered in October 2014, the cocooned plutonium production reactor, 105-F, signaled the LTS Program's entry into the Surveillance and Maintenance (S and M) era. Reactor entries at Hanford are conducted at 5-year intervals to assess the condition of the structures and evaluate potential deterioration of the reactor core, shield walls and roof. The cocooned structures are designed to protect the reactor core for up to 75 years while radioactive decay continues, ultimately making the structures safe for demolition and removal. The 105-F entry demonstrates that the LTS program at Hanford is shifting from a program focused on transitioning cleaned up land and waste sites to a program focused primarily on S and M activities. The entry process is carefully planned, choreographed and monitored to ensure safety of the workers and minimize the time the reactor structure is opened. The process includes controlled opening of the reactor, air quality monitoring, structural safety inspections, and radiological clearance. Once the structure is cleared for entry, assessments of the structural integrity and radiologic conditions are completed. Evaluation of the interior temperature and flood monitoring equipment is conducted. Facility visits by regulators and DOE personnel close out the process prior to welding the door closed until the next assessment, five years later. This paper will document execution of the entry work package, identify challenges overcome, and provide video documentation as reference material for future workers and the public. The current LTS program has responsibility for approximately 100,000 acres, over 200 waste sites and six cocooned reactors. Just over 5,600 documents have been identified, indexed and tagged for storage in the LTS document library. The program has successfully completed seven consecutive transitions since July 2011, with six more transitions planned in the next 18 months to support the U.S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office's (DOE-RL) near-term cleanup objectives to significantly reduce the footprint of active cleanup operations for the River Corridor. (authors)

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EDF's used fuel management french policy - 15199

Regarding back-end fuel cycle, EDF's strategy, implemented from the very beginning of French nuclear production, consists in reprocessing of used fuel; decision to recycle plutonium in French PWR was taken from 1984. This reprocessing and recycling strategy, relying on existing industrial facilities (AREVA La Hague and Melox plants), has proven to be reliable and efficient. Treatment leads to a stabilization of used fuel total inventory in interim storage. Vitrification process ensures a safe packaging for high level and long-lived waste under a reduced volume. Recycling of fissile materials saves natural uranium requirements. Concentration of Pu in MOX used fuel leaves open the option to reuse it for starting next Generation IV systems beyond 2040. In 2008, EDF and AREVA, supported by French Government, agreed on commercial terms covering long term fuel reprocessing and recycling (up to 2040). Currently, EDF fuel management strategy relies on flow equilibrium in order to respect fuel cycle consistency and sustainability. The underlying principle is to strictly adjust separated plutonium production to recycling possibilities (i.e. licensed reactors and MOX fuel fabrication facilities). Given that fuel cycle policy, any trend in NPP core management that may impact the fuel cycle should be anticipated within times in order to avoid technical or administrative incompatibilities, and guarantee a high level of safety and robustness. In collaboration with industrial operators, EDF have to perform periodic 'Cycle Impact' analyses and report to the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN); next exercise is scheduled by the end of 2016. (authors)

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WIPP - February 2014 operational events and the compliance re-certification application (CRA) 2014 - 15293

On Wednesday, February 5, 2014, an underground mine fire involving a salt haul truck occurred at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). There were 86 workers in the mine when the fire occurred. All workers were evacuated. Nine days later, on Friday, February 14, 2014, there was an incident in the underground repository at WIPP which resulted in the release of americium and plutonium from one or more transuranic (TRU) waste containers into the environment. The release was detected by an underground continuous air monitor and then directed through high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter banks located in the surface exhaust building. However, a measurable portion bypassed the HEPA filters via leakage through two ventilation system dampers and was discharged directly to the environment from an exhaust duct. No personnel were determined to have received external contamination; however, some individuals that were on site were identified through bioassay to have initially tested positive for low level amounts of internal contamination. Trace amounts of americium and plutonium were detected off-site.While significant to day-to-day operations, these events have no impact to the long-term performance of the repository. Because WIPP's re-certification is based solely on the post-closure performance of the repository (40 CFR 191, Subparts B and C), these recent events do not affect the long-term performance predictions or its technical and scientific basis. In this paper we will further explore the requirements for WIPP's re-certification, and the basis for our contention that the recent WIPP operational events do not impact long-term repository performance or have any implications on salt as a geologic disposal media, and that re-certification efforts should continue uninterrupted. (authors)

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Design and testing of a combined neutron and gamma assay system for measuring fissile material in fuel and waste items - 15340

A combined neutron and gamma ray assay system for the measurement of fissile material in both fuel and waste items has been designed, modelled, developed and tested. The purpose of the system is to measure and characterize a wide range of fissile materials including uranium, plutonium, americium and mixed oxide fuel arising from a variety of processes and facilities across the United Kingdom. Dounreay Site Restoration Limited at Dounreay currently stores these items form the United Kingdom Nuclear Decommissioning Authority's un-irradiated fuel inventory. This inventory comprises historic materials from ex-United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority nuclear fuel projects and experiments together with fast reactor fuel materials and some commercial fuel items as delivered to Dounreay for recovery. The combined assay system has been designed and constructed to support the operation of a fuel processing facility, which will be operated at Dounreay to treat these historic legacy fuel materials, making them suitable for long term storage. Appropriate characterization of the fissile material is required for safety, criticality control and nuclear materials safeguards purposes prior to final disposition. The system consists of both gamma ray and neutron measurement components. The results of a neutron measurement are combined with the gamma ray isotopic ratio measurement results to generate the assay result for the fissile material being characterized. The gamma ray component of the system employs a safeguards quality high purity Germanium detector with electro-mechanical cooling and the measurements of fissile material containers are made in a shielded chamber with a tin and copper graded lining. Containers of fissile material are rotated during the gamma ray measurement and a variable automatic steel collimator aperture mechanism is employed to adjust the measured count rate to control detector dead time. Gamma ray spectra are analysed using the plutonium and uranium isotopic ratio code PC/FRAM. The gamma ray system can also be configured to perform a direct assay of small quantities of uranium bearing material. For this assay measurement a series of cadmium filters can be positioned in front of the detector to reduce the contribution from 59 keV gamma rays from Am-241. In addition to gamma ray isotopic measurements, both active and passive neutron assay is performed by the system. The neutron-measuring component consists of a thick walled cylindrical polyethylene chamber, which provides neutron moderation for 30 one-inch diameter He-3 detector tubes located in re-entrant channels in the polyethylene moderator. Two removable polyethylene-inserts incorporating lower plug assemblies are provided, one with and one without a cadmium lining. Also two top plug units are provided, again one with cadmium and one without a cadmium liner. The Neutron Subsystem can be operated both as a passive and as an active neutron coincidence counter. In both fast and thermal active neutron mode, the neutron component employs two americium-beryllium (Am-Be) alpha-n neutron sources, one positioned in the top and the other in the bottom plug unit. The neutron sources are removed when the counter is operated in passive mode. Passive neutron detection efficiency and active neutron performance has been modelled using the MCNP Monte Carlo computer simulation code as part of the design process. In the absence of fissile samples, operation of the gamma ray component of the system has been tested initially using calibrated Eu-152 and Ba-133 gamma ray sources and the use of archived spectra from fissile material measurements. Initial testing of the neutron system has employed a calibrated Cf-252 spontaneous fission neutron source. Neutron testing has been confirmed using further MCNP simulations. The results of test measurements with the system are presented and compared with the results of MCNP measurement simulations. (authors)

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Model-based approaches to calibration and certification of nondestructive assay systems - 15615

Increasingly, model-based methods founded in physics are employed to calibrate, or extend the calibration of, nondestructive assay (NDA) systems used to characterize materials contaminated with plutonium, uranium, and other radioactive isotopes. In addition, modeling and mathematical methods are used to establish system parameters, correction factors, and measurement uncertainty components in NDA measurements. The methods combine the characteristics of the measurement configuration (detector structure, object shape and dimensions, source-detector distance and orientation, and collimation), generator knowledge of the waste composition, and known physical properties of the system in order to establish these parameters, factors, and components. These methods offer several important benefits over traditional methods used to test, calibrate, operate, and certify radiation measurement systems. First, instruments can be set up and put into service more quickly and correctly using a model-based approach. Second, calibrations can be performed, tested, and modified with reduced use of plutonium and uranium standards when modeling and mathematical methods are employed. Also, modeled approaches avoid calibration error resulting from heterogeneous source distribution. Moreover, the parameters can be installed quickly and simply in an office setting without the need for the safety, security, and safeguards considerations that are present when standards are used. Calibrations can also be tailored to fit unique or nonstandard container configurations (for example, over-packed drums), new container types, or specialized matrices. Finally, when modeling methods are applied, correction factors and measurement uncertainty elements can be developed, tested, and validated relatively quickly and without the need for surrogate matrix materials and a large number of test measurements. A combined gamma and neutron NDA system has recently been moved from Idaho National Laboratory to the TA 55 facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The system will be used to assay transuranic waste packaged in drums. After the move, the system was modified to replace degraded components and improve system performance. Afterwards, it was set up to assay different container types and to extend the calibration range. Model-based approaches were used to adapt the system to its new purpose at LANL. This report will describe the setup, calibration, and certification of the combined system at LANL Included in this discussion will be the measurement applications and details of the measurement methods. The steps in these processes that involved the use of modeling and mathematical calculations to replace or supplement more traditional methods will be identified and discussed. Finally, an overarching discussion of the methods and advantages of model-based methods to establish the properties of NDA systems will be presented. We conclude that validated mathematical methods offer a robust, flexible, and mature approach which is technically defensible from first principle physics. (authors)

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Thermochemical Reactivity Hazards of TRU Waste Constituents - 16075

The thermochemical stability of transuranic (TRU) wastes can be problematic and can lead to uncontrolled chemical reactions that can pose a risk to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities. In 2003, decontamination cloth waste laden with sodium or potassium nitrate and cerium nitrate caught fire in a glovebox at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) in Colorado. In 2005, as a result of the RFETS fire, management responsible for decommissioning Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) engaged Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to investigate the thermochemical stabilities of potential TRU wastes arising from decontamination of PFP plutonium gloveboxes. Based on PNNL's studies, PFP management used decontamination approaches that would produce TRU wastes that would be stable during PFP waste management operations, during transport, and eventually during disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico. In 2014, TRU waste containing nitrate-laden organic kitty litter reacted uncontrollably, breached its TRU drum, released TRU, contaminated 21 individuals and the WIPP, and resulted in TRU release outside the facility. In support of the Technical Advisory Team assembled by DOE to investigate the causes of the WIPP event, PNNL investigated the thermochemical stabilities of characteristic wastes in the breached drum and identified a waste that could have caused the breach. This paper describes the RFETS fire, provides results from PNNL's screening studies of potential PFP decontamination wastes and, provides results from PNNL's probative studies investigating the thermochemical stabilities of representative waste constituents in the breached WIPP drum. (authors)

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ENDF/B-VIII.0 testing with AMPX and SCALE

As the new ENDF/B-VIII.0 data has continued development from its initial beta release into the final release version, it has subsequently undergone processing and testing at Oak Ridge National Laboratory with AMPX and SCALE. Each of the beta releases has been processed with AMPX to create both multigroup (MG) and continuous-energy (CE) libraries. The MG libraries were all processed using the SCALE 252-group structure. These libraries were then used with the VALID suite for benchmarking the new data library's performance against the currently distributed ENDF/B-VII.1 (VII.1)-based SCALE libraries. Here, we compare the MG and CE VALID results for the two current ENDF releases, versions VII.1 and the most recent beta release of ENDF/B-VIII.0 as of this writing (VIII.0.β4). Generally, both the MG and CE VALID aggregate results for VIII.0.β4 compare reasonably well with their VII.1-derived counterparts. As can be expected of any new ENDF release, some of the individual cases have substantially different computed neutron multiplicity (k{sub eff}) values between the two releases, although typically the differences are less than 100 percent-milli (pcm). However, changes to the plutonium cross sections have induced much larger changes in the ratio of the computed k{sub eff} to the experimental value (C/E) for thermal spectrum plutonium solution critical systems. This paper details the comparative performance of the VII.1 and VIII.0.β4 data for the broad range of test cases covered by the VALID suite. A companion paper at this conference provides details of the baseline validation of SCALE 6.2, including the first release of the VII.1 data. (authors)

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Optimising National WM Strategies through early consideration of Nuclear Safeguards - 18607

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards stand alongside safety and security as one of the three pillars for prudent management of all nuclear material, including nuclear waste. Although safety considerations, including public and environmental radiation protection, are the traditional drivers of waste management strategies, there is a requirement for nuclear safeguards in shaping and quantifying long-term solutions for special classes of radioactive waste. This is especially important when considering the disposal of nuclear material in a repository that could be released from regulatory oversight for radiation protection after a period of institutional control, as some safeguards oversight would still be required. Failure to consider nuclear safeguards at the early stages of planning may alternatively lead to excessive volumes for disposal or the need to recondition already treated wastes. At the very least, safeguards measures should be considered before countries seek to dispose of legacy nuclear materials, decommissioning wastes and other materials containing uranium, thorium or plutonium in an operating repository. Nuclear safeguards are the set of tools and techniques used by the IAEA to verify that countries comply with their international obligations not to divert nuclear materials to nuclear explosive devices. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear safeguards apply to all uranium, thorium and plutonium held in non-weapons NPT states, with limited exceptions. In nuclear-weapon states, much of their material is likewise subject to IAEA safeguards through conditions in agreements with respective suppliers of the uranium. Under IAEA safeguards, such nuclear material must remain accounted for and accessible for periodic verification-analogous to the safety concepts of reversibility and retrievability. Nevertheless, safeguards requirements can be terminated - provided that the State and the [IAEA] agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable - through dilution or immobilisation in solid form (such as cement, glass or ceramic). This means candidate material can be disposed of as non- nuclear material, with no further safeguards requirements, provided this criterion is met. Unlike radiological wastes where repository design strongly influences pathways for radionuclide migration and overall safety performance, repository design is not a factor in considering the termination of safeguards on nuclear material. This paper looks at similarities and differences in the safety, security and safeguards regulatory requirements for the management of radioactive waste and nuclear material in Australia. In particular, it outlines recent experience gained from participation in Australia's waste acceptance criteria working group for a national low-level waste repository and intermediate-level waste store, as well as from Australia's overall waste management strategy. These items of work have coincided with the IAEA update of its internal policy on termination of safeguards on nuclear material. Australia's experience shows how inclusion of safeguards criteria in the planning process is leading to optimisations in choice of facility concepts, project sequencing and equitable distribution of economic risk. By considering the three pillars-safety, security and safeguards-early on in the planning process, Australia's waste management strategy will provide a benchmark for other states in establishing and updating their own waste acceptance criteria for the disposal of nuclear material. (authors)

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Re-evaluation of the Gamma Radiolysis Radiation Chemistry of Neptunium

The reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel by solvent extraction techniques starts with dissolving fuel in concentrated nitric acid (HNO{sub 3}). The resulting radioactive liquor is subjected to multiple stages of solvent extraction to partition desired metal ions (e.g. uranium, plutonium, and neptunium) into an organic phase using specialized extractants. Under process conditions the solvent system is continuously exposed to a high intensity radiation field, which induces radiolytic degradation of both the diluent and extractants. This degradation occurs through the formation of radicals, as well as degradation products. Moreover, both radicals and degradation products can undergo redox chemistry with metal ions within the solvent system. This can be particularly problematic for metals such as neptunium which depend on the maintenance of a particular valence state amenable to complexation by extractants such as tributylphosphate in the PUREX (Plutonium Uranium Redox Extraction) process. Neptunium (Np) is well extracted when it is Np(IV) and Np(VI) but almost unextractable when Np(V). A recently study showed that the radiolysis of Np (VI) in acidic (4 M HNO{sub 3}) solution underwent reduction to Np(V). This reduction only occurred after sufficient production of nitrous acid (HNO{sub 2}) which countered the action of radiolytically-produced oxidizing free radicals (nitrate radical, NO{sub 3}{sup .} and hydroxyl radical, {sup .}OH). This radiation-induced chemistry was successfully modeling using a simplified kinetic model, that included a reaction set for water radiolysis, plus published rate constants for the reactions of free radicals with Np(VI) and Np(V). The most sensitive reaction rate constants were identified in this model, and optimization of the five most sensitive was performed to get excellent model agreement with the experimental data. No Np(IV) was observed or predicted by the model under these conditions. The present research re-evaluates this radiation chemistry of neptunium in aerated aqueous solutions of HNO; by using a far more comprehensive FACSIMILE code. We have also extended this modeling to study the radiolytically-induced Np redox chemistry occurring under multiple other nitric acid acidities, to fully characterize the importance of the oxidizing radical and reducing nitrous acid reactions under a range of conditions relevant to large-scale process conditions. (authors)

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Mass Inventory Balance and Fuel Breeding Analysis on Transuranic Recycling Option of FBR

Maintaining sustainability of nuclear fuel can be maintained by utilizing new fresh fuel resources, utilization of spent fuel resource, and obtaining fuel breeding resource in the reactors. Utilization of used fuel from recycling resource and fuel breeding resource becomes the key issue which affects to the reprocessing and refueling facilities. Some minor actinides (MA) have been developed to be recycled as well as some different compositions of plutonium for some purposes such as converted fuel for extending longer reactor operation, burning and transmutation of MA, fuel breeding of FBR as well as for proliferation resistance purposes. This evaluation intends to investigate the mass inventory balance focused on plutonium (Pu) and minor actinide (MA) inventory and reactor behavior in relation to reactor criticality, excess reactivity and fuel breeding for several fuel types. Time dependence as well as irradiation process during reactor operation gives the significant impact for changing the behavior of fuel composition which affects to the behavior of reactor itself. Reactor operation time effect on this analysis has been analyzed from the beginning of cycle up to the equilibrium condition of each fuel type compositions. (authors)

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Transmutation Fuels Development in the Advanced Fuels Campaign

Metallic fuels have a history of use that spans the entire nuclear age, especially in association with the development of the LMFBR. Initially, metallic fuels were employed due to their ease of fabrication and high heavy metal density (which led to the most favorable breeding efficiencies in fast reactors). During subsequent decades of use, metallic fuel technology has matured significantly, leading to the realization of major benefits in the areas of fuel reliability and burnup, proliferation-resistant recycling, remote fabrication, and passive reactor safety. Such characteristics continue to make metallic fuels a highly attractive technology, especially for use with future sodium fast reactors. Current research and development activities on metallic fuels in DOE's Advanced Fuels Campaign are focused on their potential use for actinide transmutation in advanced SFRs. In such a mission, metallic fuels would be employed as part of a closed fuel cycle into which plutonium and minor actinides (Am, Np) recovered from LWR spent fuel would be incorporated. All actinides in this metallic fuel would be fissioned or transmuted in a fast reactor to eliminate the extremely long-lived, heat-producing actinides in order to reduce the volume, heat load, and radio-toxicity burden on a future geological repository. Thus, the need exists to demonstrate reliable performance of metallic fuels with Pu and minor actinide constituents to very high burnup. As part of this application, there is also a need for a near zero-loss fabrication process, since losses during fuel fabrication are a potential source of long-lived actinides destined for geologic disposal. This paper presents the current state and future direction of the development of metallic fuels for actinide transmutation in the US. Metallic fuels have had a long history of use in sodium-cooled fast reactors. Continued research, development, and design innovation over a period of decades have demonstrated this fuel technology to be safe and reliable to extremely high burnups over a wide range of compositions. Their simple fabrication has historically given them a significant economic advantage over other fuel forms. Research and development on metallic fuels continues, with particular emphasis on showing that this fuel technology can incorporate significant quantities of plutonium and minor actinides for the purpose of efficiently and economically transmuting these elements in a fast-spectrum reactor. New fabrication methods to improve retention of the volatile fuel constituents during the casting process (and reduce waste generation), are being developed. Irradiation testing of the new metallic fuels has so far indicated that the new compositions, although differing significantly both in the quantities of Pu and minor actinides included and in the Zr alloying addition, perform as a function of fission density very analogously to the historic U-Zr and U-Pu-Zr fuels. In the next few years it is anticipated that a new casting furnace prototype will demonstrate that these new metallic fuel alloys can be fabricated at engineering scale, in a remote environment, with no significant fuel loss or waste generation. Irradiation tests currently underway will provide the performance data needed to assess fuel reliability/burnup capability and identify any unique behaviors that are a result of the new compositions. If these future results are consistent with the intermediate data available at present, metallic fuels are expected to continue to be a strong contender for the fuel technology choice of future fast reactors. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Improving PCM Waste Management Through New Approaches to Screening for LLW Treatment and Disposal - 20145

A major step forward in the management of Plutonium Contaminated Material (PCM) Waste has been taken at the Sellafield site with the introduction of new capabilities to enable wastes previously conservatively designated as PCM Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) to be re-classified for treatment as Low Level Waste (LLW). The Sellafield site, located in the North West of England, within the United Kingdom (UK), has operated plutonium processing plants and waste facilities for almost 70 years. During this time management of the raw PCM waste produced has presented a variety of challenges. The waste is currently processed by high force waste compaction in the Waste Treatment Complex (WTC). The WTC converts 200 litre drums of raw PCM waste into a compacted, grout encapsulated monolith form within stainless steel containment, ready for emplacement within the UK's Geological Disposal Facility (GDF) when it becomes available. To help progress some of the wastes waiting for treatment, recent improvements have been made with the introduction of new waste assay instrumentation which enables the identification of a 'candidate' waste potentially suitable for disposal via the LLW treatment route. Opening a new LLW route for previously designated PCM has been a major advance in PCM waste management policy. It has required a range of technical assessment arrangements to be developed, tested and commissioned and involved the engagement of a wide range of stakeholders. In particular, very detailed technical analysis methods have been developed to ensure that there is a robust and conservative approach to the final sentencing of waste. Following completion of commissioning tests, the first 86 m{sup 3} of previously designated PCM waste was successfully treated through the LLW route and consigned to LLW disposal in June 2019. The direct benefit of sentencing waste to the correct waste route (LLW) is the significant cost savings across the complete range of waste management activities. This work is also strategically important for demonstrating to a range of stakeholders including workforce and regulators, that waste previously designated as PCM can be re-classified in a systematic and justifiable way without increasing risk to personnel or the wider environment. By ensuring that waste is being managed appropriately it will be possible to carry out more remediation work safely, in less time, and at a lower cost. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

In-Can Incineration and Vitrification Process for the Treatment of Transuranic Wastes - 20035

Technological alpha contaminated wastes are produced by the nuclear fuel cycle management industry, essentially from MOX fuel production units. These Plutonium Contaminated Materials (PCM) contain a mixture of organic, metal and mineral materials, contaminated with uranium, plutonium and americium. One treatment scenario under study is to incinerate the organic materials, melt the metallic fraction and incorporate the mineral fraction (including ashes from organics incineration) into a glass matrix without sorting or pretreatment (grinding for instance). A scale 1 pilot of this PIVIC process (Process for Incineration and Vitrification In Can) has been commissioned in 2018 at the CEA R and D vitrification facility in Marcoule site. A R and D program aiming to demonstrate the feasibility of this process is currently on going. This paper starts with a description of PIVIC process with explanation of the technologies involved. Then, main results of the first year of operation with the technological demonstration goal are presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Infrastructure and DFLAW Support at Hanford - 20443

Manhattan Project era infrastructure systems are degrading at an accelerated pace across the Department of Energy's (DOE) Environmental Management complex. Revitalizing, rejuvenating and right-sizing these systems to ensure reliability for ongoing cleanup missions is a major focus at the 580-square- mile Hanford Site in southeast Washington State. The push to complete construction, commissioning, startup, and operation of facilities and systems in the Direct-Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) program at Hanford by 2023 requires considerable coordination among site contractors and a significant investment in infrastructure. The passage of time also poses a challenge. It has been about 75 years since facilities were first operated at the site, and approximately 40 years of plutonium production created a legacy of unidentified active and abandoned underground obstacles and waste sites that must be avoided when building and upgrading the infrastructure. Converting infrastructure systems originally built to support plutonium production from the 1940's to the 1980's and upgrading those systems to optimize technology is an ever-changing balance of funding profiles, available resources and execution strategies. The DOE Richland Operations Office (RL) has long recognized the need for increased investment in Hanford Site infrastructure to support the future processing of approximately 56 million gallons of waste currently stored in large underground tanks. When DFLAW is fully operational, safe and reliable infrastructure systems will be needed to ensure continuity of operations around the clock, 365 days a year. These include roadways, water, power, sewer, information technology systems and facilities. To ensure the readiness of Hanford's infrastructure to support treating tank waste in the next three years, 15 projects were identified with a combined value of $133.8 million. Through calendar year 2019, 7 infrastructure projects have been substantially completed and the remaining 8 projects, with a remaining value of $103.8 million, are scheduled to be completed by December 2023. RL and its site services/infrastructure contractor, Mission Support Alliance (MSA), regularly evaluate the needs of the DFLAW program and other Hanford Site missions to ensure the highest priority systems are addressed. In addition to a fast-approaching deadline for round-the-clock treatment operations, RL and MSA face another significant infrastructure challenge. As cleanup is being completed in a 220-square-mile area called the River Corridor, most of the cleanup operations going forward will occur in a 20-square-mile area in the center of the Hanford Site, known as the Central Plateau. Infrastructure systems are becoming more congested in an already overcrowded area. This paper/presentation will outline some of the challenges Hanford faces while executing infrastructure reliability projects. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Synthesis and Analysis of Glass Analogs for Solid Fallout Debris

Following a nuclear detonation, radiochemists and post-detonation debris diagnosticians are tasked with performing high-quality analysis of fallout debris samples and accurate device interpretation. Debris formed following a nuclear detonation commonly consists of a heterogeneous glassy matrix containing uranium, plutonium, neptunium, americium, and fission/activation products. Homogeneous and well-characterized reference materials are critical for accurate post-detonation debris analysis. Such reference materials can include aged nuclear explosion debris from the Nevada Test Site (e.g., Trinitite) as well as 'fresh' doped-glass material. Recent work has highlighted the often heterogeneous nature of historical debris, which presents a problem from the aspects of safeguards accountancy and verification as well as micro-scale characterization (i.e., microbeam analysis). In this regard, our work focuses on the creation of homogeneous, 'fresh' doped-glassy standards containing uranium, plutonium, surrogate fission products (e.g., Sr, Cs, Pm, Sm, Eu), and urban material (e.g., Fe and Ca from construction material, stainless steel, aluminosilicates phases as a surrogate for dirt). (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗