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At least 1,531 records · Page 85

UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Idaho National Laboratory Radioactive Waste Management Complex Low-Level Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) Low-Level Waste (INEL11006367N, Revision 4 [INL 2017]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the INL RWMC Low-Level Waste meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The INL RWMC Low-Level Waste is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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UNREVIEWED DISPOSAL QUESTION EVALUATION: Disposal of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Regulated Asbestos-Contaminated Low-Level Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sited, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Regulated Asbestos-Contaminated Low-Level Waste (LANL000000029, Revision 5 [LANL 2017]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the LANL Regulated Asbestos-Contaminated Low-Level Waste meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The LANL Regulated Asbestos Contaminated Low-Level Waste is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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Special Analysis for the Disposal of U.S. Department of Energy High Activity Cesium Sources Waste Stream at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This special analysis (SA) evaluates whether the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) High Activity Cesium (Cs) Sources waste stream (BCLADOEOSRPCS, Revision 0) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the LLNL DOE High Activity Cs Sources waste meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The LLNL DOE High Activity Cs Sources waste stream is recommended for acceptance with the conditions that 1) the total waste stream cesium-137 ( 137 Cs) activity be limited to 1.7E16 becquerel (Bq) and 2) the waste be disposed greater than 4.4 meters (m) (14 feet [ft], 5 inches [in.]) below existing grade.

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Special Analysis for the Disposal of the Transuranic Waste Processing Center Mixed Low-Level Waste Stream at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This special analysis (SA) evaluates whether the Transuranic Waste Processing Center (TWPC) Mixed Low-Level waste stream is suitable for disposal by shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the TWPC Mixed Low-Level waste was meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives. The TWPC Mixed Low-Level waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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Inadvertent Disposal of Chromium Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS), a waste generator approved to ship waste to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), made 49 waste shipments in the period 2009 to 2015 that were subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. One of the 49 shipments contained bottles of liquid blowback solution and was returned to NFS for disposition. The remaining 48 shipments consisted of a total of 93 disposal packages of chromium-containing waste that were disposed in seven low-level waste (LLW) cells at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS).

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Model Evaluation Report for Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Revision 1)

This Model Evaluation Report (MER) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 97, Yucca Flat/Climax Mine (YF/CM), Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. The YF/CM CAU is located in the northeastern portion of the NNSS and comprises 720 corrective action sites. A total of 747 underground nuclear detonations took place within this CAU between 1957 and 1992 and resulted in the release of radionuclides (RNs) in the subsurface in the vicinity of the detonation cavities.

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CY2018 Annual Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98, Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (January 2018–December 2018, Revision 1)

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98: Frenchman Flat on the Nevada National Security Site was the location of 10 underground nuclear tests. CAU 98 underwent a series of investigations and actions in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order to assess contamination of groundwater by radionuclides from the tests. A Closure Report completed that process in 2016 and called for long-term monitoring, use restrictions (URs), and institutional controls to protect the public and environment from potential exposure to contaminated groundwater. Three types of monitoring are performed for CAU 98: water quality, water level, and institutional control. These are monitored to determine whether the URs remain protective of human health and the environment, and to ensure that the regulatory boundary objectives are being met. Monitoring data will be used in the future, once multiple years of data are available, to evaluate consistency with the groundwater flow and contaminant transport models because the contaminant boundaries calculated with the models are the primary basis of the UR boundaries. Six wells were sampled for water-quality monitoring in 2018. Contaminants of concern were detected only in the two source/plume wells already known to contain contamination as a result of a radionuclide migration experiment. Tritium concentrations in both of these wells, RNM-2S and UE-5n, remain above the Safe Drinking Water Act maximum contaminant level of 20,000 picocuries per liter but declined in 2018 as compared to measurements in 2017. All other contaminants of concern are below the minimum detection level plus analytical error. The water-level monitoring network includes 16 wells. Depth to water measured in 2018 is generally consistent with recent measurements for all wells. Many wells continue to exhibit a long-term downward trend in water level, despite small increases in measured water levels in 2018. The sharp 2016 decline in water level in Well ER-5-3-2 remains unexplained, with the lower level persisting through 2018. Rising water-level trends continue to be observed in two relatively deep wells (ER-5-3 deep piezometer and ER-5-4-2), and also in former supply Well WW-5A. The current supply wells exhibit relatively erratic water levels associated with pumping activities. Institutional control monitoring confirmed the URs are recorded in U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Air Force land management systems, and that no activities within Frenchman Flat basin are occurring that could potentially affect the contaminant boundaries. Survey of groundwater resources in basins surrounding Frenchman Flat similarly identify no current or pending development that would indicate the need to increase monitoring activities or would otherwise cause concern for the closure decision. The URs continue to prevent exposure of the public, workers, and the environment to contaminants of concern by preventing use of potentially contaminated groundwater.

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Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability and Installation Energy Security

The U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) fixed installations - or military bases - are a critical element of national security. Military bases support the maintenance and deployment of weapons systems, training and mobilization of combat forces, and provide direct support to combat operations. Fixed installations do not operate without energy and they rely largely on electricity to support critical missions and functions. Installations are dependent on a commercial grid that is vulnerable to disruption due to severe weather, physical attacks, and cyberattacks. This report looks at the impact on the highest priority critical loads.

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Modular Security Apparatus for Managing Distributed Cryptography for Command-and-Control Messages on Operational Technology Networks (Module-OT)

Module-OT is a bump- in- the- wire solution acting as a secure conduit for data between devices or systems across a network. Using the latest in open-source cryptographic libraries, all defined communications undergo authentication, authorization, and encryption. The core system can be easily installed through industry standard processes, and the use of popular open-source packages allows for it to be customizable customized by the developer community or deployed in unique embedded environments.

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International Radiological/Nuclear Training for Emergency Response - Major Public Events Virtual Workshop: Nuclear Security Planning and Operations (Day 3) [Slides]

This module will provide a basic overview of radiological/nuclear search operations, including the application of radiological detection instrumentation and best practices for operational tactics, techniques and procedures. This module will introduce basic radiological/nuclear search operations and include the following: (1) A review of the principles of optimizing detection, (2) An understanding of radiation hazards and alarms, and (3) An examination of nuclear security measures best practices for buildings and stadium complexes, large areas, roadways and parking areas, and pedestrian and vehicle entrance portals.

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Artificial Intelligence for Digital Security and Protections

Proper functioning of nuclear power plants relies on a mix of well-regulated human and machine-driven workflows. This regulation supports nuclear safety through a series of processes and many of the tasks that support these processes have a repetitive nature that make artificial intelligence (AI) informed by machine learning (ML) a potential aid in a variety of tasks. AI is being evaluated for activities that include inspections, fuel processing, monitoring, and other activities. The introduction of any new technology presents a potential new attack vector. In the case of AI/ML, there are many attacks that have already been discovered and over time the attacks can be expected to follow the growth pattern observed in cyber security. While future planning is necessary, current efforts need to be established now to predict the threat emergence over the next year 10 years and mitigate potential threats. Based on these observations, AI/ML will need to become trustworthy, which corresponds to techniques and procedures that emphasize AI explainability along with resilience techniques to data, algorithms, models, and systems. This kind of system robustness is the foundation for defenses against AI/ML-specific attacks. Attempting to look forward and take a broad view of capabilities provides input to research roadmaps and the ability to distill vulnerabilities into specific use cases may provide greater assistance in understanding the technology benefits while introducing new risks. The impact of current and future AI in three areas—capabilities, challenges, and recovery strategies—represents an initial attempt at balancing both.

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Security Enhancements for Distributed Energy Resource Systems Interconnected with Distribution Networks: Final Technical Report

The revised IEEE 1547 Standard defines new complex communication-adjustable voltage and frequency regulation and ride-through characteristics, while maintaining the general antiislanding requirement for unintentional islanding situations. Unintentional islanding is prohibited while intentional islanding is specifically allowed, thus effectively enabling microgrid operation mode. Further, IEEE 1547-2018 Standard introduces new requirements in terms of interoperability so that the DER plant/circuit segments may be seamlessly integrated with the utility networks but at the same time become vulnerable to a cyber-attack. Traditional cybersecurity measures including encryption, authentication and role-based access control may not be fully implementable to all communication protocols specified in the IEEE 1547 Standard. Therefore, in this project we have identified, researched, implemented and tested several cyberphysical approaches that rely mostly on the behavior of the DER circuit and may help with validating the incoming command and control action potentially coming through an insecure communications channel. Additionally, we have built semantic models and communications profiles for DER facilities and have implemented lightweight IEC 61850 based publisher-subscriber GOOSE messaging mechanism, with security extensions in terms of authentication and encryption. The project proposed information models for integration into UCA OpenFMB 2.0 profiles focusing on grid code compliance.

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Improving the Cyber and Physical Security Posture of the Electric Sector (Final Report)

Cooperative electric utilities represent an integral part of the larger electric grid and are part of the nation’s critical infrastructure. The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) has a unique relationship with approximately 900 cooperatively owned and operated electric utilities and engaged in a program with the Department of Energy (DOE) to promote a culture of cybersecurity and resiliency within the electric cooperative community. The Rural Cooperative Cybersecurity Capabilities (RC3) Program, funded under a Cooperative Agreement with DOE (Project DE-OE-0000807), focused on improving the cybersecurity and resiliency capabilities of small and mid-sized electric distribution cooperatives. This segment of electric utilities faces many challenges, but also embraces a culture of cooperation that presents opportunities. A customized approach is needed to reach these utilities – one that emphasizes collaboration, more focused and personalized training, use of trusted and familiar experts that can be deployed as needed, software security services that require limited in-house cybersecurity expertise, and shared resource models that enable access to more expensive cybersecurity options.

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Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 572: Test Cell C Ancillary Building and Structures - Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC 1

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 572, Test Cell C Ancillary Building and Structures, identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). CAU 572 comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs) located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site: CAS 25-33-01, Building 3220, Equipment Building; CAS 25-33-02, Building 3230, Motor Drive Building; CAS 25-33-03, Building 3231, Pump House; CAS 25-33-04, Building 3232, Cryogenic Evaluation Lab; CAS 25-99-22, Ancillary Facilities. This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing CAU 572. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 572 using the SAFER process. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation before selecting the appropriate corrective action. It is anticipated that the results of the field investigation and implementation of corrective actions will support a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. The purpose of the corrective action investigation (CAI) will be to document and verify the adequacy of existing information; to affirm the decision for either clean closure, closure in place, or no further action; and to provide sufficient data to implement the corrective action. The actual corrective action selected will be based on characterization activities implemented under this SAFER Plan. If it is determined that complete clean closure cannot be accomplished during the CAI, then a hold point will have been reached and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) will be consulted to determine whether the remaining contamination will be closed under the alternative corrective action of closure in place. This will be presented in a closure report that will be prepared and submitted to NDEP for review and approval.

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5G Securely Energized and Resilient: (5G-SER) (Final Report)

NREL's work on 5G integration with physical power systems (versus simulated systems demonstrated in task 3) under 5G-Securely Energized and Resilient (5G-SER) achieved a major milestone in with the completion of Task 4 activities. After many months (6+) of planning and development along with scaling challenges along the way, a full 5G end-to-end network with physical hardware components (physical inverter, physical power panel, physical battery, etc.) was deployed in a containerized environment. In parallel, a distributed controls architecture for a microgrid powering 5G resources was also successfully modified from its previous instantiation for a simulated environment to work with these physical components. These accomplishments set the stage to use newly setup 5G technology with physical microgrid components to test the feasibility of 5G wireless with physical systems to enable resilient communications between controls and distributed solar and storage resources while exploring ways to configure 5G components to survive power disturbances. The results detailed in the report below show that even utilizing physical components, 5G wireless systems were able to provide resilient results that were similar to the results from the simulated environment Task 3).

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