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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 1,441 records · Page 80
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

An agent-based deployment decision-support system for electric vehicle services

METS-R ADDSEVS simulator is a high fidelity, parallel, agent-based evacuation simulator for multi-modal energy-optimal trip scheduling in real-time (METS-R) at transportation hubs. It consists of two modules. The first one is the traffic simulator module; the second one is the high-performance computing (HPC) module. More details can be found at https://umnilab.github.io/METS-R_doc/.

Lei, Zengxiang↗
DOE OSTI2014

Facility Energy Decision System (FEDS) version 7.0

Designed for building energy managers, utilities and firms providing energy services, FEDS provides a comprehensive and user-friendly method for users to quickly and accurately identifying energy conversion and end-use technology improvements that offer maximum savings in energy usage and cost. FEDS enables the user to assess energy efficiency and consumption, identify retrofit opportunities, select minimum life cycle costs, determine payback, and prioritize investments in energy efficiency retrofit projects for multiple or single buildings across a particular site. As part of the life-cycle cost optimization it also considers several options for partial or complete abandonment of central energy plants including: individual technologies dropping off a thermal loop, a loop and all technologies dropping off a central plant, and all technologies and loops dropping off a central plant resulting in its complete abandonment. Improvements in release 7.0 include: FEDS 7.0 is now a full hourly simulation model (runs every hour of the year as opposed to the previous simplified hourly approach which ran 9 24-hour periods to represent each month). Enhanced building operation and occupancy modeling; New HVAC technology options (VAV, Economizers, Demand Controlled Ventilation, Terminal Reheat, Subcool Dehumidification); Additional chiller types; New lighting technologies (LED, Halogen, Induction, additional fluorescent options); Completely updated retrofit cost and performance data; Regional cost data tied to zip code (previously applied state level averages); Updated and enhanced reporting capabilities; and New pier floor model

Dirks, James↗
DOE OSTI2016

Methodology for Risk-informed O&M decision making in power plants

Incorporation of real-time component information using equipment condition assessment (ECA) through the development of enhanced risk monitors (ERM) for active components in advanced reactor (AR) and advanced small modular reactor (SMR) designs. We incorporate time-dependent failure probabilities from prognostic health management (PHM) systems to dynamically update the risk metric of interest. This information is used to augment data used for supervisory control and plant-wide coordination of multiple modules by providing the incremental risk incurred due to aging and demands placed on components that support mission requirements.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2018

The Benefits of Global High Resolution for Climate Simulation: Process Understanding and the Enabling of Stakeholder Decisions at the Regional Scale

Many think that the time scales of the Paris Climate Agreement indicate urgent action is required on climate policies over the next few decades, in order to avoid the worst risks posed by climate change. On these relatively short time scales the combined effect of climate variability and change are both key drivers of extreme events, with decadal time scales also important for infrastructure planning. Hence, in order to assess climate risk on such time scales, we require climate models to be able to represent key aspects of both internally driven climate variability and the response to changing forcings. In this paper we argue that we now have the modeling capability to address these requirements—specifically with global models having horizontal resolutions considerably enhanced from those typically used in previous Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP) exercises. The improved representation of weather and climate processes in such models underpins our enhanced confidence in predictions and projections, as well as providing improved forcing to regional models, which are better able to represent local-scale extremes (such as convective precipitation). We choose the global water cycle as an illustrative example because it is governed by a chain of processes for which there is growing evidence of the benefits of higher resolution. At the same time it comprises key processes involved in many of the expected future climate extremes (e.g., flooding, drought, tropical and midlatitude storms).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Effects of machine learning errors on human decision-making: manipulations of model accuracy, error types, and error importance

Abstract This study addressed the cognitive impacts of providing correct and incorrect machine learning (ML) outputs in support of an object detection task. The study consisted of five experiments that manipulated the accuracy and importance of mock ML outputs. In each of the experiments, participants were given the T and L task with T-shaped targets and L-shaped distractors. They were tasked with categorizing each image as target present or target absent. In Experiment 1, they performed this task without the aid of ML outputs. In Experiments 2–5, they were shown images with bounding boxes, representing the output of an ML model. The outputs could be correct (hits and correct rejections), or they could be erroneous (false alarms and misses). Experiment 2 manipulated the overall accuracy of these mock ML outputs. Experiment 3 manipulated the proportion of different types of errors. Experiments 4 and 5 manipulated the importance of specific types of stimuli or model errors, as well as the framing of the task in terms of human or model performance. These experiments showed that model misses were consistently harder for participants to detect than model false alarms. In general, as the model’s performance increased, human performance increased as well, but in many cases the participants were more likely to overlook model errors when the model had high accuracy overall. Warning participants to be on the lookout for specific types of model errors had very little impact on their performance. Overall, our results emphasize the importance of considering human cognition when determining what level of model performance and types of model errors are acceptable for a given task.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2015

Evaluation of watershed-derived mass loads to prioritize TMDL decision-making

A total maximum daily load (TMDL) for oxygen demanding substances is being implemented in the San Joaquin River (SJR) in California (USA) due to frequently occurring low dissolved oxygen conditions. The SJR is a eutrophic river, heavily impacted by agriculture. A mass balance was developed to identify the sources of oxygen-demanding substances and nutrients to the river with the objective of providing a scientific basis for management actions needed to meet TMDL requirements. Data were collected for flow and water quality and mass loads calculated for sites within the main stem of the SJR, river inputs (tributaries), and diversions in the study area. Using a quadrant analysis, tributary flows and loads are ranked to identify targets for water quality improvement efforts. Additionally, all mass loads were summed (inputs minus diversions) and compared with observed loads at the downstream limit of the study area. The mass balance analysis identifies major contributors of mass loads and mass balance closure is assessed for each constituent. These analysis methods inform the TMDL process which includes a load allocation, and is useful for determining locations for implementation of improvement projects needed to improve the health of the river.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2011

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 547: Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

The purpose of this CADD/CAP is to present the corrective action alternatives (CAAs) evaluated for CAU 547, provide justification for selection of the recommended alternative, and describe the plan for implementing the selected alternative. Corrective Action Unit 547 consists of the following three corrective action sites (CASs): (1) CAS 02-37-02, Gas Sampling Assembly; (2) CAS 03-99-19, Gas Sampling Assembly; and(3) CAS 09-99-06, Gas Sampling Assembly. The gas sampling assemblies consist of inactive process piping, equipment, and instrumentation that were left in place after completion of underground safety experiments. The purpose of these safety experiments was to confirm that a nuclear explosion would not occur in the case of an accidental detonation of the high-explosive component of the device. The gas sampling assemblies allowed for the direct sampling of the gases and particulates produced by the safety experiments. Corrective Action Site 02-37-02 is located in Area 2 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and is associated with the Mullet safety experiment conducted in emplacement borehole U2ag on October 17, 1963. Corrective Action Site 03-99-19 is located in Area 3 of the NNSS and is associated with the Tejon safety experiment conducted in emplacement borehole U3cg on May 17, 1963. Corrective Action Site 09-99-06 is located in Area 9 of the NNSS and is associated with the Player safety experiment conducted in emplacement borehole U9cc on August 27, 1964. The CAU 547 CASs were investigated in accordance with the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to determine and implement appropriate corrective actions for CAU 547. Existing radiological survey data and historical knowledge of the CASs were sufficient to meet the DQOs and evaluate CAAs without additional investigation. As a result, further investigation of the CAU 547 CASs was not required. The following CAAs were identified for the gas sampling assemblies: (1) clean closure, (2) closure in place, (3) modified closure in place, (4) no further action (with administrative controls), and (5) no further action. Based on the CAAs evaluation, the recommended corrective action for the three CASs in CAU 547 is closure in place. This corrective action will involve construction of a soil cover on top of the gas sampling assembly components and establishment of use restrictions at each site. The closure in place alternative was selected as the best and most appropriate corrective action for the CASs at CAU 547 based on the following factors: (1) Provides long-term protection of human health and the environment; (2) Minimizes short-term risk to site workers in implementing corrective action; (3) Is easily implemented using existing technology; (4) Complies with regulatory requirements; (5) Fulfills FFACO requirements for site closure; (6) Does not generate transuranic waste requiring offsite disposal; (7) Is consistent with anticipated future land use of the areas (i.e., testing and support activities); and (8) Is consistent with other NNSS site closures where contamination was left in place.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2011

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 375: Area 30 Buggy Unit Craters, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1

Corrective Action Unit 375 comprises three corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 25-23-22, Contaminated Soils Site; (2) 25-34-06, Test Cell A Bunker; and (3) 30-45-01, U-30a, b, c, d, e Craters. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 375 based on the implementation of corrective action of closure in place with administrative controls at CAS 25-23-22, no further action at CAS 25-34-06, and closure in place with administrative controls and removal of potential source material (PSM) at CAS 30-45-01. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from July 28, 2010, through April 4, 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 375: Area 30 Buggy Unit Craters. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides, and investigation of other releases (migration in washes and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 375 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Investigation results were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. A radiological dose FAL of 25 millirem per year was established based on the Remote Work Area exposure scenario (336 hours of annual exposure). Radiological doses exceeding the FAL were assumed to be present within the default contamination boundaries at CASs 25-23-22 and 30-45-01. No contaminants were identified at CAS 25-34-06, and no corrective action is necessary. Potential source material in the form of lead plate, lead-acid batteries, and oil within an abandoned transformer were identified at CAS 30-45-01, and corrective actions were undertaken that consisted of removing the PSM. Use restrictions and warning signs were implemented for the remaining radiological contamination at CASs 25-23-22 and 30-45-01. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: (1) No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 375; (2) A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 375; and (3) Move CAU 375 from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2011

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 106: Area 5, 11 Frenchman Flat Atmospheric Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit 106 comprises four corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 05-20-02, Evaporation Pond; (2) 05-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site - Able; (3) 05-45-04, 306 GZ Rad Contaminated Area; (4) 05-45-05, 307 GZ Rad Contaminated Area. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 106 based on the implementation of corrective actions. The corrective action of clean closure was implemented at CASs 05-45-04 and 05-45-05, while no corrective action was necessary at CASs 05-20-02 and 05-23-05. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from October 20, 2010, through June 1, 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 106: Areas 5, 11 Frenchman Flat Atmospheric Sites. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides, and investigation of other releases (mechanical displacement and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 106 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Investigation results were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. A radiological dose FAL of 25 millirem per year was established based on the Industrial Area exposure scenario (2,250 hours of annual exposure). The only radiological dose exceeding the FAL was at CAS 05-45-05 and was associated with potential source material (PSM). It is also assumed that additional PSM in the form of depleted uranium (DU) and DU-contaminated debris at CASs 05-45-04 and 05-45-05 exceed the FAL. Therefore, corrective actions were undertaken at these CASs that consisted of removing PSM and collecting verification samples. Results of verification samples show that remaining soil does not contain contamination exceeding the FALs. Therefore, the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) provides the following recommendations: (1) No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 106. (2) A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 106. (3) Corrective Action Unit 106 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Decision Paper for the Disposition of FS-65 Shipping Containers, Support Equipment, and Mixed Oxide (MOX) Material Contents (Rev. 1.1)

A description of the containers, contents, and disposition alternatives follow. Table 1 provides a rough order of magnitude cost and schedule duration estimate for the 2 disposition alternatives. Cost and schedule data are rounded to two significant figures and the durations are based on 1735 working hours per year. The sub-task durations and personnel are not totaled for the tasks because many of the sub-tasks will be conducted in parallel. Once an Alternative is selected a detailed resource loaded schedule will be developed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Decision Paper for the Disposition of FS-65 Shipping Containers, Support Equipment, and Mixed Oxide (MOX) Material Contents (Rev. 1.2)

A description of the containers, contents, and disposition alternatives follow. Table 1 provides a rough order of magnitude cost and schedule duration estimate for the 2 disposition alternatives. Cost and schedule data are rounded to two significant figures and the durations are based on 1735 working hours per year. The sub-task durations and personnel are not totaled for the tasks because many of the sub-tasks will be conducted in parallel. Once an Alternative is selected a detailed resource loaded schedule will be developed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2012

User's manual for the BROOM decision support system

The Building Restoration Operations Optimization Model (BROOM) software system, developed by Sandia National Laboratories, is a comprehensive system designed to improve the efficiency and quality of sample collection, data management, and interpretation. Currently, BROOM is capable of supporting sampling efforts at facilities contaminated with chemical and/or biological agents. BROOM provides advanced visualization, analysis, and sampling optimization functions, which speed up the sampling process and lower the associated sampling costs. BROOM enables the user to develop a defensible sampling plan based on statistical analysis of sample results. BROOM consists of two applications: one that runs on a hand-held PDA and one that runs on a Windows desktop/laptop. This document covers the installation and basic operation of both components and provides examples of the application of these tools during and following an actual field exercise.

Knowlton, Robert G.↗
DOE OSTI2012

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 366: Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

The purpose of this CADD is to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of corrective action alternatives (CAA) for the six CASs within CAU 366. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from October 12, 2011, to May 14, 2012, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 366: Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗