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Resilient Control System Execution Agent (ReCoSEA)

In an increasingly networked world, critical infrastructure systems suffer from two types of vulnerability. The first is the traditionally recognized problem of monitoring the systems for faults and failures, recognizing and analyzing data, and responding with real understanding to the problems of the system. Increasingly complex systems create the opportunity for single points of failure to cascade when inaccurate assessment of system health increases response time or leads to faulty analysis of the problems involved. A second problem involves vulnerability to cyber intrusion, in which bad actors can mask system deterioration or present false data about system status. A resilient system will protect stability, efficiency, and security. To ensure these three states, the system must react to changing conditions within the system with coordination: no one component of the system can be allowed to react to problems without real consideration of the effects of that action on other components within the system. Systems with multi-agent design typically have three layers of action, a management layer, a coordination layer, and an execution layer. A resilient multi-agent system will emphasize functions of the execution layer, which has the responsibility of initiating actions, monitoring, analyzing, and controlling its own processes, while feeding information back to the higher levels of management and coordination. The design concept of a resilient control system execution agent (ReCoSEA) grows out of these underpinnings, and through the use of computational intelligence techniques, this paper suggests an associated design methodology.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

ORNL Automated-In-Motion Evaluation Environment (AIMVEE) User Training and Testing Materials - U.S. Copyright TXu 1-797-273

The AIMVEE/WIM system electronically retrieves deployment information, identifies vehicle automatically, and determines total weight, individual wheel weight, individual axle weights, axle spacing, and center-of-balance for any wheeled vehicle in motion. The AIMVEE/WIM system can also perform these functions statically for both wheel vehicles and cargo with information. The AIMVEE/WIM system incorporates digital images and applies cubing algorithms to determine length, width, height for cubic dimensions of both vehicle and cargo. Once all this information is stored, it electronically links to data collection and dissemination systems to provide actual weight and measurement information for planning, deployment, and in-transit visibility. The Static Scale Conversion (SSC) system is an unique enhancement to the AIMVEE/WIM system. It enables a SSC to weigh and measure vehicles and cargo dynamically (i.e., as they pass over the large scale and is included in the AIMVEE computer code base. The material copyrighted is the ORNL Automated-In-Motion Vehicle Evaluation Environment (AIMVEE)/Weigh-In-Motion User Training and Testing material. It includes instructional material in the set-up, operation and tear-down of the AIMVEE/WIM system. It also includes a final exam associated with the training.

Automated-in-Motion Evaluation Environment (AIMVEE↗

Cyber Resilient Design and Controls for Energy Systems

As the grid of today is evolving into a highly distributed and autonomous cyber-physical system with higher penetration of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) and autonomous controls that are dependent on the cyber infrastructure, there are novel and increasing challenges to cyber-resilient operation of the grid. While the traditional mechanisms take a "bolt on" approach to cybersecurity and resiliency, this talk presents two novel technologies developed at NREL that "bake in" security and resilience into the design and control of the grid. An Adaptive Resilience Metrics framework is a novel mechanism for system owners and operators to understand the impact of cyber and physical system design and topology on the resilient operation, while also helping determine optimal policies in response to adverse cyber events. Along with that a zero-knowledge proof-based technique helps incorporate security into the controls layer by focusing on computational integrity rather than data integrity. By leveraging design and control properties unique to Operational Technology systems these technologies will not only help enhance cyber-resilience for the grid of today, but a highly distributed and autonomous grid of tomorrow.

cyber resilience↗

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 2 – Prioritizing Digital Assurance Challenges, Session 2

The second session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 10, 2025, focused on prioritizing digital assurance challenges at the intersection of data centers and the electric grid. Building on the foundational concepts introduced in Workshop 1, this session deepened the application of the Threat–Vulnerability–Consequence (TVC) framework and emphasized the urgency of addressing cybersecurity, supply chain integrity, and operational reliability. Participants explored the growing convergence of digital and physical systems, the expanding attack surface due to global supply chain dependencies, and the implications of AI-driven load behavior. Real-world incidents—including the Volt Typhoon campaign and vulnerabilities in Solarman and Deye platforms—were analyzed to illustrate the risks of unpatched systems, insecure APIs, and inadequate vendor oversight. Key themes included architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and human and procedural shortcomings. The workshop also examined the evolving regulatory landscape, highlighting new federal mandates around Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) compliance and large-load reliability standards. Through interactive exercises, stakeholders ranked and mapped digital assurance risks from their respective perspectives—utilities, operators, and vendors—laying the groundwork for mitigation strategies and shared accountability models to be developed in Workshop 3. Session 2 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Decision-level Information Fusion to Assess Threat Likelihood in Shipped Containers

A significant challenge in the distribution of goods is assessing the potential threat that an individual shipping container poses. Due to the high volume of shipped goods, a primary concern is balancing accuracy and container scan time. The application of information fusion to the problem enables automated threat determination and the presentation of relevant data to an operator, in a decision support capacity, in order to maintain a sufficient level of processing. This paper outlines an approach to container threat assessment that combines data from multiple sources in order to reliably score the likelihood that a given container holds a threat. Fused data is also leveraged as a tool to optimize the routing of containers through a scanning system comprised of multiple data acquisition stations and providing data in multiple modes. Furthermore, we propose methods for the consolidated presentation of fused data to an operator in order to both minimize the time expended in container evaluation and maximize the accuracy of the assessment.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Alerts Analysis and Visualization in Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems

The alerts produced by network-based intrusion detection systems, e.g. Snort, can be difficult for network administrators to efficiently review and respond to due to the enormous number of alerts generated in a short time frame. This work describes how the visualization of raw IDS alert data assists network administrators in understanding the current state of a network and quickens the process of reviewing and responding to intrusion attempts. The project presented in this work consists of three primary components. The first component provides a visual mapping of the network topology that allows the end-user to easily browse clustered alerts. The second component is based on the flocking behavior of birds such that birds tend to follow other birds with similar behaviors. This component allows the end-user to see the clustering process and provides an efficient means for reviewing alert data. The third component discovers and visualizes patterns of multistage attacks by profiling the attacker s behaviors.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A threat-based definition of IA- and IA-enabled products.

This paper proposes a definition of 'IA and IA-enabled products' based on threat, as opposed to 'security services' (i.e., 'confidentiality, authentication, integrity, access control or non-repudiation of data'), as provided by Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 8500.2, 'Information Assurance (IA) Implementation.' The DoDI 8500.2 definition is too broad, making it difficult to distinguish products that need higher protection from those that do not. As a consequence the products that need higher protection do not receive it, increasing risk. The threat-based definition proposed in this paper solves those problems by focusing attention on threats, thereby moving beyond compliance to risk management. (DoDI 8500.2 provides the definitions and controls that form the basis for IA across the DoD.) Familiarity with 8500.2 is assumed.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A threat-based definition of IA and IA-enabled products.

This paper proposes a definition of 'IA and IA-enabled products' based on threat, as opposed to 'security services' (i.e., 'confidentiality, authentication, integrity, access control or non-repudiation of data'), as provided by Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 8500.2, 'Information Assurance (IA) Implementation.' The DoDI 8500.2 definition is too broad, making it difficult to distinguish products that need higher protection from those that do not. As a consequence the products that need higher protection do not receive it, increasing risk. The threat-based definition proposed in this paper solves those problems by focusing attention on threats, thereby moving beyond compliance to risk management. (DoDI 8500.2 provides the definitions and controls that form the basis for IA across the DoD.) Familiarity with 8500.2 is assumed.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 413: Clean Slate II Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada (Rev. 1)

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 413 is located on the Tonopah Test Range, which is approximately 130 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and approximately 40 miles southeast of Tonopah, Nevada. The CAU 413 site consists of the release of radionuclides to the surface and shallow subsurface from the conduct of the Clean Slate II (CSII) storage–transportation test conducted on May 31, 1963. CAU 413 includes one corrective action site (CAS), TA-23-02CS (Pu Contaminated Soil). The known releases at CAU 413 are the result of the atmospheric deposition of contamination from the 1963 CSII test. The CSII test was a non-nuclear detonation of a nuclear device located inside a reinforced concrete bunker covered with 2 feet of soil. This test dispersed radionuclides, primarily plutonium, on the ground surface. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 413 will be evaluated based on information collected from a corrective action investigation (CAI). The investigation is based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on June 17, 2015, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; the U.S. Air Force; and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 413. The CAI will include radiological surveys, geophysical surveys, collection and analyses of soil samples, and assessment of investigation results. The collection of soil samples will be accomplished using both probabilistic and judgmental sampling approaches. To facilitate site investigation and the evaluation of DQO decisions, the releases at CAU 413 have been divided into seven study groups.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 414: Clean Slate III Plutonium Dispersion (TTR) Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 1

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 414 is located on the Tonopah Test Range, which is approximately 130 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and approximately 40 miles southeast of Tonopah, Nevada. The CAU 414 site consists of the release of radionuclides to the surface and shallow subsurface from the conduct of the Clean Slate III (CSIII) storage–transportation test conducted on June 9, 1963. CAU 414 includes one corrective action site (CAS), TA-23-03CS (Pu Contaminated Soil). The known releases at CAU 414 are the result of the atmospheric dispersal of contamination from the 1963 CSIII test. The CSIII test was a nonnuclear detonation of a nuclear device located inside a reinforced concrete bunker covered with 8 feet of soil. This test dispersed radionuclides, primarily uranium and plutonium, on the ground surface. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 414 will be evaluated based on information collected from a corrective action investigation (CAI). The investigation is based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on June 7, 2016, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; the U.S. Air Force; and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective action alternatives for CAU 414.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

WISP: Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies (Final Technical Report)

The complex interdependencies of cyber systems (sensors and communications), physical grids and associated electricity market operations make protecting electric power grids a significant challenge. The energy sector is constantly under new, targeted, advanced and dangerous cyber-attacks that have the potential to result in the loss of human life. These threats are further exacerbated by our need to modernize the grid. One focus of cyber security research in smart grids is the securing of the SCADA system through advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and bad data detection algorithms in state estimation. These methods either require full knowledge of the system topology and parameters or fail to understand the physical behaviors under attack. WISP (Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies) is designed to provide additional protection to the power grid using only publicly available data. In particular, WISP exploits the spatio-temporal nature of the real time locational marginal prices (LMPs), in conjunction with other information such as bids, weather, outages and load data to analyze anomalous power pricing behaviors and then correlate those observations to localize regions of interest and identify potential cyber events. WISP is non-intrusive as the tool is deployed as a service in the Cloud or on premise and provides reliable information to system operators for enhanced situational awareness, without impeding energy delivery functions. The WISP technology comprises three modules: the data-driven anomaly detection core, the vulnerability and risk analysis and the root cause analysis. The data-driven anomaly detection core performs the tasks of feature selection, anomaly detection and attack region localization. The vulnerability and risk analysis module provides system level information of the vulnerable variables and times, assisting the operators in selecting monitoring and protection nodes. The root cause analysis module takes the detection results and identifies potential operational conditions that contribute to the detected anomalies. In Phase I, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WISP. We developed a realistic electricity market simulator capable of generating normal and attack market data under various operational conditions. We developed a series of cyber-attack detection and analysis algorithms and evaluated them under multiple data sources. Finally, we integrated all modules into an end-to-end software, providing functions for data management, data analytics and visualization. Specifically, we have achieved: (i) real-time data acceptance from external utility interfaces with >99% acceptance rate; (ii) high performance anomaly detection algorithms with >98% detection accuracy and <0.1% false alarm rate; and (iii) ultra-low computing delay <50 milliseconds. Additionally, our team developed algorithms to identify the vulnerable variables in electricity market operations and root cause analysis functions to identify major contributors to the price spikes. These ancillary modules are necessary when deploying WISP in real world industry environment. In Phase II, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of WISP software on realistic largescale power systems. We performed red team testing for the Phase I WISP software and identified software vulnerabilities and implemented corresponding mitigation solutions. We adapted the electricity market simulator for the Texas synthetic 2000-bus system and generated datasets for the false data injection attacks. We created database and visualization interfaces for the Texas system and the ISO New England system. We performed software optimization in terms of operation efficiency, computing speed and detection accuracy. Finally, we tested the software on the Texas system and the ISO New England system and evaluated the detection performance. Overall, we achieved above 89% detection rate, below 3% false alarm rate and below 37 seconds of end-to-end detection delay.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Secure Mass Measurements From Transit Timing: 10 Kepler Exoplanets Between 3 and 8M⊕ with Diverse Densities and Incident Fluxes

We infer dynamical masses in eight multiplanet systems using transit times measured from Keplerʼs complete dataset, including short-cadence data where available. Of the 18 dynamical masses that we infer, 10 pass multiple tests for robustness. These are in systems Kepler-26 (KOI-250), Kepler-29 (KOI-738), Kepler-60 (KOI-2086), Kepler-105 (KOI-115), and Kepler-307 (KOI-1576). Kepler -105 c has a radius of 1.3R⊕ and a density consistent with an Earth-like composition. Strong transit timing variation (TTV) signals were detected from additional planets, but their inferred masses were sensitive to outliers or consistent solutions could not be found with independently measured transit times, including planets orbiting Kepler-49 (KOI-248), Kepler-57 (KOI-1270), Kepler-105 (KOI-115), and Kepler-177 (KOI-523). Nonetheless, strong upper limits on the mass of Kepler-177 cimply an extremely low density of 0.1 g cm−3. In most cases, individual orbital eccentricities were poorly constrained owing to degeneracies in TTV inversion. For five planet pairs in our sample, strong secular interactions imply a moderate to high likelihood of apsidal alignment over a wide range of possible eccentricities. We also find solutions for the three planets known to orbit Kepler-60 in a Laplace-like resonance chain. However, nonlibrating solutions also match the transit timing data. For six systems, we calculate more precise stellar parameters than previously known, enabling useful constraints on planetary densities where we have secure mass measurements. Placing these exoplanets on the mass–radius diagram, we find that a wide range of densities is observed among sub-Neptune-mass planets and that the range in observed densities is anticorrelated with incident flux.

Stars individual↗

AI-ENABLED MONITORING OPTIONS TOWARDS SECURE MICROREACTOR DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS

Global nuclear energy deployment scenarios suggest favorable economics for smaller, more versatile, and self-contained reactor technologies. Recognizing their key features as integrated, autonomous and either semi-remotely operated or fully remotely operated systems, microreactors are expected to be deployed in large numbers servicing off/micro-grids, many in geographically remote locations. Integrated nature of these systems as well as ease of their transportation as complete units, simplified installation and relocation/decommissioning challenge traditional continuity-of-knowledge practices used for conventional light water reactors where refueling is done onsite at designated times only replacing portions of their cores and only after their full commissioning for operations including completion of their containment building with security and safeguards measures in place. This effort is exploring AI (artificial intelligence)-enabled monitoring options that would be design agnostic and would assure secure unit deployment and operations. The principle is to maintain situational awareness via real-time evaluations of simultaneous and remotely transmitted monitoring data capturing key safeguards attributes including such characteristics as temperature, radiation, vibrational signals (inter alia), and others. The key principle is to provide reliable and resilient security options while maintaining simplified and economical deployment. The paper will review feasible options for AI-enabled solutions for such evaluations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NW-MILO Acoustic Data Collection

There is an enduring requirement to improve our ability to detect potential threats and discriminate these from the legitimate commercial and recreational activity ongoing in the nearshore/littoral portion of the maritime domain. The Northwest Maritime Information and Littoral Operations (NW-MILO) Program at PNNL’s Coastal Security Institute in Sequim, Washington is establishing a methodology to detect and classify these threats - in part through developing a better understanding of acoustic signatures in a near-shore environment. The purpose of the acoustic data collection described here is to investigate the acoustic signatures of small vessels. The data is being recorded continuously, 24 hours a day, along with radar track data and imagery. The recording began in August 2008, and to date the data contains tens of thousands of signals from small vessels recorded in a variety of environmental conditions. The quantity and variety of this data collection, with the supporting imagery and radar track data, makes it particularly useful for the development of robust acoustic signature models and advanced algorithms for signal classification and information extraction. The underwater acoustic sensing system is part of a multi-modal sensing system that is operating near the mouth of Sequim Bay. Sequim Bay opens onto the Straight of Juan de Fuca, which contains part of the border between the U.S. and Canada. Table 1 lists the specific components used for the NW-MILO system. The acoustic sensor is a hydrophone permanently deployed at a mean depth of about 3 meters. In addition to a hydrophone, the other sensors in the system are a marine radar, an electro-optical (EO) camera and an infra-red (IR) camera. The radar is integrated with a vessel tracking system (VTS) that provides position, speed and heading information. The data from all the sensors is recorded and saved to a central server. The data has been validated in terms of its usability for characterizing the signatures of small vessels. The sampling rate of 8 kHz and low pass filtering to 2 kHz results in an alias-free signal in the frequency band that is appropriate for small vessels. Calibration was performed using a Lubell underwater speaker so that the raw data signal levels can be converted to sound pressure. Background noise is present due to a nearby pump and as a result of tidal currents. More study is needed to fully characterize the noise, but it does not pose an obstacle to using the acoustic data for the purposes of vessel detection and signature analysis. The detection range for a small vessel was estimated using the calibrated voltage response of the system and a cylindrical spreading model for transmission loss. The sound pressure of a typical vessel with an outboard motor was found to be around 140 dB mPa, and could theoretically be detected from 10 km away. In practical terms, a small vessel could reliably be detected from 3 - 5 km away. The data is archived in netCDF files, a standard scientific file format that is "self describing". This means that each data file contains the metadata - timestamps, units, origin, etc. - needed to make the data meaningful and portable. Other file formats, such as XML, are also supported. A visualization tool has been developed to view the acoustic data in the form of spectrograms, along with the coincident radar track data and camera images.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Assembled genomic and tissue-specific transcriptomic data resources for two genetically distinct lines of Cowpea (Vigna unguiculata (L.) Walp)

Cowpea (Vigna unguiculata (L.) Walp) is an important legume crop for food security in areas of low-input and smallholder farming throughout Africa and Asia. Genetic improvements are required to increase yield and resilience to biotic and abiotic stress and to enhance cowpea crop performance. An integrated cowpea genomic and gene expression data resource has the potential to greatly accelerate breeding and the delivery of novel genetic traits for cowpea. Extensive genomic resources for cowpea have been absent from the public domain; however, a recent early release reference genome for IT97K-499-35 (Vigna unguiculata v1.0, NSF, UCR, USAID, DOE-JGI, http://phytozome.jgi.doe.gov/) has now been established in a collaboration between the Joint Genome Institute (JGI) and University California (UC) Riverside. Here we release supporting genomic and transcriptomic data for IT97K-499-35 and a second transformable cowpea variety, IT86D-1010. The transcriptome resource includes six tissue-specific datasets for each variety, with particular emphasis on reproductive tissues that extend and support the V. unguiculata v1.0 reference. Annotations have been included in our resource to allow direct mapping to the v1.0 cowpea reference. Access to this resource provided here is supported by raw and assembled data downloads.

Spriggs, Andrew↗

Pre-Shot Simulations of Near-Field and Far-Field Ground Motion for the Source Physics Experiment (SPE) Explosions at the Climax Stock, Nevada National Security Site: SPE3

The Source Physics Experiment (SPE) is designed to improve ground motion prediction capabilities for underground nuclear testing through the development of new physics-based models together with validation via new chemical explosion data. The SPE shots consist of different size and depth chemical explosions in a granite borehole at the Climax Stock on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The third shot in the series (SPE3) will be the same size (1000 kg TNT equivalent) and depth (45 m canister centroid) as the previous shot (SPE2). The main purpose of the SPE3 is to investigate the effects of the damage zone caused by the SPE2 chemical explosion on the SPE3 explosion, keeping all other parameters (e.g. size, depth, explosive type) the same. This SPE3 pre-shot report addresses progress made in simulation of the expected wavefield in the both the near- and the far-field. In this report we consider the far-field to be where seismic wave motion can be characterized by elastic or visco-elastic approximations, in contrast to the near-field where other, often non-linear effects, play a major role. The current simulations build on previous work from the SPE1 and SPE2 shots. The simulations are intended to highlight differences between SPE2 and SPE3 using a variety to approximations intended to mimic the expected effect of the damage zone. The simplest physics of damage zone effects suggest changes in the source region material properties (density, velocity), and in the yield strength (coupling) of the rock, should both impact the far-field signal. We can illustrate this in a simplistic way for P-waves in Figure A using the empirical Mueller-Muphy (1971) far-field explosion model (MM). First if the SPE2 explosion-induced damage reduces velocities and densities without affecting the yield strength or coupling, then by energy conservation the amplitudes for SPE 3 would increase as shown in the top of Figure A. Similarly if the explosion induced damage increased density (say by compacting pore space) the amplitude would decrease. This impedance effect, where the product of the density, wave-velocity, and ground-velocity squared is conserved, is well known. The second and harder effect to quantify, are changes in the energy coupling or yield strength. In the simple MM model this is represented by the coupling factor between cavity radius and yield. If we assume the granite was slightly weakened by SPE2 such that the cavity radius increases slightly then the overall amplitudes of SPE3 decrease relative to SPE2 as shown in the bottom of Figure A. In reality both effects, may exist due to the damage zone, and furthermore we know they are interrelated in complex ways. For S-waves we expect even more complex effects due to motion on joints and faults. For this reason we are developing physics-based near field simulation models coupled to far-field propagation codes to predict the overall effects of changes in the source emplacement region on observed signals. Near-field simulations have been performed using the Eulerian code (GEODYN). An ensemble model, calibrated to match records from past large-scale nuclear events is used. Both 2D axisymmetric (no faults) and fully three-dimensional GEODYN calculations (with /without faults) were conducted in which the damage zones sustained by SPE2 are retained as the initial condition for the SPE3 calculations. The results indicate that the waveform peak amplitudes are slightly decayed since the ensemble model includes no softening mechanism. The pulse widths are reduced, indicating the energy is dissipated more by the damage zone as expected. The dominant motions calculated in all the scenarios are spherically symmetric and non-spherical components are small as seen for the SPE2 calculations. The arrival time of the SPE3 waveform at the boreholes is shorter than SPE2 due to compaction during the previous explosion. As shown in the SPE 1 and 2 observations shear waves are generated, indicating the potential contributions from the induced motion on distributed joints. The effects of joints are evaluated using the Lagrangian hydrocode (GEODYN-L), which was benchmarked against the GEODYN calculations for the ensemble model. A new granite model calibrated for samples from the SPE site is used. The new model includes effects of poroelasticity and water saturation and may be scaled allowing application to both small and large scales. Parametric tests were performed to evaluate the effect of joints within the granite and the results demonstrate that in situ joints introduce anisotropy and significant tangential motions.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

A comparison of machine learning methods to classify radioactive elements using prompt-gamma-ray neutron activation data

The detection of illicit radiological materials is critical to establishing a robust second line of defence in nuclear security. Neutron-capture prompt-gamma activation analysis (PGAA) can be used to detect multiple radioactive materials across the entire Periodic Table. However, long detection times and a high rate of false positives pose a significant hindrance in the deployment of PGAA-based systems to identify the presence of illicit substances in nuclear forensics. In the present work, six different machine-learning algorithms were developed to classify radioactive elements based on the PGAA energy spectra. The model performance was evaluated using standard classification metrics and trend curves with an emphasis on comparing the effectiveness of algorithms that are best suited for classifying imbalanced datasets. We analyse the classification performance based on Precision, Recall, F1-score, Specificity, Confusion matrix, ROC-AUC curves, and Geometric Mean Score (GMS) measures. The tree-based algorithms (Decision Trees, Random Forest and AdaBoost) have consistently outperformed Support Vector Machine and K-Nearest Neighbours. Based on the results presented, AdaBoost is the preferred classifier to analyse data containing PGAA spectral information due to the high recall and minimal false negatives reported in the minority class.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗