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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Building a better framework for evaluating human well-being impacts in global change analysis: The example of energy security

Human well-being can be greatly impacted by the global environmental and socio-economic change captured in Integrated Models of Global Change (IMGCs). Though most IMGCs address some aspects of well-being, their underlying modeling approach and ‘philosophy’ differ widely, and some key elements – like energy security – are omitted. In this report, we describe a project in which we set out to a create a framework through which the well-being dimensions of the household are connected to key drivers of socio-economic and environmental change – and how the needed metrics, data and modeling methods can be brought to bear. We focus on the well-being dimensions of energy, and lay out the necessary elements to capturing household energy security – using household energy burden as the relevant metric. We begin by showing the conceptual linkage of energy burden to environmental drivers like temperature change, using a simple and straightforward conceptual framework. We then go further to use the example of GCAM-USA to show how some key analytical features of the model can provide insight into how energy security across different groups can change along alternative pathways to sustainability. We compare our preliminary assessment of household energy burden to existing data and suggest further steps to improve and refine this analysis in future research.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
NASA NTRS2019

Earth Observations and Integrative Models in Support of Food and Water Security

Global food production depends upon many factors that Earth observing satellites routinely measure about water, energy, weather, and ecosystems. Increasingly sophisticated, publicly-available satellite data products can improve efficiencies in resource management and provide earlier indication of environmental disruption. Satellite remote sensing provides a consistent, long-term record that can be used effectively to detect large-scale features over time, such as a developing drought. Accuracy and capabilities have increased along with the range of Earth observations and derived products that can support food security decisions with actionable information. This paper highlights major capabilities facilitated by satellite observations and physical models that have been developed and validated using remotely-sensed observations. Although we primarily focus on variables relevant to agriculture, we also include a brief description of the growing use of Earth observations in support of aquaculture and fisheries.

Water Resources↗
NASA NTRS2016

Cyber Security for the Spaceport Command and Control System: Vulnerability Management and Compliance Analysis

With the rapid development of the Internet, the number of malicious threats to organizations is continually increasing. In June of 2015, the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) had a data breach resulting in the compromise of millions of government employee records. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is not exempt from these attacks. Cyber security is becoming a critical facet to the discussion of moving forward with projects. The Spaceport Command and Control System (SCCS) project at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) aims to develop the launch control system for the next generation launch vehicle in the coming decades. There are many ways to increase the security of the network it uses, from vulnerability management to ensuring operating system images are compliant with securely configured baselines recommended by the United States Government.

Cyber Security↗
DOE OSTI2020

Pahute Mesa-Oasis Valley Hydrostratigraphic Framework Model for Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nye County, Nevada (Rev. 0)

A new, revised three-dimensional (3-D) hydrostratigraphic framework model (HFM) for the Central and Western Pahute Mesa Corrective Action Units 101 and 102 was completed in 2019. The initial (Phase I) model was completed in 2002 and was documented in A Hydrostratigraphic Model and Alternatives for the Groundwater Flow and Contaminant Transport Model of Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nye County, Nevada (BN, 2002). Subsequent flow and transport modeling revealed the need to collect additional data to reduce uncertainties. The Phase II data collection and characterization effort included extensive well drilling and testing activities, and rebuilding of the Phase I 3-D HFM, resulting in the Phase II HFM (NSTec, 2014). Further drilling (Well ER-20-12), data collection, and interpretive work (e.g., Thirsty Canyon Lineament [Wurtz and Day, 2018]) were incorporated into the Pahute Mesa-Oasis Valley (PM-OV) HFM. The PM-OV HFM incorporates the area of interest from the Phase II HFM and adds additional areas, primarily to the north and west with minor additions to the south and east. The new, expanded area matches the PM-OV groundwater basin as defined in Fenelon et al. (2016) and includes Pahute Mesa, a former nuclear testing area at the Nevada National Security Site; and Oasis Valley, a groundwater discharge area downgradient from contaminant source areas on Pahute Mesa. The data and information necessary to build the PM-OV HFM are provided in Navarro (2019). The PM-OV HFM will be used by hydrologic modelers who are tasked with developing a model to determine how contaminants are transported by groundwater flow in an area of complex geology. The model area is large (more than 6,250 square kilometers) and geologically complex, including Paleozoic- to Mesozoic-age structures (e.g., thrust faults, Thirsty Canyon Lineament), at least seven Tertiary-age calderas, several intrusive bodies, and many relatively recent basin-and-range normal faults. Investigators from the U.S. Geological Survey; National Security Technologies, LLC; National Laboratories; and U.S. Department of Energy contractors have organized the more than 300 volcanic units and other rocks in the model area into 77 hydrostratigraphic units (HSUs). The volcanic rocks are subdivided into 42 aquifers, 11 confining units, and 9 composite units (containing both aquifer and confining unit rocks). The underlying pre-Tertiary rocks were divided into 5 HSUs, comprising 2 aquifers and 3 confining units. The model also includes 1 alluvial aquifer unit, 8 intrusive confining units, and 1 granite confining unit. The model depicts the thickness, extent, and geometric relationships of these HSUs (“layers” in the model) along with all the major structural features that control them, including calderas and faults. The most substantive differences between the Phase II HFM and the PM-OVHFM include (1) addition of the new data and resulting revised interpretations from the additional area encompassed by the PM-OV groundwater basin; (2) incorporation of 16 new faults; (3) 12 boreholes from the northern extension; (4) 2 additional caldera-collapse collars; and (5) correlation of the simulated faulting and hydrostratigraphy in the eastern part of the model domain with the delineations represented in the neighboring Rainier Mesa-Shoshone Mountain HFM-Prime and Yucca Flat-Climax Mine HFM. All PM-OV HFM delineations were based on published and unpublished data from geophysical investigations, surface geologic maps, and drill-hole records. Phase II approached model uncertainty using the model-building software to test model configurations and hydrologic consequences using a range of values for parameters such as fault offset amounts and HSU elevations. The PM-OV HFM expands on this approach to encompass the entire PM-OV groundwater basin.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2015

Utilization of GIS technology to support development of flow and contaminant fate and transport models at US DOE sites - 15457

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites have accumulated years of data and millions of spatial and temporal records related to the hydrological cycle, contaminant transport, and parameters of remediation technologies. In addition, numerical models which use field monitoring data to help understand flow and transport produce gigabytes of computed spatial and temporal data for each computation node. There is a need therefore for an advanced spatial data structure that can be used to address the management, processing, and analysis of spatial and temporal numerical modeling data derived from multiple sources. This can be accomplished using a geo-database. The development of an ArcSDE geo-database facilitates the centralized storage, backup, accessibility, organization, and management of model configuration and computed simulation data, putting it into a structured, coherent, and logical computer-supported system. GIS data processing and automation would enable faster and hence more complex analyses of field test data. The Applied Research Center (ARC) at Florida International University (FIU) has provided analysis of flow and transport for several watersheds at DOE's Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), including East Fork Poplar Creek (EFPC), Upper EFPC in the Y-12 National Security Complex area (Y-12 NSC) and White Oak Creek (WOC). Integrated surface and subsurface flow, fate and transport models were developed to provide analysis of contaminant patterns within each watershed. In addition, digital monitoring data available from the Oak Ridge Environmental Information System (OREIS) related to mercury (Hg) contamination and remediation within these watersheds was used for calibration and verification of the model. Experimental studies were also carried out which provided kinetic and equilibrium data about important parameters related to Hg transport, speciation and methylation/demethylation kinetics within the watershed. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) technology was employed to support the modeling work through storage and geo-processing of spatial and temporal data required by the models and to produce hydrogeological maps for visualization. An ArcGIS geo-database was developed for centralized storage and management of experimental and computed model data and its capabilities were extended over the years using tools such as ModelBuilder combined with Python scripting to automate repetitive tasks, perform statistical analyses and generate maps and reports. The hydrologic geo-database model developed possesses a structure that enables linkage with scalable hydrologic modeling tools/applications to model hydrologic systems, and in this case, enables the testing of the potential impacts of various remediation scenarios on the ORR watersheds. The ArcSDE geo-database can also be used to automate and simplify the process of calling stored GIS and time series data. This geo-database can serve as a tool for contaminant flow and transport analyses which require large amounts of high-quality spatial and temporal data in order to ensure reliability and validity of modeling results. The existing geo-database structure developed for the hydrological modeling at ORR was designed to be replicable for application at other DOE sites. An investigation of downloadable free/open source GIS software along with required security protocols to facilitate online querying of the database was also conducted to determine methods by which project-derived data can be more easily shared with other project stakeholders such as DOE personnel and site contractors. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Data Breach Preparation

The Home Depot Data Breach is the second largest data breach on record. It has or will affect up to 56 million debit or credit cards. A trusted vendor account, coupled with the use of a previously unknown variant of malware that allowed the establishment of a foothold, was the entry point into the Home Depot network. Once inside the perimeter, privilege escalation provided an avenue to obtain the desired information. Home Depot did, however, learn some lessons from Target. Home Depot certainly communicated better than Target, procured insurance, and instituted as secure an environment as possible. There are specific measures an institution should undertake to prepare for a data breach, and everyone can learn from this breach. Publicly available information about the Home Depot Data Breach provides insight into the attack, an old malware variant with a new twist.While the malware was modified as to be unrecognizable with tools, it probably should have been detected. There are also concerns with Home Depot’s insurance and the insurance provider’s apparent lack of fully reimbursing Home Depot for their losses. The effect on shareholders and Home Depot’s stock price was short lived. This story is still evolving but provides interesting lessons learned concerning how an organization should prepare for it inevitable breach.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2015

Orange County Government Solar Demonstration and Research Facility

Orange County Florida completed the construction of a 20 kilowatt Solar Demonstration and Research Facility in March 2015. The system was constructed at the Orange County/University of Florida Cooperative Extension Center whose electric service address is 6021 South Conway Road, Orlando, Florida 32802. The Solar Demonstration and Research Facility is comprised of 72 polycrystalline photovoltaic modules and 3 inverters which convert direct current from the solar panels to alternating current electricity. Each module produces 270 watts of direct current power, for a total canopy production of just under 20,000 watts. The solar modules were installed with a fixed tilt of 5 degrees and face south, toward the equator to maximize the amount of sunlight captures. Each year, the electricity generated by the solar array will help eliminate 20 metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions as well as provide covered parking for staff and visitors vehicles. The solar array is expected to generate 27,000 kilowatt hours of electricity annually equating to an estimated $\$$266 savings in the monthly electric bill, or $\$$3,180 annually for the Orange County/University of Florida Cooperative Extension Center. In addition to reducing the electric bill for the Extension Center, Orange County’s solar array also takes advantage of a rebate incentive offered by the local utility, Orlando Utility Commission, which provided a meter that measures the amount of power produced by the solar array. The local utility company’s Solar Photovoltaic Production Incentive will pay Orange County $\$$0.05 per kilowatt hour for the power that is produced by the solar array. This incentive is provided in addition to Net Metering benefits, which is an effort to promote the use of clean, renewable energy on the electric grid. The Photovoltaic Solar Demonstration and Research Facility also serves an educational tool to the public; the solar array is tied directly into a data logger that provides real time power generation accessible for public viewing on an interactive kiosk located in the Orange County/University of Florida Cooperative Extension Center’s lobby where visitors can review “real time” power generation, cost savings and environmental benefits of the system. Site commissioning with the software program was delayed due to Internal Security Software issues within Orange County that needed to be resolved, therefore the “real time” capture of the production data for the solar array using the software program commenced on May 1, 2015. In addition an educational flyer was developed and is available in the Orange County Education Center’s main lobby. The project completed under this grant award assisted Orange County in demonstrating leadership by installing the application of a renewable energy technology combined with energy efficiency measures; resulting in reduced energy costs for the Orange County University of Florida Cooperative Extension Center, and helping Orange County citizens and visitors move towards the goals of greater energy independence and climate protection. The addition of the new Solar Demonstration and Research Facility has advanced the Orange County/University of Florida Cooperative Extension Center’s mission of extending, educating and providing research-based information to residents and visitors of Orange County by demonstrating the application of renewable energy technology combined with energy efficiency measures; resulting in reduced energy costs, and helping Orange County move towards the goal of greater energy independence and climate protection. In 2014, the Orange County Cooperative Extension Center hosted nearly 10,800 visitors to their on-site Exploration Gardens plus 12,686 walk-in visitors to their office plant clinic and other services. The Education Center held 2,217 educational events that were attended by 46,434 adults and youth, but about half of those events occurred off-site. Based on the visitation numbers in 2014 the Orange County Cooperative Extension Center Education is a vital partner to Orange County’s continued outreach and education efforts concerning renewable energy technologies and greenhouse gas emission reduction well in the current 2015 year and future years of operation of the solar array to the future visitors of the Center which help stimulate market demand that will continue to advance the commercialization and the widespread application and use of renewable energy technologies in Orange County and the state of Florida. The project period performance date for this grant was November 1, 2009 through March 1, 2015. The Final Project costs to complete the project as reported in the FINAL SF 425 were $\$$195,512.50 (50% recipient cost share was satisfied as required by grant terms and conditions).

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) (Final Technical Report)

Electric grids have historically been susceptible to both physical attacks and environmental hazards but the implementation of smart grids, remote management, and self-healing networks, has now made the grid vulnerable to cyber attacks. To address risks introduced by routable connectivity, utilities must establish dynamic solutions to identify, protect, detect, respond to, and recover from cyber security threats and vulnerabilities. In response to the evolving threat landscape U.S. Department of Energy-Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (DOE CESER) initiated the Cybersecurity for the OT Environment (CyOTE) pilot program, a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) effort designed to leverage U.S. intelligence capabilities to prevent, detect, or mitigate a cyber attack on utility operational technology (OT) networks. As part of the CyOTE pilot, The Southern Company (Southern Company or Southern) researched, evaluated and deployed emerging Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) technologies and cyber security monitoring architectures to provide previously unrealized network visibility and situational awareness through deep packet inspection and data analytics. This Final Scientific/Technical Report documents the objectives, methodology, lessons learned, and results of Southern Company’s participation in the CyOTE pilot from December 2018 to September 2023.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Secure mmWave Spectrum Sharing with Autonomous Beam Scheduling for 5G and Beyond

Spectrum Sharing (SS) has seen a renewed set of initiatives in 5G with the availability of shared and unlicensed spectrum bands that can be used by multiple cellular service providers and private cellular networks. Beam based transmission, instead of the traditional sector based transmission in conjunction with the spectrum agility of the 5G New Radio (NR) has brought new opportunities to optimized sharing of spectrum. Currently in the U.S., a centralized Spectrum Access Server (SAS) is used to co-ordinate spectrum sharing among networks sharing the same spectrum band. However, SAS becomes a focal point for security attacks and a performance bottleneck. In addition, SAS relies on an Environmental Sensor Network (ESN), separate from the 5G network. Without trusted spectral occupancy information, false reporting of spectrum sensing data can create sub-optimal and unfair spectrum usage. This paper summarizes our recent research findings in using a decentralized scheme for multiple networks to securely share spectrum with autonomous beam scheduling : 1) A new stochastic network framework based on Lyapunov Optimization approach is developed to optimize scheduling at the base stations; 2) Game theoretic (GT) approach is used to formulate the distributed scheduler; 3) Another distributed scheduler with Q-learning is presented that utilizes the Reinforcement Learning (RL) approach; 4) The performance and convergence rate of these distributed solutions to use shared and unlicensed spectrum are compared with existing solutions. Conditions under which the performance of these schedulers approach the theoretical upper bound, which is the performance possible with no interference among the operators sharing the spectrum, are presented; 5) The ability of a base station to use its own user equipment as sensors, for optimal spectrum sharing with base stations in other operator networks, is demonstrated to be an effective approach.

5G↗
DOE OSTI2020

Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program Monitoring Well Inspection and Maintenance Plan

This plan describes the systematic approach for: inspecting the physical condition of monitoring wells at Y-12, determining maintenance needs that extend the life of a well, and identifying those wells that no longer meet acceptable monitoring well design or well construction standards and require plugging and abandonment. The inspection and maintenance of groundwater monitoring wells is one of the primary management strategies of the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP) Management Plan, that is, the “proactive stewardship of the extensive monitoring well network at Y-12" (Consolidated Nuclear Security, L.L.C. [CNS], 2018). Effective stewardship, and a program of routine inspections of the physical condition of each monitoring well, ensures that representative water-quality samples and hydrologic data are obtained from the well network and protects the subsurface environment. In accordance with the Y-12 GWPP Monitoring Optimization Plan (MOP) for Groundwater Monitoring Wells at the Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (CNS, 2017), the status designation (active or inactive) for each well determines the scope and extent of well inspections and maintenance activities. This plan, in conjunction with the above document, formalizes the GWPP approach to focus available resources on monitoring wells which provide the most useful data, and for that reason the GWPP inspects and performs maintenance on the wells sampled by the GWPP. This plan applies to groundwater monitoring wells installed at Y-12 and the related waste management facilities located within the three hydrogeologic regimes: (1) the Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime), (2) the Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime), and (3) the Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime). The Bear Creek Regime encompasses the section of Bear Creek Valley (BCV) immediately west of Y-12. The East Fork Regime encompasses most of the Y-12 process, operations, and support facilities in BCV west of Scarboro Road. The Chestnut Ridge Regime is directly south of Y-12 and encompasses a section of Chestnut Ridge that is bounded to the west by a surface drainage feature (Dunaway Branch, located immediately west of Industrial Landfill II) and by Scarboro Road to the east. The GWPP maintains an extensive database of geographic and construction details and related information for the monitoring wells in each hydrogeologic regime in the Updated Subsurface Database for Bear Creek Valley, Chestnut Ridge, and Parts of Bethel Valley on the U.S. DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (CNS, 2019). A detailed description of the hydrogeologic framework at Y-12 can be found in the GWPP Management Plan (CNS, 2018).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Equipment Testing Environment (ETE) Specification

Cyber security has been difficult to quantify from the perspective of defenders. The effort to develop a cyber-attack with some ability, function, or consequence has not been rigorously investigated in Operational Technologies. This specification defines a testing structure that allows conformal and repeatable cyber testing on equipment. The purpose of the ETE is to provide data necessary to analyze and reconstruct cyber-attack timelines, effects, and observables for training and development of Cyber Security Operation Centers. Standardizing the manner in which cyber security on equipment is investigated will allow a greater understanding of the progression of cyber attacks and potential mitigation and detection strategies in a scientifically rigorous fashion.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Enabling Cybersecurity, Situational Awareness and Resilience in Distribution Grids with High Penetration of Photovoltaics (CARE-PV) (Final Report)

Since legacy distribution systems have very limited visibility beyond the substation, high penetration of PV at the grid edge presents some unique operational challenges. One approach to address these challenges is to use information from advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and µPMUs. However, exploiting this information is impacted by a number of factors, including multi-timescale measurements, volume of data generated, communication network impairments (e.g., information loss and latency) and susceptibility to cyber-attacks. Therefore, one of the critical tasks involved in the management of a distribution grid is to develop complete situational awareness by integrating cyber-security mechanisms with state estimation strategies and leveraging this situational awareness to assure energy services at strategic locations while exploiting AMI/PV inverter/ µPMU data. This CARE-PV project addresses the fundamental challenges in situational awareness and resilience to cyber and physical vectors by exploiting the synergy between innovative modeling, estimation, data analytics, testing and validation using smart PV inverters designed at K-State and facilities at NREL. Specifically, the project involved the development, testing and validation of the following novel enabling technologies: (Thrust 1) Resilience to cyber vectors that impact data integrity was addressed via a two-level defense strategy that combines cyber intrusion detection using self-learning, cooperative smart PV inverters, and a novel moving target defense framework to combat data integrity attacks. (Thrust 2) Resilience to cyber-physical vectors that impact situational awareness by limiting data availability was addressed via novel centralized and decentralized, sparsity-based static and dynamic state estimation approaches that enhance observability even when the underlying system is unobservable. (Thrust 3) Leveraging a unique probabilistic sensitivity analysis approach accompanied by one-of-a-kind dominant influencer set computation, the vulnerability of critical infrastructure at strategic locations was evaluated so that proactive PV-based control strategies can be used to support operations under normal/outage scenarios. These CARE-PV project innovations were demonstrated on both small-scale IEEE and larger utility-scale testbeds (Thrust 4). Feedback from Industry Advisory Board members was used to formulate a commercialization pathway for a subset of CARE-PV technologies. These CARE-PV technologies will ultimately lead to reliable and secure, large-scale integration of renewable energy and mitigate the risk of energy disruption resulting from cyber incidents and other emerging threats within the energy environment.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
NASA NTRS2010

Climate Change, Nutrition and Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa

Food security and nutrition in sub-Saharan Africa have long been affected by variations in the weather. Vulnerability to these hazards, along with economic shocks and an adverse political environment, is often uneven in a community. Some individuals and households are more susceptible to emergencies or crises than others, and thus determining who is most vulnerable are and how they are responding to a shock or crises is essential to understand the impact on food security. Daily, quantitative and global observations derived from satellite remote sensing instruments can contribute to understanding how food production has declined due to drought, flood or other weather-related hazard, but it can say nothing about the likelihood that the people living in that area are suffering food insecurity as a result. As Amartya Sen argued, a famine can occur even when there is an absolute surplus of food in a region. Thus organizations like the US Agency for International Development's Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) work to integrate biophysical and socio-economic indicators together with on-the ground assessments to estimate the food security consequences of a variety of events. Climate change is likely to restructure local, regional and global agricultural systems and commodity markets. Although remote sensing information has been used to identify seasonal production declines for the past two decades, new ways of using the data will need to be developed in order to understand, document and respond to the impact of climate change on food security as it is manifested in shorter term shocks. In this article, the contribution of remote sensing is explained, along with the other factors that affect food security

Brown, Molly E.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Implementation Aspects of Smart Grids Cyber-Security Cross-Layered Framework for Critical Infrastructure Operation

Communication networks in power systems are a major part of the smart grid paradigm. It enables and facilitates the automation of power grid operation as well as self-healing in contingencies. Such dependencies on communication networks, though, create a roam for cyber-threats. An adversary can launch an attack on the communication network, which in turn reflects on power grid operation. Attacks could be in the form of false data injection into system measurements, flooding the communication channels with unnecessary data, or intercepting messages. Using machine learning-based processing on data gathered from communication networks and the power grid is a promising solution for detecting cyber threats. In this paper, a co-simulation of cyber-security for cross-layer strategy is presented. The advantage of such a framework is the augmentation of valuable data that enhances the detection as well as identification of anomalies in the operation of the power grid. The framework is implemented on the IEEE 118-bus system. The system is constructed in Mininet to simulate a communication network and obtain data for analysis. A distributed three controller software-defined networking (SDN) framework is proposed that utilizes the Open Network Operating System (ONOS) cluster. According to the findings of our suggested architecture, it outperforms a single SDN controller framework by a factor of more than ten times the throughput. This provides for a higher flow of data throughout the network while decreasing congestion caused by a single controller’s processing restrictions. Furthermore, our CECD-AS approach outperforms state-of-the-art physics and machine learning-based techniques in terms of attack classification. The performance of the framework is investigated under various types of communication attacks.

cross-layered↗
NASA NTRS2017

Payload Performance of Third Generation TDRS and Future Services

NASA has accepted two of the 3rd generation Tracking and Data Relay Satellites, TDRS K, L, and M, designed and built by Boeing Defense, Space & Security (DSS). TDRS K, L, and M provide S-band Multiple Access (MA) service and S-band, Ku-band and Ka-band Single Access (SA) services to near Earth orbiting satellites. The TDRS KLM satellites offer improved services relative to the 1st generation TDRS spacecraft, such as: an enhanced MA service featuring increased EIRPs and G/T; and Ka-band SA capability which provides a 225 and 650 MHz return service (customer-to-TDRS direction) bandwidth and a 50 MHz forward service (TDRS-to-customer direction) bandwidth. MA services are provided through a 15 element forward phased array that forms up to two beams with onboard active beamforming and a 32 element return phased array supported by ground-based beamforming. SA services are provided through two 4.6m tri-band reflector antennas which support program track pointing and autotrack pointing. Prior to NASAs acceptance of the satellites, payload on-orbit testing was performed on each satellite to determine on-orbit compliance with design requirements. Performance parameters evaluated include: EIRP, G/T, antenna gain patterns, SA antenna autotrack performance, and radiometric tracking performance. On-orbit antenna calibration and pointing optimization was also performed on the MA and SA antennas including 24 hour duration tests to characterize and calibrate out diurnal effects. Bit-Error-Rate (BER) tests were performed to evaluate the end-to-end link BER performance of service through a TDRS K and L spacecraft. The TDRS M is planned to be launched in August 2017. This paper summarizes the results of the TDRS KL communications payload on-orbit performance verification and end-to-end service characterization and compares the results with the performance of the 2nd generation TDRS J. The paper also provides a high-level overview of an optical communications application that will augment the data rates supported by the Space Network.

RF↗
NASA NTRS2017

Payload Performance of TDRS KL and Future Services

NASA has accepted two of the 3nd generation Tracking and Data Relay Satellites, TDRS K, L, and M, designed and built by Boeing Defense, Space Security (DSS). TDRS K, L, and M provide S-band Multiple Access (MA) service and S-band, Ku-band and Ka-band Single Access (SA) services to near Earth orbiting satellites. The TDRS KLM satellites offer improved services relative to the 1st generation TDRS spacecraft, such as: an enhanced MA service featuring increased EIRPs and GT; and Ka-band SA capability which provides a 225 and 650 MHz return service (customer-to-TDRS direction) bandwidth and a 50 MHz forward service (TDRS-to-customer direction) bandwidth. MA services are provided through a 15 element forward phased array that forms up to two beams with onboard active beamforming and a 32 element return phased array supported by ground-based beamforming. SA services are provided through two 4.6m tri-band reflector antennas which support program track pointing and autotrack pointing. Prior to NASAs acceptance of the satellites, payload on-orbit testing was performed on each satellite to determine on-orbit compliance with design requirements. Performance parameters evaluated include: EIRP, GT, antenna gain patterns, SA antenna autotrack performance, and radiometric tracking performance. On-orbit antenna calibration and pointing optimization was also performed on the MA and SA antennas including 24 hour duration tests to characterize and calibrate out diurnal effects. Bit-Error-Rate (BER) tests were performed to evaluate the end-to-end link BER performance of service through a TDRS K and L spacecraft. The TDRS M is planned to be launched in August 2017. This paper summarizes the results of the TDRS KL communications payload on-orbit performance verification and end-to-end service characterization and compares the results with the performance of the 2nd generation TDRS J. The paper also provides a high-level overview of an optical communications application that will augment the data rates supported by the Space Network.

Laser↗
DOE OSTI2019

Factors Influencing the Evaluation of Spent Fuel Rail Routes - 19010

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is considering use of rail transport for future shipments of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from where it currently resides to storage or disposal facilities. Rail carriers transporting in commerce certain quantities of 'rail security sensitive materials,' including SNF, face a regulatory requirement from the U.S. Department of Transportation to perform route risk assessments on an annual basis. In performing these assessments, each affected rail carrier must take into consideration twenty-seven different route factors, and document its rationale for selecting preferred and alternative routes on the basis of the safety and security risk analysis results. The major freight rail carriers operating in the U.S. have invested in the development of a proprietary tool, for rail carrier use only, to assist them in making route selections. This tool utilizes operations data input by each affected rail carrier in conjunction with geographic information systems (GIS) data to represent proximate risk factors, to be integrated and assigned to individual points and segments on the railroad network. Separate safety and security risk values are generated for each rail route under consideration. These values are then placed on an equivalent scoring basis and summed together to allow direct comparison between different route options and to rank order each route in terms of its relative attractiveness. Each affected rail carrier files an annual report for evaluation by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) that documents its route risk assessment approach and analysis results. DOE has developed its own decision-support tool, Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START), which is capable of generating and analyzing routing options for transporting SNF by rail in addition to other freight modes. To better understand how affected rail carriers are likely to route SNF shipments in accordance with regulatory requirements and those route factors likely to be most influential in impacting DoE's evaluation of alternative SNF rail routes, a study was undertaken by DOE with the following objectives: - Review the shipment routes that have been historically used by rail carriers to move high hazard materials, including SNF; - Identify the physical, operational and proximate characteristics (attributes) associated with the rail segments that comprise these routes; - Evaluate the relationships between these attributes; - Make suggestions for how to streamline the factors used in DoE's rail route evaluations; - Contrast these relationships with how the factors are used by the rail carriers in applying their tool This paper describes the study approach, analysis results, and implications for rail route selection methodology. Differences between this evaluation and railroad industry information about rail route assessments are also discussed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗