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Extreme Scale Computing to Secure the Nation

Since the dawn of modern electronic computing in the mid 1940's, U.S. national security programs have been dominant users of every new generation of high-performance computer. Indeed, the first general-purpose electronic computer, ENIAC (the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer), was used to calculate the expected explosive yield of early thermonuclear weapons designs. Even the U. S. numerical weather prediction program, another early application for high-performance computing, was initially funded jointly by sponsors that included the U.S. Air Force and Navy, agencies interested in accurate weather predictions to support U.S. military operations. For the decades of the cold war, national security requirements continued to drive the development of high performance computing (HPC), including advancement of the computing hardware and development of sophisticated simulation codes to support weapons and military aircraft design, numerical weather prediction as well as data-intensive applications such as cryptography and cybersecurity U.S. national security concerns continue to drive the development of high-performance computers and software in the U.S. and in fact, events following the end of the cold war have driven an increase in the growth rate of computer performance at the high-end of the market. This mainly derives from our nation's observance of a moratorium on underground nuclear testing beginning in 1992, followed by our voluntary adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) beginning in 1995. The CTBT prohibits further underground nuclear tests, which in the past had been a key component of the nation's science-based program for assuring the reliability, performance and safety of U.S. nuclear weapons. In response to this change, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiated the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) program in response to the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act, which requires, 'in the absence of nuclear testing, a progam to: (1) Support a focused, multifaceted program to increase the understanding of the enduring stockpile; (2) Predict, detect, and evaluate potential problems of the aging of the stockpile; (3) Refurbish and re-manufacture weapons and components, as required; and (4) Maintain the science and engineering institutions needed to support the nation's nuclear deterrent, now and in the future'. This program continues to fulfill its national security mission by adding significant new capabilities for producing scientific results through large-scale computational simulation coupled with careful experimentation, including sub-critical nuclear experiments permitted under the CTBT. To develop the computational science and the computational horsepower needed to support its mission, SBSS initiated the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative, later renamed the Advanced Simulation & Computing (ASC) program (sidebar: 'History of ASC Computing Program Computing Capability'). The modern 3D computational simulation capability of the ASC program supports the assessment and certification of the current nuclear stockpile through calibration with past underground test (UGT) data. While an impressive accomplishment, continued evolution of national security mission requirements will demand computing resources at a significantly greater scale than we have today. In particular, continued observance and potential Senate confirmation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) together with the U.S administration's promise for a significant reduction in the size of the stockpile and the inexorable aging and consequent refurbishment of the stockpile all demand increasing refinement of our computational simulation capabilities. Assessment of the present and future stockpile with increased confidence of the safety and reliability without reliance upon calibration with past or future test data is a long-term goal of the ASC program. This will be accomplished through significant increases in the scientific bases that underlie the computational tools. Computer codes must be developed that replace phenomenology with increased levels of scientific understanding together with an accompanying quantification of uncertainty. These advanced codes will place significantly higher demands on the computing infrastructure than do the current 3D ASC codes. This article discusses not only the need for a future computing capability at the exascale for the SBSS program, but also considers high performance computing requirements for broader national security questions. For example, the increasing concern over potential nuclear terrorist threats demands a capability to assess threats and potential disablement technologies as well as a rapid forensic capability for determining a nuclear weapons design from post-detonation evidence (nuclear counterterrorism).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

RERTR 2009 (Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors)

The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Global Threat Reduction in cooperation with the China Atomic Energy Authority and International Atomic Energy Agency hosted the 'RERTR 2009 International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors.' The meeting was organized by Argonne National Laboratory, China Institute of Atomic Energy and Idaho National Laboratory and was held in Beijing, China from November 1-5, 2009. This was the 31st annual meeting in a series on the same general subject regarding the conversion of reactors within the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). The Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program develops technology necessary to enable the conversion of civilian facilities using high enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and targets.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

The Handicap Principle, Strategic Information Warfare and the Paradox of Asymmetry

The term asymmetric threat (or warfare) often refers to tactics utilized by countries, terrorist groups, or individuals to carry out attacks on a superior opponent while trying to avoid direct confrontation. Information warfare is sometimes also referred to as a type of asymmetric warfare perhaps due to its asymmetry in terms of cost and efficacy. Obviously, there are differences and commonalities between two types of asymmetric warfare. One major difference lies in the goal to avoid confrontation and one commonality is the asymmetry. Regardless, the unique properties surrounding asymmetric warfare warrant a strategic-level study. Despite enormous studies conducted in the last decade, a consensus on the strategy a nation state should take to deal with asymmetric threat seems still intriguing. In this article, we try to shed some light on the issue from the handicap principle in the context of information warfare. The Handicap principle was first proposed by Zahavi (1975) to explain the honesty or reliability of animal communication signals. He argued that in a signaling system such as one used in mate selection, a superior male is able to signal with a highly developed "handicap" to demonstrate its quality, and the handicap serves "as a kind of (quality) test imposed on the individual" (Zahavi 1975, Searcy and Nowicki 2005). The underlying thread that inspires us for the attempt to establish a connection between the two apparently unrelated areas is the observation that competition, communication and cooperation (3C), which are three fundamental processes in nature and against which natural selection optimize living things, may also make sense in human society. Furthermore, any communication networks, whether it is biological networks (such as animal communication networks) or computer networks (such as the Internet) must be reasonably reliable (honest in the case of animal signaling) to fulfill its missions for transmitting and receiving messages. The strategic goal of information warfare is then to destroy or defend the reliability (honesty) of communication networks. The handicap principle that governs the reliability (honesty) of animal communication networks can be considered as the nature s version of information warfare strategy because it is a product of natural selection. What is particularly interesting is to transfer the evolutionary game theory models [e.g., Sir Philip Sydney (SPS) game] for the handicap principle to the study of information warfare. In a broad perspective, we realize that the handicap principle may actually contradict the principle of asymmetry in asymmetric warfare. Anyway, not every species of animals has evolved expensive signaling equipments like male peacocks (whose exaggerated train is an example of handicap). Furthermore, the handicap principle is not only about communication, and it also embodies the spirits of cooperation and competition. In human societies, communication modulates cooperation and competition; so does in animal communication networks. Therefore, to evolve or maintain a sustainable communication network, the proper strategy should be to balance (modulate) the cooperation and competition with communication tools (information warfare tools), which is perhaps in contradiction with the asymmetric strategy. There might be a paradox in the strategy of asymmetric warfare, and whether or not information warfare can be used as an asymmetric tool is still an open question.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Arsenic chemistry in soils and sediments

Arsenic is a naturally occurring trace element that poses a threat to human and ecosystem health, particularly when incorporated into food or water supplies. The greatest risk imposed by arsenic to human health results from contamination of drinking water, for which the World Health Organization recommends a maximum limit of 10 {micro}g L{sup -1}. Continued ingestion of drinking water having hazardous levels of arsenic can lead to arsenicosis and cancers of the bladder, skin, lungs and kidneys. Unfortunately, arsenic tainted drinking waters are a global threat and presently having a devastating impact on human health within Asia. Nearly 100 million people, for example, are presently consuming drinking water having arsenic concentrations exceeding the World Health Organization's recommended limit (Ahmed et al., 2006). Arsenic contamination of the environment often results from human activities such as mining or pesticide application, but recently natural sources of arsenic have demonstrated a devastating impact on water quality. Arsenic becomes problematic from a health perspective principally when it partitions into the aqueous rather than the solid phase. Dissolved concentrations, and the resulting mobility, of arsenic within soils and sediments are the combined result of biogeochemical processes linked to hydrologic factors. Processes favoring the partitioning of As into the aqueous phase, potentially leading to hazardous concentrations, vary extensively but can broadly be grouped into four categories: (1) ion displacement, (2) desorption (or limited sorption) at pH values > 8.5, (3) reduction of arsenate to arsenite, and (4) mineral dissolution, particularly reductive dissolution of Fe and Mn (hydr)oxides. Although various processes may liberate arsenic from solids, a transition from aerobic to anaerobic conditions, and commensurate arsenic and iron/manganese reduction, appears to be a dominant, but not exclusive, means by which high concentrations of dissolved arsenic are generated. Within the subsequent sections of this chapter, we explore and describe the biological and chemical processes that control the partitioning of arsenic between the solid and aqueous phase.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Offsite source recovery project - ten years of sealed source recovery and disposal

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) Offsite Source Recovery Project (OSRP) has been recovering excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources for ten years. In January 2009, GTRI announced that the project had recovered 20,000 sealed radioactive sources (this number has since increased to more than 23,000). This project grew out of early efforts at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to recover and disposition excess Plutonium-239 (Pu-239) sealed sources that were distributed in the 1960s and 1970s under the Atoms for Peace Program. Decades later, these sources began to exceed their special form certifications or fall out of regular use. As OSRP has collected and stored sealed sources, initially using 'No Path Forward' waste exemptions for storage within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, it has consistently worked to create disposal pathways for the material it has recovered. The project was initially restricted to recovering sealed sources that would meet the definition of Greater-than-Class-C (GTCC) low-level radioactive waste, assisting DOE in meeting its obligations under the Low-level Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendments (PL 99-240) to provide disposal for this type of waste. After being transferred from DOE-Environmental Management (EM) to the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to be part of GTRI, OSRP's mission was expanded to include not only material that would be classified as GTCC when it became waste, but also any other materials that might constitute a 'national security consideration.' It was recognized at the time that the GTCC category was a waste designation having to do with environmental consequence, rather than the threat posed by deliberate or accidental misuse. The project faces barriers to recovery in many areas, but disposal continues to be one of the more difficult to overcome. This paper discusses OSRP's disposal efforts over its 10-year history. For sources meeting the DOE definition of 'transuranic,' OSRP has achieved many milestones, including defense determinations for various isotopes, a WIPP RCRA permit modification to accommodate headspace gas sampling requirements, and approval of a peer-reviewed non-assay radiological characterization methodology. For non-transuranic sources, which OSRP began to recover in 2004, OSRP has achieved NEP A coverage for storage and implemented consolidated storage at both DOE and commercial locations, as well as completing several specific disposal operations. The closure of the Barnwell low-level waste disposal site in 2008 has left 36 states with absolutely no commercial disposal pathway for most sealed sources, increasing the demands on OSRP. This and other current challenges and future work will also be discussed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Autonomous Pathogen Detection System

We developed, tested, and now operate a civilian biological defense capability that continuously monitors the air for biological threat agents. The Autonomous Pathogen Detection System (APDS) collects, prepares, reads, analyzes, and reports results of multiplexed immunoassays and multiplexed PCR assays using Luminex{copyright} xMAP technology and flow cytometer. The mission we conduct is particularly demanding: continuous monitoring, multiple threat agents, high sensitivity, challenging environments, and ultimately extremely low false positive rates. Here, we introduce the mission requirements and metrics, show the system engineering and analysis framework, and describe the progress to date including early development and current status.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Toward A National Early Warning System for Forest Disturbances Using Remotely Sensed Land Surface Phenology

We are using a statistical clustering method for delineating homogeneous ecoregions as a basis for identifying disturbances in forests through time over large areas, up to national and global extents. Such changes can be shown relative to past conditions, or can be predicted relative to present conditions, as with forecasts of future climatic change. This quantitative ecoregion approach can be used to predict destinations for populations whose local environments are forecast to become unsuitable and are forced to migrate as their habitat shifts, and is also useful for predicting the susceptibility of new locations to invasive species like Sudden Oak Death. EFETAC and our sister western center WWETAC, along with our NASA and ORNL collaborators, are designing a new national-scale early warning system for forest threats, called FIRST. Envisioned as a change-detection system, FIRST will identify all land surface cover changes at the MODIS observational scale, and then try to discriminate normal, expected seasonal changes from locations having unusual activity that may represent potential forest threats. As a start, we have developed new national data sets every 16 days from 2002 through 2008, based on land surface phenology, or timing of leaf-out in the spring and brown-down in the fall. Changes in such phenological maps will be shown to contain important information about vegetation health status across the United States. The standard deviation of the duration of fall can be mapped, showing places where length of fall is relatively constant or is variable in length from year to year.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

National Missile Defense: What, When and Why?

The Bush Administration is steaming ahead with the deployment of the Clinton-designed mid-course hit-to-kill intercept system for national missile defense. This has serious disabilities against even the simplest strategic ballistic missiles. What is the threat to the United States from such missiles, in context? Is NMD a rational response, considering the always limited resources of the U.S. government? What are the other threats and needs? If protection is demanded against potential emerging missile states, what are the options? Answers to these questions will be provided in the talk and some are already available at the author’s web site: http://www.fas.org/rlg.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Administrator Highlights U.S.-Georgian Nuclear Security Cooperation in Tbilisi

NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino highlighted the strong U.S.-Georgian cooperation on nuclear security issues during a day-long visit to the Republic of Georgia in mid-June. He briefed the media at availability at the Tbilisi airport. In April 2009, President Obama outlined an ambitious agenda to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years, calling the danger of a terrorist acquiring nuclear weapons "the most immediate and extreme threat to global security." In this year's State of the Union, he called the threat of nuclear weapons, "the greatest danger to the American people." In order to meet that challenge, the President's FY2011 Budget Request includes close to $2.7 billion for the National Nuclear Security Administration's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program -- an increase of 25.7 percent over FY2010. Included in that request is NNSA's Second Line of Defense (SLD) program, which works around the world to strengthen the capability of foreign governments to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders and through the global maritime shipping system.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NNSA B-Roll: Fuel Removals

The National Nuclear Security Administration established the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) to identify, secure, remove and/or facilitate the disposition of high risk vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world, as quickly as possible, that pose a threat to the United States and the international community.

nuclear security, gtri, highly enriched uranium↗

Teleconference highlights-NE-NA proliferation resistance review

Herczeg gave a readout from the kickoff meeting with Paul Lisowski - namely develop a common definition of proliferation resistance (for use by S-1, other upper management, public affairs, etc.), and to evaluate possible framework where a metric could be assigned for fuel cycle comparisons (integral, easy to communicate). Sprinkle raised concern about 'trivializing' notion of proliferation resistance (PR), with idea of making sure we don't lose the concept that strong safeguards and security are required within a nonproliferation framework that support U.S. policy goals. Integrated Safeguards by Design notion was brought up in this context. Round table discussion of the term PR, its misuse (even unintentional), fact that Chu is using term and apparently in context of proliferation proof. It was noted that there has been much work already done in this area and we should not reinvent the wheel. One of the first tasks needs to be gathering up old reports (TOPS, Como, PRPP, etc) and distributing to group (action item for all). It was also noted that there are multiple definitions of PR, including the recent NPIA, supporting the need for this type of activity. Miller described the current work package under AFCI, with $50k of funding from the campaign management account. Herczeg asked about additional funds should it become clear that a larger effort is required (tension between current program and getting something out relatively soon). Goldner to look into potential additional funds. Miller notes that within current work package, easy to engage LANL participants and that Per Peterson can participate under UCB funding (a new center is being established with UC fee awards from LANL and LLNL - the Berkeley Nuclear Research Center). Consensus that Per would be a good external member of the group. Sprinkle notes that held like to coordinate the NE and NA work packages. Miller and Sprinkle to work offline. Wallace talked about the possibility of being more quantitative in an analysis based on recent conversation with Chuck Bathke, Pratap Sadasivan, and John Ireland in which some statistical and data integration concepts that have been used for homeland security applications might be of value. Wallace and Murphy talked about different threats, which influence analys is (such as is being done in the SPIKE/material attractiveness analyses). Three threats identified - nation state with advanced nuclear capabilities, nation state without advanced nuclear capabilities, and sub-national or terrorist. Sprinkle brought forward idea that a third category could be nation state that does not have nuclear proliferation aspirations.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

SECURITY MODELING FOR MARITIME PORT DEFENSE RESOURCE ALLOCATION

Redeployment of existing law enforcement resources and optimal use of geographic terrain are examined for countering the threat of a maritime based small-vessel radiological or nuclear attack. The evaluation was based on modeling conducted by the Savannah River National Laboratory that involved the development of options for defensive resource allocation that can reduce the risk of a maritime based radiological or nuclear threat. A diverse range of potential attack scenarios has been assessed. As a result of identifying vulnerable pathways, effective countermeasures can be deployed using current resources. The modeling involved the use of the Automated Vulnerability Evaluation for Risks of Terrorism (AVERT{reg_sign}) software to conduct computer based simulation modeling. The models provided estimates for the probability of encountering an adversary based on allocated resources including response boats, patrol boats and helicopters over various environmental conditions including day, night, rough seas and various traffic flow rates.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

With the end of the Cold War, in a dramatically changed security environment, the advances in nonnuclear strategic capabilities along with reduced numbers and roles for nuclear forces has altered the calculus of deterrence and defense, at least for the United States. For many, this opened up a realistic possibility of a nuclear-free world. It soon became clear that the initial post-Cold War hopes were exaggerated. The world did change fundamentally, but it did not become more secure and stable. In place of the old Soviet threat, there has been growing concern about proliferation and terrorism involving nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, global instability and increasingly serious new and emerging threats, including cyber attacks and attacks on satellites. For the United States at least, in this emerging environment, the political rationales for nuclear weapons, from deterrence to reassurance to alliance management, are changing and less central than during the Cold War to the security of the United States, its friends and allies. Nuclear weapons remain important for the US, but for a far more limited set of roles and missions. As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission report reveals, there is a domestic US consensus on nuclear policy and posture at the highest level and for the near term, including the continued role of nuclear arms in deterring WMD use and in reassuring allies. Although the value of nuclear weapons has declined for the United States, the value of these weapons for Russia, China and so-called 'rogue' states is seen to be rising. The nuclear logic of NATO during Cold War - the need for nuclear weapons to counter vastly superior conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact - is today heard from Russians and even some proliferants. Moreover, these weapons present a way for rogues to achieve regional hegemony and possibly to deter interventions by the United States or others. While the vision of a nuclear-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. And the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that was largely unaffected by US and other nuclear-weapon decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects for warfare could rise. In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to take advantage of moves toward disarmament, while friends and allies who are not reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if deterrence declined. To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorismincluding defenses and consequence management-are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes efforts to: (1) Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (2) Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; (3) Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism; (4) Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and (5) Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These and other activities are important in themselves, and are essential to maintaining and strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) bargain by bolstering two of its pillars - nonproliferation and peaceful nuclear energy cooperation. There is no alternative, and little prospect for a better deal.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

10 years and 20,000 sources: the offsite source recovery project

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) Offsite Source Recovery Project (OSRP) has been recovering excess and unwanted sealed sources for ten years. In January 2009, GTRI announced that the project had recovered 20,000 sealed radioactive sources. This project grew out of early efforts at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to recover and disposition excess Plutonium-239 (Pu-239) sealed sources that were distributed in the 1960s and 1970s under the Atoms for Peace Program. Sealed source recovery was initially considered a waste management activity, as evidenced by its initial organization under the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Environmental Management (EM) program. After the terrorist attacks of 2001, however, the interagency community began to recognize the threat posed by excess and unwanted radiological material, particularly those that could not be disposed at the end of their useful life. After being transferred to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to be part of GTRI, OSRP's mission was expanded to include not only material that would be classified as Greater-than-Class-C (GTCC) when it became waste, but also any other materials that might be a 'national security consideration.' This paper discusses OSRP's history, recovery operations, expansion to accept high-activity beta-gamma-emitting sealed sources and devices and foreign-possessed sources, and more recent efforts such as cooperative projects with the Council on Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD) and involvement in GTRI's Search and Secure project. Current challenges and future work will also be discussed.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Isotope Enrichment Detection by Laser Ablation - Dual Tunable Diode Laser Absorption Spectrometry

The rapid global expansion of nuclear energy is motivating the expedited development of new safeguards technology to mitigate potential proliferation threats arising from monitoring gaps within the uranium enrichment process. Current onsite enrichment level monitoring methods are limited by poor sensitivity and accuracy performance. Offsite analysis has better performance, but this approach requires onsite hand sampling followed by time-consuming and costly post analysis. These limitations make it extremely difficult to implement comprehensive safeguards accounting measures that can effectively counter enrichment facility misuse. In addition, uranium enrichment by modern centrifugation leads to a significant proliferation threat, since the centrifuge cascades can quickly produce a significant quantity of highly enriched uranium (HEU). The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is developing an engineered safeguards approach having continuous aerosol particulate collection and uranium isotope analysis to provide timely detection of HEU production in a low enriched uranium facility. This approach is based on laser vaporization of aerosol particulate samples, followed by wavelength tuned laser diode spectroscopy, to characterize the 235U/238U isotopic ratio by subtle differences in atomic absorption wavelengths arising from differences in each isotope’s nuclear mass, volume, and spin (hyperfine structure for 235U). Environmental sampling media is introduced into a small, reduced pressure chamber, where a focused pulsed laser vaporizes a 10 to 20-µm sample diameter. The ejected plasma forms a plume of atomic vapor. A plume for a sample containing uranium has atoms of the 235U and 238U isotopes present. Tunable diode lasers are directed through the plume to selectively excite each isotope and their presence is detected by monitoring absorbance signals on a shot-to-shot basis. Single-shot detection sensitivity approaching the femtogram range and abundance uncertainty less than 10% have been demonstrated with measurements on surrogate materials. In this paper we present measurement results on samples containing background materials (e.g., dust, minerals, soils) laced with micron-sized target particles having isotopic ratios ranging from 1 to 50%.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

FOSTERING MULTI-LATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, COLOMBIA, AND THE UNITED STATES TO ENHANCE THE PROTECTION OF HIGH-ACTIVITY RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) reduces and protects vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide from sabotage, theft or diversion. The GTRI has worked successfully with foreign countries to remove and protect nuclear and radioactive materials including high-activity sources used in medical, commercial, and research applications. There are many barriers to successful bilateral cooperation that must be overcome including language, preconceived perceptions, long distances, and different views on the threat and protection requirements. Successful cooperation is often based on relationships and building trusting relationships takes time. In the case of Dominican Republic, the GTRI first received contact in 2008 from the Government of Dominican Republic. They requested cooperation that was similar to the tri-partite cooperation between Colombia, Mexico and the United States. Throughout the region it was widely known that the GTRI’s cooperation with the Government of Colombia was a resounding success resulting in the securing of forty sites; the consolidation of numerous disused/orphan sources at a secure national storage facility; and, the development of a comprehensive approach to security including, inter alia, training and sustainability. The Government of Colombia also showcased this comprehensive approach to thirteen Central American and Caribbean countries at a GTRI regional security conference held in Panama in October 2004. In 2007, Colombia was an integral component of GTRI multi-lateral cooperation initiation in Mexico. As a result, twenty two of Mexico’s largest radioactive sites have been upgraded in the past eighteen months. These two endeavors served as catalysts for cooperation opportunities in the Dominican Republic. Representatives from the Colombian government were aware of GTRI’s interest in initiating cooperation with the Government of Dominican Republic and to facilitate this cooperation, they traveled to the Dominican Republic and provided briefings and presentations which demonstrated its successful cooperation with the GTRI. Shortly after that visit, the Government of Dominican Republic agreed to move forward and requested that the cooperative efforts in Dominican Republic be performed in a tripartite manner, leveraging the skills, experience, and resources of the Colombians, and the financial and technical support of the United States. As a result, two of Dominican Republic’s largest radioactive sites had security upgrades in place within 90 days of the cooperation visit in December 2008.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

FOSTERING MULTI-LATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF MEXICO, COLOMBIA, AND THE UNITED STATES TO ENHANCE THE PROTECTION OF HIGH-ACTIVITY RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) reduces and protects vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide from sabotage, theft or diversion. The GTRI program has worked successfully with foreign countries to remove and protect nuclear and radioactive materials including high-activity sources used in medical, commercial, and research applications. There are many barriers to successful bilateral cooperation that must be overcome including language, preconceived perceptions, long distances, and different views on the threat and protection requirements. Successful cooperation is often based on relationships and building trusting relationships takes time. In the case of Mexico, GTRI first made contact in 2005. The project then lost momentum and stalled. At the same time, GTRI’s cooperation with the Republic of Colombia was a resounding success resulting in the securing of forty sites; the consolidation of numerous disused/orphan sources at a secure national storage facility; and, the development of a comprehensive approach to security including, inter alia, training and sustainability. The government of Colombia also showcased this comprehensive approach to thirteen Central American and Caribbean countries at a GTRI regional security conference held in Panama in October 2004. Representatives from the Colombian government were aware of GTRI’s interest in initiating cooperation with the Government of Mexico and to facilitate this cooperation, they offered to invite their Mexican counterparts to Colombia to observe its successful cooperation with GTRI. Shortly after that visit, the Government of Mexico agreed to move forward and requested that the cooperative efforts in Mexico be performed in a tripartite manner, leveraging the skills, experience, and resources of the Colombians. As a result, 22 of Mexico’s largest radioactive sites have had security upgrades in place within 18 months of cooperation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Risk assessment methodology applied to counter IED research & development portfolio prioritization

In an effort to protect the United States from the ever increasing threat of domestic terrorism, the Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T), has significantly increased research activities to counter the terrorist use of explosives. More over, DHS S&T has established a robust Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Program to Deter, Predict, Detect, Defeat, and Mitigate this imminent threat to the Homeland. The DHS S&T portfolio is complicated and changing. In order to provide the ''best answer'' for the available resources, DHS S&T would like some ''risk based'' process for making funding decisions. There is a definite need for a methodology to compare very different types of technologies on a common basis. A methodology was developed that allows users to evaluate a new ''quad chart'' and rank it, compared to all other quad charts across S&T divisions. It couples a logic model with an evidential reasoning model using an Excel spreadsheet containing weights of the subjective merits of different technologies. The methodology produces an Excel spreadsheet containing the aggregate rankings of the different technologies. It uses Extensible Logic Modeling (ELM) for logic models combined with LANL software called INFTree for evidential reasoning.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗