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At least 1,477 records · Page 82

Composite Sampling of a Bacillus anthracis Surrogate with Cellulose Sponge Surface Samplers from a Nonporous Surface

A series of experiments was conducted to explore the utility of composite-based collection of surface samples for the detection of a Bacillus anthracis surrogate using cellulose sponge samplers on a nonporous stainless steel surface. Two composite-based collection approaches were evaluated over a surface area of 3716 cm 2 (four separate 929 cm 2 areas), larger than the 645 cm 2 prescribed by the standard Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and Prevention cellulose sponge sampling protocol for use on nonporous surfaces. The CDC method was also compared to a modified protocol where only one surface of the sponge sampler was used for each of the four areas composited. Differences in collection efficiency compared to positive controls and the potential for contaminant transfer for each protocol were assessed. The impact of the loss of wetting buffer from the sponge sampler onto additional surface areas sampled was evaluated. Statistical tests of the results using ANOVA indicate that the collection of composite samples using the modified sampling protocol is comparable to the collection of composite samples using the standard CDC protocol (p = 0.261). Most of the surface-bound spores are collected on the first sampling pass, suggesting that multiple passes with the sponge sampler over the same surface may be unnecessary. The effect of moisture loss from the sponge sampler on collection efficiency was not significant (p = 0.720) for both methods. Contaminant transfer occurs with both sampling protocols, but the magnitude of transfer is significantly greater when using the standard protocol than when the modified protocol is used (p<0.001). The results of this study suggest that composite surface sampling, by either method presented here, could successfully be used to increase the surface area sampled per sponge sampler, resulting in reduced sampling times in the field and decreased laboratory processing cost and turn-around times.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

COVID-19-associated school closures and related efforts to sustain education and subsidized meal programs, United States, February 18-June 30, 2020

Pre-emptive school closures are frontline community mitigation measures recommended by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for implementation during severe pandemics. This study describes the spatiotemporal patterns of publicly announced school closures implemented in response to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and assesses how public K-12 districts adjusted their methods of education delivery and provision of subsidized meals. During February 18–June 30, 2020, we used daily systematic media searches to identify publicly announced COVID-19–related school closures lasting ≥1 day in the United States (US). We also collected statewide school closure policies from state government websites. Data on distance learning and subsidized meal programs were collected from a stratified sample of 600 school districts. The first COVID-19–associated school closure occurred on February 27, 2020 in Washington state. By March 30, 2020, all but one US public school districts were closed, representing the first-ever nearly synchronous nationwide closure of public K-12 schools in the US. Approximately 100,000 public schools were closed for ≥8 weeks because of COVID-19, affecting >50 million K-12 students. Of 600 districts sampled, the vast majority offered distance learning (91.0%) and continued provision of subsidized meal programs (78.8%) during the closures. Despite the sudden and prolonged nature of COVID-19–associated school closures, schools demonstrated flexibility by implementing distance learning and alternate methods to continue subsidized meal programs.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Nutritional markers and proteome in patients undergoing treatment for pulmonary tuberculosis differ by geographic region

Contemporary phase 2 TB disease treatment clinical trials have found that microbiologic treatment responses differ between African versus non-African regions, the reasons for which remain unclear. Understanding host and disease phenotypes that may vary by region is important for optimizing curative treatments. We characterized clinical features and the serum proteome of phase 2 TB clinical trial participants undergoing treatment for smear positive, culture-confirmed TB, comparing host serum protein expression in clinical trial participants enrolled in African and Non-African regions. Serum samples were collected from 289 participants enrolled in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention TBTC Study 29 (NCT00694629) at time of enrollment and at the end of the intensive phase (after 40 doses of TB treatment). After a peptide level proteome analysis utilizing a unique liquid chromatography IM-MS platform (LC-IM-MS) and subsequent statistical analysis, a total of 183 core proteins demonstrated significant differences at both baseline and at week 8 timepoints between participants enrolled from African and non-African regions. The majority of the differentially expressed proteins were upregulated in participants from the African region, and included acute phase proteins, mediators of inflammation, as well as coagulation and complement pathways. Downregulated proteins in the African population were primarily linked to nutritional status and lipid metabolism pathways. We have identified differentially expressed nutrition and lipid pathway proteins by geographic region in TB patients undergoing treatment for pulmonary tuberculosis, which appear to be associated with differential treatment responses. Future TB clinical trials should collect expanded measures of nutritional status and further evaluate the relationship between nutrition and microbiologic treatment response.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Understanding Virulence in the Brucellae and Francisellae: Towards Efficacious Treatments for Two Potential Biothreat Agents

Francisella tularensis, Yersinia pestis and Brucellae species are highly infectious pathogens classified as select agents by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) with the potential for use in bioterrorism attacks. These organisms are known to be facultative intracellular pathogens that preferentially infect human monocytes. As such, understanding how the host responds to infection with these organisms is paramount in detecting and combating human disease. We have compared the ability of fully virulent strains of each pathogen and their non-pathogenic near neighbors to enter and survive inside the human monocytic cell line THP-1 and have quantified the cellular response to infection with the goal of identifying both unique and common host response patterns. We expanded the scope of these studies to include experiments with pathogenic and non-pathogenic strains of Y. pestis, the causative agent of plague. Nonpathogenic strains of each organism were impaired in their ability to survive intracellularly compared with their pathogenic counterparts. Furthermore, infection of THP-1 cells with pathogenic strains of Y. pestis and F. tularensis resulted in marked increases in the secretion of the inflammatory chemokines IL-8, RANTES, and MIP-1{beta}. In contrast, B. melitensis infection failed to elicit any significant increases in a panel of cytokines tested. These differences may underscore distinct strategies in pathogenic mechanisms employed by these pathogens.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Antibody-Based Diagnostics and Production for High Consequence Animal Pathogens II

New Horizons Diagnostic Corporation (NHD) develops, manufactures, and tests products for the detection of bacteria and toxins in human, environmental, surface, food, and water samples for government, municipal and corporate customers. It offers diverse medical products, such as products for testing cholera, gonorrhea, syphilis, and drug abuse screening products. The major product line for NHD is the development, marketing and sales of rapid antibody based diagnostic kits. Infectious diseases spread through food or water is a common, distressing, and sometimes life-threatening problem for millions of people in the United States and around the world. World Health Organization (WHO) studies have shown that in 1996, infectious and parasitic diseases accounted for 43% of the 40 million deaths in developing countries. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates 76 million people suffer foodborne illnesses each year in the United States, accounting for 325,000 hospitalizations and more than 5,000 deaths.

Morris, James E↗

Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack

This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Study of the structure and function of a novel bacterial virulence factor isolated from Francisella tularensis

During my internship at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), I studied a novel virulence factor of the potential bioterrorism agent, Francisella tularensis. This bacterium is a facultative intracellular pathogen with a broad host range, and is known to be the causative agent of the zoonotic disease tularemia (1). F. tularensis is highly infectious, requiring only 1 to 10 bacteria to cause severe disease (2). Due to its high rate of infectivity, F. tularensis has potential use as a bioterrorism agent. As a result, it has been categorized as a class A biothreat pathogen by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (3).

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Nowcasting influenza outbreaks using open-source media report.

We construct and verify a statistical method to nowcast influenza activity from a time-series of the frequency of reports concerning influenza related topics. Such reports are published electronically by both public health organizations as well as newspapers/media sources, and thus can be harvested easily via web crawlers. Since media reports are timely, whereas reports from public health organization are delayed by at least two weeks, using timely, open-source data to compensate for the lag in %E2%80%9Cofficial%E2%80%9D reports can be useful. We use morbidity data from networks of sentinel physicians (both the Center of Disease Control's ILINet and France's Sentinelles network) as the gold standard of influenza-like illness (ILI) activity. The time-series of media reports is obtained from HealthMap (http://healthmap.org). We find that the time-series of media reports shows some correlation ( 0.5) with ILI activity; further, this can be leveraged into an autoregressive moving average model with exogenous inputs (ARMAX model) to nowcast ILI activity. We find that the ARMAX models have more predictive skill compared to autoregressive (AR) models fitted to ILI data i.e., it is possible to exploit the information content in the open-source data. We also find that when the open-source data are non-informative, the ARMAX models reproduce the performance of AR models. The statistical models are tested on data from the 2009 swine-flu outbreak as well as the mild 2011-2012 influenza season in the U.S.A.

Ray, Jaideep↗

Towards a method of rapid extraction of strontium-90 from urine: urine pretreatment and alkali metal removal

A technical program to support the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention is being developed to provide an analytical method for rapid extraction of Sr-90 from urine, with the intent of assessing the general population’s exposure during an emergency response to a radiological terrorist event. Results are presented on the progress in urine sample preparation and chemical separation steps that provide an accurate and quantitative detection of Sr-90 based upon an automated column separation sequence and a liquid scintillation assay. Batch extractions were used to evaluate the urine pretreatment and the column separation efficiency and loading capacity based upon commercial, extractant-loaded resins. An efficient pretreatment process for decolorizing and removing organics from urine without measurable loss of radiostrontium from the sample was demonstrated. In addition, the Diphonix® resin shows promise for the removal of high concentrations of common strontium interferents in urine as a first separation step for Sr-90 analysis.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Transportation Modeling and Global Health

A patient in the United States has been diagnosed with Ebola. Fear and panic kicks in across the country, and hospitals are inundated with hundreds of people, some infected with the highly contagious disease and others not. Blood tests are needed for positive diagnoses, but the diagnostic labs are overwhelmed with blood samples to test, and staff are overworked and stressed. Infected people need to be quarantined and treated, but it's hard to find rooms to quarantine so many patients. Sick people who need triage and regular care for other emergencies are afraid to go to hospitals for fear of Ebola, which has a 50% fatality rate. And since hospitals are so overwhelmed, sick people often stay home, infecting heathy people around them; the U.S. is now in the grips a full-blown Ebola outbreak. Sandia's high-performance computers simulated such a nightmare scenario recently, and with good reason. An Ebola outbreak in the United States could be devastating if hospitals are not prepared. When an Ebola outbreak in West Africa became a global concern in 2014, health advisers were alarmed at the length of time it took to properly diagnose infected people. In rural areas in Liberia, for example, blood samples from ailing people would be sent to a laboratory for testing, but the closest lab was hundreds of miles away through difficult and sometimes impassable roads. In more urban areas, blood samples would be sent to nearby labs, but those labs were often already overburdened by the sheer volume of samples to test. Staff at some treatment centers were unaware that a lab a little farther away might have the capacity to take in more samples. Meanwhile, undiagnosed infected people were unknowingly spreading the disease to many others around them, worsening the outbreak. The U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) posed a serious question: how do we improve blood-sample transportation routes in Liberia to ensure that samples taken from ill people are tested as quickly as possible, ensuring a proper diagnosis and faster treatment? Sandia scientists, already experts in transportation modeling for nuclear materials, quickly swarmed on this problem. The Sandia Ebola response team immediately set out to collect data from the region using available maps and local information, and transformed the raw data to GIS maps. Then, applying Sandia transportation routing algorithms, the team identified the optimal routes to get blood samples to the best laboratory for testing, even if that lab was not geographically the closest. The models also showed the best possible locations for mobile diagnostic laboratories that would better support the very rural regions that were most affected by the Ebola outbreak.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Conditioning multi-model ensembles for disease forecasting

In this study we investigate how an ensemble of disease models can be conditioned to observational data, in a bid to improve its predictive skill. We use the ensemble of influenza forecasting models gathered by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as the exemplar. This ensemble is used every year to forecast the annual influenza outbreak in the United States. The models constituting this ensemble draw on very different modeling assumptions and approximations and are a diverse collection of methods to approximate epidemiological dynamics. Currently, each models' predictions are accorded the same importance, or weight, when compiling the ensemble's forecast. We consider this equally-weighted ensemble as the baseline case which has to be improved upon. In this study, we explore whether an ensemble forecast can be improved by "conditioning" the ensemble to whatever observational data is available from the ongoing outbreak. "Conditioning" can imply according the ensemble's members different weights which evolve over time, or simply perform the forecast using the top k (equally-weighted) models. In the latter case, the composition of the "top-k-see of models evolves over time. This is called "model averaging" in statistics. We explore four methods to perform model-averaging, three of which are new. We find that the CDC ensemble responds best to the "top-k-models" approach to model-averaging. All the new MA methods perform better than the baseline equally-weighted ensemble. The four model-averaging methods treat the models as black-boxes and simply use their forecasts as inputs i.e., one does not need access to the models at all, but rather only their forecasts. The model-averaging approaches reviewed in this report thus form a general framework for model-averaging any model ensemble.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Observations Regarding Commonly Available Materials for Face Shield Emulated-Personal Protective Equipment

The Center for Disease Control has recommended that to reduce potential exposure to COVID-19 the public should wear cloth face coverings in public settings where other social distancing measures are difficult to maintain. These face coverings and other Emulated-Personal Protective Equipment (E-PPE) can be made by using Commonly Available Materials (CAMs). As E-PPE recommendations continue to flood the media, a Sandia COVID-19 LDRD effort, the Sandia E-PiPEline Team, systematically evaluated E-PPE design options considering their effectiveness, durability, build difficulty, build cost, and comfort. Using qualitative and semi-quantitative evaluation tools, results of the investigation are presented here to provide guidelines for home and office construction of E-PPE.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Observations Regarding Commonly Available Materials for Face Covering Emulated-Personal Protective Equipment

The Center for Disease Control has recommended that to reduce potential exposure to COVID-19 the public should wear cloth face coverings in public settings where other social distancing measures are difficult to maintain. These face coverings and other Emulated-Personal Protective Equipment (E-PPE) can be made by using Commonly Available Materials (CAMs). As E-PPE recommendations continue to flood the media, a Sandia COVID-19 LDRD effort, the Sandia E-PiPEline Team, systematically evaluated E-PPE design options considering their effectiveness, durability, build difficulty, build cost, and comfort. Using qualitative and semi-quantitative evaluation tools, results of the investigation are presented here to provide guidelines for home and office construction of E-PPE.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

E-PiPEline: Quick to Market Emulated-PPE using Commonly Available Materials

The Center for Disease Control has recommended the public to wear cloth face coverings in public settings that reduce potential exposure to COVID-19 where other social distancing measures are difficult to maintain (e.g., grocery stores and pharmacies) especially in areas of significant community based transmission. These face coverings and other Emulated-Personal Protective Equipment (EPPE) can be made by using Commonly Available Materials (CAMs). As part of the Sandia COVID-19 LDRD effort (funded under the Materials Science Investment Area), the Sandia E-PiPEline task evaluated E-PPE design options for face coverings and face shields considering their effectiveness, durability, build difficulty, build cost, and comfort. Observations from this investigation are presented here to provide guidelines for home construction of E-PPE. This executive summary includes a brief roadmap of the analysis methodology, two one-page handouts geared to be distributed to the public at large (one for E-PPE face coverings and one for E-PPE face shields), and additional observations regarding the potential solutions for E-PPE face coverings and face shields included to further support the one-page handouts.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Working Safely at LANL during the COVID-19 Pandemic (Rev. 2)

The COVID-19 pandemic is an emerging, rapidly evolving public health emergency. The content of this course reflects the most up-to-date guidance and information from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), World Health Organization (WHO) and scientific literature available at the time the course was developed. Check the LANL COVID-19 Hub for the latest information and guidance. Updates to the course will be made as necessary to reflect evolving guidance form public health authorities and new data form the scientific literature.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Observations Regarding Face Covering Designs Using Commonly Available Materials

The Center for Disease Control has recommended that the public should wear cloth face coverings in public settings'. A Sandia COVID-19 LDRD effort, the Sandia E-PiPEline Team, systematically evaluated design options for face coverings constructed from commonly available materials (CAMS). The design options were analyzed with subject matter expert input considering the design's effectiveness (metric fiber density, material construction, and water saturation), reusability (degree of inertness), producibility (ability to obtain materials, build time), cost, and comfort (fit on face, breathability). Observations for the design of face coverings using CAMs are provided here.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

E-PiPEline: Face Shields and Face Coverings Using Commonly Available Materials

The Center for Disease Control has recommended that the public should wear cloth face coverings in public settings . Face coverings and face shields can be made by using Commonly Available Materials (CAMs). As part of the Sandia COVID - 19 LDRD effort (funded under the Materials Science Investment Area), the Sandia E - PiPEline task evaluated design options for face coverings and face shields considering their effectiveness, durability, build difficulty, build cost, and comfort. Observations from this investigation are presented here to provide guidelines for home construction of face coverings and face shields

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

FRMAC Assessment Manual Volume 1: Overview and Methods

This Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) Assessment Manual has been prepared by representatives of those Federal and State agencies that can be expected to play the major roles during a radiological emergency. Federal Agencies include: the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). This final manual was reviewed by experts from across the community and their input has been incorporated.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗