Flight software trends and patterns in the aerospace industry: JPL lessons learned
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In this paper, we will summarize the software trends and their impact on the cost of developing flight and ground software.
The Optical Communications Demonstrator (OCD) is a laboratory based lasercom terminal that was developed to validate several key technologies such as precision beam pointing, high bandwidth beacon tracking and beacon acquisition.
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The MicroPrecision Interferometer Testbed (MIP) at JPL is a dynamically and dimensionally representative hardware model of a future spaceborne optical interferometer.
In this paper, the rover navigation performance is analyzed on the basis of received rover telemetry, rover uplink commands and stereo images captured by the lander cameras.
In 1992, Dr. Wes Huntress challenged the JPL staff to undertake the first of NASA's new Discovery Program missions; Pathfinder.
This paper focuses on the onboard planner and scheduler CASPER, whose core planning engine is based on the ground system ASPEN. Given the challenges of developing flight software, we discuss several of the issues encountered in preparing the planner for flight, including reducing the code image size, determining what data to place within the engineering telemetry packet, and performing long term planning.
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This paper uses comparisons of AIRS measured radiances with other sources to evaluate AIRS performance.
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Launched in 1997, the Cassini-Huygens Mission sent the largest interplanetary spacecraft ever built in the service of science. Carrying a suite of 12 scientific instruments and an atmospheric entry probe, this complex spacecraft to explore the Saturn system may not have gotten off the ground without undergoing significant design changes and cost reductions.
The International Space Station (ISS) is operated by a multi-national, multi-organizational team that is dispersed across multiple locations, time zones, and work schedules. At NASA, both junior and senior mission control personnel have had to find ways to address the leadership challenges inherent in such work, but neither have had systematic training in how to do so. The goals of this study were to examine the major leadership challenges faced by ISS mission control personnel and to highlight the approaches that they have found most effective to surmount them. We pay particular attention to the approaches successfully employed by the senior personnel and to the training needs identified by the junior personnel. We also evaluate the extent to which responses are consistent across the junior and senior samples. Further, we compare the issues identified by our interview survey to those identified by a standardized questionnaire survey of mission control personnel and a contrasting group of space station crewmembers. We studied a sample of 14 senior ISS flight controllers and a contrasting sample of 12 more junior ISS controllers. Data were collected using a semi-structured qualitative interview and content analyzed using an iterative process with multiple coders and consensus meetings to resolve discrepancies. To further explore the meaning of the interview findings, we also conducted new analyses of data from a previous questionnaire study of 13 American astronauts, 17 Russian cosmonauts, and 150 U.S. and 36 Russian mission control personnel supporting the ISS or Mir space stations. The interview data showed that the survey respondents had substantial consensus on several leadership challenges and on key strategies for dealing with them, and they offered a wide range of specific tactics for implementing these strategies. Interview data from the junior respondents will be presented for the first time at the meeting. The questionnaire data showed that the US mission control sample reported a level of support from their management that compared favorably to national norms. American mission control personnel and Russian crewmembers reported higher supervisor support than American crewmembers and Russian mission control personnel. We will present the specific issues underlying these findings and compare and contrast the results from the two datasets. Although specific to space station personnel, our results are consistent with recent management, cultural, and aerospace research. We aim to use our results to improve training for current and future mission control personnel.
After the Shuttle Columbia catastrophe, the investigation board (CAIB) stated that NASA needs to develop a "learning culture", meaning a capability to learn from past failures by understanding the technical and organizational causes of these mistakes (CAIB report, 2003). While many organizations learn from obvious failures, we argue that it is harder for organizations to learn from near-miss events (i.e., situations where a failure does not occur but nearly did), because these near-misses are processed as successes. For the shuttle program, prior debris problems could have caused a similar failure as on the Columbia mission except that the large pieces missed the highly sensitive portions of the orbiter. This acceptance of foam debris was adopted as a normal occurrence by the shuttle program managers similar to the problems at the time of the Challenger Disaster (detailed in Vaughan, 1996). We extend that work to show that an outcome bias influences people's evaluation of project managers, such that managers of failed missions were perceived more poorly than managers who made the same decisions but whose mission ended in either success or a near-miss. The similarity of ratings between the near-miss and success condition imply that even when a problem occurs that is clearly linked to prior managerial decisions, if the project is not harmed because of good luck, that manager is not held accountable for faculty decision making and neither the individual manager nor the organization learn from the experience potentially increasing the likelihood of a failure in the future.