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Disposal of LLW and ILW in Germany - Characterisation and Documentation of Waste Packages with Respect to the Change of Requirements

Since the 1998 termination of LLW and ILW emplacement in the Morsleben repository (ERAM), Germany, the treatment, conditioning and documentation of radioactive waste products and packages have been continued on the basis of the waste acceptance requirements as of 1995, prepared for the Konrad repository near Salzgitter in Lower Saxony, Germany. The resulting waste products and packages are stored in interim storage facilities. Due to the Konrad license issued in 2002 the waste acceptance requirements have to be completed by additional requirements imposed by the licensing authority, e. g. for the declaration of chemical waste package constituents. Therefore, documentation of waste products and packages which are checked by independent experts and are in parts approved by the responsible authority (Office for Radiation Protection, BfS) up to now will have to be checked again for fulfilling the final waste acceptance requirements prior to disposal. In order to simplify these additional checks, databases are used to ensure an easy access to all known facts about the waste packages. A short balance of the existing waste products and packages which are already checked and partly approved by BfS as well as an overview on the established databases ensuring a fast access to the known facts about the conditioning processes is presented. (authors)

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Commodity Flow Study - Clark County, Nevada, USA

The United States Department of Energy has designated Clark County, Nevada as an 'Affected Unit of Local Government' due to the potential for impacts by activities associated with the Yucca Mountain High Level Nuclear Waste Repository project. Urban Transit, LLC has led a project team of transportation including experts from the University of Nevada Las Vegas Transportation Research Center to conduct a hazardous materials community flow study along Clark County's rail and truck corridors. In addition, a critical infrastructure analysis has also been carried out in order to assess the potential impacts of transportation within Clark County of high level nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel to a proposed repository 90 miles away in an adjacent county on the critical infrastructure in Clark County. These studies were designed to obtain information relating to the transportation, identification and routing of hazardous materials through Clark County. Coordinating with the United States Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U. S. Federal Highway Administration, the Nevada Department of Transportation, and various other stakeholders, these studies and future research will examine the risk factors along the entire transportation corridor within Clark County and provide a context for understanding the additional vulnerability associated with shipping spent fuel through Clark County. (authors)

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A Challenge for Radioactive Waste Management: Memory Preservation

ANDRA, the French National Radioactive Waste Management Agency, is responsible for managing all radioactive waste in France over the long term. In the case of short-lived waste for which disposal facilities have a life expectancy of a few centuries, the Agency has set up a system for preserving the memory of those sites. Based on the historical analysis on a comparable timescale and on an appraisal of information-conservation means, a series of regulatory as well as technical provisions was made in order to ensure that sound information be transmitted to future generations. Requirements associated to the provisions deal mostly with legibility and a clear understanding of the information that must be decrypted and understood at least during the lifetime of the facilities (i.e., a few centuries). It must therefore be preserved throughout the same period. Responses to the requirements will be presented notably on various information-recording media, together with the information-diffusion strategy to the different authorities and structures within French society. A concrete illustration of the achievements made so far is the Centre de la Manche Disposal Facility, which was closed down in 1994 and is currently in its post-closure monitoring phase since 2003. In the case of deep geological repositories for long-lived radioactive waste, preserving memory takes a different aspect. First of all, timescales are much longer and are counted in hundreds of thousands of years. It is therefore much more difficult to consider how to maintain the richness of the information over such time periods than it is for short-lived waste. Both the nature and the form of the information to be transmitted must be revised. It would be risky indeed to base memory preservation over the long term on similar mechanisms beyond 1,000 years. Based on the heritage of a much more ancient history, we must seek to find appropriate means in order to develop surface markers and even more to ensure their conservation over compatible timescales with those of deep geological repositories. It will also be necessary, in the light of the experiments and efforts made in order to decrypt the messages written on rupestral paintings or in pyramids, find suitable expression means that will help, not the next few generations, but much more future generations, to grasp the meaning of what we aim at transmitting them. This paper presents the state of the French reflection on memory preservation and transmission over the very long term, for timescales consistent with the long-lived radioactive geological waste disposal projects. (author)

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Prediction of the Extent of the Disturbed Rock Zone around a WIPP Disposal Room, USA

This paper is one of a series of papers outlining the recent performance assessment for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant repository conducted by Sandia National Laboratories. The disturbed rock zone (DRZ) is an important feature that is included in the performance assessment process models to predict future repository conditions and brine flow to the accessible environment. Furthermore, the properties of the DRZ control a significant portion of the brine that can flow into the waste rooms. Extensive laboratory salt creep data demonstrate that damage can be assessed in terms of volumetric strain and principal stresses. Stress states that cause dilation are defined in terms of stress invariants, which allow reasonable models of DRZ evolution and devolution. In this paper, the change of DRZ extent with time is calculated based on a dilatant damage potential criterion. The constant C in the dilatancy criterion is determined by comparing the numerical analysis results of the Room Q access drift with the field data obtained at the same location for the analysis. The most extensive DRZ exists during early times, within the first ten years after an opening is mined. As the back stresses from the waste stack resist deformation, the damage to the salt decreases. The maximum extents of the DRZ calculated below and above the room reach approximately 2.24 m and 4.74 m, respectively. The maximum lateral DRZ extent in the side of the room is calculated to be roughly 2 m. (authors)

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Fluid (Air/Water) Cushion Transportation Technology for Emplacing Heavy Canisters into Horizontal Disposal Drifts

The disposal of certain types of radioactive waste canisters in a deep repository involves handling and emplacement of very heavy loads. The weight of these particular canisters can be in the order of 20 to 50 metric tons. They generally have to be handled underground in openings that are not much larger than the canisters themselves as it is time consuming and expensive to excavate and backfill large openings in a repository. This therefore calls for the development of special technology that can meet the requirements for safe operation at an industrial scale in restrained operating spaces. Air/water cushion lifting systems are used world wide in the industry for moving heavy loads. However, until now the technology needed for emplacing heavy cylindrical radioactive waste packages in bored drifts (with narrow annular gaps) has not been previously developed or demonstrated. This paper describes the related R and D work carried out by ANDRA (for air cushion technology) and by SKB and Posiva (for water cushion technology) respectively, mainly within the framework of the European Commission (EC) funded Integrated Project called ESDRED (6. European Framework Programme). The background for both the air and the water cushion applications is presented. The specific characteristics of the two different emplacement concepts are also elaborated. Then the various phases of the Test Programmes (including the Prototype phases) are detailed and illustrated for the two lifting media. Conclusions are drawn for each system developed and evaluated. Finally, based on the R and D experience, improvements deemed necessary for an industrial application are listed. The tests performed so far have shown that the emplacement equipment developed is operating efficiently. However further tests are required to verify the availability and the reliability of the equipment over longer periods of time and to identify the modifications that would be needed for an industrial application in a nuclear and mining environment. (authors)

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Recommendation for the Lower Limit of the Waste Shear Strength (Parameter Borehole: TAUFAIL)

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant demonstrates compliance with federal containment requirements by means of performance assessment calculations carried out to estimate the probability and consequences of radionuclide releases from the repository to the accessible environment. These calculations are performed using a system of computer codes which assess twenty-four peer-reviewed conceptual models. One of those is the cuttings and cavings model, which determines the amount of waste material that would be eroded off a borehole wall due to drilling mud flowing up the borehole during an inadvertent drilling intrusion that intersects the repository. This paper describes the results of several investigations to better constrain the shear strength of the degraded waste material constituting the borehole wall. The lower limit of the range of waste shear strength values is specifically addressed. Based on experimental results on realistic surrogate waste materials, a detailed literature review, and additional analyses it is recommended that the lower value of waste shear strength be changed from 0.05 to 1.50 Pa. In addition to the increase from 0.05 to 1.50 in the lower bound to the range of waste shear strength, a change from log-uniform to a uniform distribution is also recommended for performance assessment calculations. These changes will result in a decrease in the estimated magnitude and frequency of radionuclide releases due to inadvertent human intrusion events. This paper is one of a series of papers describing proposed changes for Waste Isolation Pilot Plant performance assessment calculations as summarized in Nemer et al. (authors)

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Experimental Study on the pH of Pore water in Compacted Bentonite under Reducing Conditions with Electromigration

Compacted bentonite and carbon steel are considered a good buffer and over-pack materials in the repositories of high-level radioactive waste disposal. Sodium bentonite, Kunipia-F contains approximately 95 wt% of montmorillonite. Bentonites prominent properties of high swelling, sealing ability and cation exchange capacity provide retardation against the transport of radionuclides from the waste into the surrounding rocks in the repository and its properties determine the behavior of bentonite. In this regards, the pH of pore water in compacted bentonite is measured with pH test paper wrapped with semi-permeable membrane of collodion sheet under reducing conditions. On 30 days, the pH test paper in the experimental apparatus indicated that the pH of pore water in compacted bentonite is around 8.0 at saturated state. The carbon steel coupon is connected as the working electrode to the potentiostat and is held at a constant supplied potential between +300 and -300 mV vs. Ag/AgCl electrode for up to 7 days. During applying electromigration the pH of pore water in bentonite decreased and it reached 6.0{approx}6.0 on 7 days. The concentration of iron and sodium showed nearly complementary distribution in the bentonite specimen after electromigration. It is expected that iron could migrate as ferrous ion through the interlayer of montmorillonite replacing exchangeable sodium ions in the interlayer. Semi-permeable membrane of collodion sheet does not affect the color change of pH test paper during the experiment. (authors)

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Implementation of SAP Waste Management System

The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) assumed responsibility for newly generated waste on October 1, 2005. To ensure effective management and accountability of newly generated waste, Y-12 has opted to utilize SAP, Y-12's Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) tool, to track low-level radioactive waste (LLW), mixed waste (MW), hazardous waste, and non-regulated waste from generation through acceptance and disposal. SAP Waste will include the functionality of the current waste tracking system and integrate with the applicable modules of SAP already in use. The functionality of two legacy systems, the Generator Entry System (GES) and the Waste Information Tracking System (WITS), and peripheral spreadsheets, databases, and e-mail/fax communications will be replaced by SAP Waste. Fundamentally, SAP Waste will promote waste acceptance for certification and disposal, not storage. SAP Waste will provide a one-time data entry location where waste generators can enter waste container information, track the status of their waste, and maintain documentation. A benefit of the new system is that it will provide a single data repository where Y-12's Waste Management organization can establish waste profiles, verify and validate data, maintain inventory control utilizing hand-held data transfer devices, schedule and ship waste, manage project accounting, and report on waste handling activities. This single data repository will facilitate the production of detailed waste generation reports for use in forecasting and budgeting, provide the data for required regulatory reports, and generate metrics to evaluate the performance of the Waste Management organization and its subcontractors. SAP Waste will replace the outdated and expensive legacy system, establish tools the site needs to manage newly generated waste, and optimize the use of the site's ERP tool for integration with related business processes while promoting disposition of waste. (authors)

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Uncertainties In Performance Assessments For The Yucca Mountain Site And The Edge-of-Compliance

Numerical performance assessments of deep geologic disposal systems of long-lived radioactive wastes serve as the primary tool for quantitatively assessing projected performance and for making regulatory compliance decisions, both in the U.S. and disposal programs abroad. However there is a significant body of opinion, expressed in the international literature, that the confidence that can be placed on such assessments decreases significantly as the analysis time frames increase into the many hundreds of thousands of years. With the inclusion of highly corrosion resistant metals in the planned waste package designs for the Yucca Mountain (YM) system commercial spent fuel and defense-generated high-level radioactive waste disposal, published projections for the site show doses to the receptor at times extending into the many hundreds of thousands of years. The question of relative confidence in dose projections becomes more important at very long time frames, particularly when the time frame for significant doses increases dramatically reflecting the effects of using highly corrosion resistant materials. To examine uncertainties in performance assessments of the YM disposal system over very long time frames, a site model developed by the U.S. Department of Energy to assess sensitivities in peak dose performance was modified and used to examine the propagation of uncertainties for a hypothetical disposal system. These analyses start with a hypothetical disposal system at the 'edge-of-compliance' at 10,000 years, reflecting the generic repository standard in 40 CFR Part 191. The hypothetical system was poised to give a mean dose of 0.15 milli-sievert/year (15 mrem/yr.) at 10,000 years, by allowing a fixed number of waste packages to 'fail' within the first 5,000 years after closure. By maintaining the number failed waste packages constant over time, the spread in dose estimates over the time to peak dose was calculated for this system perched at the 'edge-of-compliance' at 10,000 years. This hypothetical construct removes waste package performance from the analyses and allows the site model to explore the effects of uncertainties in the natural barrier and site conditions on the dose projections out to the time of peak dose. The sensitivities of these projections to various 'driver' parameters were examined, including infiltration rates, solubility constraints, water chemistry and roof collapse assumptions. Overall, the initial construct showed a one and one-half order of magnitude spread between the 5. and 95. percentiles at 10,000 years, the initial state for the analyses. This spread increased to approximately three and one-half orders of magnitude at peak dose, reflecting the effects of transport and retardation mechanisms on the fixed source term. The model eliminated portions of the transport path from the repository where relatively little retardation would be expected. Travel times were therefore significantly reduced thereby eliminating radioactive decay as an important mechanism in reducing projected doses. Solubility controls appear to be a major source of uncertainties in the dose projections for the model used. These results support the general international consensus that confidence in dose projections over very long time frames does decrease, and illustrates that this conclusion also applies to assessments of the YM projected performance as well. (authors)

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The Environmental Protection Agency's Safety Standards for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel: Potential Path Forward in Response to the Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future - 13388

Following the decision to withdraw the Yucca Mountain license application, the Department of Energy created a Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) on America's Nuclear Future, tasked with recommending a national strategy to manage the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. The BRC issued its final report in January 2012, with recommendations covering transportation, storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF); potential reprocessing; and supporting institutional measures. The BRC recommendations on disposal of SNF and high-level waste (HLW) are relevant to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which shares regulatory responsibility with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC): EPA issues 'generally applicable' performance standards for disposal repositories, which are then implemented in licensing. For disposal, the BRC endorses developing one or more geological repositories, with siting based on an approach that is adaptive, staged and consent-based. The BRC recommends that EPA and NRC work cooperatively to issue generic disposal standards-applying equally to all sites-early in any siting process. EPA previously issued generic disposal standards that apply to all sites other than Yucca Mountain. However, the BRC concluded that the existing regulations should be revisited and revised. The BRC proposes a number of general principles to guide the development of future regulations. EPA continues to review the BRC report and to assess the implications for Agency action, including potential regulatory issues and considerations if EPA develops new or revised generic disposal standards. This review also involves preparatory activities to define potential process and public engagement approaches. (authors)

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A Proposal for Geologic Radioactive Waste Disposal Environmental Zero-State and Subsequent Monitoring Definition - First Lessons Learned from the French Environment Observatory - 13188

Obtaining a reference state of the environment before the beginning of construction work for a geological repository is essential as it will be useful for further monitoring during operations and beyond, thus keeping a memory of the original environmental state. The area and the compartments of the biosphere to be observed and monitored as well as the choice of the markers (e.g. bio-markers, biodiversity, quality of the environment, etc.) to be followed must be carefully selected. In parallel, the choice and selection of the environmental monitoring systems (i.e. scientific and technical criteria, social requirements) will be of paramount importance for the evaluation of the perturbations that could be induced during the operational phase of the repository exploitation. This paper presents learning points of the French environment observatory located in the Meuse/Haute-Marne that has been selected for studying the feasibility of the underground disposal of high level wastes in France. (authors)

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Blue Ribbon Commission, Yucca Mountain Closure, Court Actions - Future of Decommissioned Reactors, Operating Reactors and Nuclear Power - 13249

Issues related to back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle continue to be difficult for the commercial nuclear power industry and for the decision makers at the national and international level. In the US, the 1982 NWPA required DOE to develop geological repositories for SNF and HLW but in spite of extensive site characterization efforts and over ten billion dollars spent, a repository opening is nowhere in sight. There has been constant litigation against the DOE by the nuclear utilities for breach of the 'standard contract' they signed with the DOE under the NWPA. The SNF inventory continues to rise both in the US and globally and the nuclear industry has turned to dry storage facilities at reactor locations. In US, the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future issued its report in January 2012 and among other items, it recommends a new, consent-based approach to siting of facilities, prompt efforts to develop one or more geologic disposal facilities, and prompt efforts to develop one or more consolidated storage facilities. In addition, the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident had a severe impact on the future growth of nuclear power. The nuclear industry is focusing on mitigation strategies for beyond design basis events and in the US, the industry is in the process of implementing the recommendations from NRC's Near Term Task Force. (authors)

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The Creation of a French Basic Nuclear Installation - Description of the Regulatory Process - 13293

CEA is a French government-funded technological research organization. It has to build a medium-level waste interim storage facility because the geological repository will not be available until 2025. This interim storage facility, called DIADEM, has to be available in 2017. These wastes are coming from the research facilities for spent fuel reprocessing and the dismantling of the most radioactive parts of nuclear facilities. The CEA handles the waste management by inventorying the needs and updating them regularly. The conception of the facility is mainly based on this inventory. It provides quantity and characteristics of wastes and it gives the production schedule until 2035. Beyond mass and volume, main characteristics of these radioactive wastes are chemical nature, radioisotopes, radioactivity, radiation dose, the heat emitted, corrosive or explosive gas production, etc. These characteristics provide information to study the repository safety. DIADEM mainly consists of a concrete cell, isolated from the outside, wherein stainless steel welded containers are stored, stacked in a vertical position in the racks. DIADEM is scheduled to store three types of 8 mm-thick, stainless steel cylindrical containers with an outside diameter 498 mm and height from 620 to 2120 mm. DIADEM will be a basic nuclear installation (INB in French) because of overall activity of radioactive substances stored. The creation of a French basic nuclear installation is subject to authorization according to the French law No. 2006-686 of 13 June 2006 on Transparency and Security in the Nuclear Field. The authorization takes into account the technical and financial capacities of the licensee which must allow him to conduct his project in compliance with these interests, especially to cover the costs of decommissioning the installation and conduct remediation work, and to monitor and maintain its location site or, for radioactive waste disposal installations, to cover the definitive shut-down, maintenance and surveillance expenditure. The authorization is issued by a decree adopted upon advice of the French Nuclear Safety Authority and after a public enquiry. In accordance with Decree No. 2007-1557 of November 2, 2007, the application is filed with the ministries responsible for nuclear safety and the Nuclear Safety Authority. It consists of twelve files and four records information. The favorable opinion of the Nuclear Safety Authority on the folder is required to start the public inquiry. Once the public inquiry is completed, the building permit is issued by the prefect. (authors)

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Preliminary Safety Analysis of the Gorleben Site: Overview - 13298

The project preliminary safety analysis of the Gorleben site started in 2010 and is based on the safety requirements for heat generating radioactive waste released from the German Federal Ministry for Environment, natural conservation and nuclear safety. The project consists of several tasks: the database defining the geology of Gorleben and the composition of the waste to be disposed of, the safety and demonstration concept, the repository concepts, the scenario analysis, the system analysis with long-term safety assessment and the synthesis. The overall synthesis indicates presently the compatibility of a repository in Gorleben with the safety requirements. The application of the method for a site selection process is still under evaluation. (authors)

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Preliminary Safety Analysis of the Gorleben Site: Geological Database - 13300

The Gorleben salt dome is 4 km wide and nearly 15 km long. It is composed of different salt rock types of the Zechstein (Upper Permian) series and extends to the Zechstein basis in a depth of more than 3 km. In the course of the salt dome formation the salt was moved several kilometers. During the uplift of the salt the initially plane-bedded strata of the Zechstein series were extensively folded. In this process anhydrite as a competent layer was broken to isolated blocks. In the core of the salt dome the Hauptsalz, which is characterized by a particularly high creeping capacity, forms a homogeneous halite body with a volume of several cubic kilometres. The Hauptsalz contains gaseous and liquid hydrocarbons in separated zones of decimeter to meter dimensions. The overall hydrocarbon content is far below 0.01 %. At the flanks the salt dome consists of salt rocks with lower creeping capacities. Brine reservoirs with fluid volumes in the range of liters to hundreds of cubic meters exist in certain regions of this part of the salt dome. The water content of the Hauptsalz is below 0.02 %. Interconnected pores do not exist in the salt rock outside of fluid bearing or fractured areas, i.e. the salt rock is impermeable. The exploration of the Gorleben site as a potential site for a HLW-repository started in 1979 and is still in progress. To date no scientific findings contest the suitability of the site for a safe HLW-repository. (authors)

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Dry Storage of Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel - 13321

Spent fuel from domestic and foreign research reactors is received and stored at the Savannah River Site's L Area Material Storage (L Basin) Facility. This DOE-owned fuel consists primarily of highly enriched uranium in metal, oxide or silicide form with aluminum cladding. Upon receipt, the fuel is unloaded and transferred to basin storage awaiting final disposition. Disposition alternatives include processing via the site's H Canyon facility for uranium recovery, or packaging and shipment of the spent fuel to a waste repository. A program has been developed to provide a phased approach for dry storage of the L Basin fuel. The initial phase of the dry storage program will demonstrate loading, drying, and storage of fuel in twelve instrumented canisters to assess fuel performance. After closure, the loaded canisters are transferred to pad-mounted concrete overpacks, similar to those used for dry storage of commercial fuel. Unlike commercial spent fuel, however, the DOE fuel has high enrichment, very low to high burnup, and low decay heat. The aluminum cladding presents unique challenges due to the presence of an oxide layer that forms on the cladding surface, and corrosion degradation resulting from prolonged wet storage. The removal of free and bound water is essential to the prevention of fuel corrosion and radiolytic generation of hydrogen. The demonstration will validate models predicting pressure, temperature, gas generation, and corrosion performance, provide an engineering scale demonstration of fuel handling, drying, leak testing, and canister backfill operations, and establish 'road-ready' storage of fuel that is suitable for offsite repository shipment or retrievable for onsite processing. Implementation of the Phase I demonstration can be completed within three years. Phases II and III, leading to the de-inventory of L Basin, would require an additional 750 canisters and 6-12 years to complete. Transfer of the fuel from basin storage to dry storage requires integration with current facility operations, and selection of equipment that will allow safe operation within the constraints of existing facility conditions. Examples of such constraints that are evaluated and addressed by the dry storage program include limited basin depth, varying fuel lengths up to 4 m, (13 ft), fissile loading limits, canister closure design, post-load drying and closure of the canisters, instrument selection and installation, and movement of the canisters to storage casks. The initial pilot phase restricts the fuels to shorter length fuels that can be loaded to the canister directly underwater; subsequent phases will require use of a shielded transfer system. Removal of the canister from the basin, followed by drying, inerting, closure of the canister, and transfer of the canister to the storage cask are completed with remotely operated equipment and appropriate shielding to reduce personnel radiation exposure. (authors)

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Stakeholder Transportation Scorecard: Reviewing Nevada's Recommendations for Enhancing the Safety and Security of Nuclear Waste Shipments - 13518

As a primary stakeholder in the Yucca Mountain program, the state of Nevada has spent three decades examining and considering national policy regarding spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste transportation. During this time, Nevada has identified 10 issues it believes are critical to ensuring the safety and security of any spent nuclear fuel transportation program, and achieving public acceptance. These recommendations are: 1) Ship the oldest fuel first; 2) Ship mostly by rail; 3) Use dual-purpose (transportable storage) casks; 4) Use dedicated trains for rail shipments; 5) Implement a full-scale cask testing program; 6) Utilize a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process for the selection of a new rail spur to the proposed repository site; 7) Implement the Western Interstate Energy Board (WIEB) 'straw man' process for route selection; 8) Implement Section 180C assistance to affected States, Tribes and localities through rulemaking; 9) Adopt safety and security regulatory enhancements proposed states; and 10) Address stakeholder concerns about terrorism and sabotage. This paper describes Nevada's proposals in detail and examines their current status. The paper describes the various forums and methods by which Nevada has presented its arguments and sought to influence national policy. As of 2012, most of Nevada's recommendations have been adopted in one form or another, although not yet implemented. If implemented in a future nuclear waste program, the State of Nevada believes these recommendations would form the basis for a successful national transportation plan for shipments to a geologic repository and/or centralized interim storage facility. (authors)

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Walk the Line: The Development of Route Selection Standards for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-level Radioactive Waste in the United States - 13519

Although storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLRW) are widely dispersed throughout the United States, these materials are also relatively concentrated in terms of geographic area. That is, the impacts of storage occur in a very small geographic space. Once shipments begin to a national repository or centralized interim storage facility, the impacts of SNF and HLRW will become more geographically distributed, more publicly visible, and almost certainly more contentious. The selection of shipping routes will likely be a major source of controversy. This paper describes the development of procedures, regulations, and standards for the selection of routes used to ship spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in the United States. The paper begins by reviewing the circumstances around the development of HM-164 routing guidelines. The paper discusses the significance of New York City versus the Department of Transportation and application of HM-164. The paper describes the methods used to implement those regulations. The paper will also describe the current HM-164 designated routes and will provide a summary data analysis of their characteristics. This analysis will reveal the relatively small spatial scale of the effects of HM 164. The paper will then describe subsequent developments that have affected route selection for these materials. These developments include the use of 'representative routes' found in the Department of Energy (DOE) 2008 Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the formerly proposed Yucca Mountain geologic repository. The paper will describe recommendations related to route selection found in the National Academy of Sciences 2006 report Going the Distance, as well as recommendations found in the 2012 Final Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. The paper will examine recently promulgated federal regulations (HM-232) for selection of rail routes for hazardous materials transport. The paper concludes that while the HM 164 regime is sufficient for certain applications, it does not provide an adequate basis for a national plan to ship spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to centralized storage and disposal facilities over a period of 30 to 50 years. (authors)

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