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At least 1,477 records · Page 82

Astro-D Prelaunch Mission Operation Report (MOR)

The Prelaunch Mission Operation Report for the Astro-D mission is enclosed for your information. Astro-D is a Japanese-led program involving the United States as a participating partner. The Japanese Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS) provides overall program management, the launch vehicle, the spacecraft, and two Gas Scintillation Imaging System detectors. NASA is providing four nested, thin-foil, grazing-incidence telescope mirrors and two X-ray charged-coupled device solid-state detectors. NASA also provides telemetry tracking support using Deep Space Network ground stations. In return for its scientific instrument contribution, the U.S. will receive 15 percent of the observing time and will share an additional 25 percent for collaborative U.S./Japan scientific investigations. Launch is scheduled for mid- February 1993 from the ISAS launch center near Kagoshima in southern Japan. This MOR: (a) describes the NASA objectives for the Astro-D mission; (b) provides brief descriptions of the spacecraft and its scientific instruments; (c) provides a chronology of launch and deployment; and (d) describes the ground operation elements that support the mission. .

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Evaluation of NASA Data Products for RPO Applications

This presentation summarizes preliminary investigations at SSC by NASA's ASD in Air Quality including decision support tools, partner plans, working groups, and committees. An overview of follow-on short-term and long-term objectives is also provided. A table of potential NASA sensors for use with air quality applications is included, along with specifications for MODIS 04 and 06 products. This presentation was originally given by Rich Piorot of the Vermont Department of Environmental Conservation - Air Quality as part of a round-table discussion during "Exploring Collaborative Opportunities in Air Quality Monitoring, Modelling and Communication Workshop" in Boulder, CO, on March 21-22, 2005; verbal consent for this presentation to be provided to Mr. Piorot was given by the NASA SSC ASD Air Quality Program Manager on March 14, 2005.

Frisbie, Troy↗

Toward a Suite of Standard Lunar Regolith Simulants for NASA's Lunar Missions: Recommendations of the 2005 Workshop of Lunar Regolith Simulant Materials

As NASA turns its exploration ambitions towards the Moon once again, the research and development of new technologies for lunar operations face the challenge of meeting the milestones of a fast-pace schedule, reminiscent of the 1960's Apollo program. While the lunar samples returned by the Apollo and Luna missions have revealed much about the Moon, these priceless materials exist in too scarce quantities to be used for technology development and testing. The need for mineral materials chosen to simulate the characteristics of lunar regoliths is a pressing issue that is being addressed today through the collaboration of scientists, engineers and NASA program managers. The issue of reproducing the properties of lunar regolith for research and technology development purposes was addressed by the recently held Workshop on Lunar Regolith Simulant Materials at Marshall Space Flight Center. The conclusions from the workshop and considerations concerning the feasibility (both technical and programmatic) of producing such materials will be presented here.

Schlagheck, R. A.↗

Standard Lunar Regolith Simulants for Space Resource Utilization Technologies Development: Effects of Materials Choices

As NASA turns its exploration ambitions towards the Moon once again, the research and development of new technologies for lunar operations face the challenge of meeting the milestones of a fastpace schedule, reminiscent of the 1960's Apollo program. While the lunar samples returned by the Apollo and Luna missions have revealed much about the Moon, these priceless materials exist in too scarce quantities to be used for technology development and testing. The need for mineral materials chosen to simulate the characteristics of lunar regoliths is a pressing issue that is being addressed today through the collaboration of scientists, engineers and NASA program managers. The issue of reproducing the properties of lunar regolith for research and technology development purposes was addressed by the recently held 2005 Workshop on Lunar Regolith Simulant Materials at Marshall Space Flight Center. The recommendation of the workshop of establishing standard simulant materials to be used in lunar technology development and testing will be discussed here with an emphasis on space resource utilization. The variety of techniques and the complexity of functional interfaces make these simulant choices critical in space resource utilization.

Sibille, Laurent↗

STS-121: Discovery Post Flight Readiness Review Briefing

This post Flight Readiness Review (FRR) briefing begins with NASA Press Secretary Dean Acosta, introducing the panel who consist of: NASA Administrator, Dr. Michael Griffin; Associate Administrator for Space Operations, Bill Gerstenmaier; Space Shuttle Program Manager, Wayne Hale; and NASA Launch director, Mike Leinbach. The discussion begins with Dr. Michael Griffin, who expresses his gladness to be a part of the FRR. Bill Gerstenmaier talks about how they were very thorough about the subjects reviewed and that they wanted to make sure that they were ready to fly. He discusses and presents two slides. The first slide is a description of the LO2 intertank and LH2 ice/frost ramps staging location and the second are the top ten LH2 Ice/Frost Ramp Foam Loss events. Wayne Hale gives his thoughts on the human element that came into play during the FRRs. He talks about the willingness of everyone to speak their mind, instead of giving short comments. He expressed that this element is a huge step forward for NASA. Mike Leinbach reports on the processing of the vehicle and expresses that everything is going well and there is nothing to prohibit the launch. He also gives a good report on Atlantis, in case there is a need to use the vehicle. This FRR briefing ends with a short question and answer period from the press on topics such as debris, foam loss, ice/frost ramp redesign, crew risks, and launch date.

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Space Shuttle Status News Conference

Richard Gilbech, External Tank "Tiger Team" Lead, begins this space shuttle news conference with detailing the two major objectives of the team. The objectives include: 1) Finding the root cause of the foam loss on STS-114; and 2) Near and long term improvements for the external tank. Wayne Hale, Space Shuttle Program Manager, presents a chart to explain the external tank foam loss during STS-114. He gives a possible launch date for STS-121 after there has been a repair to the foam on the External Tank. He further discusses the changes that need to be made to the surrounding areas of the plant in New Orleans, due to Hurricane Katrina. Bill Gerstemaier, NASA Associate Administrator for Space Operations, elaborates on the testing of the external tank foam loss. The discussion ends with questions from the news media about a fix for the foam, replacement of the tiles, foam loss avoidance, the root cause of foam loss and a possible date for a new external tank to be shipped to NASA Kennedy Space Center.

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STS-121/Discovery: Imagery Quick-Look Briefing

Kyle Herring (NASA Public Affairs) introduced Wayne Hale (Space Shuttle Program Manager) who stated that the imagery for the Space shuttle external tank showed the tank performed very well. Image analysis showed small pieces of foam falling off the rocket booster and external tank. There was no risk involved in these minor incidents. Statistical models were built to assist in risk analysis. The orbiter performed excellently. Wayne also provided some close-up pictures of small pieces of foam separating from the external tank during launching. He said the crew will also perform a 100% inspection of the heat shield. This flight showed great improvement over previous flights.

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Space Shuttle Program Update News Conference with Wayne Hale

Jessica Rye from NASA Public Affairs introduces: Wayne Hale, Space Shuttle Deputy Program Manager; Mike Leinbach, NASA Launch Director; and Tim Wilson, from the NASA Engineering and Safety Center. Hale begins the discussion with a video showing the following processes: 1) Changing of gap fillers at Orbiter Processing Facility; 2) The Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS) being loaded into Discovery payload bay; 3) Engine installation; 4) Spacecrew at Michoud Assembly observing the area where the PAL ramps were removed; 5) Test being performed to mitigate liquid air forming underneath foam; and 6) Roll out of ET119 from New Orleans. Hale also presents a slide of the ET debris Mitigation Activities and ET Ice/Frost Ramps. Mike Leinbach says that Kennedy Space Center is ready to receive the tank and that he is ready to get on with the mission. Tim Wilson heads the team to resolve foam loss issues which is his primary goal before this flight. A question and answer period follows.

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Space Shuttle Program Update

Bruce Buckingham, from NASA Public Affairs, introduces Wayne Hale, Space Shuttle Program Manager, and Mike Leinbach, NASA launch Director. Wayne Hale begins discussing the Flight Readiness Review (FRR) that has just occurred to see if they were ready to fly. He points out that the review was a debris verification review (DVR). This review was done to ascertain how well they have done to eliminate the potential for debris to come off of the External Tank (ET), or any other part of the launch vehicle. He expresses that they have made significant improvements to the ET. He gives a description of the ET that is presently on the launch pad. Mike Leinbach discusses hardware processing and the condition of the launch vehicle. Questions from the news media about possible modifications to the ice frost ramp, Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) electrical problems, ET foam loss, amount of debris loss expectation during ascent, and return to flight costs are all addressed.

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STS-121: Discovery Post Launch Press Briefing

The briefing begins with Dean Acousta (NASA Press Secretary) introducing Michael Griffin (NASA Administrator), Bill Gerstenmaier (Associate Administrator for Space Operations) Wayne Hale (Space Shuttle Program Manager), John Shannon (Chairman, Mission Management Team, JSC), and Mike Leinbach (NASA Launch Director). The teams effort and dedication paid off in the form of a perfect launch and the weather cooperated. The Mission Management Team no problems during inspection. Debris assessment at 2 min. 47 sec. and 4 min. 50 sec. will be discussed when that information becomes available.The floor was then open for questions from the press.

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Exploration Health Risks: Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Maintenance of human health on long-duration exploration missions is a primary challenge to mission designers. Indeed, human health risks are currently the largest risk contributors to the risks of evacuation or loss of the crew on long-duration International Space Station missions. We describe a quantitative assessment of the relative probabilities of occurrence of the individual risks to human safety and efficiency during space flight to augment qualitative assessments used in this field to date. Quantitative probabilistic risk assessments will allow program managers to focus resources on those human health risks most likely to occur with undesirable consequences. Truly quantitative assessments are common, even expected, in the engineering and actuarial spheres, but that capability is just emerging in some arenas of life sciences research, such as identifying and minimize the hazards to astronauts during future space exploration missions. Our expectation is that these results can be used to inform NASA mission design trade studies in the near future with the objective of preventing the higher among the human health risks. We identify and discuss statistical techniques to provide this risk quantification based on relevant sets of astronaut biomedical data from short and long duration space flights as well as relevant analog populations. We outline critical assumptions made in the calculations and discuss the rationale for these. Our efforts to date have focussed on quantifying the probabilities of medical risks that are qualitatively perceived as relatively high risks of radiation sickness, cardiac dysrhythmias, medically significant renal stone formation due to increased calcium mobilization, decompression sickness as a result of EVA (extravehicular activity), and bone fracture due to loss of bone mineral density. We present these quantitative probabilities in order-of-magnitude comparison format so that relative risk can be gauged. We address the effects of conservative and nonconservative assumptions on the probability results. We discuss the methods necessary to assess mission risks once exploration mission scenarios are characterized. Preliminary efforts have produced results that are commensurate with earlier qualitative estimates of risk probabilities in this and other operational contexts, indicating that our approach may be usefully applied in support of the development of human health and performance standards for long-duration space exploration missions. This approach will also enable mission-specific probabilistic risk assessments for space exploration missions.

Rhatigan, Jennifer↗

Corporate Social Responsibility in Aviation

The dialog within aviation management education regarding ethics is incomplete without a discussion of corporate social responsibility (CSR). CSR research requires discussion involving: (a) the current emphasis on CSR in business in general and aviation specifically; (b) business and educational theory that provide a basis for aviation companies to engage in socially responsible actions; (c) techniques used by aviation and aerospace companies to fulfill this responsibility; and (d) a glimpse of teaching approaches used in university aviation management classes. The summary of this research suggests educators explain CSR theory and practice to students in industry and collegiate aviation management programs. Doing so extends the discussion of ethical behavior and matches the current high level of interest and activity within the aviation industry toward CSR.

Phillips, Edwin D.↗

Near-Miss Evaluation Bias as an Obstacle to Organizational Learning: Lessons from NASA

After the Shuttle Columbia catastrophe, the investigation board (CAIB) stated that NASA needs to develop a "learning culture", meaning a capability to learn from past failures by understanding the technical and organizational causes of these mistakes (CAIB report, 2003). While many organizations learn from obvious failures, we argue that it is harder for organizations to learn from near-miss events (i.e., situations where a failure does not occur but nearly did), because these near-misses are processed as successes. For the shuttle program, prior debris problems could have caused a similar failure as on the Columbia mission except that the large pieces missed the highly sensitive portions of the orbiter. This acceptance of foam debris was adopted as a normal occurrence by the shuttle program managers similar to the problems at the time of the Challenger Disaster (detailed in Vaughan, 1996). We extend that work to show that an outcome bias influences people's evaluation of project managers, such that managers of failed missions were perceived more poorly than managers who made the same decisions but whose mission ended in either success or a near-miss. The similarity of ratings between the near-miss and success condition imply that even when a problem occurs that is clearly linked to prior managerial decisions, if the project is not harmed because of good luck, that manager is not held accountable for faculty decision making and neither the individual manager nor the organization learn from the experience potentially increasing the likelihood of a failure in the future.

Dillon, Robin L.↗

Biology-inspired Architecture for Situation Management

Situation Management is a rapidly developing science combining new techniques for data collection with advanced methods of data fusion to facilitate the process leading to correct decisions prescribing action. Current research focuses on reducing increasing amounts of diverse data to knowledge used by decision makers and on reducing time between observations, decisions and actions. No new technology is more promising for increasing the diversity and fidelity of observations than sensor networks. However, current research on sensor networks concentrates on a centralized network architecture. We believe this trend will not realize the full potential of situation management. We propose a new architecture modeled after biological ecosystems where motes are autonomous and intelligent, yet cooperate with local neighborhoods. Providing a layered approach, they sense and act independently when possible, and cooperate with neighborhoods when necessary. The combination of their local actions results in global effects. While situation management research is currently dominated by military applications, advances envisioned for industrial and business applications have similar requirements. NASA has requirements for intelligent and autonomous systems in future missions that can benefit from advances in situation management. We describe requirements for the Integrated Vehicle Health Management program where our biology-inspired architecture provides a layered approach and decisions can be made at the proper level to improve safety, reduce costs, and improve efficiency in making diagnostic and prognostic assessments of the structural integrity, aerodynamic characteristics, and operation of aircraft.

Jones, Kennie H.↗

Factors Influencing the Selection of the Systems Integration Organizational Model Type for Planning and Implementing Government High-Technology Programs

While there has been extensive research in defining project organizational structures for traditional projects, little research exists to support high technology government project s organizational structure definition. High-Technology Government projects differ from traditional projects in that they are non-profit, span across Government-Industry organizations, typically require significant integration effort, and are strongly susceptible to a volatile external environment. Systems Integration implementation has been identified as a major contributor to both project success and failure. The literature research bridges program management organizational planning, systems integration, organizational theory, and independent project reports, in order to assess Systems Integration (SI) organizational structure selection for improving the high-technology government project s probability of success. This paper will describe the methodology used to 1) Identify and assess SI organizational structures and their success rate, and 2) Identify key factors to be used in the selection of these SI organizational structures during the acquisition strategy process.

Thomas, Leann↗

Best Practices for Reliable and Robust Spacecraft Structures

A study was undertaken to capture the best practices for the development of reliable and robust spacecraft structures for NASA s next generation cargo and crewed launch vehicles. In this study, the NASA heritage programs such as Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and the Space Shuttle program were examined. A series of lessons learned during the NASA and DoD heritage programs are captured. The processes that "make the right structural system" are examined along with the processes to "make the structural system right". The impact of technology advancements in materials and analysis and testing methods on reliability and robustness of spacecraft structures is studied. The best practices and lessons learned are extracted from these studies. Since the first human space flight, the best practices for reliable and robust spacecraft structures appear to be well established, understood, and articulated by each generation of designers and engineers. However, these best practices apparently have not always been followed. When the best practices are ignored or short cuts are taken, risks accumulate, and reliability suffers. Thus program managers need to be vigilant of circumstances and situations that tend to violate best practices. Adherence to the best practices may help develop spacecraft systems with high reliability and robustness against certain anomalies and unforeseen events.

Raju, Ivatury S.↗

2006 NASA Strategic Plan

On January 14, 2004, President George W. Bush announced A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President's Vision for U.S. Space Exploration, a new directive for the Nation's space program. The fundamental goal of this directive is "to advance U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests through a robust space exploration program." In issuing it, the President committed the Nation to a journey of exploring the solar system and beyond: returning to the Moon in the next decade, then venturing further into the solar system, ultimately sending humans to Mars and beyond. He challenged NASA to establish new and innovative programs to enhance understanding of the planets, to ask new questions, and to answer questions that are as old as humankind. NASA enthusiastically embraced the challenge of extending a human presence throughout the solar system as the Agency's Vision, and in the NASA Authorization Act of 2005, Congress endorsed the Vision for Space Exploration and provided additional guidance for implementation. NASA is committed to achieving this Vision and to making all changes necessary to ensure success and a smooth transition. These changes will include increasing internal collaboration, leveraging personnel and facilities, developing strong, healthy NASA Centers,a nd fostering a safe environment of respect and open communication for employees at all levels. NASA also will ensure clear accountability and solid program management and reporting practices. Over the next 10 years, NASA will focus on six Strategic Goals to move forward in achieving the Vision for Space Exploration. Each of the six Strategic Goals is clearly defined and supported by multi-year outcomes that will enhance NASA's ability to measure and report Agency accomplishments in this quest.

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A Comprehensive Plan for the Long-Term Calibration and Validation of Oceanic Biogeochemical Satellite Data

The primary objective of this planning document is to establish a long-term capability and validating oceanic biogeochemical satellite data. It is a pragmatic solution to a practical problem based primarily o the lessons learned from prior satellite missions. All of the plan's elements are seen to be interdependent, so a horizontal organizational scheme is anticipated wherein the overall leadership comes from the NASA Ocean Biology and Biogeochemistry (OBB) Program Manager and the entire enterprise is split into two components of equal sature: calibration and validation plus satellite data processing. The detailed elements of the activity are based on the basic tasks of the two main components plus the current objectives of the Carbon Cycle and Ecosystems Roadmap. The former is distinguished by an internal core set of responsibilities and the latter is facilitated through an external connecting-core ring of competed or contracted activities. The core elements for the calibration and validation component include a) publish protocols and performance metrics; b) verify uncertainty budgets; c) manage the development and evaluation of instrumentation; and d) coordinate international partnerships. The core elements for the satellite data processing component are e) process and reprocess multisensor data; f) acquire, distribute, and archive data products; and g) implement new data products. Both components have shared responsibilities for initializing and temporally monitoring satellite calibration. Connecting-core elements include (but are not restricted to) atmospheric correction and characterization, standards and traceability, instrument and analysis round robins, field campaigns and vicarious calibration sites, in situ database, bio-optical algorithm (and product) validation, satellite characterization and vicarious calibration, and image processing software. The plan also includes an accountability process, creating a Calibration and Validation Team (to help manage the activity), and a discussion of issues associated with the plan's scientific focus.

Hooker, Stanford B.↗