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The concept of the use of recycled uranium for increasing the degree of security of export deliveries of fuel for light-water reactors

The present paper deals with investigation of the possibilities for reducing the risk of proliferation of fissionable materials by means of increasing the degree of protection of fresh fuel intended for light-water reactors against unsanctioned use in the case of withdrawal of a recipient country of deliveries from IAEA safeguards. It is shown that the use of recycled uranium for manufacturing export nuclear fuel makes transfer of nuclear material removed from the fuel assemblies for weapons purposes difficult because of the presence of isotope {sup 232}U, whose content increases when one attempts to enrich uranium extracted from fresh fuel. In combination with restricted access to technologies for isotope separation by means of establishing international centers for uranium enrichment, this technical measure can significantly reduce the risk of proliferation associated with export deliveries of fuel made of low-enriched uranium. The assessment of a maximum level of contamination of nuclear material being transferred by isotope {sup 232}U for the given isotope composition of the initial fuel is obtained. The concept of further investigations of the degree of security of export deliveries of fuel assemblies with recycled uranium intended for light-water reactors is suggested.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Security assessment and impact analysis of cyberattacks in integrated T&D power systems

In this paper, we examine the impact of cyberattacks in an integrated transmission and distribution (T&D) power grid model with distributed energy resource (DER) integration. We adopt the OCTAVE Allegro methodology to identify critical system assets, enumerate potential threats, analyze and prioritize risks for threat scenarios. Based on the analysis, attack strategies and exploitation scenarios are identified which could lead to system compromise. Specifically, we investigate the impact of data integrity attacks in inverted-based solar PV controllers, control signal blocking attacks in protective switches and breakers, and coordinated monitoring and switching time-delay attacks. Index Terms—Cyberattacks, security assessment, impact analysis, case studies, integrated power systems.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Learning to Solve Large-Scale Security-Constrained Unit Commitment Problems

Security-constrained unit commitment (SCUC) is a fundamental problem in power systems and electricity markets. In practical settings, SCUC is repeatedly solved via mixed-integer linear programming (MIP), sometimes multiple times per day, with only minor changes in input data. In this work, we propose a number of machine learning techniques to effectively extract information from previously solved instances in order to significantly improve the computational performance of MIP solvers when solving similar instances in the future. Based on statistical data, we predict redundant constraints in the formulation, good initial feasible solutions, and affine subspaces where the optimal solution is likely to lie, leading to a significant reduction in problem size. Computational results on a diverse set of realistic and large-scale instances show that using the proposed techniques, SCUC can be solved on average 4.3 times faster with optimality guarantees and 10.2 times faster without optimality guarantees, with no observed reduction in solution quality. Out-of-distribution experiments provide evidence that the method is somewhat robust against data-set shift. Summary of Contribution. The paper describes a novel computational method, based on a combination of mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) and machine learning (ML), to solve a challenging and fundamental optimization problem in the energy sector. The method advances the state-of-the-art, not only for this particular problem, but also, more generally, in solving discrete optimization problems via ML. We expect that the techniques presented can be readily used by practitioners in the energy sector and adapted, by researchers in other fields, to other challenging operations research problems that are solved routinely.

Machine Learning↗

Recent Developments in Security-Constrained AC Optimal Power Flow: Overview of Challenge 1 in the ARPA-E Grid Optimization Competition

In “Recent Developments in Security-Constrained AC Optimal Power Flow: Overview of Challenge 1 in the ARPA-E Grid Optimization Competition,” we review the state of the art in practical algorithms for scheduling power-systems operations in the short term and the results of the recent competition organized by the U.S. Advanced Research Projects Agency–Energy. We explain the mixed-integer nonlinear formulation used in the competition for nonspecialists in electrical engineering, the context and organization of the competition, and the performance of competitors. We find that the collective approaches and results of competitors provide support for efforts to move nonlinear optimization techniques into industrial applications, as they have proven to be a robust and efficient alternative to current linear approximation techniques.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Technical and Regulatory Aspects of Integrating Safety and Security at Nuclear Power Plants

This paper provides an overview of lessons learned in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available FOF simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework. It describes how a user could integrate their plant-specific FOF models with safety mitigation actions in EMRALD, and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as MAAP. The work performed in this paper is based on a generic EMRALD model with actual plant data used for the analysis. However, only the generic model and general results of the analysis are presented for dissemination. No plant’s sensitive information is included in this paper. The discussion shows examples of insights that can be obtained from the proposed methodology.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

National Nuclear Security Administration Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report in Brief: October 2007 - May 2008

This abbreviated Annual Report covers program activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) from October 2007 through May 2008--the timeframe between the last Annual Report (which covered activities through September 2007) and the next report (which will begin with June 2008 activities). In that timeframe, the NGFP continued building a solid foundation as the program began reaping the benefits of recently implemented changes. This report is organized by Fellowship class and the pertinent program activities for each, including: October 2007 Recruiting events and final applications (Class of 2008) Winter 2007 Selection and hiring (Class of 2008) Spring 2008 Career development roundtables (Class of 2007) Orientation planning (Class of 2008) Recruitment planning and university outreach (Class of 2009) May 2008 Closing ceremony (Class of 2007)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Muon Fluence Measurements for Homeland Security Applications

This report focuses on work conducted at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to better characterize aspects of backgrounds in RPMs deployed for homeland security purposes. Two polyvinyl toluene scintillators were utilized with supporting NIM electronics to measure the muon coincidence rate. Muon spallation is one mechanism by which background neutrons are produced. The measurements performed concentrated on a broad investigation of the dependence of the muon flux on a) variations in solid angle subtended by the detector; b) the detector inclination with the horizontal; c) depth underground; and d) diurnal effects. These tests were conducted inside at Building 318/133, outdoors at Building 331G, and underground at Building 3425 at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Framework for a Risk-Informed Groundwater Compliance Strategy for Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada, Revision 1

Note: This document was prepared before the NTS was renamed the Nevada National Security Site (August 23, 2010); thus, all references to the site herein remain NTS. Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98, Frenchman Flat, at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) was the location of ten underground nuclear tests between 1965 and 1971. As a result, radionuclides were released in the subsurface in the vicinity of the test cavities. Corrective Action Unit 98 and other CAUs at the NTS and offsite locations are being investigated. The Frenchman Flat CAU is one of five Underground Test Area (UGTA) CAUs at the NTS that are being evaluated as potential sources of local or regional impact to groundwater resources. For UGTA sites, including Frenchman Flat, contamination in and around the test cavities will not be remediated because it is technologically infeasible due to the depth of the test cavities (150 to 2,000 feet [ft] below ground surface) and the volume of contaminated groundwater at widely dispersed locations on the NTS. Instead, the compliance strategy for these sites is to model contaminant flow and transport, estimate the maximum spatial extent and volume of contaminated groundwater (over a period of 1,000 years), maintain institutional controls, and restrict access to potentially contaminated groundwater at areas where contaminants could migrate beyond the NTS boundaries.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

American perspectives on security : energy, environment, nuclear weapons, and terrorism : 2010.

We report findings from an Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone among the American public in mid-2010 on US energy and environmental security. Key areas of investigation include public perceptions shaping the context for debate about a comprehensive national energy policy, and what levels of importance are assigned to various prospective energy technologies. Additionally, we investigate how public views on global climate change are evolving, how the public assesses the risks and benefits of nuclear energy, preferences for managing used nuclear fuel, and public trust in sources of scientific and technical information. We also report findings from a national Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone in mid-2010 on public views of the relevance of US nuclear weapons today, support for strategic arms control, and assessments of the potential for nuclear abolition. Additionally, we analyze evolving public views of the threat of terrorism, assessments of progress in the struggle against terrorism, and tolerance for intrusive antiterror policies. Where possible, findings from each survey are compared with previous surveys in this series for analyses of trends.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Improved Meteorological Input for Atmospheric Release Decision support Systems and an Integrated LES Modeling System for Atmospheric Dispersion of Toxic Agents: Homeland Security Applications

When hazardous material is accidently or intentionally released into the atmosphere, emergency response organizations look to decision support systems (DSSs) to translate contaminant information provided by atmospheric models into effective decisions to protect the public and emergency responders and to mitigate subsequent consequences. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-led Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC) is one of the primary DSSs utilized by emergency management organizations. IMAAC is responsible for providing 'a single piont for the coordination and dissemination of Federal dispersion modeling and hazard prediction products that represent the Federal position' during actual or potential incidents under the National Response Plan. The Department of Energy's (DOE) National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC), locatec at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), serves as the primary operations center of the IMAAC. A key component of atmospheric release decision support systems is meteorological information - models and data of winds, turbulence, and other atmospheric boundary-layer parameters. The accuracy of contaminant predictions is strongly dependent on the quality of this information. Therefore, the effectiveness of DSSs can be enhanced by improving the meteorological options available to drive atmospheric transport and fate models. The overall goal of this project was to develop and evaluate new meteorological modeling capabilities for DSSs based on the use of NASA Earth-science data sets in order to enhance the atmospheric-hazard information provided to emergency managers and responders. The final report describes the LLNL contributions to this multi-institutional effort. LLNL developed an approach to utilize NCAR meteorological predictions using NASA MODIS data for the New York City (NYC) region and demonstrated the potential impact of the use of different data sources and data parameterizations on IMAAC/NARAC fate and transport predictions. A case study involving coastal sea breeze circulation patterns in the NYC region was used to investigate the sensitivity of atmospheric dispersion results on the source of three-dimensional wind field data.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Pre-Shot Simulations of Far-Field Ground Motions for the Source Physics Experiment (SPE) Explosions at the Climax Stock, Nevada National Security Site

The Source Physics Experiment (SPE) will involve a series of explosions in various geologic and emplacement conditions to validate numerical simulation methods to predict behavior of seismic wave excitation and propagation for nuclear test monitoring. The first SPE's currently underway involve explosions in the Climax Stock (granitic geology) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Detailed geologic data and published material properties for the major lithologic units of the NNSS and surrounding region were used to build three-dimensional models for seismic wave propagation simulations. The geologic structure near the SPE shot point is quite varied including granitic, carbonate, tuff and alluvium lithologies. We performed preliminary ground motion simulations for a near-source domain covering 8 km x 8 km at the surface centered on the shot point to investigate various source and propagation effects using WPP, LLNL's anelastic seismic wave finite difference code. Simulations indicate that variations in wave propagation properties of the sub-surface will generate strongly path-dependent response once the energy has left the relatively small granitic geology of the near-surface Climax Stock near the SPE shot point. Rough topography to the north and west of SPE shot point causes additional complexity in the signals including energy on the transverse components. Waves propagate much faster through the granitic and carbonate formations and slower through the tuff and alluvium. Synthetic seismograms for a pure explosion source in a 3D geologic structure show large amplitudes on transverse component. For paths to the south sampling the granite, tuff and alluvium lithologies transverse component amplitudes are as high as 50% of that on the vertical and radial components.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Calendar Year 2009 Groundwater Monitoring Report, U.S. Department of Energy, Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

This report contains the groundwater and surface water monitoring data that were obtained during calendar year (CY) 2009 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (hereafter referenced as Y-12) on the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The CY 2009 monitoring data were obtained from wells, springs, and surface water sampling locations in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12. The Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime) encompasses a section of Bear Creek Valley (BCV) between the west end of Y-12 and the west end of the Bear Creek Watershed (directions are in reference to the Y-12 grid system). The Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime) encompasses the Y-12 industrial facilities and support structures in BCV. The Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime) encompasses a section of Chestnut Ridge directly south of Y-12. Section 2 of this report provides background information pertinent to groundwater and surface water quality monitoring in each hydrogeologic regime, including the topography and bedrock geology, surface water drainage, groundwater system, and extent of groundwater contamination. The CY 2009 groundwater and surface water monitoring data in this report were obtained from sampling and analysis activities implemented under the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP) managed by Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Y-12, LLC (B&W Y-12) and from sampling and analysis activities implemented under several monitoring programs managed by Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC). Cooperative implementation of the monitoring programs directed by the Y-12 GWPP and BJC (i.e., coordinating sample collection and sharing data) ensures that the CY 2009 monitoring results fulfill requirements of all the applicable monitoring drivers with no duplication of sampling and analysis efforts. Section 3 of this report contains a summary of information regarding the groundwater and surface water sampling and analysis activities implemented under the Y-12 GWPP including sampling locations and frequency; quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) sampling; sample collection and handling; field measurements and laboratory analytes; data management and data quality objective (DQO) evaluation; and groundwater elevation monitoring. However, this report does not include equivalent QA/QC or DQO evaluation information regarding the groundwater and surface water sampling and analysis activities associated with the monitoring programs implemented by BJC. Such details are deferred to the respective programmatic plans and reports issued by BJC (see Section 3.0). Collectively, the groundwater and surface water monitoring data obtained during CY 2009 by the Y-12 GWPP and BJC address DOE Order 450.1A (Environmental Protection Program) requirements for monitoring groundwater and surface water quality in areas: (1) which are, or could be, affected by operations at Y-12 (surveillance monitoring); and (2) where contaminants from Y-12 are most likely to migrate beyond the boundaries of the ORR (exit pathway/perimeter monitoring). Section 4 of this report presents a summary evaluation of the monitoring data with regard to the respective objectives of surveillance monitoring and exit pathway/perimeter monitoring, based on the analytical results for the principal groundwater contaminants at Y-12: nitrate, uranium, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), gross alpha activity, and gross beta activity. Section 5 of this report summarizes the most pertinent findings regarding the principal contaminants, along with recommendations proposed for ongoing groundwater and surface water quality monitoring performed under the Y-12 GWPP. Narrative sections of this report reference several appendices. Figures (maps and diagrams) and tables (excluding data summary tables presented in the narrative sections) are in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. Appendix C contains construction details for the wells in each regime that were sampled during CY 2009 by either the Y-12 GWPP or BJC. Field measurements recorded during collection of the groundwater and surface water samples and results of laboratory analyses of the samples are in Appendix D (Bear Creek Regime), Appendix E (East Fork Regime and surrounding areas), and Appendix F (Chestnut Ridge Regime). Appendix G contains data for the QA/QC samples associated with monitoring performed in each regime by the Y-12 GWPP.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Groundwater Withdrawals and Associated Well Descriptions for the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada, 1951-2008

From 1951 to 2008, groundwater withdrawals totaled more than 25,000 million gallons from wells on and directly adjacent to the Nevada National Security Site. Total annual groundwater withdrawals ranged from about 30 million gallons in 1951 to as much as 1,100 million gallons in 1989. Annual withdrawals from individual wells ranged from 0 million gallons to more than 325 million gallons. Monthly withdrawal data for the wells were compiled in a Microsoft © Excel 2003 spreadsheet. Groundwater withdrawal data are a compilation of measured and estimated withdrawals obtained from published and unpublished reports, U.S. Geological Survey files, and/or data reported by other agencies. The withdrawal data were collected from 42 wells completed in 33 boreholes. A history of each well is presented in terms of its well construction, borehole lithology, withdrawals, and water levels.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

LLNL Contribution to Sandia Used Fuel Disposition - Security March 2011 Deliverable

Cleary [2007] divides the proliferation pathway into stages: diversion, facility misuse, transportation, transformation, and weapons fabrication. King [2010], using Cleary's methodology, compares a deepburn fusion-driven blanket containing weapons-grade plutonium with a PWR burning MOX fuel enrichments of 5-9%. King considers the stages of theft, transportation, transformation, and nuclear explosive fabrication. In the current study of used fuel storage security, a similar approach is appropriate. First, one must consider the adversary's objective, which can be categorized as on-site radionuclide dispersion, theft of material for later radionuclide dispersion, and theft of material for later processing and fabrication into a nuclear explosive. For on-site radionuclide dispersion, only a single proliferation pathway stage is appropriate: dispersion. That situation will be addressed in future reports. For later radionuclide dispersion, the stages are theft, transportation, and transformation (from oxide spent fuel containing both fission products and actinides to a material size and shape suitable for dispersion). For later processing and fabrication into a nuclear explosive, the stages are theft (by an outsider or by facility misuse by an insider), transportation, transformation (from oxide spent fuel containing both fission products and actinides to a metal alloy), and fabrication (of the alloy into a weapon). It should be noted that the theft and transportation stages are similar, and possibly identical, for later radionuclide dispersion and later processing and fabrication into a nuclear explosive. Each stage can be evaluated separately, and the methodology can vary for each stage. For example, King starts with the methodology of Cleary for the theft, transportation, transformation, and fabrication stages. Then, for each stage, King assembles and modifies the attributes and inputs suggested by Cleary. In the theft (also known as diversion) stage, Cleary has five high-level categories (material handling during diversion, difficulty of evading detection by the accounting system, difficulty of evading detection by the material control system, difficulty of conducting undeclared facility modifications for the purpose of diverting nuclear material, and difficulty of evading detection of the facility modifications for the purposes of diverting nuclear material). Each category has one or more subcategories. For example, the first category includes mass per significant quantity (SQ) of nuclear material, volume/SQ of nuclear material, number of items/SQ, material form (solid, liquid, powder, gas), radiation level in terms of dose, chemical reactivity, heat load, and process temperature. King adds the following two subcategories to that list: SQs available for theft, and interruptions/changes (normal and unexpected) in material stocks and flows. For the situation of an orphaned surface storage facility, this approach is applicable, with some of the categories and subcategories being modified to reflect the static situation (no additions or removals of fuel or containers). In addition, theft would require opening a large overpack and either removing a full container or opening that sealed container and then removing one or more spent nuclear fuel assemblies. These activities would require time without observation (detection), heavy-duty equipment, and some degree of protection of the thieves from radiological dose. In the transportation stage, Cleary has two high-level categories (difficulty of handling material during transportation, and difficulty of evading detection during transport). Each category has a number of subcategories. For the situation of an orphaned surface storage facility, these categories are applicable. The transformation stage of Cleary has three high-level categories (facilities and equipment needed to process diverted materials; knowledge, skills, and workforce needed to process diverted materials; and difficulty of evading detection of transformation activities). Again, there are subcategories. King [2007] adds a fourth high-level category: time required to transform the materials. For the situation of an orphaned surface storage facility, the categories are applicable, but the evaluations of each category and subcategory will be significantly different for later radionuclide dispersion than for later processing and fabrication into a nuclear explosive. The fabrication stage of Cleary has three high-level categories (difficulty associated with design, handling difficulties, and knowledge and skills needed to design and fabricate). King replaces the first two high-level categories with the Figure of Merit for Nuclear Explosives Utility (FOM), with subcategories of bare critical mass, heat content of transformed material, dose rate of transformed material, and SQs available for theft. The next section of this report describes the FOM in more detail.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for Corrective Action Unit 574: Neptune, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan identifies the activities required for closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 574, Neptune. CAU 574 is included in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996 [as amended March 2010]) and consists of the following two Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune); (2) CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca). This plan provides the methodology for the field activities that will be performed to gather the necessary information for closure of the two CASs. There is sufficient information and process knowledge regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 574 using the SAFER process. Based on historical documentation, personnel interviews, site process knowledge, site visits, photographs, field screening, analytical results, the results of the data quality objective (DQO) process (Section 3.0), and an evaluation of corrective action alternatives (Appendix B), closure in place with administrative controls is the expected closure strategy for CAU 574. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation to verify and support the expected closure strategy and provide a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. This will be presented in a Closure Report that will be prepared and submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for review and approval.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

2011 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses

The Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site (National Security Technologies, LLC, 2007a) requires an annual review to assess the adequacy of the Performance Assessments (PAs) and Composite Analyses (CAs), with the results submitted annually to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management. The Disposal Authorization Statements for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) also require that such reviews be made and that secondary or minor unresolved issues be tracked and addressed as part of the maintenance plan (DOE, 1999a; 2000).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗