A Deterministic Hitting-Time Moment Approach to Seed-set Expansion over a Graph.
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The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility is a vital and important part of the Nation’s nuclear security enterprise. With more than two decades of operations, DARHT has a storied history. Conceived in the 1970s, constructed in the 1990s, and operational since 2000, DARHT has advanced from open-air hydrodynamic experiments (hydros) to foam-confined hydros, to vessel-confined hydros, and in 2022, the 75th hydro was successfully completed. Radiography has advanced from a single-axis, single-pulse system to a dual-axis, multi-pulse capability to variable fields of view (VFV) on both accelerators. The culmination of these experiences, accomplishments, and advancements has brought us to a very important question: What do the next two decades at DARHT look like? The world is not the same place it was in the 1990s when construction at DARHT was in progress. Evolving threats, an expanding mission, and technology changes necessitate adaptation. To adapt, the aging facility, accelerators, vessels, and detector systems require improvements to ensure DARHT remains the Nation’s hydrodynamic data foundation for stockpile certification, safety, surety, and global security threats.
The GREET ® (Greenhouse gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy use in Technologies) model has been developed by Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) with the support of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and other federal agencies. GREET is a life cycle analysis (LCA) tool, structured to systematically examine the energy and environmental effects of a wide variety of transportation fuels and vehicle technologies in major transportation sectors (i.e., road, air, marine, and rail) and other end-use sectors, and energy systems. Argonne has expanded and updated the model in various sectors in GREET 2022, and this report provides a summary of the release.
Lathe Operation includes loading the beryllium part into the middle of the spindle that turns the part at roughly 800 rpm. Multiple tools are setup at a time so that all machining operations are done in one setup. Beryllium’s material science properties and strengths require the same spindle rpm and machining feed speeds that we have used for decades.
The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility is a vital and important part of the Nation’s nuclear security enterprise. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/ NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan (SSMP) identifies DARHT as a weapons mission critical facility along with the need to modernize DARHT to support weapons modernization efforts. With more than two decades of operations, DARHT has a storied history. Conceived in the 1970s, constructed in the 1990s, and operational since 2000, DARHT has advanced from open-air hydrodynamic experiments (hydros) to foam-confined hydros, to vessel-confined hydros, and in 2022, the 75 th hydro was successfully completed. Radiography has advanced from a single-axis, single-pulse system to a dual-axis, multi-pulse capability to variable fields of view (VFV) on both accelerators. The culmination of these experiences, accomplishments, and advancements has brought us to a very important question: What do the next two decades at DARHT look like? The world is not the same place it was in the 1990s when construction at DARHT was in progress. Evolving threats, an expanding mission, and technology changes necessitate adaptation. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states that the nuclear weapons infrastructure has suffered the effects of age and underfunding with no margin for further delay in recapitalizing the physical infrastructure. To adapt, the aging facility, accelerators, vessels, and detector systems require improvements to ensure DARHT remains the Nation’s hydrodynamic data foundation for stockpile certification, safety, surety, and global security threats.
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This project is a parking-lot canopy solar photovoltaic system, consisting of four canopy structures and 1,080 470-watt (W) modules. The nameplate rating of the project is 507.6 kilowatts direct current (kWDC) at Standard Test Condition (STC), and 448 kilowatts alternating current (kWAC). It is interconnected to the existing Tribe-owned medium-voltage micro-grid generation system via a step-up transformer and short medium-voltage line. This project offsets energy usage from more expensive existing sources, specifically the Tribe-owned gas-fired engine generators providing the primary power source for existing Tribal facilities and the electric utility, which provides an alternate source. The solar photovoltaic system is a renewable source, which has the benefit of reducing reliance on fossil-fuel burning sources. By reducing demand on existing Tribe-owned conventional generators, the project has avoided the need to add more conventional generation and has prolonged the lifespan of existing gas-fired engine generators. The project reduced energy costs and reliance on fossil-fuel burning power sources, increasing Tribe-owned generating sources and self-reliance, and prolonging the lifespan of existing generators. A side benefit to the project is the production of dozens of covered parking spaces in the existing parking lot.
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This report builds upon the body of work sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE) Light-Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Flexible Power Operation and Generation (FPOG) program that presented generic probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) for the addition of a heat extraction system (HES) to light-water reactors to support the co-location of a high temperature hydrogen electrolysis facility (HTEF). Probabilistic and deterministic hazards assessments and risk analyses are leveraged throughout this report. Several improvements and new analyses are included in this report. First, higher amounts of detail in the specifications of the generic HTEFs are used to produce scaled results for a 100, 500, and 1000 MW nominal hydrogen production facility. An additional hazard assessment of 1000 kg of hydrogen storage is performed. The facility hazards and footprint are assessed to determine the safe distance required for placement near the nuclear power plant (NPP). Second, specific designs for corresponding HESs for the different levels of support required by the HTEFs are analyzed in the PRA model. Third, a hazards analysis of the specified HTEFs leads not only to effects of the quantified risk assessment for the NPP, but also qualitative hazards assessment for the community. Finally, a seismic analysis and a high winds analysis have each been added to the PRA. The results investigate the applicability of the potential licensing approaches which do not require a full United States (U.S.) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing review. The PRAs are generic and include listed assumptions. The HTEF design built for this project has further eliminated many conservative assumptions from the prior PRAs in this series. The PRA results indicate that the 10 CFR 50.59 licensing approach is justified due to the minimal increase in initiating event frequencies for all design basis accidents, with none exceeding 7.7%. The PRA results for core damage frequency and large early release frequency support the use of NRC Regulation Guide 1.174 as further risk information that supports a change without a full licensing amendment review. The hazard analyses and PRA confirm the need for engineered blast barriers of storage tanks and the common production header leaving the HTEF. The hazards analyses and PRA also confirm with high confidence that using the assumptions of design in this report that the safety case for licensing an HES addition and an HTEF sited with its unprotected high-pressure stage components 187 meters from the NPP’s transmission towers (the most fragile structure, system, and component) is strong.
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