Design Task Group Update
Slides detailing Primary Subtask 1 and 2 with the Graphite Review, accomplishments, studies, and on-going subtasks for the timeline of January 2023 through May 2023.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
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DOE Advanced Gas Reactor Fuel Development and Qualification Program Overview
Slides discussing the DOE Advanced Gas Reactor Fuel Development and Qualification Program Overview to include focus on LEU UCO TRISO fuel in cylindrical compacts, with data for fuel qualification in support of reactor licensing and a path to establish a domestic commercial TRISO fuel fabrication capability. Timelines from 2004 through 2029. Major program highlights include: Developed fuel performance models based on past observed behavior, Study to understand differences between US and German (“good”) fuel, Developed and improved fuel fabrication and characterization methods, Fabricated lab-scale fuel (AGR-1) with very high quality; excellent in-pile and post-irradiation high-temperature fuel performance, Scale-up coating fabrication (AGR-2) with excellent in-pile performance, AGR-3/4 fuel fabrication and irradiation experiment to assess FP transport behavior, Scale-up matrix fabrication (AGR-5/6/7); & fuel performance evaluation in progress.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Public Resistance is Waste-Based and What to Do About That - 13412
'Nuclear Communicators' connect a highly advanced sci-tech world with the world of everyday living. One challenge is helping stakeholders fit together three Big Ideas: (1) the valuable nuclear energy resource, (2) nuclear energy's invisible mortal dangers and potential bad-guy threats, and (3) critical scientific and engineering knowledge that is far over the heads of average (grade 8) USA reading levels. This article provides an overview of what does - and does not - work in our public communications. What does not work: 1. Going off topic. Address what concerns people most: how to manage nuclear wastes. 2. Underestimating public intelligence. What works: 1. Doing your homework on community history regarding nuclear materials. 2. Having discussion forums and public meetings with special guests from industry, government, and local leaders. 3. Regular cycles of communication with community groups to build a long-term dialogue. Solutions to some communication challenges require handling four gaps and one jungle: 1. Facts gap - Honest information about waste disposition. 2. Time gap - The timelines associated with waste management include 300 years, 10,000 years, and 703.8 million years. How do we talk about this? 3. Money gap - Who pays for new waste management challenges and technologies? 4. Confidence gap - Link local options to regional, national, and global knowledge. 5. Decision jungle - How can we make waste management rules and infrastructure more logical and transparent? Public communication needs to be grounded in facts for people who want to be credible actors in the new nuclear world. (authors)
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Siting and Transportation for Consolidated Used Nuclear Fuel Management Facilities: A Proposed Approach for a Regional Initiative to Begin the Dialogue - 13562
The Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future (BRC) was formed in January 2010 to conduct a comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, and to develop a new national strategy. Over two years, the BRC held dozens of meetings and heard from hundreds of Federal, State, Tribal, and local officials, as well as representatives of trade and labor organizations, technical groups, non-governmental organizations, and other stakeholders. The Commission's final report (issued January 26, 2012) offers a strategy to resolve longstanding challenges to responsible management of the United States' nuclear waste legacy. The Commission recommended Congressional action to rewrite parts of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA); however, a comprehensive legislative overhaul will likely take years to fully implement. The nature and characteristics of nuclear waste, the activities that generated it, and the past history of federal efforts to manage the waste make it virtually certain that finding workable solutions will be controversial and difficult. As the BRC report suggests, this difficulty can be made insurmountable if top-down, federally-mandated efforts are forced upon unwilling States, Tribes, and local communities. Decades of effort and billions of ratepayer and taxpayer dollars have been spent attempting to site and operate spent fuel storage and disposal facilities in this manner. The experience thus far indicates that voluntary consent and active partnership of States, Tribes, and local governments in siting, designing, and operating such facilities are critical. Some States, Tribes, and local communities have indicated that, given adequate scientific and technical information, along with appropriate incentives, assurances, and authority, they might be willing to consider hosting facilities for consolidated storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The authors propose a new regional approach to identifying and resolving issues related to the selection of a consolidated storage site. The approach would be characterized by informed discussion and deliberation, bringing together stakeholders from government, the non-governmental (NGO) community, industry, and other sectors. Because site selection would result in regional transportation impacts, the development of the transportation system (e.g., route identification, infrastructure improvements) would be integrated into the issue-resolution process. In addition to laying out the necessary steps and associated timeline, the authors address the challenges of building public trust and confidence in the new waste management program, as well as the difficulty of reaching and sustaining broad-based consensus on a decision to host a consolidated storage facility. (authors)
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The EM SSAB Annual Work Plan Process: Focusing Board Efforts and Resources - 13667
One of the most daunting tasks for any new member of a local board of the Environmental Management Site Specific Advisory Board (EM SSAB) is to try to understand the scope of the clean-up activities going on at the site. In most cases, there are at least two or three major cleanup activities in progress as well as monitoring of past projects. When planning for future projects is added to the mix, the list of projects can be long. With the clean-up activities involving all major environmental media - air, water, soils, and groundwater, new EM SSAB members can find themselves totally overwhelmed and ineffective. Helping new members get over this initial hurdle is a major objective of EM and all local boards of the EM SSAB. Even as members start to understand the size and scope of the projects at a site, they can still be frustrated at the length of time it takes to see results and get projects completed. Many project and clean-up timelines for most of the sites go beyond 10 years, so it's not unusual for an EM SSAB member to see the completion of only 1 or 2 projects over the course of their 6-year term on the board. This paper explores the annual work planning process of the EM SSAB local boards, one tool that can be used to educate EM SSAB members into seeing the broader picture for the site. EM SSAB local work plans divide the site into projects focused on a specific environmental issue or media such as groundwater and/or waste disposal options. Projects are further broken down into smaller segments by highlighting major milestones. Using these metrics, local boards of the EM SSAB can start to quantify the effectiveness of the project in achieving the ultimate goal of site clean-up. These metrics can also trigger board advice and recommendations for EM. At the beginning of each fiscal year, the EM SSAB work plan provides a road map with quantifiable checkpoints for activities throughout the year. When the work plans are integrated with site-specific, enforceable regulatory milestones, they can provide a comprehensive work plan for not only the board, but also regulators, site contractors, and DOE. Because the work plans are reviewed and approved by DOE, they carry some weight in holding local boards of the EM SSAB accountable. This structure provides the basis for local boards to achieve their primary function, to provide DOE with information, advice, and recommendations concerning issues affecting the EM program at the site. (authors)
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NRC Consultation and Monitoring at the Savannah River Site: Focusing Reviews of Two Different Disposal Actions - 12181
Section 3116 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA) requires the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to consult with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for certain non-high level waste determinations. The NDAA also requires NRC to monitor DOE's disposal actions related to those determinations. In Fiscal Year 2011, the NRC staff reviewed DOE performance assessments for tank closure at the F-Tank Farm (FTF) Facility and salt waste disposal at the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) as part of consultation and monitoring, respectively. Differences in inventories, waste forms, and key barriers led to different areas of focus in the NRC reviews of these two activities at the SRS. Because of the key role of chemically reducing grouts in both applications, the evaluation of chemical barriers was significant to both reviews. However, radionuclide solubility in precipitated metal oxides is expected to play a significant role in FTF performance whereas release of several key radionuclides from the SDF is controlled by sorption or precipitation within the cementitious wasteform itself. Similarly, both reviews included an evaluation of physical barriers to flow, but differences in the physical configurations of the waste led to differences in the reviews. For example, NRC's review of the FTF focused on the modeled degradation of carbon steel tank liners while the staff's review of the SDF performance included a detailed evaluation of the physical degradation of the saltstone wasteform and infiltration-limiting closure cap. Because of the long time periods considered (i.e., tens of thousands of years), the NRC reviews of both facilities included detailed evaluation of the engineered chemical and physical barriers. The NRC staff reviews of residual waste disposal in the FTF and salt waste disposal in the SDF focused on physical barriers to flow and chemical barriers to radionuclide release from the waste. Because the waste inventory and concentration at both sites is sufficient to generate unacceptable doses to an off-site member of the public or inadvertent intruder in the absence of engineered barriers, the NRC staff review focused on the engineering features DOE plans to put in place to limit radionuclide release. At the FTF, DOE expects that peak doses are delayed beyond a 10,000 year performance period by a combination of (1) the flow-limiting effect of the steel tank liner and (2) chemical conditions created by the stabilizing grout overlying the waste that limit the solubility of key radionuclides for tens of thousands of years. At the SDF, DOE expects that flow will be significantly limited by water shedding along the closure cap lower drainage layer and that radionuclide release will be further limited by radionuclide precipitation or sorption within the high pH, chemically reducing conditions created within the saltstone waste form. Because the performance of both facilities depends on the performance of engineered barriers for thousands of years, the reviews included a detailed evaluation of the expected long-term behavior of these barriers. As previously discussed, NRC staff reviews of DOE waste determinations during consultation are designed to evaluate the three NDAA criteria, whereas the review of an updated PA during monitoring only addresses whether the NRC staff has reasonable assurance that the planned disposal action will meet the performance objectives of 10 CFR Part 61. The NRC staff review of the Waste Determination for the FTF did not include conclusions about whether the planned disposal of residual waste at the FTF would meet the NDAA criteria because of the substantial uncertainties in the degree of waste removal DOE would achieve and other technical uncertainties. The main product of the NRC staff review of the planned FTF disposal action is the recommendation that DOE should conduct waste release experiments to increase support for key modeling assumptions related to: (1) the evolution of pH and Eh in the grouted tank system over time; (2) identification of HRR association with solid phases comprising the residual wastes; and (3) expected solubility of HRRs under a range of environmental or service conditions that the residual wastes in the contaminated zone are expected to be exposed to over time. Implementation of this recommendation is deemed crucial for NRC staff to have reasonable assurance that the performance objectives in 10 CFR Part 61, Subpart C can be met. Given the risk-significance of Tank 18 to the overall PA and the short timeline for closure of this tank, the NRC staff recommended that DOE should initiate discussions with NRC staff regarding implementation of this recommendation for Tank 18 as soon as practical. The NRC staff also recommended that experiments to address this recommendation should be conducted prior to final closure of Tank 18. Results of the Tank 18 residual waste experiments, if conducted, will be evaluated by NRC staff to determine the need for additional data collection, experiments, and modeling for Tank 18, as well as other FTF tanks. Additional information regarding the NRC staff's recommendations in this area, including details on the suggested implementation of other recommendations will be provided in the NRC staff's plan for monitoring the FTF later in FY 2012, after DOE makes a final decision on the waste determination. The NRC staff's review of waste disposal at the SDF is ongoing. When complete, the SDF TER will indicate whether the NRC staff continues to have reasonable assurance that waste disposal at the SDF will meet the performance objectives of 10 CFR Part 61 (NDAA Criterion 3). The TER also will include risk insights that will form the basis of the NRC staff's revised monitoring plan for the SDF. The NRC staff will publish an updated monitoring plan for the SDF later in FY 2012. (authors)
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2020 Vision for Tank Waste Cleanup (One System Integration) - 12506
The mission of the Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (ORP) is to safely retrieve and treat the 56 million gallons of Hanford's tank waste and close the Tank Farms to protect the Columbia River. The millions of gallons of waste are a by-product of decades of plutonium production. After irradiated fuel rods were taken from the nuclear reactors to the processing facilities at Hanford they were exposed to a series of chemicals designed to dissolve away the rod, which enabled workers to retrieve the plutonium. Once those chemicals were exposed to the fuel rods they became radioactive and extremely hot. They also couldn't be used in this process more than once. Because the chemicals are caustic and extremely hazardous to humans and the environment, underground storage tanks were built to hold these chemicals until a more permanent solution could be found. The Cleanup of Hanford's 56 million gallons of radioactive and chemical waste stored in 177 large underground tanks represents the Department's largest and most complex environmental remediation project. Sixty percent by volume of the nation's high-level radioactive waste is stored in the underground tanks grouped into 18 'tank farms' on Hanford's central plateau. Hanford's mission to safely remove, treat and dispose of this waste includes the construction of a first-of-its-kind Waste Treatment Plant (WTP), ongoing retrieval of waste from single-shell tanks, and building or upgrading the waste feed delivery infrastructure that will deliver the waste to and support operations of the WTP beginning in 2019. Our discussion of the 2020 Vision for Hanford tank waste cleanup will address the significant progress made to date and ongoing activities to manage the operations of the tank farms and WTP as a single system capable of retrieving, delivering, treating and disposing Hanford's tank waste. The initiation of hot operations and subsequent full operations of the WTP are not only dependent upon the successful design and construction of the WTP, but also on appropriately preparing the tank farms and waste feed delivery infrastructure to reliably and consistently deliver waste feed to the WTP for many decades. The key components of the 2020 vision are: all WTP facilities are commissioned, turned-over and operational, achieving the earliest possible hot operations of completed WTP facilities, and supplying low-activity waste (LAW) feed directly to the LAW Facility using in-tank/near tank supplemental treatment technologies. A One System Integrated Project Team (IPT) was recently formed to focus on developing and executing the programs that will be critical to successful waste feed delivery and WTP startup. The team is comprised of members from Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), Washington River Protection Solutions LLC (WRPS), and DOE-ORP and DOE-WTP. The IPT will combine WTP and WRPS capabilities in a mission-focused model that is clearly defined, empowered and cost efficient. The genesis for this new team and much of the 2020 vision is based on the work of an earlier team that was tasked with identifying the optimum approach to startup, commissioning, and turnover of WTP facilities for operations. This team worked backwards from 2020 - a date when the project will be completed and steady-state operations will be underway - and identified success criteria to achieving safe and efficient operations of the WTP. The team was not constrained by any existing contract work scope, labor, or funding parameters. Several essential strategies were identified to effectively realize the one-system model of integrated feed stream delivery, WTP operations, and product delivery, and to accomplish the team's vision of hot operations beginning in 2016: - Use a phased startup and turnover approach that will allow WTP facilities to be transitioned to an operational state on as short a timeline as credible. - Align Tank Farm (TF) and WTP objectives such that feed can be supplied to the WTP when it is required for hot operations. - Ensure immobilized waste and waste recycle streams can be received by the TF when required to support 2016 production of immobilized low-activity waste (ILAW). - Ensure the required baseline and additional funding is provided beginning in fiscal year 2011. - Modify TF and WTP contracts to adequately address this vision. The 2020 Vision provides a summary of strategies and key actions that optimize the approach to startup, commissioning, and turnover of WTP facilities. This vision focuses on the legally enforceable requirement to achieve the Consent Decree milestones of starting radioactive operations in 2019, and achieving initial WTP operations in 2022. (authors)
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Performance of B-10 based detectors
Helium-3 gas-filled detectors have been used in nuclear safeguards applications, in homeland security neutron detection modules and in research for over 30 years. With the current shortage of {sup 3}He gas, GE's Reuter-Stokes business developed a {sup 10}B lined proportional counter and a {sup 10}B hybrid detector, in which a small amount of {sup 3}He is added to a 10B detector to enhance the neutron sensitivity. In 2010, GE's Reuter-Stokes successfully developed a commercial alternative to 3He gas-filled detectors for homeland security neutron detection modules based on 10B lined proportional counters. We will present the concept behind the {sup 10}B neutron detection modules, as drop-in replacement to existing 3He neutron detection modules deployed, and the timeline and development needed to get a fully commercial application. To ensure the highest quality, each {sup 10}B neutron detection unit is put through a series of tests: temperature cycles from -40 deg. C to +55 deg. C, vibration testing at levels up to 2.5 g from 10 Hz to 50 Hz in every direction, neutron sensitivity reaching up to 4.5 cps/(ng {sup 252}CF at 2 m), and gamma insensitivity with field reaching 1 Sv/hr. In 2013, GE's Reuter-Stokes developed the B10Plus+{sup R} detector, in which a small amount of {sup 3}He is added to a {sup 10}B lined proportional counter. Depending on the amount of {sup 3}He added, the B10Plus+{sup R} can more than double the neutron sensitivity compared to a {sup 10}B lined proportional counter. {sup 10}B lined proportional counters and B10Plus+{sup R} have excellent gamma rejection and excellent performance even at very high neutron flux. The gamma rejection and high neutron flux performance of these detectors are comparable, if not better, than traditional {sup 3}He proportional counters. GE's Reuter-Stokes business modelled, designed, built and tested prototype coincidence counters using the {sup 10}B lined detectors and the {sup 10}B hybrid detectors. We will present these systems and their applications for non-destructive assay. We will also show other examples of applications where {sup 10}B lined proportional counters and B10Plus+{sup R} detectors can be used. (authors)
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
A Framework to Assess Advanced Reactor Spent Fuel Management Facility Deployment
Previous planning and prioritization for LWR SNF management investigated the risks and uncertainties of deploying facilities such as consolidated interim storage [1, 2, 3, 4]. As part of that work, activities and milestones were collected into success precedence diagrams that charted a path to achieving facility deployment [1]. In that framework, activities are any research, development, design, or decision required to achieve an intermediate goal; milestones are activity endpoints and mark the completion of deliverables. Milestones can be thought of as achievements required to reach the final goal of facility deployment; activities are the means by which milestones are accomplished. In planning, activities and milestones are compiled into comprehensive flow charts that visualize the steps necessary for deployment. This framework has been used to quantify risks, timelines, and costs of deploying SNF management facilities.
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Compressible Arch Segments for the Cigeo Access Ramps, Drifts and Vaults - A Field Test - 17011
Andra is currently implementing the detailed engineering phase of the step-wise design development of Cigeo (the French HLW and IL-LLW Deep Geological Repository). Various technical issues are at stake, including the requirements linked to 'Reversibility / Retrievability', at different stages of the repository life cycle (from its construction start-up to its final closure and monitoring). These reversibility requirements have a significant impact on the way Cigeo is designed, will be progressively developed, operated, later closed and monitored. On a shorter term, one must demonstrate that the waste container retrieval operations are technically safe and feasible. In that sense, the structural dimensioning of the ramps and mains, as well as that of the IL-LLW disposal vaults, is critical, since the concrete liner supporting the rock walls must last over a period of some 100 to 150 years (lapse of time during which retrieval operations are likely to take place). The present paper starts with a description of the geomechanical conditions prevailing in the Callovo-Oxfordian (COX) clay-stone formation (aka the argillite). The structural dimensioning of the IL-LLW disposal vault liner, as calculated at the end of the basic engineering phase is indicated. The thickness values obtained so far have led to considering an alternative design in which a compressible material is positioned between the concrete liner intrados and the rock walls: in such situation, the 'creeping effect' of the rock is mitigated, for a time, by the compressible material (nearly a perfect elastoplastic material), hence reducing the stress level exerted inside the concrete liner. This situation enables to significantly reduce the liner thickness and provides potentially significant saving in the construction of the works concerned (preliminary sensitivity results are given). The following part of the paper is then focused on a practical case story: a technological demonstration (still ongoing) of a tunnel boring experiment, implemented underground (in a dedicated drift of the Meuse Haute Marne URL infrastructures, at scale 1:2 of the Cigeo drifts/vaults). In this excavation and construction experiment, the tunnel boring machine (TBM) lays (via an erector) 'classical' concrete arch segments (forming a ring) in a first portion of the drift and 'compressible' ones (the compressible material is positioned on their extrados) in a second portion of the drift. The technical demonstration objective is two-fold: the capacity to lay compressible arch segments with a TBM is checked, their structural behavior (with time) is compared with that of 'classical' ones. The way the compressible material is produced and then fixed on the arch concrete segment is also documented, c/w a description of the complementary testing campaign to be carried out on a test bench (on surface) of a concrete ring (at a scale 1:2 of Cigeo) formed of compressible arch segments. This paper concludes with a timeline of the experiment. Should the results obtained provide some perspectives of technical and economic improvement (i.e. saving vis-a-vis the 'classical' solution) a decision could be taken by Andra to incorporate this alternative solution in the 'design freeze' of Cigeo underground infrastructures. The positive outcomes of this technical test campaign would also pave the way for specifying the Cigeo TBM characteristics (dimensions and handling equipment), scheduled for manufacturing order around 2020. (authors)
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A Cable Car Transfer System for the Cigeo Access Ramps - An Original Approach - 17035
Andra is currently implementing the detailed engineering phase of the step-wise design of Cigeo (the French HLW and IL-LLW Deep Geological Repository). Various technical issues are at stake, including the definition and development of a key component: a funicular ('cable-car') system dedicated to the transfer (down the access ramp and leading to the underground infrastructures) of the shielding casks housing the waste disposal containers (packages). The present paper starts with a brief description of the Cigeo architecture (i.e. the surface utilities, the service and nuclear ramps, the various shafts and finally the underground facilities). A focus is then made on the 'nuclear ramp' dedicated to the transfer of the waste containers lodged inside the casks (those latter weighing some 100 to 130 metric tons each) and its main geometrical characteristics (slope, length, diameter, structure). Then a discussion follows to detail the rationale having led to the choice of a somehow 'sophisticated' funicular transfer system, at the expense of what could be called 'more conventional' and more straightforward transport solutions (like a transfer system by trucks or by rack and pinion trains). A systematic comparison is finally made between the various solutions, explaining and rating the pros and cons of each concept, via a multi-criteria analysis. This technical choice (and the related justification approach) was submitted to an Experts review at the end of the Preliminary Design phase of Cigeo and comforted by their strong support before the design freeze of this solution was integrated in Cigeo. The following part of the paper is then focused on a description of the main technical components and the mechanical performance of the cable-car system, its current state of design and the set of qualification tests (of key safety components) to be implemented before its effective construction. This article concludes with a timeline of the qualification tests and developments to come. The positive outcomes of this future technical test campaign will also pave the way for the future instruction of the Cigeo licensing file, scheduled as of mid-2018. (authors)
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U.S. department of energy safety design strategy review and approval beyond critical decision 3 for the high-level waste facility - 15525
The Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) in Hanford, Washington, is the nation's largest environmental remediation construction project. In 2012, at the WTP's High-Level Waste (HLW) Facility, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection (ORP) restricted construction work at the Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility because of unresolved technical issues associated with the facility and of misalignment of the design and nuclear safety basis. By 2013, as additional issues were discovered, ORP limited HLW design and procurement activities. Addressing the technical issues and the misalignment of the design basis with the Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis (PDSA) is a priority for ORP. A proposal was developed to use the concept of a safety design strategy (SDS), as documented in DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, as a planning mechanism to support facility design and PDSA alignment. The standard provides the processes to develop an SDS that will ensure safety is integrated into design early in the project, by the start of preliminary design. Ultimately, as design progresses, an SDS is intended to support development of the project's PDSA. However, in this unique case, the HLW Facility design and construction phase has progressed beyond Critical Decision 3 and DOE-STD-1189-2008 was issued in 2008; 6 years after ORP approved the first WTP PDSA. In July 2013, ORP and the contractor recognized that the unresolved technical issues and design - safety basis misalignment should be addressed through a renewed look at nuclear safety requirements, and agreed that developing an SDS tailored to the criteria in DOE-STD-1189-2008 provided the best path forward to better integrate design and safety. Development of the SDS for the HLW Facility was one of many goals ORP established in a plan that describes how ORP will determine whether, and under what conditions, the contractor should be authorized to proceed with production engineering, procurement, and construction activities for the HLW Facility. Over the next several months, the contractor developed the draft SDS, identifying design basis accidents and control strategies for those accidents. ORP monitored progress and, when appropriate, provided recommendations. In April 2014, the contractor provided a draft SDS to ORP for initial review by an independent DOE Review Team. The Review Team was comprised of representatives from nuclear safety, criticality safety, engineering, fire protection, the Office of Environmental Management, the Assistant Manager WTP, and the DOE Chief of Nuclear Safety. A unique draft document review and interactive review process, facilitated through work sessions and continuous communication with the contractor, culminated in the development of 147 technical comments on topics varying from SDS implementation to hydrogen deflagration in vessels. Comment resolution sought to improve project clarity, delineation of control strategies, and, holistically, facilitate integration of safety into design in the SDS, as it will guide the restart of the HLW Facility production engineering and limited procurement and construction activities. All comments were resolved in support of a contractor submission of the final SDS to ORP at the end of June 2014. Successful resolution of these comments was achieved by continuing the real-time response and incorporation interaction with the contractor to ensure that mutual objectives were satisfied. The response times were facilitated through telephone, E-mail, and a shared file server accessible to contractor and DOE reviewers across the DOE complex. As a measure of success of this process, the Safety Basis Approval Authority (ORP Manager) and the WTP Federal Project Director approved the SDS on August 1, 2014, with no conditions of approval. DOE and the contractor recognized that it would be difficult to implement the SDS without changes to the existing contractor's engineering and nuclear safety processes. Accordingly, the contractor developed or revised a significant number of engineering and nuclear safety plans and procedures to implement the SDS into the design process. Over the coming year, the contractor will conduct a gap analysis between the SDS and the presently approved PDSA to incorporate the design basis accidents and preferred control strategies developed from the SDS into the PDSA. In addition, ORP will conduct an assessment of the contractor's implementation of the SDS into the design process at the appropriate stage of implementation, within 6 to 12 months of approval. Although the SDS was developed late in the HLW project timeline, the document will facilitate alignment of design and the safety basis, and is a key step in the return to full production engineering for the HLW Facility. (authors)
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Results of Modeling and Simulation Support to Specia Nuclear Material Handling Facility Operations - 16053
Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) is the sole designer and provider of nuclear powered aircraft carriers and one of only two companies in the United States to build nuclear powered submarines. As part of the upkeep of aircraft carriers, the ships return to NNS once in their lifetime for a complex overhaul and to be refueled. In support of overhaul operations NNS maintains a state of the art Special Nuclear Material (SNM) handling facility. Due to the complex nature of the operations that occur within this facility, during the design and initial operation of the building NNS developed a facility simulation model to provide decision support during the project planning and operational phases. This tool allows users to experiment with process times, process order, equipment utilization, personnel utilization and spatial utilization. By capturing the planned operations, time distributions for operations, equipment sizes and uses and personnel requirements, the tool accurately reflects the planned use of the facility. This realism allows the user to experiment with any aspect of the facility, in a controlled and cost effective space, and determine how changes or potential delays may impact overall facility operations. Thus the model allows for rapid exploration of multiple scenarios to determine likely outcomes, allowing a user to identify risks well ahead of their realization and explore mitigation strategies in a controlled space, to determine the ideal path forward. The tool was successful during the initial operation of the facility in helping to identify and mitigate risks related to the complex operations occurring during SNM handling. The tool is now in use to support planning for the next series of operations that will occur within the facility. The initial operations the model supported occurred during the deactivation of the USS Enterprise, and future operation will focus on the overhaul of Nimitz class aircraft carriers. The NNS planning team is currently using the tool to assess potential risks and challenges that are identified as potentially impacting the schedule and timelines for these overhaul processes. In addition, the NNS development team is working to add new operational steps to the model, capturing work that is occurring near the facility, but which directly impacts the facilities operational abilities. In conjuncture with the engineering planning division, the NNS development team has run over 20 complex scenarios through the tool. The team has provided output from these scenarios to both NNS personnel and government representatives. To date the model has successfully supported the identification of several feasible paths to incorporate new processes, dictated by the work to support a overhaul vs a deactivation. The model also provides a spatial arrangement component that allows users to experiment with different equipment placement within the facility. Due to the fidelity of the model, arranging equipment with the spatial component allows a user to set up the facility in an experimental layout and run the processes inside the facility to determine if the layout will be feasible, or if it would impact operational capabilities. Additionally, the spatial component allows for visual collaboration between stakeholders to ensure all operational personnel are aware of the current and planned layout, and that they do not locate equipment or work stations in locations that would interfere with facility operations. The spatial component, in combination with the simulation component, has resulted in several documented improvements in process. These include: the identification of additional equipment which could be stored outside the facility, without impacting operations, to increase space; confirmation of the ideal placement of a large water tank; and identification of several risks related to planned equipment storage area, allowing the team to develop new plans and avoid realizing the risk. (authors)
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Upgrade Your Work Plans for Better Performance - 16103
Most work plans involve at least two basic pieces: a list of things to do and a timeline for doing them. These 'tasks-and-times' plans can be used for managing a project, an organizational change, or the implementation of a strategic objective. But given the high rate of plan failures - often cited as ranging from 35% to over 80% - something must be missing. Three ideas for upgrading work plans have demonstrated higher success rates than the time-and-task method alone. First, maintain a 'GPS Scorecard' of the Goals, Performance metrics, and Schedules for accomplishment. Second, maintain a Performance Circle Register of all key players, and the key deliverables to and from each of them, that will ensure success. Third, implement all three parts of an accountability management system, collectively referred to as 'T3': Tracking, Team assignments, and Talk-times to update status and progress against the plan. Why bother to take the extra steps to strengthen work plans? There are three reasons: (a) Because traveling without a map is risky in times of high change in infrastructure, staffing, and technology; (b) Because 'expectations' do not guarantee delivery as reliably as well-defined agreements; and (c) Because 'accountability' is a management practice, not a personality trait. Together, implementing these three ideas can provide for clarity of purpose, guidance in establishing the productive relationships necessary for success, and a system of supporting accountability for all participants, both on the team and with others inside and outside of the organization. (authors)
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
Developing a New National Programme and Implementation Plan for the Management and Disposal of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Wastes in Romania - 16391
The European 'Waste Directive' (2011/70/Euratom) required each Member State to report by August 2015 on their National Programme for management of spent fuel and radioactive wastes. In Romania, the Nuclear Agency (ANDR) was responsible for preparing the National Programme report, and this was done in a step-wise manner that involved the regulators and waste producers. The starting point for the process was an assessment of existing policy against the evolving situation in the nuclear sector in the country, most notably the decision to progress with the construction of two new CANDU reactors. The final agreed National Programme report submitted to the European Commission describes the activities currently undertaken to manage spent fuel and radioactive wastes in Romania. The report also sets out, at a high-level, the additional activities that will need to be taken in the future (and an indicative timeline), including those steps that will be required to implement a new surface repository for short-lived wastes, and a geological repository for spent fuel and long-lived wastes. Additional, on-going work is intended to lead to a revision of Government policy and the development of a more detailed implementation strategy, underpinned by a programme of R and D and robust financing plans. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Lessons Learned From Decommissioning B411 Decontamination Centre at Whiteshell Laboratories - 18211
Whiteshell Laboratories, located in Manitoba, Canada, provided research facilities for the Canadian nuclear industry since the early 1960's. The facility was centered on the largest organically cooled, heavy water moderated nuclear reactor in the world, the WR-1. It is now operated by Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) and is the first major decommissioning project of a nuclear research establishment in Canada. One of the major projects to support the closure of Whiteshell Laboratories (WL) is the decommissioning and demolition of the Building 411 (B411) Decontamination Centre, which provided a decontamination service for maintaining research and development of experimental rigs, equipment and tools in a safe usable state. It also provided a laundry service for radioactively contaminated clothing. The team successfully self-performed their first demolition of a nuclear facility, but not without challenges. The baseline decommissioning strategy assumed most of the facility would meet unconditional clearance levels; however when characterization revealed the extent of contamination exceeded initial assumptions projected from process knowledge, in conjunction with resource challenges and a waste disposal pathway not firmly established, active remediation of the facility was undertaken. With an unknown waste acceptance criteria for the future waste disposal facility, sludge that had accumulated in a tank used to collect xylene and organic coolant from contaminated tools and equipment and the selection of appropriate waste packages for waste storage, transportation and disposal forced the project team to adjust their demolition timeline. This, coupled with developing an open air demolition plan and managing an uncertain end state criteria, were just some of the major tasks the team successfully navigated. The impact on both schedule and cost performance caused by the change in strategy, and the lessons learned experienced by the WL Decommissioning Project Team that are being applied as the Whiteshell Laboratories Closure Project (WLCP) moves forward with the next major decommissioning challenge, are highlighted in this paper. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Innovation in Contracting Strategy for a Master Services Agreement for Remediation of Low Level Radioactive Waste - 18381
The Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI) is a federal environmental clean-up program. Its mandate is the remediation and local, long-term, safe management of approximately 1.7 million cubic metres of historic low-level radioactive waste in the adjacent communities of Port Hope and Port Granby in Southern Ontario, Canada. The PHAI is being undertaken by Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL), on behalf of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, a federal Crown corporation. It is currently one of the largest environmental remediation projects in Canada. The safety of workers, the public and the environment while delivering the PHAI on time and within budget is CNL's number one priority. The PHAI is being carried out as two projects - the Port Hope Project and the Port Granby Project. The Port Hope Project is the larger of the two and includes the cleanup of approximately 1.2 million cubic metres of historic waste from several locations, including the Port Hope Harbour, a closed municipal landfill and approximately 800 residential properties. This complex project requires contracting the services of qualified, skilled and experienced environmental remediation contractors to meet the diverse needs of the myriad tasks that comprise the remediation and restoration of all properties. This paper will highlight how the CNL contracting services team developed an innovative approach to a contracting strategy designed to deliver the safe execution of work and keep the project on time and within budget. The approach addresses the complexities of a scope of work that consists of multiple work packages to be executed both concurrently and in tandem, and that require highly specialized trades/skills, as well as high-level project management expertise to ensure seamless coordination among the various contractors. The author will discuss CNL's strategy to engage the market with a Request for Expression of Interest to identify potential qualified suppliers and gauge their level of interest, issue a Request for Prequalification (RFPQ) to determine eligible contractors and, ultimately, issue a Request for Proposal for a Master Services Agreement (MSA) that would competitively evaluate each contractor's direct experience, technical expertise, quality management programs, safety systems compliance and track record. Using CNL's experience as a case study, the paper will highlight how an innovative approach can positively affect project timelines by describing how CNL addressed the challenge associated with the limited time available to implement procurement processes and deliver a series of executed agreements while ensuring that work would begin on time and key project milestones would be met. The author will summarize how CNL's strategy put the project back on schedule, without compromising the process guideline/requirements, and ensured that a qualified and experienced set of contractors, committed to a strong safety culture, will be available to perform the work required when the cleanup in the Port Hope community begins in 2018. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Organization Change: Leadership Speaks the Future, Management Makes It Happen - 18462
Implementing an organization change is challenging, because many changes touch unexpected organizational units and processes, requiring unplanned inter-group communications and collaboration. Organization change communications can be designed to engage people, and to coordinate their actions for a successful change completion. Leadership communication focuses on presenting the idea for an organization change as a purposeful and worthwhile process that will deliver benefits to the organization and its customers and stakeholders. A series of discussions with personnel to clarify the change objectives, success metrics, and timelines serve to engage them in productive participation in the change process. Management communication ensures that the actions taken will be effective to accomplish the intended results and benefits of the change. The depth, detail, and orientation of the information delivered in these three types of communication is different, but the intention, in all cases, is to have people work together to successfully complete the goal(s) of the change. An example of these communications is included in this paper, focusing on the communications of a change leader. Change leadership communications are usually delivered by high-level people but can be delivered by individuals at any level. They speak a vision for a possibility, i.e., a new future, in a way that engages people in its value and desirability. The shift from change leadership communications to change management communications is best made as a collection of dialogues with groups of people who will be leading, managing, supporting and/or participating in various aspects of the change. These dialogues take several forms, including Q and A sessions, dialogues to clarify what 'success' will look like, and discussions that develop management tools and practices for the change. These 'engagement' discussions create a bridge from leadership vision to management implementation. Change managers often head up departments, teams, or smaller groups. Their communications are designed to have group members participate in refining the change goals into team goals, measures, and assignments; collaboration with key players; and tracking and updating elements of the change process as it progresses toward completion. This work is often more daunting than the leadership phase, due to forces of increasing detail, complexity, and disorganization over time, such as unexpected interruptions, changes in resources, and new requirements for coordination. (authors)
96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗