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At least 1,513 records · Page 84

DOC-DICAM: Domain Aware One Class Defect Identification in Composite Aerostructure Material

Fiber-reinforced composites are a common material used in the design of aircraft structures due to their good tensile strength and resistance to compression. During the manufacturing process, these structures are thoroughly inspected for flaws and defects to ensure structural integrity during commercial use. Non-destructive testing (NDT) is a collection of inspection methods that allow inspectors to evaluate material without altering it. Due to the high safety standards in aerospace manufacturing, the NDT process is done manually and can be a significant bottleneck in the development workflow. In this paper, we develop an AI-based assistance tool to drastically reduce inspection time. Typical AI workflows require large amounts of annotated data, but defects rarely occur resulting in strong class imbalance. To overcome this, we formulate the problem of defect identification as an anomaly detection task in which our primary focus is learning non-defect characteristics. To do this, we develop a multi-task self-supervised learning framework that embeds problem specific domain knowledge into the deep learning model. We verify our method using fuselage data generated in a production environment. As a result, we show that our method can effectively identify defects and requires minimal training and inference time.

anomaly detection↗

Protection of extreme ultraviolet lithography masks. II. Showerhead flow mitigation of nanoscale particulate contamination [Protection of EUV lithography masks II: Showerhead flow mitigation of nanoscale particulate contamination]

An analysis is presented of a method to protect the reticle (mask) in an extreme ultraviolet (EUV) mask inspection tool using a showerhead plenum to provide a continuous flow of clean gas over the surface of a reticle. The reticle is suspended in an inverted fashion (face down) within a stage/holder that moves back and forth over the showerhead plenum as the reticle is inspected. It is essential that no particles of 10-nm diameter or larger be deposited on the reticle during inspection. Particles can originate from multiple sources in the system, and mask protection from each source is explicitly analyzed. The showerhead plate has an internal plenum with a solid conical wall isolating the aperture. The upper and lower surfaces of the plate are thin flat sheets of porous-metal material. These porous sheets form the top and bottom showerheads that supply the region between the showerhead plate and the reticle and the region between the conical aperture and the Optics Zone box with continuous flows of clean gas. The model studies show that the top showerhead provides robust reticle protection from particles of 10-nm diameter or larger originating from the Reticle Zone and from plenum surfaces contaminated by exposure to the Reticle Zone. Protection is achieved with negligible effect on EUV transmission. Furthermore, the bottom showerhead efficiently protects the reticle from nanoscale particles originating from the Optics Zone.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Poster — Thur Eve — 54: Radiotherapy and Non-Radiotherapy Safety Practices Beyond Licensing Expectations

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) regulates the use of nuclear energy and materials to protect the health, safety and security of Canadians and the environment, and to implement Canada's international obligations on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In order to perform this regulatory activity, the CNSC issue licences and has its staff perform inspections to verify conformity to the aspects of those licences. Within the CNSC, the Accelerators and Class II Facilities Division (ACFD) is responsible for the regulatory oversight of Class II Prescribed Equipment used in medical, academic, and industrial sectors in Canada. In performing inspections, ACFD has encountered licensees with practices that are either below, meet or exceed regulatory expectations in specific areas. Unfortunately, none of these practices are ever communicated to the broader Class II community to help other licensees avoid the same problem or achieve high standards. In this poster, ACFD will highlight safety practices that go beyond expectations. These practices are taken from observations during site inspections between 2007 and 2013 and will be presented in six areas: Procedures, Participation, Awareness, Equipment, Servicing and Software. Each area briefly discusses a number of practices that the CNSC feels went beyond the expectations dictated by the licence. Where possible, names are added of the contact people at the centres who can be reached for full details of their implementations. It is hoped that this communication will assist other licensees to achieve these same high levels of compliance and possibly go beyond.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Model Data Archive Associated with Manuscript "Fire-altered Carbon Pools Create Disturbance Memory in Stream Dissolved Organic Carbon"

This data package supports the publication “Fire-altered Carbon Pools Create Disturbance Memory in Stream Dissolved Organic Carbon” by Li et al. (2026). The package contains processed model inputs, configuration files, restart files, simulation outputs, scripts, and visualization products used to evaluate post-fire dissolved organic carbon (DOC) dynamics in the Naches River Watershed, Washington, USA, following the 2021 Schneider Springs Fire. The modeling workflow couples ELM-BGC, the biogeochemistry-enabled Energy Exascale Earth System Model Land Model; ATS, the Advanced Terrestrial Simulator for integrated surface-subsurface hydrology; and PFLOTRAN, a reactive transport model for multicomponent aqueous geochemistry. Together, these models simulate how wildfire-induced changes in vegetation, litter, coarse woody debris, and soil organic matter influence DOC production, transport, and reaction from burned hillslopes to stream networks. The archive includes preprocessed meteorological, geospatial, hydrologic, and biogeochemical forcing data; ELM-BGC-derived DOC source terms; ATS mesh files; PFLOTRAN reactive-transport inputs; model configuration files; spin-up and transient restart files; watershed-scale diagnostic outputs; stream concentration time series; and figures or visualization files used to inspect and reproduce key results. File types include Hierarchical Data Format 5 (HDF5) files for gridded forcing and model-coupling data, model input and configuration files for ELM-BGC, ATS, and PFLOTRAN, restart and simulation-output files generated by the modeling workflow, tabular or time-series diagnostic outputs, scripts for post-processing and figure generation, and image or visualization products associated with the manuscript. Use of the package depends on the intended task. Re-running the simulations requires the relevant modeling software, including ELM-BGC, ATS, and PFLOTRAN as ATS's geochemical engine. Inspecting outputs and reproducing figures requires Python with scientific plotting libraries such as Matplotlib, and three-dimensional model outputs may be viewed with ParaView. Geographic information system files or maps may be inspected with ArcGIS Pro or comparable GIS software. The data package is intended to enable traceability, reuse, and partial reproduction of the coupled land-to-watershed hydro-biogeochemical modeling workflow used to test how wildfire disturbance affects terrestrial carbon pools and downstream DOC dynamics.

ATS↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 574: Neptune, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 574 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as 'Neptune' and consists of the following two Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune); and (2) CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca). This Closure Report presents information supporting closure of CAU 574 according to the FFACO (FFACO, 1996 [as amended March 2010]) and the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 574 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2011). The following activities were performed to support closure of CAU 574: (1) In situ external dose rate measurements were collected using thermoluminescent dosimeters at CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca). (2) Total effective dose rates were determined at both sites by summing the internal and external dose rate components. (3) A use restriction (UR) was implemented at CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune). Areas that exceed the final action level (FAL) of 25 millirems per year (mrem/yr) based on the Occasional Use Area exposure scenario are within the existing use restricted area for CAU 551. The 25-mrem/yr FAL is not exceeded outside the existing CAU 551 UR for any of the exposure scenarios (Industrial Area, Remote Work Area, and Occasional Use Area). Therefore, the existing UR for CAU 551 is sufficient to bound contamination that exceeds the FAL. (4) An administrative UR was implemented at CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca) as a best management practice (BMP). The 25-mrem/yr FAL was not exceeded for the Remote Work Area or Occasional Use Area exposure scenarios; therefore, a UR is not required. However, because the 25-mrem/yr FAL was exceeded for the Industrial Area exposure scenario, an administrative UR was established as a BMP. UR documentation is included as Appendix B. The UR at CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune), is within the existing UR for CAU 551. Additional postings were not installed, and annual post-closure inspections will be performed in conjunction with the inspections performed for CAU 551. At CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca), the administrative UR does not require postings or inspections. NNSA/NSO requests the following: (1) A Notice of Completion from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to NNSA/NSO for closure of CAU 574; and (2) The transfer of CAU 574 from Appendix III to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, of the FFACO

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Alternate paddle configuration for improved wear resistance in the saltstone mixer

The Saltstone Production Facility has a 10-inch Readco-Kurimoto continuous mixer that mixes the premix dry feeds and low-level waste salt solution to make fresh (uncured) saltstone. Inspection of the mixer in January 2013 showed significant wear on the third, fourth and fifth paddle pairs after the conveying augers. A 2-inch Readco-Kurimoto continuous mixer was used to test alternate paddle configurations for use in the 10-inch mixer to decrease the wear rate on the paddles. Two wear tests were conducted to investigate a method of reducing wear on the mixer paddles. The first test (wear test 2a) had a paddle configuration similar to the currently installed 10-inch mixer in the SPF. This test established baseline wear. The second test (wear test 2b) had a reconfigured paddle arrangement that replaced the flat paddles with helical paddles for paddle pairs 2 - 6 and aligned paddle pair 1 with the augers. The intent of the reconfiguration was to more effectively convey the partially wetted dry feeds through the transition region and into the liquid feed where paddle wear is reduced due to dry feeds and salt solution being mixed at the intended water to premix ratio. The design of the helical paddles provides conveyance through the transition region to the liquid feed inlet. The alignment with the auger is aimed to provide a smoother transition (minimizing the discontinuity between the auger and paddle pair 1) into the downstream paddles. A soft metal with low wear resistance (6000 series aluminum) was used for the wear testing paddles to determine wear patterns while minimizing run time and maximizing wear rate. For the two paddle configurations tested using the scaled 2-inch Readco-Kurimoto continuous mixer, with the first six paddles after the augers replaced by the wear paddles and the remaining paddles were stainless steel. Since the 10-inch SPF mixer is designed with the liquid inlet centered over paddle pairs 5 and 6, the scaled 2-inch mixer was configured the same way. The wear rate from wear test 2a was approximately double the wear rate from wear test 2b for paddle pairs 4 and 5. For both configurations, there was little or no wear on paddle pairs 1, 2, 3 and 6 based on mass change, indicating that the un-wetted and fully wetted premix materials cause less wear than the partially wetted premix. Additionally, inspection of the wear surface of the paddles showed more deformation on the flat paddles than the helical paddles which was consistent with the wear rates. Aligning of the auger discharge flight with paddle pair 1 resulted in a lower wear rate paddle pair 1 rather than having them misaligned with the feed augers. During the paddle wear tests, polishing wear was observed on the inside barrel of the mixer. The polishing wear is evident on the upper housing clamshell and the lower housing clamshell primarily at paddle pairs 4 and 5, which is the transition region of the mixer. Wear on the mixer barrel increases the space between the paddles and the barrel, resulting in increased grout build up on the barrel. Since the mixer barrel cannot be reconfigured or replaced in the SPF, the method for mitigating wear on the barrel is to move the more viscous grout through the transition region as quickly as possible. In addition, the location of the liquid inlet does not allow for sufficient cleaning of the mixer since residual grout remains on paddle pairs 1 - 4. As the paddles continue to wear and the self-cleaning capability of the paddles is lost, the lack of sufficient flushing would aid in grout build up between the barrel and the paddles which could eventually lead to decreased throughput capacity of the dry feeds. Changing the paddle configuration from flat to helical resulted in no change to the rheological properties of the grout mixture. Both tests produced a grout that is within the processing range of the SPF. Based on the results of this testing, it is recommended for the currently installed SPF mixer that paddle pairs 1 through 6 be helical rather than flat, with the paddle pair 1 aligned with the feed augers in order to minimize the wear occurring in the SPF mixer. Based on the results of this testing, it is recommended that the mixer be inspected and critical measurements be taken whenever the SPF processing schedule allows in order to establish a wear rate of the 10-inch mixer paddles.5 Based on these measurements, the lifetime of paddles in the transition region can be established in order to set up a maintenance schedule for the mixer. Since replacing the entire mixer is very expensive and time intensive, replacing the worn paddles after a specific time period would allow for planned shutdowns as well as process optimization such that the mixer throughput is not compromised. In addition, further testing should be performed to determine an alternate liquid inlet location to better flush the mixer of residual grout at the end of processing. Sufficiently cleaning the mixer will help eliminate another potential source of wear. Another potential method for reducing the wear rate in the mixer is to reduce the mixer speed without affecting the throughput capacity. Since wear rate is a function of impact velocity of the grout and mixing paddles, testing could be done using the 2-inch mixer determine the optimum mixer speed to reduce wear but not adversely impact facility operations (e.g. throughput capacity and grout properties).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program Monitoring Optimization Plan For Groundwater Monitoring Wells At The U.S. Department Of Energy Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

This document is the monitoring optimization plan for groundwater monitoring wells associated with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The plan describes the technical approach that is implemented under the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP) to focus available resources on the monitoring wells at Y-12 that provide the most useful hydrologic and groundwater quality monitoring data. The technical approach is based on the GWPP status designation for each well. Under this approach, wells granted "active" status are used by the GWPP for hydrologic monitoring and/or groundwater quality sampling, whereas wells granted "inactive" status are not used for either purpose. The status designation also defines the frequency at which the GWPP will inspect applicable wells, the scope of these well inspections, and extent of any maintenance actions initiated by the GWPP. Details regarding the ancillary activities associated with implementation of this plan (e.g., well inspection) are deferred to the referenced GWPP plans. This plan applies to groundwater wells associated with Y-12 and related waste management areas and facilities located within three hydrogeologic regimes.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Opportunities for Process Monitoring Techniques at Delayed Access Facilities

Except for specific cases where the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) maintains a continuous presence at a facility (such as the Japanese Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant), there is always a period of time or delay between the moment a State is notified or aware of an upcoming inspection, and the time the inspector actually enters the material balance area or facility. Termed by the authors as “delayed access,” this period of time between inspection notice and inspector entrance to a facility poses a concern. Delayed access also has the potential to reduce the effectiveness of measures applied as part of the Safeguards Approach for a facility (such as short-notice inspections). This report investigates the feasibility of using process monitoring to address safeguards challenges posed by delayed access at a subset of facility types.

Delayed access↗

Fabrication Control Plan for ORNL RH-LOCA ATF Test Specimens to be Irradiated in the ATR

The purpose of this fabrication plan is (1) to summarize the design of a set of rodlets that will be fabricated and then irradiated in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) and (2) provide requirements for fabrication and acceptance criteria for inspections of the Light Water Reactor (LWR) – Accident Tolerant Fuels (ATF) rodlet components. The functional and operational (F&OR) requirements for the ATF program are identified in the ATF Test Plan. The scope of this document only covers fabrication and inspections of rodlet components detailed in drawings 604496 and 604497. It does not cover the assembly of these items to form a completed test irradiation assembly or the inspection of the final assembly, which will be included in a separate INL final test assembly specification/inspection document. The controls support the requirements that the test irradiations must be performed safely and that subsequent examinations must provide valid results.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Electronic Production Control System News Note

The CMD subprogram develops and deploys multi-application weapon component manufacturing capabilities needed to replace sunset technologies, upgrade existing technologies, and introduce new technologies that support the nuclear weapons stockpile. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is currently developing an Electronic Production Control System (EPCS) for ASIC production in the back end of line (BEOL) flow. A pre-production version of EPCS has been released and is operating as intended. We are currently processing all ASIC products, including CVV validation ASICs. The BEOL flow includes wafer probe, packaging, quality inspection, initial electrical test, dynamic burn-in, final electrical test, quality inspection, final visual inspection, radiation testing, SNL acceptance, DOE SSO acceptance, and qualification testing steps. EPCS will execute this production workflow (initiate, control, and electronically track each product); it will implement defect prevention strategies; it will create an electronic inventory control system that is accountable for all ASIC material from inception to delivery; it will electronically collect and store any and all required quality evidence and most of the electronic BEOL data; and it will create a management reporting module with production statistics and timelines. The defect prevention strategies include the use of 2D marks on our ASICs with 2D scanners so that there will be no manual entry of part numbers (scanners), will not allow testing the wrong parts in Test and Burn-in. Other defect prevention strategies will negate the possibility of neither using the wrong test or burn-in program for any part nor the use of BEOL machines or boards that are out of calibration. In summary, EPCS is being implemented and it will greatly improve the product acceptance through full electronic data collection and quality control and defect prevention through bar codes, scanners, tracking training of personnel, and tracking tool availability.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Improved Large Aperture Collector Manufacturing

The parabolic trough is the most established CSP technology and carries a long history of design experimentation dating back to the 1970’s. This has led to relatively standardized collector architectures, a maturing global supply chain, and a fairly uniform cost reduction strategy. Abengoa has deployed more than 1,500MWe of CSP troughs across several countries and has built and tested full-scale prototypes of many R&D concepts. The latest trough R&D efforts involved efforts to internalize non-CSP industry experience including a preliminary DFMA principles review done with Boothroyd Dewhurst, a construction literature review by the Arizona State University School of Construction Management, and two more focused manufacturing engineering subcontracts done by Ricardo Inc. and the nonprofit Edison Welding Institute. The first two studies highlighted strong opportunities in lowering part count, standardizing components and fasteners, developing modular designs to support prefabrication and automation, and devising simple, error-proof manual assembly methods. These principles have delivered major new cost savings in otherwise “mature” products in analogous industries like automotive, truck trailer manufacture, metal building fabrication, and shipbuilding. For this reason, they were core in the design development of the SpaceTube® collector, and arguably key to its early successes. The latter two studies were applied specifically to the first-generation SpaceTube® design and were important in setting the direction of the present SolarMat project. These studies developed a methodology to analyze the costs of manufacture and assembly, and identify new tooling concepts for more efficient manufacture. Among the main opportunities identified in these studies were the automated mirror arm manufacturing concept and the need for a less infrastructure-intensive assembly line, both of which now form central pillars of the SolarMat project strategy. These new designs will be supported by new technology in the area of quality control inspection, in which state of the art photogrammetry and laser CMM inspection methods will be used to qualify parts and assemblies, and in which the recently-developed Absorber Reflection Method will enable in-line quality control inspection of modules produced by the new high-rate production line.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Compilation of PRF Canyon Floor Pan Sample Analysis Results

On September 28, 2015, debris collected from the PRF (236-Z) canyon floor, Pan J, was observed to exhibit chemical reaction. The material had been transferred from the floor pan to a collection tray inside the canyon the previous Friday. Work in the canyon was stopped to allow Industrial Hygiene to perform monitoring of the material reaction. Canyon floor debris that had been sealed out was sequestered at the facility, a recovery plan was developed, and drum inspections were initiated to verify no additional reactions had occurred. On October 13, in-process drums containing other Pan J material were inspected and showed some indication of chemical reaction, limited to discoloration and degradation of inner plastic bags. All Pan J material was sealed back into the canyon and returned to collection trays. Based on the high airborne levels in the canyon during physical debris removal, ETGS (Encapsulation Technology Glycerin Solution) was used as a fogging/lock-down agent. On October 15, subject matter experts confirmed a reaction had occurred between nitrates (both Plutonium Nitrate and Aluminum Nitrate Nonahydrate (ANN) are present) in the Pan J material and the ETGS fixative used to lower airborne radioactivity levels during debris removal. Management stopped the use of fogging/lock-down agents containing glycerin on bulk materials, declared a Management Concern, and initiated the Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis determination process. Additional drum inspections and laboratory analysis of both reacted and unreacted material are planned. This report compiles the results of many different sample analyses conducted by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory on samples collected from the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) floor pans by the CH2MHill’s Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC). Revision 1 added Appendix G that reports the results of the Gas Generation Rate and methodology. The scope of analyses requested by CHPRC includes the determination of common anions, gamma spectrometry, metals, corrosivity, organics and alpha spectrometry (note: alpha spectrometry was cancelled during the performance of this work with concurrence from CHPRC). Results may help elucidate the components that led to the unexpected reaction in the canyon as well as inform the radiological and hazardous characteristics. The specific anions, gamma emitters, organics and metals requested by CHPRC are provided in the analytical reports sections. The individual analyses were conducted under the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Floor Pan Evaluation Project Quality Assurance Project Plan (PFP Floor Pan Evaluation QAPP, Revision 0.) developed by PNNL specifically for this project. The final reports for each analysis set are included in this compilation of the results. Each package was reviewed under the PFP Floor Pan Evaluation Project Quality Assurance Project Plan so no additional reviews were conducted in this compilation task. The Gas Generation Rates in Appendix G were conducted under the PNNL “How Do I…” quality assurance program and were NOT conducted under the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Floor Pan Evaluation Project Quality Assurance Project Plan (PFP Floor Pan Evaluation QAPP, Revision 0.).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

During their December 10-11, 2013, workshop in Grenoble France, which focused on the history and future of safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreed to conduct a joint study exploring ways to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards approach for declared research reactors. This decision was prompted by concerns about: 1) historical cases of non-compliance involving misuse (including the use of non-nuclear materials for production of neutron generators for weapons) and diversion that were discovered, in many cases, long after the violations took place and as part of broader pattern of undeclared activities in half a dozen countries; 2) the fact that, under the Safeguards Criteria, the IAEA inspects some reactors (e.g., those with power levels under 25 MWt) less than once per year; 3) the long-standing precedent of States using heavy water research reactors (HWRR) to produce plutonium for weapons programs; 4) the use of HEU fuel in some research reactors; and 5) various technical characteristics common to some types of research reactors that could provide an opportunity for potential proliferators to misuse the facility or divert material with low probability of detection by the IAEA. In some research reactors it is difficult to detect diversion or undeclared irradiation. In addition, infrastructure associated with research reactors could pose a safeguards challenge. To strengthen the effectiveness of safeguards at the State level, this paper advocates that the IAEA consider ways to focus additional attention and broaden its safeguards toolbox for research reactors. This increase in focus on the research reactors could begin with the recognition that the research reactor (of any size) could be a common path element on a large number of technically plausible pathways that must be considered when performing acquisition pathway analysis (APA) for developing a State Level Approach (SLA) and Annual Implementation Plan (AIP). To broaden the IAEA safeguards toolbox, the study recommends that the Agency consider closing potential gaps in safeguards coverage by, among other things: 1) adapting its safeguards measures based on a case-by-case assessment; 2) using more frequent and expanded/enhanced mailbox declarations (ideally with remote transmission of the data to IAEA Headquarters in Vienna) coupled with short-notice or unannounced inspections; 3) putting more emphasis on the collection and analysis of environmental samples at hot cells and waste storage tanks; 4) taking Safeguards by Design into account for the construction of new research reactors and best practices for existing research reactors; 5) utilizing fully all legal authorities to enhance inspection access (including a strengthened and continuing DIV process); and 6) utilizing new approaches to improve auditing activities, verify reactor operating data history, and track/monitor the movement and storage of spent fuel.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Plug and Play PV Systems for American Homes

The core objectives of the Plug & Play PV Systems Project were to develop a PV system that can be installed on a residential rooftop for less than $1.50/W in 2020, and in less than 10 hours (from point of purchase to commissioning). The Fraunhofer CSE team’s approach to this challenge involved a holistic approach to system design – hardware and software – that make Plug & Play PV systems: • Quick, easy, and safe to install • Easy to demonstrate as code compliant • Permitted, inspected, and interconnected via an electronic process Throughout the three years of work during this Department of Energy SunShot funded project, the team engaged in a substantive way with inspectional services departments and utilities, manufacturers, installers, and distributors. We received iterative feedback on the system design and on ideas for how such systems can be commercialized. This ultimately led us to conceiving of Plug & Play PV Systems as a framework, with a variety of components compatible with the Plug & Play PV approach, including string or microinverters, conventional modules or emerging lightweight modules. The framework enables a broad group of manufacturers to participate in taking Plug & Play PV Systems to market, and increases the market size for such systems. Key aspects of the development effort centered on the system hardware and associated engineering work, the development of a Plug & Play PV Server to enable the electronic permitting, inspection and interconnection process, understanding the details of code compliance and, on occasion, supporting applications for modifications to the code to allow lightweight modules, for example. We have published a number of papers on our testing and assessment of novel technologies (e.g., adhered lightweight modules) and on the electronic architecture.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Cultural Artifact Detection in Long Wave Infrared Imagery.

Detection of cultural artifacts from airborne remotely sensed data is an important task in the context of on-site inspections. Airborne artifact detection can reduce the size of the search area the ground based inspection team must visit, thereby improving the efficiency of the inspection process. This report details two algorithms for detection of cultural artifacts in aerial long wave infrared imagery. The first algorithm creates an explicit model for cultural artifacts, and finds data that fits the model. The second algorithm creates a model of the background and finds data that does not fit the model. Both algorithms are applied to orthomosaic imagery generated as part of the MSFE13 data collection campaign under the spectral technology evaluation project.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Experimental Design for Evaluating Selected Nondestructive Measurement Technologies - Advanced Reactor Technology Milestone: M3AT-16PN2301043

The harsh environments in advanced reactors (AdvRx) increase the possibility of degradation of safety-critical passive components, and therefore pose a particular challenge for deployment and extended operation of these concepts. Nondestructive evaluation technologies are an essential element for obtaining information on passive component condition in AdvRx, with the development of sensor technologies for nondestructively inspecting AdvRx passive components identified as a key need. Given the challenges posed by AdvRx environments and the potential needs for reducing the burden posed by periodic in-service inspection of hard-to-access and hard-to-replace components, a viable solution may be provided by online condition monitoring of components. This report identifies the key challenges that will need to be overcome for sensor development in this context, and documents an experimental plan for sensor development, test, and evaluation. The focus of initial research and development is on sodium fast reactors, with the eventual goal of the research being developing the necessary sensor technology, quantifying sensor survivability and long-term measurement reliability for nondestructively inspecting critical components. Materials for sensor development that are likely to withstand the harsh environments are described, along with a status on the fabrication of reference specimens, and the planned approach for design and evaluation of the sensor and measurement technology.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

2015 Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) Title ll Annual Report, L-Bar, New Mexico Disposal Site

The L-Bar, New Mexico, Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) Title II Disposal Site was inspected on August 18, 2015. The tailings impoundment was in excellent condition. Erosion and vegetation measurements to monitor the condition of the impoundment cover indicated that no erosion is occurring, and perennial vegetation foliar cover at the measurement plots increased substantially compared to previous years due to above-average precipitation for the year. A short segment of the perimeter fence near the site entrance was realigned in spring 2015 because a gully was undermining the fence corner. Loose fence strands at another location were repaired during the inspection, and a section of fence needs to be realigned to avoid areas affected by deep gullies and sediment deposition. Inspectors identified no other maintenance needs or cause for a follow-up inspection. Groundwater monitoring is required every 3 years. The next monitoring event will be in 2016.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Lakeview, Oregon, Disposal Site

9.1 Compliance Summary The Lakeview, Oregon, Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) Title I Disposal Site was inspected September 16 and 17, 2015. Other than some ongoing concern with erosion-control rock riprap degradation, the disposal cell was in good condition. Some minor fence repairs and vegetation removal, and minor erosion repair work along the west site fence is planned. Inspectors identified no other maintenance needs or cause for a follow-up or contingency inspection. Disposal cell riprap is evaluated annually to ensure continued long-term protection of the cell from erosion during a severe precipitation event. Degradation of the rock riprap was first observed at the site in the mid-1990s. Rock gradation monitoring of the riprap on the west side slope has been performed as part of the annual inspection since 1997 to determine the mean diameter (D 50 ) value. As prescribed by the monitoring procedure, the rock monitoring is routinely conducted at random locations. However, at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) request, the 2015 rock monitoring approach deviated from the normal procedure by using a pre-established monitoring grid in a subset area of the west side slope. This changed the monitoring approach from random sampling to biased sampling. The D 50 value measured during the 2015 gradation monitoring is 2.39 inches, which falls below the original D 50 design size range of 2.7–3.9 inches for the Type B size side slope riprap. At NRC’s request, rock durability monitoring was added to the gradation monitoring in 2009 to monitor durability by rock type. Results of the 2015 durability monitoring showed that74 percent of the total rock sampled is durability class code A rock with an assigned durability class of “highly durable” or durability class code B “durable” rock, and that over 90 percent of the 3-inch or larger rock is durability class code A or B. The rock durability classifications are further explained in Section 9.4.2.2.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗