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At least 145 records · Page 8

S&S-PRG-036 – Security Connection

In order to provide Members of the Workforce with timely, accurate, and consistent responses to security-related questions and concerns, the Security and Emergency Management (S&EM) Center developed Security Connection, a customer-interfacing, single entry point resource center. Security Connection is manned by Security Connection Representatives (SCR) who process incoming questions via multiple sources, including phone and e-mail. In addition, SCRs also provide call volume relief to various Security programs and assume responsibility for answering program questions for line customers. In this manner, Security Connection adds value to both line customers and Security programs.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Climate-derived tensions in Arctic security.

Globally, there is no lack of security threats. Many of them demand priority engagement and there can never be adequate resources to address all threats. In this context, climate is just another aspect of global security and the Arctic just another region. In light of physical and budgetary constraints, new security needs must be integrated and prioritized with existing ones. This discussion approaches the security impacts of climate from that perspective, starting with the broad security picture and establishing how climate may affect it. This method provides a different view from one that starts with climate and projects it, in isolation, as the source of a hypothetical security burden. That said, the Arctic does appear to present high-priority security challenges. Uncertainty in the timing of an ice-free Arctic affects how quickly it will become a security priority. Uncertainty in the emergent extreme and variable weather conditions will determine the difficulty (cost) of maintaining adequate security (order) in the area. The resolution of sovereignty boundaries affects the ability to enforce security measures, and the U.S. will most probably need a military presence to back-up negotiated sovereignty agreements. Without additional global warming, technology already allows the Arctic to become a strategic link in the global supply chain, possibly with northern Russia as its main hub. Additionally, the multinational corporations reaping the economic bounty may affect security tensions more than nation-states themselves. Countries will depend ever more heavily on the global supply chains. China has particular needs to protect its trade flows. In matters of security, nation-state and multinational-corporate interests will become heavily intertwined.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

The IAEA Assistance Training Programme for Transport Security

The IAEA Office of Nuclear Security is working cooperatively with the U.S. Department of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiative, European Union and Australia to provide transport security assistance to countries throughout the world. Assistance is available to countries in reviewing and upgrading their transport security programs at all levels: (1) National level (regulatory and other government agencies); and (2) Operator level (shippers and carriers). Assistance is directed at implementing a consistent level of security throughout the life cycle of radioactive material (same level of security during transport as when in a fixed facility) Upgrade assistance can include: (1) Expert advisory missions to provide advice and guidance; (2) Training courses for regulatory, governmental and industry personnel; (3) Transport security awareness; (4) Detailed training on designing and implementing transport security programs; (5) Planning to identify and prioritize needs (developing security approaches and plans); (6) Developing model security plans and procedures; and (7) Equipment (vehicles, packages, command and control equipment, etc.). Country visits are now being scheduled to initiate transport security cooperative activities. A training course has been developed to assist countries in developing and implementing transport security programs. The training course has been given as a national training course (three times) and as a Regional training course (three times). The course addresses recommended security provisions for the transport of all radioactive material.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

The IAEA Assistance and Training Programme for Transport Security

The IAEA Office of Nuclear Security is working cooperatively with the U.S. Department of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiative, European Union and Australia to provide transport security assistance to countries throughout the world. Assistance is available to countries in reviewing and upgrading their transport security programs at all levels: (1) National level (regulatory and other government agencies); and (2) Operator level (shippers and carriers). Assistance is directed at implementing a consistent level of security throughout the life cycle of radioactive material (same level of security during transport as when in a fixed facility) Upgrade assistance can include: (1) Expert advisory missions to provide advice and guidance; (2) Training courses for regulatory, governmental and industry personnel; (3) Transport security awareness; (4) Detailed training on designing and implementing transport security programs; (5) Planning to identify and prioritize needs (developing security approaches and plans); (6) Developing model security plans and procedures; and (7) Equipment (vehicles, packages, command and control equipment, etc.). Country visits are now being scheduled to initiate transport security cooperative activities. A training course has been developed to assist countries in developing and implementing transport security programs. The training course has been given as a national training course (three times) and as a Regional training course (three times). The course addresses recommended security provisions for the transport of all radioactive material.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Strategic Analyses and Assessments Office Annual Report 2023

The past year has seen a significant increase in focus on strategic issues with the continued aggression by Russia, the rapid expansion of China’s military—particularly their nuclear capabilities, North Korea’s rapid improvements in intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology, and the increase in Iranian fuel enrichment. The U.S. continues to modernize Nuclear Command Control and Communication and all three legs of its nuclear Triad—Columbia-class submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, and B-21 bombers—for the Department of Defense (DOD). At the same time, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is updating its stockpile, producing the B61-12, the new B61-13, the W88 Alteration, the W87-1—with new pits, and the W80-4. This rework of the nuclear enterprise represents the most aggressive expansion of our capabilities and infrastructure in the modern era. At the same time, the Strategic Posture Commission completed its report to Congress and reported that the current modernization program, although clearly necessary, is insufficient to meet the threats that are emerging.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

A Section 106 Evaluation of Building CP-1, Area 6, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

On December 17, 2015, the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) vacated Building CP-1 (Building 06-CP-1) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. Starting in 1951, nearly all nuclear tests during the Cold War were controlled from this building on the facility, known as the Nevada Test Site for most of its years of operation. The test site was renamed the NNSS in 2010. CP-1 was the command and control center where decisions about NNSS activities were sought and made; where authorization for movements about the areas forward (north) of Mercury base camp were coordinated, granted or declined, and monitored; and where problems and emergencies in the forward areas were communicated and relayed to the appropriate agencies for solution. Some of the testing duties for the Control Point included the timing and firing of nuclear tests, air operations, security, communications, weather monitoring, and radiation safety. During tests, communications were maintained through various channels to receive and pass instructions or information to the numerous testing operations, to Washington, D.C., the national laboratories, and overhead aircraft monitoring the tests. At one time, the Security Control Center, a Class A Weather Station, and the Radiation Safety Headquarters were located in CP-1, which also contained a cafeteria, a dining area, and bunk rooms. This survey was prompted by recognition that closure of the building in place creates a situation where CP-1 is vulnerable to decay in its present and unused condition. Activities at CP-1 have been reduced gradually over time since the end of nuclear testing in 1992. The Area of Potential Effects (APE) was determined by NNSA/NFO to be a two-acre area historically considered the space directly associated with CP-1 and available to CP-1 personnel for use. The APE is bounded on the south by an unnamed main paved road into the guarded Control Point area, on the west by the edge of the parking lot for adjacent Building CP-9, on the east by the edge of the bladed cut-and-fill terrace for CP-1, and on the north by a barbed wire security fence (Figure 2). All of this lot is either bladed or covered with asphalt. Contained within the lot are eight Accessary Resources (AR) which are much more closely aligned with CP-1 than with adjacent buildings. AR are defined by the Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) (2013) as “…related but subordinate to the principal building. Accessory resources would not exist were it not for the principal resource.” The Visual APE was determined by NNSA/NFO to be the same as the APE used for intensive survey because no exterior modifications to the resource are anticipated. The APE is located in Section 34 T11S R53E MDBM (projected) within the NNSS base called the Control Point in Area 6. It is on the 1986 Yucca Lake USGS 7.5 min. series topographic quadrangle. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) surveyed the APE with the assistance of National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), resulting in recordation and evaluation of CP-1 (SHPO Resource Number B14490) and eight accessory resources (AR1-AR8). This recording of CP-1 was done in three sessions. Copies of the building form and report are on file at Nevada Cultural Resources Information System (NVCRIS), DRI, and with the NNSA/NFO, Las Vegas, Nevada. Control Point refers to the support facilities of which Building CP-1, with its 126 rooms, is the most important part (Campbell et al. 1983:165). CP-1 refers to the entire building but it also is the designation for the first phase of construction, i.e. the original building. There were three major subsequent phases of additions to the building. The first two were called CP-1A (the east wing) and CP-1B (the west wing with the new War Room). A final phase filled in the hyphen between CP-1 and CP-1B with a Field Office. For convenience this last phase is called CP-1C in this report. Hence, CP-1 can refer either the entire building or to the first phase of the building exclusive of additions. The context makes clear which of the two meanings is intended in the various sections of this report. There were also two minor expansions consisting of a small battery room and a shelter for an emergency exit.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

LDRD23-0184: Resilience and Hazard Risk Assessment to Prioritize Security Operations for Decisions and Impacts (RHAPSODI)

Recent examples provide a significant concern for the resilience of the U.S. electric grid and represent a need for enhanced decision-making to address an increasingly wide range of complex system interactions and potential consequences. In response, this LDRD project produced a proof-of-concept evaluation called the Resilience and Hazard Assessment to Prioritize Security Operations for Decisions and Impacts (RHAPSODI) methodology as an agile and flexible analytic framework capable of addressing multiple, diverse threats to desired electric grid performance. After empirically grounding needs for the future of U.S. electric grid resilience, this project employed the systems-theoretic process analysis (STPA) to develop a systems engineering risk model. The results of a completed feasibility study of a notional high voltage transmission system demonstrate an improved ability to incorporate both spatial (e.g., geographically distributed) and temporal (e.g., dynamic and time-dependent) elements of security risk to the gird. The success of this LDRD project provides the foundation for further evolution of the systems engineering risk model for the grid; derivation of quantitative approaches to evaluate risk and resilience performance; facilitation of agile experimenting and grid sensitivity to a range of vulnerabilities; and development of tools to assist decision-makers in enhancing U.S. electrical grid resilience.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Fano resonance in the nonadiabatically pumped shot noise of a time-dependent quantum well in a two-dimensional electron gas and graphene

Interference between different quantum paths can generate Fano resonance. One of the examples is transport through a quasibound state driven by a time-dependent scattering potential. Previously it is found that Fano resonance occurs as a result of energy matching in one-dimensional systems. In this work, we demonstrate that when transverse motion is present, Fano resonance occurs precisely at the wavevector matching situation. Using the Floquet scattering theory, we considered the transport properties of a nonadiabatic time-dependent well both in a two-dimensional electron gas and monolayer graphene structure. Dispersion of the quasibound state of a static quantum well is obtained with transverse motion present. We found that Fano resonance occurs when the wavevector in the transport direction of one of the Floquet sidebands is exactly identical to that of the quasibound state in the well at equilibrium and follows the dispersion pattern of the latter. To observe the Fano resonance phenomenon in the transmission spectrum, we also considered the pumped shot noise properties when time and spatial symmetry secures vanishing current in the considered configuration. Prominent Fano resonance is found in the differential pumped shot noise with respect to the reservoir Fermi energy.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Detecting Unclassified Electromagnetic Signals for Secure Wireless Communication Using Open Set Recognition

We developed multiple machine learning methods for the detection and classification of new wireless communication waveforms, which is critical for targeted attacks in wireless networks and electronic warfare. Our machine learning models are capable of dynamically detecting security threats in near real time through our advanced open set recognition (OSR) approach. This model has demonstrated significant improvements in the detection of unknown waveforms, thereby enhancing the security and reliability of mission critical communications. Our approach to detecting uncertain security threats is novel; we advanced OSR techniques by incorporating domain knowledge of wireless signals. Specifically, we combined time and frequency domain model features to enhance the model’s performance. Utilizing an OSR approach eliminates the need for training data to be distributed similarly to the deployment environment and removes the requirement for the training set to contains all possible threat classes. This is crucial because it is often infeasible to determine and characterize all potential security threats in advance. Our model were trained on simulated data, generated in partnership with the University at Albany, State of New York. The data set contained a diverse array of wireless signals, including those with additive white Gaussian noise and multipath signals, with and without line of sight. This comprehensive training set allowed us to optimize our models to detect unknown waveforms under various challenging scenarios, such as low signal-to-noise ratios. By training on various waveforms, varying signal-to-noise ratio, and different sample sizes under normal conditions, our models were fine tuned to perform effectively in challenging environments.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Particle and nuclear physics instrumentation and its broad connections

Subatomic physics shares with other basic sciences the need to innovate, invent, and develop tools, techniques, and technologies to carry out its mission to explore the nature of matter, energy, space, and time. In some cases, entire detectors or technologies developed specifically for particle physics research have been adopted by other fields of research or in commercial applications. In most cases, however, the development of new devices and technologies by particle physics for its own research has added value to other fields of research or to applications beneficial to society by integrating them in the existing technologies. Thus, detector research and development has not only advanced the current state of technology for particle physics, but has often advanced research in other fields of science and has underpinned progress in numerous applications in medicine and national security. At the same time particle physics has profited immensely from developments in industry and applied them to great benefit for the use of particle physics detectors. Finally, this symbiotic relationship has seen strong mutual benefits with sometimes unexpected far reach.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Validating a Dynamic PWR Safety and Security Model?

Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are assessed for safety and security using separate models that cannot capture how an attacker's decisions and a plant's response unfold together in real time, leaving regulators and operators without a complete picture of true plant vulnerability. Traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods treat adversarial events as fixed initiators with predetermined outcomes, and are structurally incapable of representing the time-dependent interplay between physical security events, safety system response, and operator mitigative actions. At Idaho National Laboratory (INL), I contributed to the development and validation of Modeling and Analysis for Safety and Security using the Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). Where static PRA relies on event-tree logic that cannot evolve mid-scenario, MASS-DEF couples a time-dependent dynamic PRA tool EMRALD (Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams) with attack simulation software, allowing attacker behavior, plant system states, and operator actions to interact across time. My work focused on validating a general Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) model. I traced model logic against PWR plant to identified errors in logic and confirm accuracy. I then built and tested attack scenarios against a general PWR model to verify that the model produced expected outcomes across all logical pathways. I also contributed a section to a related technical paper applying the same EMRALD platform to radiation dose modeling. Results show that MASS-DEF can quantitatively demonstrate that many plants exceed their regulatory security thresholds. This demonstrated margin provides a technically defensible basis for reducing the number of guards without compromising regulatory compliance. Physical security costs represent roughly 10% of annual operating budgets, making such reductions directly meaningful to INL's mission of sustaining existing commercial NPPs. This internship strengthened my understanding of nuclear systems, probabilistic modeling, and technical writing, and has solidified my pursuit of a career at a national laboratory.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

L-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System Engineering - Initial Safety and Security Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) terrestrial en route communications system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents a preliminary safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the L-band communication system after the technology is chosen and system rollout timing is determined. The security risk analysis resulted in identifying main security threats to the proposed system as well as noting additional threats recommended for a future security analysis conducted at a later stage in the system development process. The document discusses various security controls, including those suggested in the COCR Version 2.0.

Zelkin, Natalie↗

Ultra-compact optical true time delay device for wideband phased array radars.

An ultra-compact optical true time delay device is demonstrated that can support 112 antenna elements with better than six bits of delay in a volume 16-inch x 5-inch x 4-inch including the box and electronics. Free-space beams circulate in a White cell, overlapping in space to minimize volume. The 18 mirrors are slow-tool diamond turned on two substrates, one at each end, to streamline alignment. Pointing accuracy of better than 10 {micro}rad is achieved, with surface roughness {approx}45 nm rms. A MEMS tip-style mirror array selects among the paths for each beam independently, requiring {approx}100 {micro}s to switch the whole array. The micromirrors have 1.4{sup o} tip angle and three stable states (east, west, and flat). The input is a fiber-and-microlens array, whose output spots are re-imaged multiple times in the White cell, striking a different area of the single MEMS chip in each of 10 bounces. The output is converted to RF by an integrated InP wideband optical combiner detector array. Delays were accurate to within 4% (shortest delay) to 0.03% (longest mirror train). The fiber-to-detector insertion loss is 7.82 dB for the shortest delay path.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

PMU Placement for Enhancing Dynamic Observability of a Power Grid

Power grids are operated in an increasingly complicated environment. However, operators lack effective and accurate tools for real-time monitoring and control of power systems. The U.S. Department of Energy, along with several utilities and system operators, is making a major $108 million investment in the Western Interconnection for phasor measurement unit (PMU) installation and phasor application development. This phasor measurement network opens up many opportunities for the estimation and prediction of power system states in real time, which enable operators to evaluate the system dynamic security in advance and allow them more time to respond to disturbances. Kalman filter based dynamic state estimation offers a solution suitable for this purpose. Our work indicates that the performance of Kalman filters in dynamic state estimation would degrade if PMU measurements cannot adequately capture the system dynamics. This paper develops a framework to identify how to place PMUs to improve dynamic observability of the power grid. Simulation results validate the concept, and the guidelines for PMU placement are derived.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Final report and documentation for the security enabled programmable switch for protection of distributed internetworked computers LDRD.

An increasing number of corporate security policies make it desirable to push security closer to the desktop. It is not practical or feasible to place security and monitoring software on all computing devices (e.g. printers, personal digital assistants, copy machines, legacy hardware). We have begun to prototype a hardware and software architecture that will enforce security policies by pushing security functions closer to the end user, whether in the office or home, without interfering with users' desktop environments. We are developing a specialized programmable Ethernet network switch to achieve this. Embodied in this device is the ability to detect and mitigate network attacks that would otherwise disable or compromise the end user's computing nodes. We call this device a 'Secure Programmable Switch' (SPS). The SPS is designed with the ability to be securely reprogrammed in real time to counter rapidly evolving threats such as fast moving worms, etc. This ability to remotely update the functionality of the SPS protection device is cryptographically protected from subversion. With this concept, the user cannot turn off or fail to update virus scanning and personal firewall filtering in the SPS device as he/she could if implemented on the end host. The SPS concept also provides protection to simple/dumb devices such as printers, scanners, legacy hardware, etc. This report also describes the development of a cryptographically protected processor and its internal architecture in which the SPS device is implemented. This processor executes code correctly even if an adversary holds the processor. The processor guarantees both the integrity and the confidentiality of the code: the adversary cannot determine the sequence of instructions, nor can the adversary change the instruction sequence in a goal-oriented way.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Authentication Protocol using Quantum Superposition States

When it became known that quantum computers could break the RSA (named for its creators - Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman) encryption algorithm within a polynomial-time, quantum cryptography began to be actively studied. Other classical cryptographic algorithms are only secure when malicious users do not have sufficient computational power to break security within a practical amount of time. Recently, many quantum authentication protocols sharing quantum entangled particles between communicators have been proposed, providing unconditional security. An issue caused by sharing quantum entangled particles is that it may not be simple to apply these protocols to authenticate a specific user in a group of many users. An authentication protocol using quantum superposition states instead of quantum entangled particles is proposed. The random number shared between a sender and a receiver can be used for classical encryption after the authentication has succeeded. The proposed protocol can be implemented with the current technologies we introduce in this paper.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Vadose zone monitoring at the radioactive waste management sites at the Nevada national security site - 15294

Two lysimeter facilities continuously monitor the vadose zone at the radioactive waste disposal sites at the Nevada National Security Site. The time-series data collected at these facilities support the performance assessments of the radioactive waste disposal sites, the closure cover designs, and the long-term monitoring decisions for these sites. The Weighing Lysimeter Facility at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) consists of a bare-soil weighing lysimeter and a vegetated weighing lysimeter. The upper surfaces of both weighing lysimeters are exposed to precipitation. The Drainage Lysimeter Facility at the Area 3 RWMS includes bare-soil lysimeters that receive precipitation or precipitation supplemented with irrigation equal to double precipitation and vegetated lysimeters that have the same upper boundary conditions as the bare-soil lysimeters. Lysimeter sensors are connected to data-loggers that are accessed remotely for data acquisition. Lysimeter water balance measurements show the arid climate and native vegetation at the NNSS provide a natural sustainable system to effectively prevent transport of contaminants from the RWMSs through the vadose zone to groundwater. Transport by infiltration and percolation of present day precipitation at the RWMSs is prevented. The native desert vegetation is adapted to extract moisture from very dry soils and maintains negative matric potentials at the base of the root zone effectively buffering the deep vadose zone from episodic precipitation events at the surface. The very negative matric potential at the base of the root zone effectively intercepts all infiltration from precipitation and draws moisture upward from the vadose zone below the root zone. This system is sustainable because it does not rely on engineered features and mimics the stable landscapes and no groundwater recharge of the current condition surrounding the RWMSs. The system depends on establishing native vegetation in the covers above the waste cells and a stable climate. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

PowerModelsGAT-AI: Physics-Informed Graph Attention for Multi-System Power Flow With Continual Learning

Solving the alternating current power flow equations in real time is essential for secure grid operation, yet classical Newton–Raphson solvers can be slow under stressed conditions. Existing graph neural networks for power flow are typically trained on a single system and often degrade on different systems. We present PowerModelsGAT-AI, a physics-informed graph attention network that predicts bus voltages and generator injections. The model uses bus-type-aware masking to handle different bus types and balances multiple loss terms, including a power-mismatch penalty, using learned weights. We evaluate the model on 14 benchmark systems (4 to 6,470 buses) and train a unified model on 13 of these under contingency conditions with up to two branch outages, achieving an average normalized mean absolute error of 0.89% for voltage magnitudes and R 2 >0.99 for voltage angles. We also show continual learning: when adapting a base model to a new 1,354-bus system, standard fine-tuning causes severe forgetting with error increases exceeding 1000% on base systems, while our experience replay and elastic weight consolidation strategy keeps error increases below 2% and in some cases improves base-system performance. Interpretability analysis shows that learned attention weights correlate with physical branch parameters (susceptance: r=0.38 ; thermal limits: r=0.22 ), and feature importance analysis supports that the model captures established power flow relationships.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗