Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Criticality”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 1,513 records · Page 84

Agile Approach to Assuring the Safety-Critical Embedded Software for NASA's Orion Spacecraft

Human-rated missions like NASA's Exploration Mission - 1 (EM-1) and the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle are becoming exceedingly complex in terms of software's contribution to achieving mission objectives. The increasing complexity and inherent safety critical nature of the embedded flight software imposes a unique resource challenge to assurance providers responsible for affirming that the mission is going to fly safely. Another challenge NASA and other Government agencies are facing is that more and more software is being developed using an agile development methodology, which is divergent from the typical waterfall, iterative, and incremental development methodologies assurance providers generally observe in the development of safety-critical embedded software. Orion Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) has addressed these challenges by providing focused assurance results of critical mission capabilities prioritized by a dynamic assessment of risk level. Prior to this approach, Orion IV&V evaluated areas of risk in much broader, and more static, terms. Due to the agile software development life cycle that Orion follows, IV&V findings were often reported months out of phase with the developer thereby imposing increased rework costs. As a result of evolving the approach to adding assurance on Orion, IV&V is able to incrementally deliver high-priority assurance conclusions and more impactful issues more in phase with the developer activities, thereby increasing the value of the findings to the project. The agile IV&V approach employed by the Orion IV&V team strives to achieve a cadence of delivery that matches the pace of development. This agile approach provides increased flexibility for the assurance provider to become more efficient in reporting assurance conclusions and issues. This paper and presentation will discuss the principles which drive the design of our approach, results to date, and stimulate thinking for groups looking to add assurance to software being developed using an agile methodology.

Justin Smith↗

Tracking Critical Thermal Metrics throughout the Life Cycle of a Large Observatory Thermal Model

Observatory thermal models for large, complex missions, such as the Wide Field InfraRed Survey Telescope (WFIRST) mission, produce an immense amount of data to be processed. Configuration management of the model throughout the project life cycle has mainly focused on which versions of the subsystem models form the current observatory level configuration. However, the results produced by the model are not nearly as well tracked and traceable. Given the various states of design maturity for each of the components in the WFIRST design, an updated component model is nearly ready to be integrated at the next higher level of assembly about every month or two. With each subsystem model delivery, the observatory model needs to remove the old component, integrate the new one, execute the model, and inspect the results. Usually, this inspection focuses primarily on the newly integrated component. Recently, a Metric Tracking Spreadsheet was developed to help provide a “big picture” view of the entire observatory highlighting key parameters critical to mission performance. This spreadsheet helps track impacts on subsystems by updates of other subsystems that were not intuitively obvious. Metrics tracked include: absorbed environmental loading (to determine effectiveness of sunshield), temperatures of critical avionics, electrical dissipations, heater power predictions, stability of critical optics, parasitic heat leaks in cryogenic region, high level heat flows between elements, and model run time. Producing this data for the same operational configuration with each model update has helped produce a trail of data to evaluate the impact of model updates. While the metrics selected are specific for WFIRST, other large, complex observatories could be well served to establish their own metrics early in the project life cycle to track to quickly assess the impact of any subsystem on other subsystems or the overall system itself.

Thermal Desktop↗

Adaptive Stress Testing: Using Reinforcement Learning to Find Failures in Safety-Critical Systems

Emerging applications in artificial intelligence, such as driverless cars and autonomous aircraft promise to be more efficient, cheaper to operate, and always available. However, ensuring the safety of these systems remains a major challenge to their certification and adoption. These autonomous systems are expected to routinely make safety-critical decisions where failures can have serious consequences including loss of life and property. Testing and validation techniques aim to identify and diagnose potential failures before the system is deployed. However, finding failure scenarios in autonomous systems can be very challenging due to high-dimensional and continuous state spaces, interaction with large environments over many time steps, and the rarity of failures. This talk presents Adaptive Stress Testing (AST), a simulation-based testing framework for finding the most likely path to a failure event of a safety-critical system. The key idea of AST is that stress testing can be formulated as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP), which enables reinforcement learning techniques to be used for finding failure events. Reinforcement learning algorithms can efficiently explore the search space and have been shown to scale to very large systems. We present applications of AST to find failures in various safety-critical systems including the aircraft collision avoidance systems, autonomous cars, and small unmanned aerial vehicles.

autonomous vehicles↗

Critical Ablative TPS Capabilities Sustainment - An Approach to Playing the Long Game

Historically, we have been pound foolish and penny wise for decades, and it is time to reverse this. We present an approach that will maintain critical NASA ablative TPS capabilities through small, sustained, smart and targeted investment. NASA’s ablative TPS history is one of developing new capabilities and letting them atrophy. When needed, there are two options: (1) revive the capability at considerable cost impact or (2) develop an alternate capability with considerable schedule impact. Either of these options have had considerable mission impact. The third alternate is to maintain proven capabilities in a cost effective manner to allow the science community to propose missions with confidence. NASA and DoD have had a working group to periodically assess and make recommendations on at-risk items. This working group typically focuses on raw materials availability. While we agree that at-risk raw materials are an important and necessary part of the overall capability, focus solely on them is not sufficient. Instead, we advocate for a broader focus on the critical “technology capability” that includes not only raw material but also industrial manufacturing and processing capabilities and in-house expertise in design, testing and flight hardware certification. In this proposed presentation, we will highlight a case study related to PICA capability. We will present the rationale for sustaining PICA and HEEET as two minimum essential ablative TPS capabilities for future NASA missions. We will present an approach for how small investment could lead to maintaining mission critical capabilities over a longer period. While HEEET and PICA are NASA unique, the raw material and some of the vendor capabilities involved also support DoD TPS. Hence a partnership between NASA and DoD is recommended for broader benefit.

Ethiraj Venkatapathy↗

Detecting Juno’s ‘Heartbeat’: Communications Support during Critical Events of the Juno Mission

The first section of this paper summarizes the radio systems of the spacecraft, the antennas of the DSN, and signal processing performed in real-time on the ground to support the critical activities. The second section goes into detail on each of the critical events with details of the radio science support and results of each event. Finally, the paper is concluded with a discussion of future planned supports and capabilities of radio science support during critical events.

Jongeling, Andre↗

An Approach to Critical Ablative TPS Capabilities Sustainment for Future NASA Missions

We plan to present an approach for NASA to maintain critical ablative TPS capabilities through small, sus-tained, smart and targeted investment. Historically, we have been pound foolish and penny wise for decades and paid very little attention to sustainability of abla-tive TPS and as a result, spent couple of decades in learning what we lost and inventing newer technology solutions. NASA’s ablative TPS history has been one of in-vesting in new and unique capabilities in anticipation of needs, and once flight proven, letting the capability atrophy due to lack of subsequent near-term mission needs [1]. When the need arises, NASA has resorted to two options: (1) revive the capability at considerable cost impact, or (2) develop an alternate capability with considerable schedule impact. Both these options have had considerable mission impact. The third alternate is to maintain proven capabilities in a cost effective manner. A risk informed decision process in terms of maintaining ablative TPS capabilities is feasible with planning and sustained support. Assured TPS availa-bility will allow the science community to propose competed missions with confidence and at a lower risk for selection. We submitted a white paper to the cur-rent Decadal Survey [2] on the need for and im-portance of sustainability. Since then, we have been formulating an executable cost effective strategy. The intent of this presentation is to outline the develop-ments since the submission of the white paper. NASA and DoD have had a working group related to critical technologies to periodically assess and make recommendations on at-risk items from a national need perspective. This inter-agency working group typically focuses on raw materials availability. While we agree that at-risk raw materials are important, fo-cus solely on them is not sufficient. Instead, we advo-cate for a broader focus that includes not only raw material but also industrial manufacturing and processing, and NASA expertise in design, testing and flight hardware certification. In this proposed presentation, we will give a brief overview of NASA’s ablative TPS history along with recent examples of atrophy to highlight case studies related to the PICA and Carbon-Phenolic TPS. We will present the rationale for sustaining PICA, HEEET and 3MDCP for future NASA missions. We will present an approach for how targeted small investments could lead to maintaining mission critical capabilities over long periods.

E Venkatapathy↗

Developing Approaches for Certification of Uninspectable Fracture Critical AM Components

Introduction - Human-rated spaceflight hardware is subject to the Fracture Control requirements in NASA-STD5019, which are intended to control the risk of component failure due to undetected cracks or defects. - All hardware in this mission class is classified for Fracture Control – Exempt, Non-fracture Critical, or Fracture Critical - Fracture Critical: A classification that identifies a part where failure due to the presence of a crack is a catastrophic hazard ➔ Pressure vessels, engine components, primary structure, etc. - Axiom 1: Material and manufacturing process produce structures and components with cracks or defects. - Axiom 2: The presence of a crack or defect of sufficient size reduces the strength and life of the structure. - Damage Tolerance: demonstration that a component can survive the service life (with a safety factor) in the presence of an undetected flaw or damage. - Components are manufactured from aerospace quality materials using controlled processes. - Components are inspected for damage (cracks, flaws, defects, etc.). - Components are shown by test or analysis to be tolerant to undetected flaws.

Will Tilson↗

ECI Final Report: Closing of Critical Technology Gaps for Rotating Detonation Rocket Engines

NASA has successfully fired several configurations of a dual regenerative 10K lbf class Rotating Detonation Rocket Engines using cryogenic liquid methane, liquid hydrogen, and RP-1 as fuel and liquid or gaseous oxygen as the oxidizer. In addition, 3 hot fire test phases were conducted to evaluate parametrically varying combustor geometries using a subscale 500-1K lbf class thruster RDRE. Several studies were successfully completed to evaluate the impacts of contraction ratio, annulus L’, heat transfer through calorimetry, and varying injector designs. Laser powder bed fusion GRCop-42, GRX-810, and C-103 alloys were used for the outer bodies, inner bodies, nozzles, and injector variations. The development of RDRE technology is only now possible with additive manufacturing techniques and these specialized alloys. Critical design parameters, design rules of thumb, and operability limitations have been identified. Major lessons learned in the development of critical components have also been documented. All critical technology gaps have been demonstrated at one scale or another and closed. A major finding of this work is that the combustion efficiency of the RDRE is far superior to that of the traditional liquid rocket engine requiring an order of magnitude lower chamber volume and residence time to react. Because of this, the design trade space opens up significantly. More compact chamber geometries are now possible with potential mass savings and significant length savings possible to flight geometries. In addition, the ceiling for the technology, in terms of Isp, has not yet been reached. It is likely that an additional ~10% better Isp over equivalent state-of-the-art combustion devices may be achieved over the next decade should the technology continue to be developed. This technology has been shown to be viable for near term infusion (2-5 years) into space missions and enable cost effective space access for US industry. This final report documents all major findings from this early career initiative (ECI) project and lays out what is needed post ECI.

Thomas Teasley↗

Critical Magnetic Field Determination of Superconducting Materials

Superconducting RF technology is becoming more and more important. With some recent cavity test results showing close to or even higher than the critical magnetic field of 170-180 mT that had been considered a limit, it is very important to develop a way to correctly measure the critical magnetic field (H{sup RF}{sub c}) of superconductors in the RF regime. Using a 11.4 GHz, 50-MW, <1 {mu}s, pulsed power source and a TE013-like mode copper cavity, we have been measuring critical magnetic fields of superconductors for accelerator cavity applications. This device can eliminate both thermal and field emission effects due to a short pulse and no electric field at the sample surface. A model of the system is presented in this paper along with a discussion of preliminary experimental data.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Addressing Fission Product Validation in MCNP Burnup Credit Criticality Calculations

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation issued Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) 8, Revision 3 in September 2012. This ISG provides guidance for NRC staff members’ review of burnup credit (BUC) analyses supporting transport and dry storage of pressurized water reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in casks. The ISG includes guidance for addressing validation of criticality (k eff ) calculations crediting the presence of a limited set of fission products and minor actinides (FP&MAs). Based on previous work documented in NRC Regulatory Guide (NUREG) Contractor Report (CR)-7109, the ISG recommends that NRC staff members accept the use of either 1.5 or 3% of the FP&MA worth—in addition to bias and bias uncertainty resulting from validation of k eff calculations for the major actinides in SNF—to conservatively account for the bias and bias uncertainty associated with the specified unvalidated FP&MAs. The ISG recommends (1) use of 1.5% of the FP&MA worth if a modern version of SCALE and its nuclear data are used and (2) 3% of the FP&MA worth for well qualified, industry standard code systems other than SCALE with the Evaluated Nuclear Data Files, Part B (ENDF/B),-V, ENDF/B-VI, or ENDF/B-VII cross sections libraries. The work presented in this paper provides a basis for extending the use of the 1.5% of the FP&MA worth bias to BUC criticality calculations performed using the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) code. The extended use of the 1.5% FP&MA worth bias is shown to be acceptable by comparison of FP&MA worths calculated using SCALE and MCNP with ENDF/B-V, -VI, and -VII–based nuclear data. The comparison supports use of the 1.5% FP&MA worth bias when the MCNP code is used for criticality calculations, provided that the cask design is similar to the hypothetical generic BUC-32 cask model and that the credited FP&MA worth is no more than 0.1 Δk eff (ISG-8, Rev. 3, Recommendation 4).

42 ENGINEERING↗

Deconstructing the Assessment of Anomaly-based Intrusion Detectors for Critical Applications

Anomaly detection is a key strategy for cyber intrusion detection because it is conceptually capable of detecting novel attacks. This makes it an appealing defensive technique for environments such as the nation's critical infrastructures that is currently facing increased cyber adversarial activity. When considering deployment within the purview of such critical infrastructures it is imperative that the technology is well understood and reliable, where its performance is benchmarked on the results of principled assessments. This paper works towards such an imperative by analyzing the current state of anomaly detector assessments with a view toward mission critical deployments. We compile a framework of key evaluation constructs that identify how and where current assessment methods may fall short in providing sufficient insight into detector performance characteristics. Within the context of three case studies from literature, we show how error factors that influence the performance of detectors interact with different phases of a canonical evaluation strategy to compromise the integrity of the final results.

Viswanathan, Arun↗

Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies Assessment

Throughout the world there is strong recognition that critical infrastructure security and resilience needs to be improved. In the United States, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) provides the strategic vision to guide the national effort to manage risk to the Nation’s critical infrastructure.”1 The achievement of this vision is challenged by the complexity of critical infrastructure systems and their inherent interdependencies. The update to the NIPP presents an opportunity to advance the nation’s efforts to further understand and analyze interdependencies. Such an important undertaking requires the involvement of public and private sector stakeholders and the reinforcement of existing partnerships and collaborations within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other Federal agencies, including national laboratories; State, local, tribal, and territorial governments; and nongovernmental organizations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Development Of A Novel Genetic Algorithm-based Optimization Method For Design Of Nuclear Criticality Experiments

A new evaluation of isotopic molybdenum total neutron cross section data based on measurements performed at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute prompted researchers at Rensselaer and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to design a nuclear criticality experiment for the validation of the data. A novel approach of criticality experiment design employing a genetic algorithm-based optimization technique was developed. The method produced a critical experiment with a cross section sensitivity that exceeded target specifications by an order of magnitude.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FOR PACKAGING SHIELDING & NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY COURSES DEVELOPED AND CONDUCTED BY OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY

The US Department of Energy (DOE) Packaging Certification Program, Office of Packaging and Transportation, is offering Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) Shielding and Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) courses for SARP generalists and analysts. The SARP generalist course is designed for project managers, supervisors, NCS/shielding subject matter experts (SME), and SMEs in non-NCS/shielding technical areas (e.g., structural, thermal, package design) who need to improve their understanding of how NCS/shielding analyses fit into the broader spectrum of SARP documentation. The generalist course provides an overview of the regulations and guidelines for the criticality and shielding analyses included in a SARP, and it illustrates how the NCS/shielding chapters integrate with the other parts of the SARP. After course material is presented, students in the generalist course will review an actual SARP document to examine key elements of the shielding and criticality analyses. The analyst course provides detailed instructions on the radioactive material package shielding analyses and NCS evaluation fundamentals needed by analysts/practitioners, including safety analysts and/or technical reviewers, to prepare and/or review technical analyses for SARP documentation. The analyst course also provides an overview of regulations and guidelines, in addition to detailed in-class exercises associated with package shielding and NCS analyses. Analysis teams will be faced with staged SARP examples in which several important decision processes in the generation of a SARP will be demonstrated and discussed. Both courses are offered at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and for interested students, the analyst course is offered for one hour of graduate credit (course ME-690) from the University of Nevada at Reno. An overview of the course will be provided to ensure that the NCS community is aware of the course and its intent to support the shielding and NCS aspects of packaging and transportation analyses for SARP activities.

Bowen, Douglas G.↗

Nuclear Criticality Safety Lessons Learned in the Design of the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex

The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) is being built by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to replace aging uranium processes at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12 NSC) in Oak Ridge Tennessee. Specifically, the processes housed in building 9212 are being replaced as this facility dates to the World War II Manhattan Project days of Y-12. When the UPF Project is completed it will consist of three main facilities along with several support facilities. The Main Processing Building (MPB) will house oxide production and metal casting operations. The Salvage and Accountability Building (SAB) will house wet chemistry operations (examples include recovery evaporation and calcination of solutions). The Personnel Support Building will be connected to both the SAB and the MPB and will serve as a transition facility for materials and personnel between the two. The MPB will also be connected to the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Storage Facility (HEUMF) via a connector (HCON) to permit transfers from storage into UPF directly. This paper will summarize some of the more important lessons learned for the NCS practitioner working in a design environment rather than in a production or experimental environment. As the Chief NCS Engineer for the UPF Project I have been responsible for ensuring the technical evaluations produced on the project are high quality, technically accurate, and conform to the Y-12 NCS Program expectations. Ensuring nuclear criticality safety for processes that do not yet exist in reality is a challenge very different than that of ensuring subcriticality for processes in an operating facility. The biggest difference being that in design space – everything is imaginary whereas in the operating facility you have the benefit of being able to go out and look at the equipment and interview the operators. Ensuring that Nuclear Criticality Safety is integrated into design is a process that requires constant communication between the NCS staff and the broader engineering design team. Until the facility is constructed – nothing is physically stable and so rigorous documentation of decisions – to include any assumptions – is necessary to minimize errors. Non-NCS engineers will not understand the hazard or the physics of nuclear criticality. It is up to the NCS staff to provide training and communication to the team. The NCS staff must be patient and prepared to explain themselves many times and be as flexible as possible.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

A Misload Analysis Methodology Supporting Criticality Analysis of Spent Nuclear Fuel Canisters Using As-Loaded Configurations

This paper presents an assembly misload analysis methodology developed to support criticality safety analysis of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dual-purpose canisters (DPCs) using as-loaded configurations. The misload analysis approach is based on Interim Staff Guidance 8 “Burnup Credit in the Criticality Safety Analyses of PWR Spent Fuel in Transportation and Storage Casks” (ISG 8 rev. 3), but extended to support as-loaded configurations. The two misload scenarios analyzed included; (1) the correct assemblies are selected from the pool but placed incorrectly into the most reactive configuration inside the canister, and (2) the incorrect, most reactive assembly/assemblies in the pool is/are placed into the most reactive position(s) in the canister. Results from this misload analysis approach can be combined with misload probability to support criticality safety assessment of SNF during storage, transportation, and disposal. The misload analysis has been applied to 67 loaded DPCs at two sites using a disposal scenario. The analyzed sites include both PWR and BWR reactors and two canister variants—MPC-32 and MPC-68.

Liljenfeldt, Henrik↗

NEAR CRITICAL POINT TESTING AND PERFORMANCE RESULTS OF A SCO2 COMPRESSOR FOR A 10MWE BRAYTON CYCLE

Development and commercial acceptance of sCO2 Brayton cycles for power generation applications are growing rapidly as they offer performance advantages over other cycles. To maximize the cycle performance, the compressors are designed to operate near the critical point of the working fluid. At the critical point the fluid properties change rapidly with variations in inlet conditions. This makes it challenging to both accurately predict the performance and guarantee the operability of the compressor, as the behavior is affected by these slight variations in inlet conditions. A full scale 1st stage main compressor for a 10MWe-Class recompression Brayton cycle was built and tested to validate performance and operability in this unique operating range. The compressor was tested in a laboratory environment with additional instrumentation, beyond what is required by PTC-10, to minimize the uncertainty in the measured performance. Complete constant speed characteristics were collected at multiple supercritical points, operating at constant inlet conditions for each speed line covering a range of compressor inlet densities from 400 to 600 kg/m3. Variations in the compressor stage efficiency and choke margin were observed, and the overall operability and stability of the compressor in response to changes in operating condition were also monitored. The compressor was shown to have excellent performance that closely matched the original design prediction. The performance at various inlet conditions showed minimal change in isentropic head coefficient at the design flow, but did show some variation in efficiency and choke margin across the map. These changes in performance were observed to be minimal, and did not affect the stable operation of the compressor. The results demonstrate that a commercial scale sCO2 compressor can operate near the critical point and achieve the high levels of performance and stability required for power generation applications.

pelton, rob↗

THE POTENTIAL FOR REUSE OF PRODUCED WATER IN THE CRITICAL MINERALS SUPPLY CHAIN IN THE POWDER RIVER BASIN OF WYOMING AND MONTANA

The Powder River Basin (PRB) Carbon Ore, Rare Earth, and Critical Minerals (CORE-CM) project is part of the Department of Energy sponsored CORE-CM initiative focused on domestic production of critical minerals and promoting economic development in traditionally fossil fuel producing basins. An important part of this project is regional assessment of waste streams and development of basinal strategies for waste stream reuse within the critical minerals (CM) supply chain. The availability of water for all parts of the CM supply chain is of particular concern in the arid mountain west. In the Wyoming PRB, average annual production of produced water (PW) by the oil and gas industry is more than 16 billion gallons (2015-2022). Through published data and engagement with industry partners, we conducted a preliminary investigation of PW in the PRB to understand volumes, quality, and the potential for use in the CM supply chain. PW was assessed for potential as a direct feedstock and for use in CM processing of a variety of conventional and unconventional feedstocks, including ore from the Bear Lodge Alkaline Complex, coal, and coal byproducts. Preliminary findings suggest that PRB PW contains significantly lower concentrations of rare earth elements (REE) and lithium than would be considered economic at this time. For example, concentrations of REE+Sc measured in PRB PW are <1 ppb (DE-EE0007603), and only seven PRB PW samples reported in the USGS PW database had lithium concentrations ≥50 ppm. However, enrichment of CM in residual brine and sludge from PW evaporation and solidification treatment ponds may yield concentrations of interest over a pond lifetime and should be considered in future studies. Coal bed methane (CBM) PW accounted for 42% of all PW in the Wyoming PRB in 2022. Compared to non-CBM PW, PRB CBM water quality generally meets standards allowing surface discharge and reuse in local industries such as livestock. CBM PW may help to fill water needs within the CM supply chain. Understanding the distribution of CBM PW that is discharged versus reused will help develop basinal reuse strategies.

Jackson, Lily↗