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DOE OSTI2020

Issue Resolution During the Development of the Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility - 20125

In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high-activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance (i.e., 100 m from the SDUs). In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. A number of issues were overcome during the development of these simulations. These issues were identified as part of internal technical reviews. Simulations are developed by people and people make mistakes, so the internal technical review process is a vital step in PA development. Specific examples of resolved issues include a unit-conversion error, an inappropriate definition for a model boundary condition, a model time-stepping issue, and an error in the calculation for the buildup of contaminants in soil. Actions taken to address these issues resulted in an improved product with a better supported technical basis and more defensible results. The identification and correction of these issues are discussed. By understanding these issues, model developers and technical reviewers working on PAs in the future may avoid repeating these types of mistakes. Transparency with respect to these mistakes builds trust between waste management sites, regulators, and stakeholders. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems for Post-closure Waste Site Maintenance and Surveillance - 20143

The P- and R-Area Reactor buildings, located at SRS near Aiken, SC, were in-situ decommissioned by grouting below-grade portions of the buildings and demolishing some above-grade structures to grade level. Other reactor building structures were left above-grade and sealed to prevent human or animal access. Because the above grade-structures are expected to continue in their present state for hundreds of years, the condition of the building roofs is critical to mitigate rainwater intrusion. For this reason, building roof areas were strengthened with high strength concrete to ensure the long-term integrity of the roof structure. Periodic inspections of the roof structures are required to ensure that the roofs are functioning properly and to identify damage areas. The traditional method of inspecting closed reactor buildings requires the use of a helicopter and photographer to generate photographs and videos for review. This method proved sufficient but lacked the resolution and clarity that is required for a thorough inspection of the building structure. Fortunately, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has established a Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) program using commercially available and custom-built remote-controlled aircraft. EC and ACP contacted the SRNL program to evaluate whether the sUAS technology could be employed for periodic reactor building inspections. The sUAS can fly within a few meters of the reactor buildings and hover, allowing for a more thorough aerial inspection. The initial sUAS inspection of the P-Area Reactor building was completed in February 2018 and at the R-Area Reactor building in August 2018 and were successful in providing higher resolution photos and videos. The sUAS inspections also revealed that vegetation had begun to grow on the roofs that could potentially damage the structure integrity. SRNL partnered with Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University to build a custom heavy lift sUAS that could be equipped with herbicides to remotely treat the vegetative growth. Herbicides were successfully applied to the R-Area Reactor building roof using the custom sUAS in September 2018. The use of unmanned aircraft systems at SRS to perform aerial inspections and herbicide treatment in otherwise inaccessible areas has proven to be an efficient and cost-effective technology that provides high value, increases knowledge of facility conditions, and provides for early detection of damage. Periodic inspections of the reactor building roofs using sUAS technology are performed safely, efficiently, and at a significant cost and schedule savings while reducing emissions, noise, and fossil fuel use. The use of sUAS equipment for building inspections and herbicide application at SRS is unique within the DOE complex. The goal of SRS is to apply this remote technology to other waste unit operations and maintenance activities in the future. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Update on Full-Scale Retrieval and Transfer System Testing for Pneumatic Conveyance of High-Level Calcine Waste - 20241

The Idaho National Laboratory processed spent nuclear fuel from 1953 to 1994. The process used solvent extraction to separate uranium, resulting in a liquid waste. A calcination process was used to convert the liquid waste to a high-level radioactive solid powder, referred to as calcine. The calcine is stored in stainless steel bins contained within concrete vaults called the Calcined Solids Storage Facilities. There are a total of seven CSSFs. The Calcine Retrieval Project is tasked with retrieving the calcine from the bins of CSSF 1 and pneumatically transferring it to the bins of CSSF 6. CSSF 1 was constructed to be a final calcine repository with no forethought of retrieval. It represents the greatest technical hurdle to calcine extraction of all the CSSFs. The challenges inherent with accessing the calcine, safely extracting it, and securely transporting it are copious and complex. Once the calcine is removed from CSSF1, that facility may be closed, reducing the footprint of waste storage at the INL. The same process for removing Calcine from CSSF1 may then be utilized to remove the calcine from the remaining CSSFs for final treatment and transport to a long-term storage facility. To overcome these inherent challenges with accessing CSSF 1 and extracting the calcine in a timely manner, a full-scale integrated mockup has been constructed. The mockup includes a full-size model of a concentric group of bins from CSSF 1 and a storage vessel representing CSSF 6. All essential elements of the transport design are represented in the Mockup, including motive and makeup air supply (air compressor), a replica of the CSSF6 cyclone, pre-filter, HEPA filter, vacuum pump, and retrieval control devices. Construction on the Mockup was completed in 2018 and testing began in February 2019. It has already proven very beneficial to the CRP. Experience in running the Mockup have aided in the development of retrieval and transport methodologies and the selection of process parameter values. It has also uncovered some unforeseen technological challenges and will continue to be valuable to the testing team as these hurdles are overcome and the process is proven effective. Operations personnel have also benefitted from its use as a training tool and will continue to use the Mockup as a simulator to reproduce problems encountered during extraction and transfer of Calcine from CSSF 1. The knowledge gained during this process will also be of continued benefit as future work is done to remove various types of calcine from the remaining CSSFs. The methodology of safe and secure transfer of radioactive material may be of benefit to others throughout the U.S. Department of Energy complex. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Opportunities to Implement Solutions to Achieve Remedial Action Objectives in Consideration of Stakeholder Interests - 20365

A case study in the implementation of a soils excavation and removal project conducted at a Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) Maywood Superfund Site (FMSS) vicinity property; an active commercial business, in a densely populated area, with significant operational, technical and, logistical constraints that were expected to limit areas that could be remediated. The United States Army Corps of Engineers-led (USACE) team successfully navigated complex overlapping stakeholder interests to achieve a more efficient and complete removal of contaminated soils and debris while minimizing unnecessary excess costs to the Government. This paper centers on FUSRAP activities at the FMSS vicinity property located at 149-151 Maywood Avenue, Maywood, Bergen County, New Jersey. For most of its FUSRAP history, this ∼109,000 square meter (27-acre) property housed a now-demolished ∼26,000 square meter (6.5-acre) warehouse operated by Sears Logistics Services, a unit of the Sears Roebuck Company (Figure 2). Sears ended its property lease and vacated the warehouse in December 2016. Given that long history and for the purposes of this paper, the property will be referred to as the 'Sears property' or simply 'the property.' The Sears property is approximately 109,000 square meters (27-acres) and is currently zoned for commercial use. The property is bound to the north and northwest by 100 West Hunter Avenue (the Stepan Company), to the northeast by 205 Maywood Avenue, to the east by Maywood Avenue, to the south by 23 West Howcroft Road, and to the west by businesses on NJ Route 17 and the NJ Route 17 roadway. Until December 2016, the property housed a warehouse and distribution center operated by Sears Logistical Services. On-site structures were demolished by the property owner in 2017. The warehouse covered the north section of the property along the Stepan Company property line. A railroad spur from the adjacent property now known as the Maywood Interim Storage Site (MISS) ended at the northeast corner of the warehouse. Wetlands were located east of the warehouse; the rest of the property was covered with paved parking lots and grassed areas. During remediation at the property, opportunities frequently arose where the project team was able to coordinate effectively with stakeholders to sequence remediation activities to facilitate removal of otherwise inaccessible soils and identify opportunities for materials reuse when supported by residual radiological and chemical levels. Some specific opportunities include: - remediating individual truck loading dock bays to maintain tenant operations; - working along a busy highway and in a utility corridor containing a 30-inch high pressure gas main; - remediating Lodi Brook and associated wetlands requiring bypass pumping and other diversionary structures to maintain local community stormwater drainage; - protecting during remediation and supporting access to facilitate tenant/owner maintenance of critical fire protection and water supply system service lines buried in contaminated soils and necessary for safe warehouse operations; and - coordinating with stakeholders to ensure non-radiological contaminants of concern for the site (unaffiliated with FUSRAP) were addressed by the responsible party in a manner that maximized benefit to all parties while supporting an efficient overall site remediation program. Once the property was vacant and the warehouse structure and radiologically non-impacted above-grade structures were demolished, the project identified an opportunity to significantly reduce the volume of waste associated with the foundation of the former warehouse, a foundation suspected of being partially constructed in radiologically contaminated soils. The project developed and implemented supplemental radiological verification survey and sampling strategies based on radiological cross-contamination risk potential with process flow-charts and screening-level based decision points; a program that classified saw-cut sections of concrete based on observed residual surface radioactivity conditions using a combination of gamma sensitive sodium-iodide scans and beta sensitive Geiger-Muller direct measurements. The proposed approach was reviewed with stakeholders with feedback, including consideration of applicable State of New Jersey Site Remediation Program criteria and guidance before implementation. Once classified, additional sampling was performed at frequencies driven by screening. The sampling methods, stockpile sampling frequencies, criteria and, approach to data evaluation were developed in consideration of existing site cleanup standards, regional background ranges, State of New Jersey radiological remediation program guidance, and specific stakeholder input With the property remediation and survey efforts nearly completed, it is relevant to examine retrospectively the objectives, assumptions and limitations in the remedial design (i.e., what was planned) versus what was able to be accomplished through effective teaming. Benefits to other environmental remediation site programs include better understanding of how to work effectively with stakeholders to achieve win-win outcomes, and approaches to site remediation, waste minimization and materials reuse that were successful in their overall outcomes. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Requalification and Declaration of High-alpha Cemented TRU-waste from the Late 70's and Early 80's - 20499

KTE and Siemens launched a project to qualify a series of 391 waste drums and 115 concrete containers produced from 1979 to 1984. The waste is characterized by a high content of long-lived alpha-nuclides (TRU-waste - Pu, U, Am in the range of 1 E+11-1 E+12 Bq/ drum. This high radionuclide inventory requires a special packaging according to the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) of the repository Konrad [1] despite the fact, that the waste was treated manually. The raw waste originally was delivered in nitric acid solution and was solidified using ordinary Portland cement. The existing documentation comprises analyses, transfer documentation for the nuclear fuel nuclides and waste treatment documentation yielding information, which waste was treated together in a batch. Additionally all drums were subjected to non-destructive gamma-spectrometry assay. A small number of 7 drums were opened and sampled to support the existing declaration. For the entire series the waste products were attributed to defined batches using the accountancy data supported by the analyses and the gamma-spectrometry. Each batch was produced from a homogeneous stock of waste solution and can therefore be declared and documented together. The declaration concept is based on the gamma spectrometry results performed on the entire drums, which were corrected and extended for the uncertainty of the analyses. The declaration concept is verified by the regulator and its independent expert. The state of the project is in the documentation of the solidification campaigns followed by the planning of the container configuration. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Declaration of the Chemical Composition of Waste-products for the German Repository Konrad Using Substance Vectors - 20500

The waste acceptance criteria of the German repository Konrad require beside a radiological declaration a compositional declaration to be able to avoid negative impact on the groundwater by a presumed leakage into the groundwater after complete corrosion of the containers in the future. The declaration of the composition has to specify compounds and substances not element analyses, because the chemical behavior and toxicity especially of organic compounds varies strongly The relevant compounds have to be described and quantified using defined substance codes provided by the operator. For simple waste types like pure concrete or steel components, the definition of the composition is rather simple. The composition of more complex waste streams is generally declared using producer specific material vectors, which can be derived for defined waste types (e.g. grouted fluids, ash from combustion, super-compacted mixed waste etc.). Additional substance vectors exist for containers, drums and grout, which together with the waste composition yield the total composition of the waste packages. The substance vectors for homogeneous waste streams like cementitious demolition waste, solidified fluids and ash are mostly based on analyses provided by the waste owner. In some cases, analyses from non-radioactive analogues or data sheets can also be used to demonstrate the composition. For each qualified treatment of radioactive waste streams the material composition is described and balanced on the basis of specific material vectors, which are composed of material codes from the material and cask list provided by the Federal company for radioactive waste disposal. For mixed waste streams like super-compacted or grouted mixed waste or materials simply packed in containers an analyses cannot be used. In these cases, the compositional information from the bookkeeping can be used for the entire waste stream to calculate a mean composition including a compositional range (min / max composition). Only waste packages with an approved material description can be delivered to Konrad. Therefore, the material declaration of all waste streams and the resulting waste products is crucial for all waste owners in Germany to be able to have enough waste packages ready, when the repository is going to open in 2027. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Leveraging 3D CAD and Virtual Reality in Design of the Calcine Disposition Project - 20512

Fluor Idaho's Calcine Disposition Project (CDP) is leveraging the power of three-dimensional (3D) visualization, light detection and ranging (Lidar), and virtual reality to improve designs and worker safety. With the use of computer-aided design (CAD) modeling software, the CDP has created 3D models of the facility and systems to aid in the design, development, and operation of its retrieval and transfer system. This by itself is nothing new and has been done in industry for years. The CDP project however is taking this a few steps farther with the use of Lidar and virtual reality software. The CRP is tasked with removing a radioactive granular material from stainless steel bins located in concrete vaults that were constructed in the late 1950's and early 1960's. While construction drawings are available, it is not certain that the drawings are as-built or how accurate they truly are. Part of the project requires precise placement of equipment on to bins around multiple pipe, electrical lines, and bin stiffeners. Relying solely on the existing drawings and models created from these drawings is highly risky and prone to failure. The first step to determine the precise location and orientation of all obstructions in the vault the project will use a Lidar system to scan the vault structure and precisely locate all vault and bin components. Once this information is obtained, the data will be integrated into the CAD model. The model will then be verified, and a true as-built model developed. Precise component location, size, and orientation will be used for final design and placement of retrieval components. The second step will be to take the verified 3D model and scan data and import it into virtual reality software creating a virtual world. While some work on the project requires all work to be completed remotely due to high radiation fields, some areas have low enough radiation levels that personnel can enter and perform work. With the use of a virtual reality headset, operators and technicians will be able to enter our virtual world and become familiar with the surroundings and perform work prior to ever entering the radiation environment. This training is expected to pay dividends by improving worker efficiency, reducing errors, and improving confidence that the work can be performed as expected. It will play a key aspect in as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles. An additional aspect in using the Lidar scans and virtual environment, is that it will give engineers and managers an opportunity to revisit the facility, especially radiation areas, at any time to obtain design information and measurements that may be costly or impossible to obtain once the facility transitions into radiation operations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Development and implementation of an in-situ cable condition monitoring method for nuclear power plants - 130

The sustainability of the existing fleet of nuclear power reactors depends on utilities' ability to manage the aging of key components that cannot easily or economically be replaced or upgraded. Cables, metals, and concrete structures are among the major and key components that the industry and government are working on to ensure the long term reliability and safety of nuclear plants. To ensure that these key components continue to meet their performance requirements, new testing and condition monitoring technologies must be developed that are capable of identifying and quantifying degradation in these materials. The work presented in this paper focuses on the development and implementation of an in-situ condition monitoring method for nuclear power plant cables. This cable condition monitoring method is based on the frequency domain reflectometry (FDR) technique, which is a non-destructive in-situ electrical test that uses the principle of transmission line theory to locate and quantify impedance changes in a cable circuit. Through extensive research, development, and validation, the FDR test technique has been adapted as a cable condition monitoring method that trends with increasing cable degradation. In addition, the FDR data has been correlated to the industry standard elongation at break (EAB) test to quantify the degree of localized degradation in nuclear plant cable insulation material caused by long term exposure to high temperatures and radiation. By correlating FDR to EAB, the aging condition of cables routed through harsh environments can be better understood in relation to its ability to perform its intended function. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Accelerated thermal aging of harvested hypalon jacket for remaining useful life determination and diagnosis - 210

For nuclear power plants (NPPs) considering second license renewal for their operation beyond 60 years, knowledge of long-term operation, condition monitoring, and viability for the reactor components including reactor pressure vessel, concrete structures, and cable systems is essential. Such knowledge will provide NPPs with a game plan to predict performance and to estimate costs that are associated with monitoring or replacement programs for the affected systems. For cable systems that encompass a wide variety of materials, manufacturers, and in-plant location, accelerated aging of harvested cable jacket and insulation can provide insight as to remaining useful life and methods for monitoring. Accelerated thermal aging in air at temperatures between 80 deg. C and 120 deg. C was carried out on a multi-conductor control rod cable that had been inservice for over 30 years and was made by Boston Insulated Wire with Hypalon{sup TM} cable jacket and ethylene-propylene rubber insulation. From elongation at break (EAB) measurements and supporting Arrhenius analysis of the jacket material, an activation energy of 97.84 kJ/mol was estimated and the time to degradation, as represented by 50% EAB at the expected maximum operating temperature of 45 deg. C, was estimated to be 80 years. These values were slightly below previous measurements on similar BIW Hypalon cable jacket and could either be attributed to inservice degradation or variations in material properties from process variations. In addition, results from indenter modulus measurements and Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy suggest possible markers that could be beneficial to monitor cable conditions. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Dry Canister Storage System Inspection and Robotic Delivery System Development

EPRI is working to develop and demonstrate technologies capable of inspecting welded stainless steel canisters used in dry cask storage systems in situ, without the need to remove them from their concrete casks. This involves the coupling of specialized cameras and inspection devices with small remotely operated vehicles (ROVs). The objective is to demonstrate the capability to identify any presence of (or precursors to) stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and other anomalies that may require additional investigation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Surrogate Post-Detonation Urban Debris (SPUD): Standard Reference Materials 4600 and 4601

If a terrorist nuclear explosion were to occur in the United States, high-quality (accurate and precise) legally defensible nuclear forensics measurements will be required to assure the certainty and confidence needed, for conclusions drawn from these data will be coupled with law enforcement and intelligence information for the purposes of attribution and retribution. Standard Reference Materials (SRMs)/Certified Reference Materials (CRMs) establish the traceability, accuracy, and precision of nuclear forensic measurements and provide the ability to benchmark measurement methods essential to meeting the requirements of legal scrutiny. Currently there is a critical shortage of key SRMs/CRMs required for accurate and precise measurements that are fundamental to nuclear measurements supporting pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics. Supplies either do not exist, are not good enough, are in short supply, and/or are very expensive. The radionuclide measurement techniques and data quality objectives for pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics are quite different than the applications for which the current suite of available SRMs/CRMs was developed. Specifically, 1) modern mass spectrometry methods have largely replaced traditional activity-based measurement methods for quantifying small quantities of long-lived radionuclides and most trace radionuclide SRMs/CRMs are certified for activity and are thus not adequate for current applications, 2) modern instrumental methods are capable of higher precision than historic measurement techniques, and in some cases exceed the precision of the available SRMs/CRMs, and 3) the quality assurance requirements for pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics are such that the existing cadre of SRMs/CRMs does not adequately support the needs for method validation. There are numerous governmental stakeholders both within the US (DOE, DoD) and internationally (IAEA, JRC-ITU) whose missions are either directly involved with nuclear forensics measurements or rely on the forensic data obtained to make the exacting policy decisions (DOJ (FBI), DHS, CIA, DIA, DoD) associated with disrupting the production of illicit nuclear materials, interdicted nuclear materials or a nuclear/radiological detonation event. Starting in 2008 the DHS NTNFC, in collaboration with NBL and NIST, took on the production of suitable SRMs/CRMs for the pre-detonation nuclear forensics community. Two CRMs have been released since the start of this effort and two more are slated for completion in 2016. More recently, NIST, as a part of its mission as the US National Metrology Institute (NMI) to deliver standards (providing traceability) and foster homeland security, has launched the first certification campaign of a measurement traceable post nuclear detonation SRM. NIST, in cooperation with partner labs (AFIT (DoD), FBI (DOJ), and NPL) and with support from the FBI, has developed two Surrogate Post-Detonation Urban Debris (SPUD) Standard Reference Materials (SRMs) - SRM 4600 and 4601. These SRMs have been developed to simulate the expected debris mixture from the detonation of an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) in an urban environment, which is capable of producing fresh fission as well as activation products. The elemental composition of the vitrified debris materials is a composite of minerals and metals characteristic of the concrete and steel, the building materials that would be exposed to a nuclear detonation and whose resulting activation products would be found in rubble samples collected for forensics evidence and attribution. Additionally, because post-detonation samples would also contain short-lived fission products, the debris materials have been doped with Uranium (U). To create the nuclear fission products, samples of the SPUD materials can be placed in a well-characterized nuclear reactor and exposed to a set neutron flux and energy, causing the encased U atoms to split and yield short-lived fission products. Because a known amount of U is added to the SPUD materials it is feasible to determine the concentration of the resulting fission products. The subsequent irradiated SPUD glass would be chemically similar to samples that would be generated in an actual detonation, and thus can serve as a standardized reference material for nuclear forensic post detonation measurements. (authors)

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2016

Assessment of Multi-Step CADIS Parameter Sensitivity to Neutron Flux Spectrum in Shutdown Dose Rate Calculations

Shutdown dose rate (SDDR) analysis requires (a) a neutron transport calculation to estimate neutron flux fields, (b) an activation calculation to compute radionuclide inventories and associated photon sources, and (c) a photon transport calculation to estimate final dose rate. In some applications, accurate full-scale Monte Carlo (MC) SDDR simulations are needed for very large systems with massive amounts of shielding materials. For example, SDDR assessments are required throughout the biological shield (bio-shield) of the ITER experimental facility to evaluate the required waiting period after the shutdown of ITER and to identify the locations where human accessibility should be prohibited. The bio-shield is a large cylindrical concrete structure (30 m tall and 34 m in diameter) surrounding the very complex tokamak machine. Determining the effects on SDDR of important factors, such as the cross talk (interactions) between the different ports of ITER, is possible only through full-scale simulations that involve all the complex inner details of the ITER tokamak machine. These simulations are impractical because calculation of space- and energy-dependent neutron fluxes throughout the structural materials is needed to estimate the distribution of radioisotopes causing the SDDR. Determining a good importance function that can be used in biasing a neutron MC calculation for SDDR is complicated because it is difficult to explicitly express the SDDR response function, which depends on subsequent computational steps. The Multi-Step Consistent Adjoint Driven Importance Sampling (MS-CADIS) hybrid MC/deterministic method was developed to speed up the SDDR MC neutron transport calculation using an importance function that represents the neutron importance to the final SDDR. The MS-CADIS method uses the CADIS method, which has been Notice: This manuscript has been authored by UT-Battelle, LLC, under Contract No. DE-AC0500OR22725 with the U.S. Department of Energy. The United States Government retains and the publisher, by accepting the article for publication, acknowledges that the United States Government retains a non-exclusive, paid-up, irrevocable, world-wide license to publish or reproduce the published form of this manuscript, or allow others to do so, for the United States Government purposes. The Department of Energy will provide public access to these results of federally sponsored research in accordance with the DOE Public Access Plan (http://energy.gov/downloads/doe-public-access-plan). successfully used for more than a decade in radiation shielding applications to generate consistent source biasing and weight window (WW) variance reduction parameters to accelerate continuous-energy MC simulations. However, because MS-CADIS focuses on multi-step shielding calculations such as SDDR calculations, it develops an importance function for the initial radiation transport calculation (e.g., the neutron calculations in SDDR simulations) that represents the importance of particles to the final response of the overall simulation. To develop this importance function, the MS-CADIS method uses an adjoint calculation with a specific neutron adjoint source that represents the neutron's contribution to the final SDDR. Brute force calculation of the MS-CADIS neutron adjoint source requires a deterministic neutron transport calculation coupled with activation calculations in each element of the deterministic mesh. These calculations are needed to determine the MS-CADIS parameter for the neutron interactions that produce radioisotopes contributing to the SDDR. The MS-CADIS parameter is the microscopic cross section of the radioisotope-producing interaction, multiplied by the mass of this radioisotope existing at the end of the irradiation and decay scenario, and divided by the steady-state rate of the interaction. Because the activation calculations are performed for each radionuclide in each mesh element, implementation of the MS-CADIS method can be computationally expensive. However, these neutron transport and activation calculations are not needed if we assume that the radioisotopes are created due to single neutron interactions and their concentrations do not change as a result of burnup by neutron irradiation. The use of this approximation, which renders the MS-CADIS parameter independent of the neutron flux, seems reasonable in calculating the MS-CADIS importance function because this function is needed only to speed up the MC calculation, not to calculate the final SDDR. In this work, we investigate the validity of this approximation by investigating the behavior of the MS-CADIS parameter as a function of the neutron flux spectra in the Fusion Evaluated Nuclear Data Library (FENDL) Neutronics and Shielding Benchmark problem that contains representative isotopes and flux environments of fusion energy systems. (authors)

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2016

Testing of graphite thermal neutron scattering law data in support of treat neutronic analysis

The Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT) has historically provided the capability for transient fuel performance and safety testing in the United States. The operation of this facility was suspended in 1994. However, in recent years preparations for the restart of TREAT were initiated. TREAT is a graphite moderated and air cooled reactor. Its core is composed of a 19 x 19 array of fuel assemblies that contain UO{sub 2} (HEU) fuel particles dispersed in a graphite matrix, along with reflector assemblies filled with graphite only. Each fuel assembly is 8 feet tall with a fueled region that is 4 feet tall and upper and lower regions of graphite that are 2 feet tall. In addition, a 2 feet thick radial graphite reflector region is present. Finally, a 5 feet thick concrete biological shield surrounds the core. Previous work showed that the graphite thermal scattering cross sections can introduce variations exceeding 2000 pcm in the predicted eigenvalue of the TREAT core. Recognizing that the graphite in the assembly (and thereby the core) is a porous mixture of crystalline and amorphous carbon (with a lower density in comparison to ideal crystalline graphite), it becomes clear that TREAT specific thermal neutron scattering cross section libraries will be needed (at all temperatures of interest) for use within neutronic codes seeking to simulate TREAT. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Characterizing the Benefits of Seismic Isolation of Nuclear Structures in Terms of Reduced Risk and Cost

Seismic isolation is a mature technology that has been implemented in many civil structures, including buildings, bridges, liquid natural gas tanks, and off shore oil platforms, both in the United States and other countries, to mitigate the damaging effects of earthquakes. Seismic isolation has also been used in nuclear structures in France and South Africa, but not yet in the United States: neither in the Department of Energy facilities nor in commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs). This is primarily due to a lack of guidelines, codes and standards for the analysis, design and construction specific to seismically isolated nuclear structures. However, seismic isolation of nuclear structures has seen increased research interest in the recent years and the recently published national consensus standard, America Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Standard 4-16 'Seismic analysis of safety related nuclear structures', now incorporates language and commentary (Chapter 12) for seismically isolating surface or near-surface-mounted nuclear facilities, including NPPs. Seismic isolation substantially reduces horizontal seismic loads (demands) on structures, systems, and components. Reduction in demand results in four potential benefits: (1) economic: reduction in capital cost, (2) increased safety: reduction in the mean annual frequency of unacceptable performance, (3) insurance: protection against increases in the known seismic hazard after construction by minimizing the effort to re-qualify and re-certify structures, systems and components, and (4) recertification: the opportunity to certify an existing NPP design for a region of higher seismic hazard. Item (2) above, an increase in safety (reduction of seismic risk), was explored in Huang et al., wherein it was demonstrated that the implementation of seismic isolation reduced seismic risk in nuclear power plant structures. Studies that assess item (1) have not been performed although the use of isolation may lead to large reductions in the capital cost of safety-related nuclear facilities. Funding provided by Nuclear Safety Research and Development in the Department of Energy (DOE) allowed the authors to develop a framework for assessing the economic benefits and reductions in seismic risk afforded by the use of seismic (base) isolation. The framework includes probabilistic risk assessment and estimation of overnight capital costs (OCC's) of a sample generic DOE nuclear facility (GDNF). The project is documented in detail in Bolisetti et al. and Yu et al., and key results are presented here. The GDNF considered in this study is based on a facility constructed at the Idaho National Laboratory. The GDNF is a two-story reinforced concrete building with an embedded basemat and is founded on soft rock at the boundary of Site Class B and Site Class C (B/C boundary) as characterized by ASCE/SEI Standard 7. The GDNF is assumed to handle radiological materials, and its structure, systems and components (SSC's) are designed to effectively confine these materials in the event of an internal failure. The GDNF is populated with components that are generic to safety-related nuclear structures. A single system, which is intended to confine a loss of materials-at-risk (MAR) to the interior of the structure, is chosen for this study. Accordingly, a hypothetical event tree and fault tree are assumed for risk assessment. The isolation system for the GDNF is designed per Chapter 12 of ASCE/SEI 4-16 but is not optimized. The isolation system consists of 38 lead rubber bearings installed in one horizontal plane below the basemat. Details of the GDNF, including the SSC's, event tree and fault tree, and isolation system, are presented in the project report and Yu et al.. This study includes seismic risk assessment and cost estimation for four cases: (1) the GDNF is located at a site of low to moderate seismic hazard and is constructed on a conventional (non-isolated) foundation; (2) the GDNF is located at the same site as case 1, but is seismically isolated; (3) the GDNF is located at a site of high seismic hazard and is constructed on a conventional foundation; and (4) the GDNF is located at the same site of high seismic hazard as case 3, but is seismically isolated. In this study, the DOE site at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is chosen as the low to moderate seismic hazard site for cases 1 and 2, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is chosen as the high seismic hazard site for cases 3 and 4.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Characterization of NORM in an Urban Environment using HPGe Measurements and MCNP6 Simulations

This work is part of a larger project aimed at producing an operationally relevant, validated simulation environment that can be used as a 'virtual testbed' for counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts. Examples of such efforts include searches for illicit radiation sources before and during large special events, such as the presidential nominating conventions, inaugurations, and large sporting events. Once validated by laboratory and field measurements, this testbed can be used to test and validate algorithms and detector systems designed for various search missions in an urban environment. The detection of radioactive sources in a city is greatly complicated by natural background radiation, which emanates from various materials common to an urban environment, such as roadways, sidewalks, and building exteriors. The methods and results offered here represent the conclusion of an effort to characterize the concentration of naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) in various elements in a controlled, but representative, urban environment. Some of the methods discussed in previous work will be briefly reiterated here, but more detail can be found in the preceding work. The location chosen for this effort was a Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) environment at the Fort Indiantown Gap (FTIG) National Guard training facility in Pennsylvania. This site was chosen because it replicates a small town where traffic and pedestrian access could be easily controlled, as to not interfere with the background measurements. This endeavor involved over 70 measurements using a high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector designed to ascertain the NORM concentrations in the soil, asphalt roads, gravel lots, concrete intersections, sidewalks, foundations, and walls found throughout the site. The NORM concentrations determined from this work will be incorporated into a large-scale simulation that can be used to investigate various search techniques and algorithms, detector types and setups, and to produce representative synthetic data for future work.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2017

Neutron-Gamma flux and Dose calculations in a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR)

The Institute of Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) acts as technical support to the French nuclear safety authorities. In this context, one of its missions is to improve nuclear safety through the enhancement of knowledge regarding operating nuclear power reactors. The issues concerning the aging and the characterisation of the reactor vessel require knowledge of the neutron and gamma radiation environment on the vessel and beyond. Since few years, ENEA (Energia Nucleare e Energie Alternative, i.e. Nuclear Energy and Alternative Energy agency) and IRSN collaborate on Monte-Carlo simulations and Variance Reduction Techniques (VRT), which are used to determine neutron and gamma spectra in and out of the core. Additionally, IRSN participates in the DISCOMS project, which stands for 'Distributed Sensing for Corium Monitoring and Safety', aiming at examining the status of the third barrier of confinement, in order to define possible mitigation strategies in case of a severe accident, namely: i) reactor pressure vessel breakthrough and corium relocation outside the vessel, ii) reactor pit concrete erosion and iii) corium cooling. One of the IRSN tasks in the frame of the DISCOMS project is to provide the radiation level in terms of neutron and gamma doses and flux energy spectra at various locations. This paper summarizes the study performed on the radiation transport in the Tihange-I Belgian nuclear reactor and contributes to several issues requiring the knowledge of the radiation environment in and outside the reactor vessel. This paper gives an overview of the work presented at the ICRS-13 and RPSD-2016 conference (for more details see the proceedings paper)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Radiological Shielding Design for the Neutron Backscattering Spectrometer EMU

In this paper we present modelling and design of compact radiation shielding required for operation of the EMU instrument, located at Australia's OPAL nuclear reactor. The acceptance criteria for the shielding design were (i) safety - dose rate ≤ 3 μSv/h at external surfaces of the instrument's experimental area, (ii) floor load limit < 20 tons/m{sup 2}, (iii) low cost and (iv) for maintenance purposes 'easy access' to components of the instruments. The EMU instrument is a cold neutron backscattering spectrometer designed to measure inelastic neutron scattering. Its distinctive feature is that it has a tight elastic energy transfer resolution, of about 1 μeV. The instrument provides unique opportunities to study diffusion in complex materials, e.g. water molecules in confinement, polymers or biological molecules, particularly in the Asia-Oceania region. EMU is the first instrument located on the CG3 neutron beam line of the OPAL Neutron Guide Hall (NGH). A pre-existing evacuated neutron guide of dimensions 200 mm (height) x 50 mm (width) feeds into the shared EMU/KOOKABURRA pre-monochromator bunker shielding assembly, and its bottom cross section will be intercepted ∼200 mm further in air by the highly orientated pyrolytic graphite (HOPG) EMU pre-monochromator (take-off angles from 125.4 deg. to 148 deg.). The bunker shielding assembly for EMU also contains a beryllium filter and Focusing Guide Section D (FGD, 170 mm (height) x 50 mm (width)). To accommodate the range of take-off angles Pb cylindrical shielding blocks of radius 140 mm and 500 mm height have been designed. These blocks will be located at the section of the bunker where the neutron beam will exit towards the experimental area and they will reside on top of a hollow steel base (sides 10 mm thick), on which they move by sliding and are integrated with the tertiary shutter. The experimental area is enclosed by a concrete wall of 2.5 m height and 300 mm thickness, shared with the KOOKABURRA instrument, Gyprock Plasterboard panels with viewing windows, a wall from the Out-of-Pile Bunker and the CG3 shielding. The neutron beam enters the experimental area via the tertiary shutter, into the Focusing Guide Section C (FGC), which has an entrance guide cross-section of 158 mm (height) x 79 mm (width) and exit guide cross-section of 149 mm (height) x 85 mm (width) and is of length 816 mm. The vacuum chamber of FGC will be connected to the vacuum chamber of the Background Chopper (BC, disc of outer radius 350 mm). Focusing Guide Section B (FGB) is aligned with FGC and its vacuum shared with the BC vacuum. The FGB has an exit guide cross section of 50 mm (height) x 49 mm (width) and is of length 4046 mm, which will focus the neutron beam vertically and horizontally towards the Al window entrance (0.82 mm thickness, labelled N16) of the Scattering Tank assembly (constructed from 20 mm - 40 mm thickness stainless steel and will be under vacuum < 1 x 10{sup -3} mbar). Inside the Scattering Tank there is another section of Focusing Guide (FGA), with an exit guide cross-section of 30 mm (height) 30 mm (width) and of length 417 mm. The neutron beam exiting the FGA will be reflected by the HOPG crystal pieces of the Graphite Chopper (GC) towards the Backscattering Monochromator (BM). The reflected neutron beam will first pass through the other Al window (0.82 mm thickness, labelled N17) of the Scattering Tank and then enter into a flight tube (steel of 10 mm thickness). The BM is formed in an 1800 mm spherical radius array of Si crystal elements (0.87 mm thickness) and is oscillated by the linear motor Doppler Drive. The neutron beam will be reflected back at 180 deg. from, and focussed by the BM to reenter the Scattering Tank through the N17 Al window. It will then pass through the GC (HOPG crystals are rotated out of the way) and will reach the scattering sample of interest to the instrument end user. Also, inside the Scattering Tank there will be {sup 3}He linear position-sensitive detectors, and Analyser Arrays formed in an 1800 mm radius spherical arrays of Si crystal elements (0.87 mm thickness) glued on aluminium support frames (10 mm thickness) and span ∼160 deg. arc.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Thermal Evaluations for Hypothetically Drain-Down Spent Fuel Storage Facility at SRS

The L-Area Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) underwater storage facility at Savannah River Site (SRS), referred to as L-Basin SNF facility, has an array of Vertical Tube Storage (VTS) racks and a group of High Flux Irradiation Reactor (HFIR) fuel cores. The underwater facility is integrally designed as a wet SNF storage system with a chemically-controlled water pool. The SNF storage racks are seismically qualified. The L-Basin pool holds about 3.4 million gallons of water with concrete wall thickness of about 5 ft and water depths of 17 ft to 30 ft. The facility has mainly two different elevation levels of 30 ft and 17 ft below the ground level. At the level 30 ft below the ground, a maximum of 110 racks of VTS and 5 racks of Dry Cave can be stored. At the level of 17 ft below the ground, 120 HFIR cores can be stored, considering that each rack contains two HFIR cores. In case of a hypothetical accident, all cooling water in the storage pool may be drained away, resulting in dry SNF storage condition. The primary objective of the work is to estimate the maximum fuel temperature in a conservative manner when the L-Basin facility is completely dry due to the hypothetical drain-down of the pool water. A three-dimensional Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) modeling approach was taken for the thermal evaluations of the water-drained SNF storage facility. The modeling calculations were performed, assuming that all of the storage racks in L-Basin are fully loaded with SNF assemblies containing decay heat sources. In the case of full loading, the L-Basin facility stores 14,600 SNF assemblies in VTS racks and 120 cores in HFIR racks. The thermal analysis results of the L-Basin model yielded maximum temperatures of VTS and HFIR fuel assemblies for different fuel loading scenarios and boundary conditions of the SNF storage racks.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗