DOE OSTI2017
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the analysis of abnormal configurations of in-line components, tanks and pumps in support of the integration of Criticality Safety into the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12). In-line components are components that are used in solution piping systems, including instrumentation, valves, pumps, and other general-use equipment. Mounted on self-contained skids/modules, in-line components (instruments, seal pots, level switches, etc.), tanks, and pumps are associated with a wide variety of the UPF processes. Using computer generated models expected to bound abnormal conditions for process module configurations, this report evaluates the impact of loss of spacing between in-line components in in-line component arrays and the effects of abnormal events. All fissile materials are considered to have a {sup 235}U enrichment of 100% and full theoretical density of 18.81 g/cm{sup 3} to conservatively represent the maximum credible enrichment available. Water and concrete were utilized to account for the construction materials associated with the skids and other reflective surfaces. Uranyl nitrate, was evaluated over the range of 0 to 550 g U/L for various normal and abnormal configurations of components mounted on skids. Abnormal events included fissile spills, sprinkler activation, and loss of spacing due to a seismic event. The results from this analysis provide a basis that supports development of nuclear safety design criteria, which generates standardized volume limits expected to bound the actual internal volume of the planned components. The results also provide a basis for consistent Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) control of in-line components, pumps, and tanks, for the ultimate development of Criticality Safety Process Studies in the UPF. (authors)
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗