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Progress in Uranium Chemistry: Driving Advances in Front-End Nuclear Fuel Cycle Forensics

The front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle encompasses several chemical and physical processes used to acquire and prepare uranium for use in a nuclear reactor. These same processes can also be used for weapons or nefarious purposes, necessitating the need for technical means to help detect, investigate, and prevent the nefarious use of nuclear material and nuclear fuel cycle technology. Over the past decade, a significant research effort has investigated uranium compounds associated with the front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium ore concentrates (UOCs), UF 4 , UF 6 , and UO 2 F 2 . These efforts have furthered uranium chemistry with an aim to expand and improve the field of nuclear forensics. Focus has been given to the morphology of various uranium compounds, trace elemental and chemical impurities in process samples of uranium compounds, the degradation of uranium compounds, particularly under environmental conditions, and the development of improved or new techniques for analysis of uranium compounds. Overall, this research effort has identified relevant chemical and physical characteristics of uranium compounds that can be used to help discern the origin, process history, and postproduction history for a sample of uranium material. This effort has also identified analytical techniques that could be brought to bear for nuclear forensics purposes. Continued research into these uranium compounds should yield additional relevant chemical and physical characteristics and analytical approaches to further advance front-end nuclear fuel cycle forensics capabilities.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Room-temperature in situ nuclear spin hyperpolarization from optically pumped nitrogen vacancy centres in diamond

Low detection sensitivity stemming from the weak polarization of nuclear spins is a primary limitation of magnetic resonance spectroscopy and imaging. Methods have been developed to enhance nuclear spin polarization but they typically require high magnetic fields, cryogenic temperatures or sample transfer between magnets. Here we report bulk, room-temperature hyperpolarization of 13C nuclear spins observed via high-field magnetic resonance. The technique harnesses the high optically induced spin polarization of diamond nitrogen vacancy centres at room temperature in combination with dynamic nuclear polarization. We observe bulk nuclear spin polarization of 6%, an enhancement of ~170,000 over thermal equilibrium. The signal of the hyperpolarized spins was detected in situ with a standard nuclear magnetic resonance probe without the need for sample shuttling or precise crystal orientation. In conclusion, hyperpolarization via optical pumping/dynamic nuclear polarization should function at arbitrary magnetic fields enabling orders of magnitude sensitivity enhancement for nuclear magnetic resonance of solids and liquids under ambient conditions.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

A roadmap for nuclear energy technology

The prospects for the future use of nuclear energy worldwide can best be understood within the context of global population growth, urbanization, rising energy need and associated pollution concerns. As the world continues to urbanize, sustainable development challenges are expected to be concentrated in cities of the lower-middle-income countries where the pace of urbanization is fastest. As these countries continue their trajectory of economic development, their energy need will also outpace their population growth adding to the increased demand for electricity. OECD IEA’s energy system deployment pathway foresees doubling of the current global nuclear capacity by 2050 to reduce the impact of rapid urbanization. The pending “retirement cliff” of the existing U.S. nuclear fleet, representing over 60 percent of the nation’s emission-free electricity, also poses a large economic and environmental challenge. To meet the challenge, the U.S. DOE has developed the vision and strategy for development and deployment of advanced reactors. As part of that vision, the U.S. government pursues programs that aim to expand the use of nuclear power by supporting sustainability of the existing nuclear fleet, deploying new water-cooled large and small modular reactors to enable nuclear energy to help meet the energy security and climate change goals, conducting R&D for advanced reactor technologies with alternative coolants, and developing sustainable nuclear fuel cycle strategies. Since the current path relying heavily on water-cooled reactors and “once-through” fuel cycle is not sustainable, next generation nuclear energy systems under consideration aim for significant advances over existing and evolutionary water-cooled reactors. Among the spectrum of advanced reactor options, closed-fuel-cycle systems using reactors with fast-neutron spectrum to meet the sustainability goals offer the most attractive alternatives. However, given these circumstances, unless the new public-private partnership models emerge to tackle the licensing and demonstration challenges for these advanced reactor concepts, realization of their enormous potential is not likely, at least in the U.S.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Nucleon and nuclear structure functions with nonperturbative and higher order perturbative QCD effects

We have studied the nucleon structure functions F EM iN (x,Q 2 ), i = 1, 2, by including contributions due to the higher order perturbative QCD effect up to next-to-next-to-leading order (NNLO) and the nonperturbative effects due to the kinematical and dynamical higher twist (HT) effects. The numerical results for F EM iN (x,Q 2 ) are obtained using Martin, Motylinski, Harland-Lang, Thorne 2014 NLO and NNLO nucleon parton distribution functions (PDFs). The dynamical HT correction has been included following the renormalon approach as well as the phenomenological approach, and the kinematical HT effect is incorporated using the works of Schienbein et al. These nucleon structure functions have been used as an input to calculate the nuclear structure functions F EM iN (x,Q 2 ). In a nucleus, the nuclear corrections arise because of the Fermi motion, binding energy, nucleon correlations, mesonic contribution, and shadowing and antishadowing effects. These nuclear corrections are taken into account in the numerical calculations to obtain the nuclear structure functions F EM iN (x,Q 2 ), for the various nuclear targets such as 12 C, 27 Al, 56 Fe, 64 Cu, 118 Sn, 197 Au, and 208 Pb which are of experimental interest. The effect of isoscalarity correction for nonisoscalar nuclear targets has also been studied. The results for the F EM iN (x,Q 2 ) are compared with nCTEQ nuclear PDFs parametrization as well as with the experimental results from JLab, SLAC, and NMC in the kinematic region of 0.1 ≤ x ≤ 0.8 for several nuclei. We have also calculated the ratio R A (x,Q 2 ) = F 2A (x,Q 2 )/2x F 1A (x,Q 2 ) in the moderate Q 2 region for various nuclei and compared the results with the available experimental data from JLab to examine the validity of the Callan-Gross relation in the nuclei. We also make predictions for the nuclear structure functions in 12 C, 64 Cu, and 197 Au in the kinematic region of the proposed experiment at JLab.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Applying QMU to Nuclear Weapon Stewardship

Quantification of Margins and Uncertainty (QMU) is a principle means and metric by which nuclear weapons performance is measured. At Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Nuclear weapon QMU is predominately a Physics assessment of the performance margin and associated uncertainties of not achieving the designed nuclear performance. To more completely apply QMU to Nuclear Weapon Stewardship, a Systems Engineering or systematic approach is being employed to identify and define requirements, allowing assessment of performance with QMU. This paper describes the basics of QMU and how it is applied below the highest level nuclear performance function down and throughout the nuclear weapon design architecture. The intended audience for this paper is a novice QMU practitioner at LLNL. The application of QMU to the entire set of nuclear weapon functions demands a broad engagement of Science and Engineering disciplines. Using a hierarchical flow-down requirements structure, performance functions and failure modes are identified for all levels of system requirements. There can be multiple failure modes per functional requirement. For each function there is a spectrum of possible outputs that can vary from outright failure to excellent performance. The possible consequences and impacts on the next higher level functions will also vary. Since performance variations exist in a weapon functional hierarchy, the assessment process needs and benefits from a system perspective. Incorporating QMU into assessments using a Systems Engineering approach to stockpile management provides a means to quantify weapon performance risks against a multitude of possible failure modes and from the highest level functions down to the lowest level component functionality. Performance risk management is a core practice of nuclear weapon management. Assessing the likelihood and consequences of the many possible failure modes is done yearly as part of Annual Assessment Reviews (AAR). When annual surveillance discovers an anomaly defect as part of weapon surveillance, investigations are launched and QMU is a key tool for quantifying performance impacts. QMU assessments are separated into two pieces, failure mode assessments and QMU analysis.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Detailed Characterization of Nuclear Recoil Pulse Shape Discrimination in the DarkSide-50 Direct Dark Matter Experiment

While evidence of non-baryonic dark matter has been accumulating for decades, its exact nature continues to remain a mystery. Weakly Interacting Massive Particles (WIMPs) are a well motivated candidate which appear in certain extensions of the Standard Model, independently of dark matter theory. If such particles exist, they should occasionally interact with particles of normal matter, producing a signal which may be detected. The DarkSide-50 direct dark matter experiment aims to detect the energy of recoiling argon atoms due to the elastic scattering of postulated WIMPs. In order to make such a discovery, a clear understanding of both the background and signal region is essential. This understanding requires a careful study of the detector's response to radioactive sources, which in turn requires such sources may be safely introduced into or near the detector volume and reliably removed. The CALibration Insertaion System (CALIS) was designed and built for this purpose in a j oint effort between Fermi National Laboratory and the University of Hawaii. This work describes the design and testing of CALIS, its installation and commissioning at the Laboratori Nazionali del Gran Sasso (LNGS) and the multiple calibration campaigns which have successfully employed it. As nuclear recoils produced by WIMPs are indistinguishable from those produced by neutrons, radiogenic neutrons are both the most dangerous class of background and a vital calibration source for the study of the potential WIMP signal. Prior to the calibration of DarkSide-50 with radioactive neutron sources, the acceptance region was determined by the extrapolation of nuclear recoil data from a separate, dedicated experiment, ScENE, which measured the distribution of the pulse shape discrimination parameter, $f_{90}$, for nuclear recoils of known energies. This work demonstrates the validity of the extrapolation of ScENE values to DarkSide-50, by direct comparison of the $f_{90}$ distributio n of nuclear recoils from ScENE and an AmBe calibration sour! ce. The combined acceptance as defined by ScENE and the \textit{in-situ} AmBe calibration were used to establish the best WIMP exclusion limit on an argon target. Unfortunately, radioactive sources used for the calibration of DarkSide-50 are universally accompanied by gamma decays, which obscure the low energy region where most WIMP interactions are expected to occur and seem to make continuing dependence on an external measurement such as ScENE inevitable. However, this work presents a novel method of nuclear recoil calibration employing event selection, unique to the design of DarkSide-50, which produces a nearly pure sample of nuclear recoils. Further, it describes the execution of a neutron calibration campaign, from planning to analysis, which yielded a valuable data set for defining the acceptance region. Together with the event selection techniques, this allows for the definition of the acceptance region independent of ScENE values. Two analytical models of the $f_{90 }$ distribution are described and their results for nuclear recoils are compared. Finally, a detailed study of integrated noise in nuclear and electron recoil

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Managing Risks Associated with Global Nuclear Energy Expansion: Emerging Challenges and Cooperative Solutions Workshop Summary Report.

Global nuclear energy has reached a critical juncture. The footprint of nuclear energy is growing and will continue to grow in coming decades to meet increasing global energy demands, desires for energy security, and mounting concerns about climate change. This growth includes construction of reactors in countries new to the nuclear energy enterprise, in addition to expansion of existing programs. The lack of operational experience coupled with weak regulatory systems in some countries raises the potential of a nuclear accident. The expansion of nuclear energy is also met with an increasingly complex threat environment, with threats to nuclear security from non-state actors as well as the continued risks of state proliferation. The trend towards increasingly digitized and networked nuclear facilities significantly expands operational uncertainty and adds complexity to implementing safeguards and security. These factors merit fresh consideration of potential safety, safeguards, security, and cyber (3SC) risks, as well as approaches for managing those risks in an integrated, sustainable, and internationally cooperative manner. In an effort to explore the emerging challenges and cooperative solutions to the global expansion of nuclear energy The George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs and Sandia National Laboratories convened a group of more than thirty experts from government, national laboratories, non-government organizations, and academia on May 5th, 2016 at George Washington University to discuss these issues in a not-for-attribution environment.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Of Clouds and Craters: The History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing

“Now!” With that word, the Atomic Age – and the era of nuclear weapons testing – dawned. The advent of World War II’s first irresistible weapon, which had been secretly tested in the New Mexico desert in July 1945, would help hasten the inevitable: complete victory for the Allies. Codenamed Trinity, the test was the first of over a thousand conducted by the United States between 1945 and 1992. Nuclear weapons would change future clashes as well. The looming Cold War, with roots stretching all the way back to 1917, was history’s first conflict between two, major nations armed with nuclear weapons. It is clear the existence of those weapons played an important role in maintaining a tenuous peace between the United States and the Soviet Union; it is also clear nuclear weapons testing played a prominent role in fueling both the arms race and the success of deterrence. Yet, the history of nuclear weapons testing is rarely remembered, even though nuclear tests have been performed in the very recent past. Of the estimated 2,000-plus nuclear tests ever performed, the U.S. is responsible for approximately half. This is the story of U.S. full-scale nuclear weapons testing.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Nuclear Rocket Technology Conference

The Lewis Research Center has a strong interest in nuclear rocket propulsion and provides active support of the graphite reactor program in such nonnuclear areas as cryogenics, two-phase flow, propellant heating, fluid systems, heat transfer, nozzle cooling, nozzle design, pumps, turbines, and startup and control problems. A parallel effort has also been expended to evaluate the engineering feasibility of a nuclear rocket reactor using tungsten-matrix fuel elements and water as the moderator. Both of these efforts have resulted in significant contributions to nuclear rocket technology. Many successful static firings of nuclear rockets have been made with graphite-core reactors. Sufficient information has also been accumulated to permit a reasonable Judgment as to the feasibility of the tungsten water-moderated reactor concept. We therefore consider that this technoIogy conference on the nuclear rocket work that has been sponsored by the Lewis Research Center is timely. The conference has been prepared by NASA personnel, but the information presented includes substantial contributions from both NASA and AEC contractors. The conference excludes from consideration the many possible mission requirements for nuclear rockets. Also excluded is the direct comparison of nuclear rocket types with each other or with other modes of propulsion. The graphite reactor support work presented on the first day of the conference was partly inspired through a close cooperative effort between the Cleveland extension of the Space Nuclear Propulsion Office (headed by Robert W. Schroeder) and the Lewis Research Center. Much of this effort was supervised by Mr. John C. Sanders, chairman for the first day of the conference, and by Mr. Hugh M. Henneberry. The tungsten water-moderated reactor concept was initiated at Lewis by Mr. Frank E. Rom and his coworkers. The supervision of the recent engineering studies has been shared by Mr. Samuel J. Kaufman, chairman for the second day of the conference, and Mr. Roy V. Humble. Dr. John C. Eward served as general chairman for the conference.

Source record↗

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion: A Joint NASA/DOE/DOD Workshop

Papers presented at the joint NASA/DOE/DOD workshop on nuclear thermal propulsion are compiled. The following subject areas are covered: nuclear thermal propulsion programs; Rover/NERVA and NERVA systems; Low Pressure Nuclear Thermal Rocket (LPNTR); particle bed reactor nuclear rocket; hybrid propulsion systems; wire core reactor; pellet bed reactor; foil reactor; Droplet Core Nuclear Rocket (DCNR); open cycle gas core nuclear rockets; vapor core propulsion reactors; nuclear light bulb; Nuclear rocket using Indigenous Martian Fuel (NIMF); mission analysis; propulsion and reactor technology; development plans; and safety issues.

Clark, John S.↗

Space Nuclear Thermal Propulsion Test Facilities Subpanel

On 20 Jul. 1989, in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the Apollo 11 lunar landing, President George Bush proclaimed his vision for manned space exploration. He stated, 'First for the coming decade, for the 1990's, Space Station Freedom, the next critical step in our space endeavors. And next, for the new century, back to the Moon. Back to the future. And this time, back to stay. And then, a journey into tomorrow, a journey to another planet, a manned mission to Mars.' On 2 Nov. 1989, the President approved a national space policy reaffirming the long range goal of the civil space program: to 'expand human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit into the solar system.' And on 11 May 1990, he specified the goal of landing Astronauts on Mars by 2019, the 50th anniversary of man's first steps on the Moon. To safely and ever permanently venture beyond near Earth environment as charged by the President, mankind must bring to bear extensive new technologies. These include heavy lift launch capability from Earth to low-Earth orbit, automated space rendezvous and docking of large masses, zero gravity countermeasures, and closed loop life support systems. One technology enhancing, and perhaps enabling, the piloted Mars missions is nuclear propulsion, with great benefits over chemical propulsion. Asserting the potential benefits of nuclear propulsion, NASA has sponsored workshops in Nuclear Electric Propulsion and Nuclear Thermal Propulsion and has initiated a tri-agency planning process to ensure that appropriate resources are engaged to meet this exciting technical challenge. At the core of this planning process, NASA, DOE, and DOD established six Nuclear Propulsion Technical Panels in 1991 to provide groundwork for a possible tri-agency Nuclear Propulsion Program and to address the President's vision by advocating an aggressive program in nuclear propulsion. To this end the Nuclear Electric Propulsion Technology Panel has focused it energies; this final report summarizes its endeavor and conclusions.

Allen, George C.↗

Nuclear electric propulsion: A better, safer, cheaper transportation system for human exploration of Mars

NASA has completed a preliminary mission and systems study of nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) systems for 'split-sprint' human exploration and related robotic cargo missions to Mars. This paper describes the study, the mission architecture selected, the NEP system and technology development needs, proposed development schedules, and estimated development costs. Since current administration policy makers have delayed funding for key technology development activities that could make Mars exploration missions a reality in the near future, NASA will have time to evaluate various alternate mission options, and it appears prudent to ensure that Mars mission plans focus on astronaut and mission safety, while reducing costs to acceptable levels. The split-sprint nuclear electric propulsion system offers trip times comparable to nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) systems, while providing mission abort opportunities that are not possible with 'reference' mission architectures. Thus, NEP systems offer short transit times for the astronauts, reducing the exposure of the crew to intergalactic cosmic radiation. The high specific impulse of the NEP system, which leads to very low propellant requirements, results in significantly lower 'initial mass in low earth orbit' (IMLEO). Launch vehicle packaging studies show that the NEP system can be launched, assembled, and deployed, with about one less 240-metric-ton heavy lift launch vehicle (HLLV) per mission opportunity - a very Technology development cost of the nuclear reactor for an NEP system would be shared with the proposed nuclear surface power systems, since nuclear systems will be required to provide substantial electrical power on the surface of Mars. The NEP development project plan proposed includes evolutionary technology development for nuclear electric propulsion systems that expands upon SP-100 (Space Power - 100 kw(e)) technology that has been developed for lunar and Mars surface nuclear power, and small NEP systems for interplanetary probes. System upgrades are expected to evolve that will result in even shorter trip times, improved payload capabilities, and enhanced safety and reliability.

Clark, John S.↗

Three-Dimensional Analysis of Nuclear Size, Shape and Displacement in Clover Root Cap Statocytes from Space and a Clinostat

Under normal (l-g) conditions the statocytes of root caps have a characteristic polarity with the nucleus in tight association with the proximal cell wall; but, in altered gravity environments including microgravity (mu-g) and the clinostat (c-g) movement of the nucleus away from the proximal cell wall is not uncommon. To further understand the cause of gravity-dependent nuclear displacement in statocytes, three-dimensional cell reconstruction techniques were used to precisely measure the volumes, shapes, and positions of nuclei in white clover (Trifolium repens) flown in space and rotated on a clinostat. Seeds were germinated and grown for 72 hours aboard the Space Shuttle (STS-63) in the Fluid Processing Apparatus (BioServe Space Technologies, Univ. of Colorado, Boulder). Clinorotation experiments were performed on a two-axis clinostat (BioServe). Computer reconstruction of selected groups of statocytes were made from serial sections (0.5 microns thick) using the ROSS (Reconstruction Of Serial Sections) software package (Biocomputation Center, NASA Ames Research Center). Nuclei were significantly displaced from the tops of cells in mu-g (4.2 +/- 1.0 microns) and c-g (4.9 +/- 1.4 microns) when compared to l-g controls (3.4 +/- 0.8 gm); but, nuclear volume (113 +/- 36 cu microns, 127 +/- 32 cu microns and 125 +/- 28 cu microns for l-g, mu-g and c-g respectively) and the ratio of nuclear volume to cell volume (4.310.7%, 4.211.0% and 4.911.4% respectively) were not significantly dependent on gravity treatment (ANOVA; alpha = 0.05). Three-dimensional analysis of nuclear shape and proximity to the cell wall, however, showed that nuclei from l-g controls appeared ellipsoidal while those from space and the clinostat were more spherically shaped. This change in nuclear shape may be responsible for its displacement under altered gravity conditions. Since the cytoskeleton is known to affect nuclear polarity in root cap statocytes, those same cytoskeletal elements could also control nuclear shape. This alteration in nuclear shape and position in mu-g and c-g when compared to l-g may lead to functional differences in the gravity signaling systems of plants subjected to altered gravity environments.

Smith, J.D.↗

Strategy for Developing Technologies for Megawatt-class Nuclear Electric Propulsion Systems

In late fiscal year 2020, the Space Nuclear Propulsion (SNP) project began the process of formulating an investment strategy to support development of the technologies required for a high-power (megawatt-class) nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) system capable of performing human-scale missions. This activity was initiated concurrent with several high-level studies and assessments were either under way or had just concluded. Studies of human-scale Mars missions have been performed several times over the past two decades. One of the most recent studies examined opposition-class human Mars missions to occur in the late 2030s timeframe [1,2]. The mission architecture assumed a hybrid NEP/chem-propelled vehicle that used a high specific impulse (Isp) NEP-system and a liquid oxygen (LOx)-liquid methane high thrust chemical stage (two 110 kN (25 klbf) thrust, 365 s Isp engines) for maneuvers performed to enter and exit gravity wells. Trajectory analyses performed in this study showed that such a mission could be performed with 2-4 MWe directed into the electric propulsion system (operating for 20,000+ hours), with the large range representing different opposition-class Mars mission opportunities and permutations on the trajectory design, concept of operations, and technology choices. In 2020, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) performed a study to evaluate the maturity of the different technologies required for nuclear propulsion systems [3]. The executive summary of this report provided the following top-level conclusions: • “The majority of critical technologies for… NEP/Chem… systems are relatively immature” • “TRLs [technology readiness levels] in the literature are often overestimated” • “The majority of critical technologies… for NEP/Chem… systems are at a relatively high level of advancement degree of difficulty (AD2 > 4) for maturation, requiring a dual development approach” • “The proper assessment of baseline TRL and AD2 values and the estimation of requirements and resources required for advancement have been consistent issues for NEP,” • “Non-advocate reviews should occur at the start of a technology program and at all key milestones.” In 2021, the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) issued a separate report [4] identifying the “primary technical and programmatic challenges, merits, and risks for maturing space nuclear propulsion technologies of interest to a future human Mars exploration mission.” That work contained several important findings, including: • “Developing a MWe-class NEP system for the baseline mission would require increasing power by orders of magnitude relative to NEP system flight- or ground-based technology demonstrations completed to date.” • “Subscale in-space flight testing of NEP systems cannot address many of the risks and potential failure modes associated with the baseline mission NEP system. With sufficient M&S [modeling & simulation] and ground testing, including modular subsystem tests at full scale and power, flight qualification requirements can be met by the cargo missions that will precede the first crewed mission to Mars. Fully integrated ground testing may not be required.” • “As a result of low and intermittent investment over the past several decades, it is unclear if even an aggressive program would be able to develop an NEP system capable of executing the baseline mission in 2039.” These efforts motivated the SNP project to investigate the technologies available for a megawatt-class high power nuclear electric propulsion system. That system is illustrated schematically in Figure 1 and is comprised of five separate top-level critical technology elements (CTEs). 1. Nuclear Reactor – Thermal power source for the system, utilizing high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) as the nuclear fuel. Reactor radiation shielding is also included in this CTE. 2. Power Conversion – Operates as a thermodynamic cycle, accepting nuclear reactor thermal power as an input and converting it to mechanical power. 3. Power Management and Distribution (PMAD) – Accepts as an input mechanical power from the power conversion system, which is used to generate electrical power. The PMAD system also distributes the generated electrical power to all other parts of the spacecraft, including the high-power EP system. The PMAD system may also perform duties such as isolation, fault detection, and power transformation/rectification for different spacecraft systems, including the thrusters. 4. Electric Propulsion (EP) – Accepts as an input electrical power, which is used to accelerate a propellant to high speeds to produce thrust. This system includes the power processing unit (PPU), which converts the power it receives to the correct current and voltage required by the thrusters, and the propellant storage and feed systems, which contain and meter the flow of propellant to the thrusters. 5. Thermal Management (Radiators/Heat Rejection) – The cold side of the thermodynamic power conversion cycle, accepts thermal power from the power conversion system and radiatively rejects that heat to space. In this paper, we describe the SNP project formulation and investment strategy that aims to accomplish the research and development required to advance the technology readiness for each CTE. The strategy relies heavily upon experimental testing supported by modeling and simulation to yield realistic assessments of the technologies, which in turn will be used to inform future NEP system-level design decisions and any potential technology downselects.

Kurt A Polzin↗

Workshop on Nuclear Data Needs for Nonproliferation

Recently, the National Nuclear Security Agency, Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D) hosted the Nuclear Data Roadmapping and Enhancement Workshop (NDREW). This workshop brought together nuclear data experts, data users, and program leads to discuss nuclear data needs for the nonproliferation mission and to recommend a path forward. Results of this workshop will lead to a comprehensive nonproliferation nuclear data strategic document. This paper provides historical context, summarizes workshop discussions, and provides recommendations by the nuclear data community for a comprehensive nuclear data program.

Romano, Catherine↗

An Overview of the United States Department of Energy's Nuclear Criticality Safety Program and Future Challenges

The United States (US) Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) was formally established in January 1998 as part of the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 97-2 implementation plan. The NCSP was initially focused on seven NCSP tasks: Critical Experiments, Benchmarking, Analytical Methods, Nuclear Data, Training and Qualification, Information Preservation and Dissemination, and Applicable Ranges of Bounding Curves and Data. The first NCSP 5-year plan was published in August 1999. Now, more than 20 years later, NCSP continues to serve the United States and the nuclear criticality safety (NCS) community around five technical program elements (TPEs): Analytical Methods, Information Preservation and Dissemination, Integral Experiments, Nuclear Data, and Training and Education. NCSP has three chartered support groups, the Criticality Safety Support Group, the Nuclear Data Advisory Group, and the DOE Criticality Safety Coordinating Team, all of which provide technical advisement to the NCS community, to DOE, and to the NCSP manager. NCSP has a comprehensive mission and vision document that provides technical and budget priorities for TPE attributes and goals to ensure that the needs of the NCS community and DOE NCS are prioritized appropriately to meet the goals defined by the 1998 DNFSB recommendation. Like any DOE/NNSA program, NCSP faces significant challenges in the future that involves program funding, rising nuclear facility costs, aging critical assembly infrastructure, knowledge retention, and other issues. This paper discusses NCSP and provides some insights into these and other challenges moving into the future.

Bowen, Douglas G.↗

SUSTAINING NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIMES THROUGH CONTINUOUS LEARNING EXPERIENCES

As Member States plan, implement, and ultimately sustain their nuclear security regimes, human resource development supporting these regimes are paramount. Human resource development broadly includes programs addressing education, training, and knowledge management. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Implementing Guide, Sustaining a Nuclear Security Regime, highlights the importance of national-level support for assigning resources that help ensure States are able to develop and retain sufficient human resources in the short, medium, and long term. Determining the resources needed to support education, training, and knowledge management is not an easy task, and knowledge management is a practice often overlooked when States plan for and allocate human resources for a nuclear security regime. The paper highlights the importance of implementing knowledge management practices as part of sustaining a nuclear security regime. Given the availability of secure web-based knowledge management tools, a nuclear security human resource development program should not depend solely on direct human interactions. To that end, the paper will offer an approach for planning and implementing a knowledge management system by using the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration’s Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Knowledge Management Website as a case study. This example offers useful lessons learned for States considering or actively developing their own nuclear security knowledge management efforts and human resource development.

Tremonte, Matthew M.↗

DETECTION OF NUCLEAR OR OTHER RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS OUT OF REGULATORY CONTROL AS CRIMINAL/UNAUTHORIZED THREATS TO MAJOR PUBLIC EVENTS

Major Public Events (MPEs), by their nature, draw great public interest and receive intense media attention. They can be anything from sporting events (e.g., Olympics, World Cups) to political summits to large festivals. The threat of nuclear or other radiological materials out of regulatory control during these events is of particular concern. A terrorist could use this material as a dirty bomb to disperse radioactive material in a stadium, or hide dangerous radioactive sources in a garbage can to expose people to harmful radiation, leading to fear and uncertainty. The requirements for nuclear security, preparedness, and operational capabilities for nuclear/radiological detection at MPEs have steadily increased in recent years. Many countries have gained considerable experience in recent years in nuclear security operations at MPEs when hosting these events. Dozens of MPEs hosted around the world each year now provide some level of nuclear security as part of their overall security plan. Several training workshops and courses, co-sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and conducted through bilateral agreements, are offered each year. These workshops and courses provide the opportunity to share best practices and lessons learned and aid countries to build capacity for nuclear security at their MPEs. Additionally, the International Atomic Energy Agency provides guidance for the detection of radiological threat materials out of regulatory control through the Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for Major Public Events, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 18.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗