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Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order: Nevada National Security Site Use Restriction Management Plan with ROTC 1

This Use Restriction Management Plan (URMP) provides the information needed to create, modify, and manage use restrictions (URs) for sites on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), and sites accessed through the NNSS main gate, that were closed using the corrective action alternative (CAA) of closure in place under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). (Note: This pertains to those FFACO sites not managed by the U.S. Department of Energy [DOE], Legacy Management.) The closure in place alternative is used for sites closed with residual contamination at levels requiring corrective action as determined using the FFACO process. The URs contain and control all requirements for long-term monitoring. This URMP also serves as the single repository of the URs implemented under the FFACO that identify use restricted areas and contain the current requirements for inspections, maintenance, and monitoring of the UR. The requirements in these URs replace all requirements listed in previous documentation. This consolidates post-closure monitoring requirements into a single source that ensures completeness and consistency of UR requirements and information. Standardized UR forms were developed to clearly document post-closure requirements that are consistent with current protocols and to ensure consistent information is contained in the URs. Standard notification, summary, and site controls statements were developed for all URs with provisions to insert site-specific options in the text. Current protocols for Industrial Sites and Soils URs are defined in this document and in the Soils Risk-Based Corrective Action (RBCA) Evaluation Process (DOE/EMNV, 2018). The standardized UR forms that have been approved to date are listed in Appendix A. Additional UR forms will be added once the review and approval process has been completed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order Nevada National Security Site Use Restriction Management Plan

This Use Restriction Management Plan (URMP) provides the information needed to create, modify, and manage use restrictions (URs) for sites on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), and sites accessed through the NNSS main gate, that were closed using the corrective action alternative (CAA) of closure in place under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 114: Area 25 EMAD Facility Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 114, Area 25 EMAD Facility, identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). CAU 114 comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs) located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site: • 25-41-03, EMAD Facility (Building 3900) • 25-99-23, Manned Control Car (MCC) and Engine Installation Vehicle (EIV) • 25-33-05, Building 3901, Engine Transport System Maintenance Building (Train Shed) This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing CAU 114. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 114 using the SAFER process. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation before selecting the appropriate corrective actions for CAU 114. It is anticipated that the results of the field investigation and implementation of corrective actions will support a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. The purpose of the corrective action investigation will be to document and verify the adequacy of existing information; to affirm the decision for either clean closure, closure in place, or no further action; and to provide sufficient data to implement the corrective action. The actual corrective action selected will be based on characterization activities implemented under this SAFER Plan. If specific conditions or findings fall outside the bounds of the conceptual site model, such as an unanticipated release, the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) will be consulted to determine the path forward before proceeding. Upon completion of SAFER activities, a closure report (CR) will be prepared and submitted to NDEP for review and approval. The schedule for completion of the CR will be established in consultation with NDEP.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Non-Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Unit (CAU) Post-Closure Inspection Report, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada For Calendar Year 2024

This report includes visual inspection results, descriptions of maintenance and repair activities, and recommendations for calendar year 2024 for use restrictions at corrective action sites located on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and on the Nevada Test and Training Range that are accessed through the NNSS Main Gate.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 2

This revision was prepared to document changes to the data-collection activities. Specifically, the drilling and completion of the wells have been revised, and enhancements to the surface geophysics measurements have been included. Corrective action is needed because underground radioactive contamination exists in these areas resulting from historic underground nuclear testing. The PM CAUs are located in the northwestern portion of the Nevada National Security Site and comprise 82 corrective action sites. A total of 85 underground nuclear detonations took place within the area covered by the PM CAUs between 1965 and 1992 and resulted in the release of radionuclides in the subsurface in the vicinity of the test cavities.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G) (Final Project Report) [Slides]

This is the final technical report for the SETO-funded project Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G) from FY22-24. The project scope included development and dissemination of standards' requirements, best practices, equipment testing procedures, assessment tools, as well as education and training materials for cyber defense, posture and maturity tailored to solar technologies. The outcomes for this work include: co-led the development of cybersecurity certification standard (UL2941), co-led the development of cybersecurity guide (IEEE1547.3), development of recommendations for supply chain cybersecurity, and development of cybersecurity risk profiles and recommendations for DERMS.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 366: Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC 1

This Closure Report presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 366, Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites, and provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that closure objectives for CAU 366 were met. CAU 366 consists of the following six Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Area 11 of the Nevada National Security Site: • CAS 11-08-01, Contaminated Waste Dump #1 • CAS 11-08-02, Contaminated Waste Dump #2 • CAS 11-23-01, Radioactively Contaminated Area A • CAS 11-23-02, Radioactively Contaminated Area B • CAS 11-23-03, Radioactively Contaminated Area C • CAS 11-23-04, Radioactively Contaminated Area D

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Calendar Year 2024 Underground Test Area Annual Sampling Letter Report, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Rev. 1

The Underground Test Area (UGTA) Sampling Plan for Corrective Action Units (CAUs) 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada (referred to herein as “the Plan”) (DOE/EMNV, 2025) describes the approach for collecting and analyzing groundwater samples to meet the objectives of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s UGTA Activity. The Plan is designed to ensure compliance with the UGTA Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) (DOE/EMNV, 2024), and the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Submittal of The Final Calendar Year (Cy) 2025 Post-Closure Monitoring Letter Report, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 1, April 2026

This letter serves as the annual post-closure letter for CAU 98, Frenchman Flat; CAU 97, Yucca Flat/Climax Mine; and CAU 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain for calendar year 2025. This letter will discuss the post-closure monitoring activities that occurred during CY 2025, identify any triggers reached, and summarize water usage on the Nevada National Security Site and surrounding hydrographic basins at the three CAUs.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Non-Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Unit (CAU) Post-Closure Inspection Report, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada For Calendar Year 2025

This report includes visual inspection results, descriptions of maintenance and repair activities, and recommendations for CY 2025 for use restrictions (URs) at corrective action sites (CASs) located on the Nevada National Security Site and on the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) that are accessed through the NNSS Main Gate. This document is arranged by project activity (i.e., Industrial Sites, Soils, and Defense Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA]); then by corrective action unit (CAU); and then by CAS. Post-closure UR inspections are performed on an annual basis, unless as noted in text. Post-closure UR inspections verify the condition of physical controls required by each UR, which may include the following activities: • Visual verification of the legibility of signs • Visual inspection of fencing, signs, monuments, and/or markers for indications of wear • Visual inspection of soil covers for indications of subsidence, erosion, or unauthorized use Deficiencies in UR requirements that were identified during CY 2024 inspections and not addressed in the CY 2024 report are addressed in this CY 2025 report.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Deny-by-Default Network Port Security: SPaRC Technical Bulletin #002

Operational Technology (OT) networks [e.g., industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems] have unique cyber security challenges due to their decades long service life, high availability requirements, and limited visibility. OT networks often take credit for being “air gapped” (i.e. disconnected from the Internet) and all devices within the OT network can “talk” to each other—even if they should not. This SPaRC Technical Bulletin describes how the unique limitations of OT networks can become strengths when it comes to cybersecurity.

Cybersecurity↗

The Resilient Economy: Integrating Competitiveness and Security

Globalization, technological complexity, interdependence, terrorism, climate and energy volatility, and pandemic potential are increasing the level of risk that societies and organizations now face. Risks also are increasingly interrelated; disruptions in one area can cascade in multiple directions. The ability to manage emerging risks, anticipate the interactions between different types of risk, and bounce back from disruption will be a competitive differentiator for companies and countries alike in the 21st century. What Policymakers Should Know The national objective is not just homeland protection, but economic resilience: the ability to mitigate and recover quickly from disruption. Businesses must root the case for investment in resilience strategies to manage a spectrum of risks, not just catastrophic ones. Making a business case for investment in defenses against low-probability events (even those with high impact) is difficult. However, making a business case for investments that assure business continuity and shareholder value is not a heavy lift. There are an infinite number of disruption scenarios, but only a finite number of outcomes. Leading organizations do not manage specific scenarios, rather they create the agility and flexibility to cope with turbulent situations. The investments and contingency plans these leading companies make to manage a spectrum of risk create a capability to respond to high-impact disasters as well. Government regulations tend to stovepipe different types of risk, which impedes companies abilities to manage risk in an integrated way. Policies to strengthen risk management capabilities would serve both security and competitiveness goals. What CEOs and Boards Should Know Operational risks are growing rapidly and outpacing many companies abilities to manage them. Corporate leadership has historically viewed operational risk management as a back office control function. But managing operational risks increasingly affects real-time financial performance. The 835 companies that announced a supply chain disruption between 1989 and 2000 experienced 33 percent to 40 percent lower stock returns than their industry peers. Twenty-five percent of companies that experienced an IT outage of two to six days went bankrupt immediately. Ninety-three percent of companies that lost their data center for 10 days or more filed for bankruptcy within a year.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Calendar Year 2007 Groundwater Monitoring Report, U.S. Department of Energy Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

This report contains the groundwater and surface water monitoring data that were obtained during calendar year (CY) 2007 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (hereafter referenced as Y-12) on the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The CY 2007 monitoring data were obtained from wells, springs, and surface water sampling locations in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12 (Figure A.1). The Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime) encompasses a section of Bear Creek Valley (BCV) between the west end of Y-12 and the west end of the Bear Creek Watershed (directions are in reference to the Y-12 grid system). The Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime) encompasses the Y-12 industrial facilities and support structures in BCV. The Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime) encompasses a section of Chestnut Ridge directly south of Y-12. Section 2 of this report provides background information pertinent to groundwater and surface water quality monitoring in each hydrogeologic regime, including the topography and bedrock geology, surface water drainage, groundwater system, and extent of groundwater contamination. The CY 2007 groundwater and surface water monitoring data in this report were obtained from sampling and analysis activities implemented under the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP) managed by BWXT Y-12, L.L.C. (BWXT), and from sampling and analysis activities implemented under several monitoring programs managed by Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC). In December 2007, the BWXT corporate name was changed to Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Y-12, LLC (B&W Y-12), which is applied to personnel and organizations throughout CY 2007 for this report. Cooperative implementation of the monitoring programs directed by the Y-12 GWPP and BJC (i.e., coordinating sample collection and sharing data) ensures that the CY 2007 monitoring results fulfill requirements of all the applicable monitoring drivers with no duplication of sampling and analysis efforts. Section 3 of this report contains a summary of information regarding the groundwater and surface water sampling and analysis activities implemented under the Y-12 GWPP including sampling locations and frequency; quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) sampling; sample collection and handling; field measurements and laboratory analytes; data management and data quality objective (DQO) evaluation; and groundwater elevation monitoring. However, this report does not include equivalent information regarding the groundwater and surface water sampling and analysis activities associated with the monitoring programs implemented by BJC. Such details are deferred to the respective programmatic plans and reports issued by BJC (see Section 3.0). Collectively, the groundwater and surface water monitoring data obtained during CY 2007 by the Y-12 GWPP and BJC address DOE Order 450.1 (Environmental Protection Program) requirements for monitoring groundwater and surface water quality in areas: (1) which are, or could be, affected by operations at Y-12 (surveillance monitoring); and (2) where contaminants from Y-12 are most likely to migrate beyond the boundaries of the ORR (exit pathway/perimeter monitoring). Section 4 of this report presents a summary evaluation of the monitoring data with regard to the respective objectives of surveillance monitoring and exit pathway/perimeter monitoring, based on the analytical results for the principal groundwater and surface water contaminants at Y-12: nitrate, uranium, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), gross alpha activity, and gross beta activity. Section 5 of this report summarizes the most pertinent findings regarding the principal contaminants, along with recommendations proposed for ongoing groundwater and surface water quality monitoring performed under the Y-12 GWPP.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

New Science for a Secure and Sustainable Energy Future

Over the past five years, the Department of Energy's Office of Basic Energy Sciences has engaged thousands of scientists around the world to study the current status, limiting factors and specific fundamental scientific bottlenecks blocking the widespread implementation of alternate energy technologies. The reports from the foundational BESAC workshop, the ten 'Basic Research Needs' workshops and the panel on Grand Challenge science detail the necessary research steps (http://www.sc.doe.gov/bes/reports/list.html). This report responds to a charge from the Director of the Office of Science to the Basic Energy Sciences Advisory Committee to conduct a study with two primary goals: (1) to assimilate the scientific research directions that emerged from these workshop reports into a comprehensive set of science themes, and (2) to identify the new implementation strategies and tools required to accomplish the science. From these efforts it becomes clear that the magnitude of the challenge is so immense that existing approaches - even with improvements from advanced engineering and improved technology based on known concepts - will not be enough to secure our energy future. Instead, meeting the challenge will require fundamental understanding and scientific breakthroughs in new materials and chemical processes to make possible new energy technologies and performance levels far beyond what is now possible.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Probabilistic Characterization of Adversary Behavior in Cyber Security

The objective of this SMS effort is to provide a probabilistic characterization of adversary behavior in cyber security. This includes both quantitative (data analysis) and qualitative (literature review) components. A set of real LLNL email data was obtained for this study, consisting of several years worth of unfiltered traffic sent to a selection of addresses at ciac.org. The email data was subjected to three interrelated analyses: a textual study of the header data and subject matter, an examination of threats present in message attachments, and a characterization of the maliciousness of embedded URLs.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Energy Security and Restoration Exercise Program/Best Practices and Information Sharing

The first year of this cooperative agreement focused on the following elements: curriculum development and presentation, curriculum maintenance, enhancements, and effectiveness, and smart card initiative. During the second year of this grant, with redirection from DOE, the IUOE modified its mission statement under the cooperative agreement. It states: 'The mission of the IUOE is to provide expertise to provide best practices, information sharing, and develop scenarios and conduct exercises ranging in size and complexity from table top to national level to prepare all stakeholders to protect and restore energy infrastructure should an event, terrorist or natural, occur'. The Program developed a number of products under this Cooperative Agreement. These products include: FOSTER (Facility Operations Safety Training Event Response) Curriculum and Training Models, Alternative Energy Supply - Generators Training Module, Liquefied Natural Gas Training Module, Education Program - Distributed Generations, Compendium of Resources and References, Energy Security and Restoration Training Manual, Manual of Situations and Scenarios Developed for Emergency Exercises, Manual of Best Practices/Lessons Learned for Energy Load Management, Training Plan, Strategic Information and Exercise Plan, National Certification Plan Report, and a Smart Card Project Report.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Final Status Survey Report for Corrective Action Unit 117 - Pluto Disassembly Facility, Building 2201, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This document contains the process knowledge, radiological data and subsequent statistical methodology and analysis to support approval for the radiological release of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 117 – Pluto Disassembly Facility, Building 2201 located in Area 26 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Preparations for release of the building began in 2009 and followed the methodology described in the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM). MARSSIM is the DOE approved process for release of Real Property (buildings and landmasses) to a set of established criteria or authorized limits. The pre-approved authorized limits for surface contamination values and corresponding assumptions were established by DOE O 5400.5. The release criteria coincide with the acceptance criteria of the U10C landfill permit. The U10C landfill is the proposed location to dispose of the radiologically non-impacted, or “clean,” building rubble following demolition. However, other disposition options that include the building and/or waste remaining at the NNSS may be considered providing that the same release limits apply. The Final Status Survey was designed following MARSSIM guidance by reviewing historical documentation and radiological survey data. Following this review a formal radiological characterization survey was performed in two phases. The characterization revealed multiple areas of residual radioactivity above the release criteria. These locations were remediated (decontaminated) and then the surface activity was verified to be less than the release criteria. Once remediation efforts had been successfully completed, a Final Status Survey Plan (10-015, “Final Status Survey Plan for Corrective Action Unit 117 – Pluto Disassembly Facility, Building 2201”) was developed and implemented to complete the final step in the MARSSIM process, the Final Status Survey. The Final Status Survey Plan consisted of categorizing each individual room into one of three categories: Class 1, Class 2 or Class 3 (a fourth category is a “Non-Impacted Class” which in the case of Building 2201 only pertained to exterior surfaces of the building.) The majority of the rooms were determined to fall in the less restrictive Class 3 category, however, Rooms 102, 104, 106, and 107 were identified as containing Class 1 and 2 areas. Building 2201 was divided into “survey units” and surveyed following the requirements of the Final Status Survey Plan for each particular class. As each survey unit was completed and documented, the survey results were evaluated. Each sample (static measurement) with units of counts per minute (cpm) was corrected for the appropriate background and converted to a value with units of dpm/100 cm2. With a surface contamination value in the appropriate units, it was compared to the surface contamination limits, or in this case the derived concentration guideline level (DCGLw). The appropriate statistical test (sign test) was then performed. If the survey unit was statistically determined to be below the DCGLw, then the survey unit passed and the null hypothesis (that the survey unit is above limits) was rejected. If the survey unit was equal to or below the critical value in the sign test, the null hypothesis was not rejected. This process was performed for all survey units within Building 2201. A total of thirty-three “Class 1,” four “Class 2,” and one “Class 3” survey units were developed, surveyed, and evaluated. All survey units successfully passed the statistical test. Building 2201 meets the release criteria commensurate with the Waste Acceptance Criteria (for radiological purposes) of the U10C landfill permit residing within NNSS boundaries. Based on the thorough statistical sampling and scanning of the building’s interior, Building 2201 may be considered radiologically “clean,” or free of contamination.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Y-12 National Security Complex Biological Monitoring And Abatement Program 2008 Calendar Year Report

The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit issued for the Oak Ridge Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12 Complex) which became effective May 1, 2006, continued a requirement for a Biological Monitoring and Abatement Program (BMAP). The BMAP was originally developed in 1985 to demonstrate that the effluent limitations established for the Y-12 Complex protected the classified uses of the receiving stream (East Fork Poplar Creek: EFPC), in particular, the growth and propagation of aquatic life (Loar et al. 1989). The objectives of the current BMAP are similar, specifically to assess stream ecological conditions relative to regulatory limits and criteria, to assess ecological impacts as well as recovery in response to Y-12 operations, and to investigate the causes of continuing impacts. The BMAP consists of three tasks that reflect complementary approaches to evaluating the effects of the Y-12 Complex discharges on the biotic integrity of EFPC. These tasks include: (1) bioaccumulation monitoring, (2) benthic macroinvertebrate community monitoring, and (3) fish community monitoring. As required by the NPDES permit, the BMAP benthic macroinvertebrate community monitoring task includes studies to annually evaluate the receiving stream's biological integrity in comparison to TN Water Quality Criteria. BMAP monitoring is currently being conducted at five primary EFPC sites, although sites may be excluded or added depending upon the specific objectives of the various tasks. Criteria used in selecting the sites include: (1) location of sampling sites used in other studies, (2) known or suspected sources of downstream impacts, (3) proximity to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) boundaries, (4) appropriate habitat distribution, and (5) access. The primary sampling sites include upper EFPC at kilometers (EFKs) 24.4 and 23.4 [upstream and downstream of Lake Reality (LR) respectively]; EFK 18.7 (also EFK 18.2 and 19), located off the ORR and below an area of intensive commercial and light industrial development; EFK 13.8, located upstream from the Oak Ridge Wastewater Treatment Facility (ORWTF); and EFK 6.3 located approximately 1.4 km below the ORR boundary (Fig. 1.1). Actual sampling locations on EFPC may differ slightly by task according to specific requirements of the task. Brushy Fork (BF) at kilometer (BFK) 7.6 and Hinds Creek at kilometer (HCK) 20.6 are the most commonly used reference sites for the Y-12 BMAP. Additional sites off the ORR are also occasionally used for reference, including Beaver Creek, Bull Run, Cox Creek, and Paint Rock Creek (Fig. 1.2). Summaries of the sampling designs for the three primary tasks of the Y-12 Complex BMAP for EFPC are presented in Tables 1.1-1.3. This report covers the 2008 period, although data collected outside this time period are included as appropriate. To address the biological monitoring requirements for Bear Creek and McCoy Branch, CERLCA-funded programs, data are summarized in Appendix A and Appendix B respectively. Data for these two watersheds are provided herein to address Section IX of the NPDES Permit for Y-12, where 'Results of these CERCLA programs can be used to meet the biological monitoring requirements of this permit...'. A summary of the toxicity testing results for Y-12 outfalls into upper EFPC is provided in Appendix C (these results have been previously reported) to provide a more thorough perspective of conditions in the stream. Data summarized in this report are available from the Oak Ridge Environmental Information system (OREIS) in an Arc-GIS usable format (http://www-oreis.bechteljacobs.org/oreis/help/oreishome.html). Per requirements specified in the NPDES permit, data collected following TDEC monitoring protocols (TDEC 2006) is also submitted directly to TDEC in Excel format.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗