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Design implementation and migration of security systems as an extreme project.

Decision Trees, algorithms, software code, risk management, reports, plans, drawings, change control, presentations, and analysis - all useful tools and efforts but time consuming, resource intensive, and potentially costly for projects that have absolute schedule and budget constraints. What are necessary and prudent efforts when a customer calls with a major security problem that needs to be fixed with a proven, off-the-approval-list, multi-layered integrated system with high visibility and limited funding and expires at the end of the Fiscal Year? Whether driven by budget cycles, safety, or by management decree, many such projects begin with generic scopes and funding allocated based on a rapid management 'guestimate.' Then a Project Manager (PM) is assigned a project with a predefined and potentially limited scope, compressed schedule, and potentially insufficient funding. The PM is tasked to rapidly and cost effectively coordinate a requirements-based design, implementation, test, and turnover of a fully operational system to the customer, all while the customer is operating and maintaining an existing security system. Many project management manuals call this an impossible project that should not be attempted. However, security is serious business and the reality is that rapid deployment of proven systems via an 'Extreme Project' is sometimes necessary. Extreme Projects can be wildly successful but require a dedicated team of security professionals lead by an experienced project manager using a highly-tailored and agile project management process with management support at all levels, all combined with significant interface with the customer. This paper does not advocate such projects or condone eliminating the valuable analysis and project management techniques. Indeed, having worked on a well-planned project provides the basis for experienced team members to complete Extreme Projects. This paper does, however, provide insight into what it takes for projects to be successfully implemented and accepted when completed under extreme conditions.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack

This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Implementation of Lessons Learned - 17406

Following a negative occurrence or event, putting corrective actions into place to address an organisation's systemic and administrative weaknesses is paramount to that organisation's future success. At Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL, or the Laboratory), recent experiences emphasize this critical point. On February 14, 2014, transuranic (TRU) waste management at DOE facilities changed significantly when a drum of mixed hazardous and TRU (MTRU) waste from LANL breached after its disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico. Shortly following the LANL-WIPP event, several internal and external investigations and analyses were conducted by LANL, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and others, including the DOE Inspector General and an Office of Environmental Management Accident Investigation Board (AIB), to determine the cause of the LANL drum breach at WIPP. Internal investigations led LANL to self-disclose non-compliancies including treatment without a permit and improper waste characterization to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED), leading to a Settlement Agreement in January 2016. The Settlement Agreement, together with the other investigations, led LANL to identify and implement many corrective actions related to its waste management practices. The Laboratory recognized the need to revisit implementation of some fundamental concepts, and noted the following 'Lessons Learned': - Communicating requirements more clearly, - Using technical expertise more effectively, and - Improving implementation of policies and procedures. This paper presents the actions LANL has taken to prevent recurrence and demonstrate the Laboratory's commitment to compliant waste management requirements. They have focused on promoting a better understanding of the regulatory requirements in order to address the key root causes and the resulting Lessons Learned, as follows: - Ensure that all levels of a Project Team understand the regulatory requirements related to performing the work;- Engage RCRA subject matter experts in planning (for both initial project plans and subsequent modifications to plans); - Validate that Project Teams' plans and procedures will be effective in meeting regulatory requirements; and - Verify implementation. We believe the corrective actions taken since the drum event at WIPP will fundamentally improve our way of doing business throughout the Laboratory. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Noncoplanar VMAT for nasopharyngeal tumors: Plan quality versus treatment time

Purpose: The authors investigated the potential of optimized noncoplanar irradiation trajectories for volumetric modulated arc therapy (VMAT) treatments of nasopharyngeal patients and studied the trade-off between treatment plan quality and delivery time in radiation therapy. Methods: For three nasopharyngeal patients, the authors generated treatment plans for nine different delivery scenarios using dedicated optimization methods. They compared these scenarios according to dose characteristics, number of beam directions, and estimated delivery times. In particular, the authors generated the following treatment plans: (1) a 4π plan, which is a not sequenced, fluence optimized plan that uses beam directions from approximately 1400 noncoplanar directions and marks a theoretical upper limit of the treatment plan quality, (2) a coplanar 2π plan with 72 coplanar beam directions as pendant to the noncoplanar 4π plan, (3) a coplanar VMAT plan, (4) a coplanar step and shoot (SnS) plan, (5) a beam angle optimized (BAO) coplanar SnS IMRT plan, (6) a noncoplanar BAO SnS plan, (7) a VMAT plan with rotated treatment couch, (8) a noncoplanar VMAT plan with an optimized great circle around the patient, and (9) a noncoplanar BAO VMAT plan with an arbitrary trajectory around the patient. Results: VMAT using optimized noncoplanar irradiation trajectories reduced the mean and maximum doses in organs at risk compared to coplanar VMAT plans by 19% on average while the target coverage remains constant. A coplanar BAO SnS plan was superior to coplanar SnS or VMAT; however, noncoplanar plans like a noncoplanar BAO SnS plan or noncoplanar VMAT yielded a better plan quality than the best coplanar 2π plan. The treatment plan quality of VMAT plans depended on the length of the trajectory. The delivery times of noncoplanar VMAT plans were estimated to be 6.5 min in average; 1.6 min longer than a coplanar plan but on average 2.8 min faster than a noncoplanar SnS plan with comparable treatment plan quality. Conclusions: The authors’ study reconfirms the dosimetric benefits of noncoplanar irradiation of nasopharyngeal tumors. Both SnS using optimized noncoplanar beam ensembles and VMAT using an optimized, arbitrary, noncoplanar trajectory enabled dose reductions in organs at risk compared to coplanar SnS and VMAT. Using great circles or simple couch rotations to implement noncoplanar VMAT, however, was not sufficient to yield meaningful improvements in treatment plan quality. The authors estimate that noncoplanar VMAT using arbitrary optimized irradiation trajectories comes at an increased delivery time compared to coplanar VMAT yet at a decreased delivery time compared to noncoplanar SnS IMRT.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

NRC Consultation and Monitoring at the Savannah River Site: Focusing Reviews of Two Different Disposal Actions - 12181

Section 3116 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA) requires the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to consult with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for certain non-high level waste determinations. The NDAA also requires NRC to monitor DOE's disposal actions related to those determinations. In Fiscal Year 2011, the NRC staff reviewed DOE performance assessments for tank closure at the F-Tank Farm (FTF) Facility and salt waste disposal at the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) as part of consultation and monitoring, respectively. Differences in inventories, waste forms, and key barriers led to different areas of focus in the NRC reviews of these two activities at the SRS. Because of the key role of chemically reducing grouts in both applications, the evaluation of chemical barriers was significant to both reviews. However, radionuclide solubility in precipitated metal oxides is expected to play a significant role in FTF performance whereas release of several key radionuclides from the SDF is controlled by sorption or precipitation within the cementitious wasteform itself. Similarly, both reviews included an evaluation of physical barriers to flow, but differences in the physical configurations of the waste led to differences in the reviews. For example, NRC's review of the FTF focused on the modeled degradation of carbon steel tank liners while the staff's review of the SDF performance included a detailed evaluation of the physical degradation of the saltstone wasteform and infiltration-limiting closure cap. Because of the long time periods considered (i.e., tens of thousands of years), the NRC reviews of both facilities included detailed evaluation of the engineered chemical and physical barriers. The NRC staff reviews of residual waste disposal in the FTF and salt waste disposal in the SDF focused on physical barriers to flow and chemical barriers to radionuclide release from the waste. Because the waste inventory and concentration at both sites is sufficient to generate unacceptable doses to an off-site member of the public or inadvertent intruder in the absence of engineered barriers, the NRC staff review focused on the engineering features DOE plans to put in place to limit radionuclide release. At the FTF, DOE expects that peak doses are delayed beyond a 10,000 year performance period by a combination of (1) the flow-limiting effect of the steel tank liner and (2) chemical conditions created by the stabilizing grout overlying the waste that limit the solubility of key radionuclides for tens of thousands of years. At the SDF, DOE expects that flow will be significantly limited by water shedding along the closure cap lower drainage layer and that radionuclide release will be further limited by radionuclide precipitation or sorption within the high pH, chemically reducing conditions created within the saltstone waste form. Because the performance of both facilities depends on the performance of engineered barriers for thousands of years, the reviews included a detailed evaluation of the expected long-term behavior of these barriers. As previously discussed, NRC staff reviews of DOE waste determinations during consultation are designed to evaluate the three NDAA criteria, whereas the review of an updated PA during monitoring only addresses whether the NRC staff has reasonable assurance that the planned disposal action will meet the performance objectives of 10 CFR Part 61. The NRC staff review of the Waste Determination for the FTF did not include conclusions about whether the planned disposal of residual waste at the FTF would meet the NDAA criteria because of the substantial uncertainties in the degree of waste removal DOE would achieve and other technical uncertainties. The main product of the NRC staff review of the planned FTF disposal action is the recommendation that DOE should conduct waste release experiments to increase support for key modeling assumptions related to: (1) the evolution of pH and Eh in the grouted tank system over time; (2) identification of HRR association with solid phases comprising the residual wastes; and (3) expected solubility of HRRs under a range of environmental or service conditions that the residual wastes in the contaminated zone are expected to be exposed to over time. Implementation of this recommendation is deemed crucial for NRC staff to have reasonable assurance that the performance objectives in 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C can be met. Given the risk-significance of Tank 18 to the overall PA and the short timeline for closure of this tank, the NRC staff recommended that DOE should initiate discussions with NRC staff regarding implementation of this recommendation for Tank 18 as soon as practical. The NRC staff also recommended that experiments to address this recommendation should be conducted prior to final closure of Tank 18. Results of the Tank 18 residual waste experiments, if conducted, will be evaluated by NRC staff to determine the need for additional data collection, experiments, and modeling for Tank 18, as well as other FTF tanks. Additional information regarding the NRC staff's recommendations in this area, including details on the suggested implementation of other recommendations will be provided in the NRC staff's plan for monitoring the FTF later in FY 2012, after DOE makes a final decision on the waste determination. The NRC staff's review of waste disposal at the SDF is ongoing. When complete, the SDF TER will indicate whether the NRC staff continues to have reasonable assurance that waste disposal at the SDF will meet the performance objectives of 10 CFR Part 61 (NDAA Criterion 3). The TER also will include risk insights that will form the basis of the NRC staff's revised monitoring plan for the SDF. The NRC staff will publish an updated monitoring plan for the SDF later in FY 2012. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Environmental Management Waste Management Facility Waste Lot Profile 155.5 for K-1015-A Laundry Pit, East Tennessee Technology Park Oak Ridge, Tennessee

In 1989, the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), which includes the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP), was placed on the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) National Priorities List. The Federal Facility Agreement (FFA) (DOE 1992), effective January 1, 1992, now governs environmental restoration activities conducted under CERCLA at the ORR. Following signing of the FFA, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the state of Tennessee signed the Oak Ridge Accelerated Cleanup Plan Agreement on June 18, 2003. The purpose of this agreement is to define a streamlined decision-making process to facilitate the accelerated implementation of cleanup, to resolve ORR milestone issues, and to establish future actions necessary to complete the accelerated cleanup plan by the end of fiscal year 2008. While the FFA continues to serve as the overall regulatory framework for remediation, the Accelerated Cleanup Plan Agreement supplements existing requirements to streamline the decision-making process. The disposal of the K-1015 Laundry Pit waste will be executed in accordance with the 'Record of Decision for Soil, Buried Waste, and Subsurface Structure Actions in Zone, 2, East Tennessee Technology Park, Oak Ridge, Tennessee' (DOB/ORAH-2161&D2) and the 'Waste Handling Plan for the Consolidated Soil and Waste Sites with Zone 2, East Tennessee Technology Park, Oak Ridge, Tennessee' (DOE/OR/01-2328&D1). This waste lot consists of a total of approximately 50 cubic yards of waste that will be disposed at the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) as non-containerized waste. This material will be sent to the EMWMF in dump trucks. This profile is for the K-1015-A Laundry Pit and includes debris (e.g., concrete, metal rebar, pipe), incidental soil, plastic and wood, and secondary waste (such as plastic sheeting, hay bales and other erosion control materials, wooden pallets, contaminated equipment, decontamination materials, etc.).

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

State and Alternative Fuel Provider Fleet Compliance Methods [Brochure]

The Energy Policy Act of 1992 has been amended several times, allowing covered state government and alternative fuel provider fleets multiple means to comply with EPAct 1992’s alternative fuel vehicle (AFV) acquisition requirements. Originally, under what is termed Standard Compliance, these fleets had to acquire a certain percentage of AFVs each model year. Since 2001, fleets have been able to obtain some compliance credit through the purchase and use of biodiesel. More recently, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) provided covered fleets additional compliance flexibility under Alternative Compliance. This compliance method allows covered fleets to employ petroleum reduction measures in lieu of acquiring AFVs under Standard Compliance. DOE’s Alternative Fuel Transportation Program is responsible for implementing the two compliance methods.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Implementing Brackish Water Use

This presentation describes the various water recovery initiatives, their key aspects, and implementation.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, Revision 1

This Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) provides the overall Quality Assurance (QA) program requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices to be applied to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program Soils Activity. The QAP requirements are consistent with the Quality Systems for Environmental Data and Technology Programs–Requirements with Guidance for Use (ANSI/ASQ, 2004); the Intergovernmental Data Quality Task Force Uniform Federal Policy for Quality Assurance Project Plans (IDQTF, 2005); and 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830.120, Quality Assurance (CFR, 2017a), which apply to specific activities performed under the Soils Activity. The EM Nevada Program owns and is responsible for maintaining this QAP. Individual participants are responsible for implementing the requirements of this QAP in accordance with their own approved programs, processes, plans, and procedures. If a participant’s requirement document differs from this QAP, the stricter requirement will take precedence.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Domestic Nuclear Power Plant Physical Security Reevaluation - High-Level Project Plan

The goal for this effort is a validated method which can be used to implement an updated physical security regime to optimize the physical security at domestic nuclear power plants (existing and future). It is the intent for the evaluation recommendations to provide the technical basis for an optimized plant security posture, which could consider reduce conservatisms in that posture, and potentially reduce security costs for the nuclear industry while meeting all security requirements.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Domestic Nuclear Power Plant Physical Security Reevaluation – High Level Project Plan

The goal for this effort is a validated method which can be used to implement an updated physical security regime to optimize the physical security at domestic nuclear power plants (existing and future). It is the intent for the evaluation recommendations to provide the technical basis for an optimized plant security posture, which could consider reduce conservatisms in that posture, and potentially reduce security costs for the nuclear industry while meeting all security requirements.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Bioenergy crop models: Descriptions, data requirements and future challenges

Field studies that address the production of lignocellulosic biomass as a potential source of renewable energy are making available critical information for the development, validation, and use of bioenergy crop models. A literature survey revealed that 14 models have been developed and validated for herbaceous and woody bioenergy crops, and for Crassulacean acid metabolism (CAM) crops adapted to arid lands. These models simulate field-scale production of biomass for switchgrass (ALMANAC, EPIC, and Agro-BGC), miscanthus (MISCANFOR, MISCANMOD, and WIMOVAC), sugarcane (APSIM, AUSCANE, and CANEGRO), and poplar and willow (SECRETS and 3PG). Two models are adaptations of dynamic global vegetation models and simulate biomass yields of miscanthus and sugarcane as plant function types at regional scales (Agro-IBIS and LPJmL). A model of biomass production in CAM plants has been developed (EPI), but lacks the sophistication of the other models. Except for CAM plants, all the models include representations of leaf area dynamics, radiation interception and utilization, biomass production, and partitioning of biomass to roots and shoots. A few of the models are capable of simulating soil water, nutrient, and carbon cycle processes, making them especially useful for assessing environmental consequences (e.g., erosion and nutrient losses) associated with the field-scale deployment of bioenergy crops. Similar to other process-based models, simulations are challenged by computing and data management issues and an integrated framework for model testing and inter-comparison is needed. Considerable work remains concerning the development of models for unconventional bioenergy crops like CAM plants, generation and distribution of high-quality field data for model development and validation, and development of an integrated framework for efficient execution of large-scale simulations for use in planning regional to global sustainable bioenergy production systems.

Surendran Nair, Sujith↗

SAVY-4000 Surveillance and Life Extension Program Fiscal Year 2013 Annual Report

The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the DOE M441.1-1 /sup>1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE, 2008) requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” In order to ensure continuing safe storage of nuclear material and the maximization of risk reduction, TA-55 has established a Surveillance Program to ensure storage container integrity for operations within its specified design life. The LANL SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan 2 defines the near-term field surveillance plan for SAVY-4000 containers as required by the Manual. A long-term surveillance plan will be established based on the results of the first several years of surveillance and the results of the lifetime extension studies as defined in the Accelerated Aging Plan 3 . This report details progress in positioning the Surveillance Program for successful implementation in FY14 and status of the Design Life Extension Program in terms of its implementation and data collection for FY13.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Strategic Energy Plan: City of Key West, Florida

This Strategic Energy Plan for the city of Key West, Florida—developed through the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Technology Innovation Partnership Project (ETIPP)—outlines a comprehensive strategy to advance the city’s energy vision: to improve energy efficiency and independence using local energy resources to foster long-term resilience. To guide this effort, the plan is structured around four focus areas: • Energy efficiency: Reduce overall energy consumption and utility costs across municipal, residential, and commercial buildings. • Local energy generation: Increase the share of energy produced from local sources to enhance energy independence. • Resilience: Strengthen critical infrastructure and community preparedness for flooding, hurricanes, and other natural weather hazards. • Electric transportation: Support the addition of new electric vehicles (EVs) and develop reliable charging infrastructure to reduce reliance on imported fuels. ETIPP provides strategic energy planning, technical assistance, and direct funding to U.S. coastal, remote, and island communities to improve energy resilience. Key West was part of ETIPP’s fourth cohort. As a low-lying island community vulnerable to infrastructure damage due to natural weather hazards, Key West seeks to reduce its dependence on external energy and build long-term sustainability. The Strategic Energy Plan identifies specific challenges, sets clear goals, and proposes actionable opportunities with implementation timelines and key stakeholders. A baseline assessment reveals significant energy consumption in both city-owned and residential/commercial buildings, limited local energy generation, and an early-stage EV market with vulnerable charging infrastructure. The proposed solutions emphasize a multifaceted approach, leveraging both established and innovative technologies, while addressing financial, technical, and community engagement challenges. The baseline assessment provided a snapshot of current energy conditions in Key West, evidencing key challenges and opportunities across the city’s energy priorities. Building on the baseline assessment and extensive input from city staff, local stakeholders, and community partners, a set of targeted opportunities was identified to address Key West’s energy goals. Each was evaluated in terms of its potential benefits, key implementation steps, associated challenges and mitigation strategies, and the city departments and stakeholders best positioned to lead or support progress.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

SU-E-T-181: Clinical Implementation of Task Group 176

Purpose: The implementation of TG-176 with regards to immobilization devices and couch tops as they effect dosimetric treatment planning. Methods: The external devices used clinically were scanned to measure their HU values. Plans were created in the Eclipse treatment planning system (TPS) using these devices, one that accounted for the correct HU value of the each device and another that did not include the device as a structure. A dose subtraction was performed between the two plans to evaluate the dosimetric differences. The metrics used for evaluation included attenuation and surface dose. Plan parameters were varied to evaluate the impact of the devices in different clinical scenarios. Results: While the exact HU values of our results are clinic-dependent, the protocol being implemented is widely applicable. We recommend a four step process for implementing this task group. First, physics should scan each treatment device to determine accurate HU values. Second, CT therapists should include in the setup note which table top was used during patient CT simulation and are asked to make immobilization devices as uniform in thickness as possible. Therapists should also index the devices whenever possible so beam will traverse the same area of the device. Third, the dosimetrist should manually correct the HU value for any external device, including the couch. For H&N cases, the rails must be removed from the couch structure. When rails are used during treatments, it is important to make note of their exact position in the setup notes. Finally, physicians should be made aware that there could be changes in surface doses depending on whether or not immobilization devices or couch tops are in the beam path. Conclusion: The protocol outlined above was implemented to reduce the errors that arise from ignoring effects of external devices, thus ensuring safer, more accurate patient treatments.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Calendar Year 2010 Groundwater Monitoring Report, U.S. Department Of Energy Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

This report contains the groundwater and surface water monitoring data that were obtained during calendar year (CY) 2010 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (hereafter referenced as Y-12) on the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The CY 2010 monitoring data were obtained from wells, springs, and surface water sampling locations in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12 (Figure A.1). The Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime) encompasses a section of Bear Creek Valley (BCV) between the west end of Y-12 and the west end of the Bear Creek Watershed (directions are in reference to the Y-12 grid system). The Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime) encompasses the Y-12 industrial facilities and support structures in BCV. The Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime) encompasses a section of Chestnut Ridge directly south of Y-12. Section 2 of this report provides background information pertinent to groundwater and surface water quality monitoring in each hydrogeologic regime, including the topography and bedrock geology, surface water drainage, groundwater system, and extent of groundwater contamination. The CY 2010 groundwater and surface water monitoring data in this report were obtained from sampling and analysis activities implemented under the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP) managed by Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Y-12, LLC (B&W Y-12) and from sampling and analysis activities implemented under several monitoring programs managed by Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC). Cooperative implementation of the monitoring programs directed by the Y-12 GWPP and BJC (i.e., coordinating sample collection and sharing data) ensures that the CY 2010 monitoring results fulfill requirements of all the applicable monitoring drivers with no duplication of sampling and analysis efforts. Section 3 of this report contains a summary of information regarding the groundwater and surface water sampling and analysis activities implemented under the Y-12 GWPP including sampling locations and frequency; quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) sampling; sample collection and handling; field measurements and laboratory analytes; data management and data quality objective (DQO) evaluation; and groundwater elevation monitoring. However, this report does not include equivalent QA/QC or DQO evaluation information regarding the groundwater and surface water sampling and analysis activities associated with the monitoring programs implemented by BJC. Such details are deferred to the respective programmatic plans and reports issued by BJC (see Section 3.0). Collectively, the groundwater and surface water monitoring data obtained during CY 2010 by the Y-12 GWPP and BJC address DOE Order 450.1A (Environmental Protection Program) requirements for monitoring groundwater and surface water quality in areas: (1) which are, or could be, affected by operations at Y-12 (surveillance monitoring); and (2) where contaminants from Y-12 are most likely to migrate beyond the boundaries of the ORR (exit pathway/perimeter monitoring). Section 4 of this report presents a summary evaluation of the monitoring data with regard to the respective objectives of surveillance monitoring and exit pathway/perimeter monitoring, based on the analytical results for the principal groundwater contaminants at Y-12: nitrate, uranium, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), gross alpha activity, and gross beta activity. Section 5 of this report summarizes the most pertinent findings regarding the principal contaminants, along with recommendations proposed for ongoing groundwater and surface water quality monitoring performed under the Y-12 GWPP.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Calendar Year 2007 Groundwater Monitoring Report, U.S. Department of Energy Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

This report contains the groundwater and surface water monitoring data that were obtained during calendar year (CY) 2007 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (hereafter referenced as Y-12) on the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The CY 2007 monitoring data were obtained from wells, springs, and surface water sampling locations in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12 (Figure A.1). The Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime) encompasses a section of Bear Creek Valley (BCV) between the west end of Y-12 and the west end of the Bear Creek Watershed (directions are in reference to the Y-12 grid system). The Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime) encompasses the Y-12 industrial facilities and support structures in BCV. The Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime) encompasses a section of Chestnut Ridge directly south of Y-12. Section 2 of this report provides background information pertinent to groundwater and surface water quality monitoring in each hydrogeologic regime, including the topography and bedrock geology, surface water drainage, groundwater system, and extent of groundwater contamination. The CY 2007 groundwater and surface water monitoring data in this report were obtained from sampling and analysis activities implemented under the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP) managed by BWXT Y-12, L.L.C. (BWXT), and from sampling and analysis activities implemented under several monitoring programs managed by Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC). In December 2007, the BWXT corporate name was changed to Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Y-12, LLC (B&W Y-12), which is applied to personnel and organizations throughout CY 2007 for this report. Cooperative implementation of the monitoring programs directed by the Y-12 GWPP and BJC (i.e., coordinating sample collection and sharing data) ensures that the CY 2007 monitoring results fulfill requirements of all the applicable monitoring drivers with no duplication of sampling and analysis efforts. Section 3 of this report contains a summary of information regarding the groundwater and surface water sampling and analysis activities implemented under the Y-12 GWPP including sampling locations and frequency; quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) sampling; sample collection and handling; field measurements and laboratory analytes; data management and data quality objective (DQO) evaluation; and groundwater elevation monitoring. However, this report does not include equivalent information regarding the groundwater and surface water sampling and analysis activities associated with the monitoring programs implemented by BJC. Such details are deferred to the respective programmatic plans and reports issued by BJC (see Section 3.0). Collectively, the groundwater and surface water monitoring data obtained during CY 2007 by the Y-12 GWPP and BJC address DOE Order 450.1 (Environmental Protection Program) requirements for monitoring groundwater and surface water quality in areas: (1) which are, or could be, affected by operations at Y-12 (surveillance monitoring); and (2) where contaminants from Y-12 are most likely to migrate beyond the boundaries of the ORR (exit pathway/perimeter monitoring). Section 4 of this report presents a summary evaluation of the monitoring data with regard to the respective objectives of surveillance monitoring and exit pathway/perimeter monitoring, based on the analytical results for the principal groundwater and surface water contaminants at Y-12: nitrate, uranium, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), gross alpha activity, and gross beta activity. Section 5 of this report summarizes the most pertinent findings regarding the principal contaminants, along with recommendations proposed for ongoing groundwater and surface water quality monitoring performed under the Y-12 GWPP.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Upgrade Pilot Project: NUREG- 0711 Process Development, Planning and Analysis Activities, and Lessons Learned

Constellation Energy and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) have established a public/private partnership to implement a pilot digital upgrade to replace legacy analog, safety-related reactor protection and emergency safety feature actuation systems (RPS/ESFAS) with modern digital systems. This effort is occurring at Constellation’s Limerick Generating Station. This project is being performed in accordance with industry processes that have been adapted to better support digital upgrades. These processes include IP-ENG-001, Standard Design Process, NISP-EN-04, Standard Digital Engineering Process and Electric Power Research Institute Report 3002011816, Digital Engineering Guide. The Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been supporting this effort. Latest INL HFE efforts in support of this project have focused on definition and implementation of the Human Factors Engineering (HFE) Program in support of Constellation design and related licensing efforts. This paper presents the development execution of the HFE Program through completion of the Planning and Analysis Phase as defined by NUREG-0711 as well as HFE lessons learned.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗