Results for “software verification and validation” — Page 8

NASA NTRS1994

A measurement system for large, complex software programs

This paper describes measurement systems required to forecast, measure, and control activities for large, complex software development and support programs. Initial software cost and quality analysis provides the foundation for meaningful management decisions as a project evolves. In modeling the cost and quality of software systems, the relationship between the functionality, quality, cost, and schedule of the product must be considered. This explicit relationship is dictated by the criticality of the software being developed. This balance between cost and quality is a viable software engineering trade-off throughout the life cycle. Therefore, the ability to accurately estimate the cost and quality of software systems is essential to providing reliable software on time and within budget. Software cost models relate the product error rate to the percent of the project labor that is required for independent verification and validation. The criticality of the software determines which cost model is used to estimate the labor required to develop the software. Software quality models yield an expected error discovery rate based on the software size, criticality, software development environment, and the level of competence of the project and developers with respect to the processes being employed.

Rone, Kyle Y.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Verification Testing: Meet User Needs Figure of Merit

Verification is the process through which Modeling and Simulation(M&S) software goes to ensure that it has been rigorously tested and debugged for its intended use. Validation confirms that said software accurately models and represents the real world system. Credibility gives an assessment of the development and testing effort that the software has gone through as well as how accurate and reliable test results are. Together, these three components form Verification, Validation, and Credibility(VV&C), the process by which all NASA modeling software is to be tested to ensure that it is ready for implementation. NASA created this process following the CAIB (Columbia Accident Investigation Board) report seeking to understand the reasons the Columbia space shuttle failed during reentry. The reports conclusion was that the accident was fully avoidable, however, among other issues, the necessary data to make an informed decision was not there and the result was complete loss of the shuttle and crew. In an effort to mitigate this problem, NASA put out their Standard for Models and Simulations, currently in version NASA-STD-7009A, in which they detailed their recommendations, requirements and rationale for the different components of VV&C. They did this with the intention that it would allow for people receiving MS software to clearly understand and have data from the past development effort. This in turn would allow the people who had not worked with the MS software before to move forward with greater confidence and efficiency in their work. This particular project looks to perform Verification on several MATLAB (Registered Trademark)(The MathWorks, Inc.) scripts that will be later implemented in a website interface. It seeks to take note and define the limits of operation, the units and significance, and the expected datatype and format of the inputs and outputs of each of the scripts. This is intended to prevent the code from attempting to make incorrect or impossible calculations. Additionally, this project will look at the coding generally and note inconsistencies, redundancies, and other aspects that may become problematic or slow down the codes run time. Certain scripts lacking in documentation also will be commented and cataloged.

validation↗

NASA NTRS1982

DSN data systems software methodology

A software methodology for JPL deep space network (DSN) data systems software implementations through transfer and delivery is presented. The DSN Data Systems Software Methodology is compatible with and depends on DSN software methodology and also incorporates the characteristics of real-time program development in a DSN environment. The DSN Data Systems software implementation consists of a series of six distinct phases. An Independent Group is responsible for verification and validation of the DSN Data Systems software during developing phases. The DSN data systems software methodology is applied to all development software provided for or by the DSN data systems section in Mark IV where there is a desire for reliability, maintainability, and usability within budget and schedule constraints.

Hung, C. K.↗

NASA NTRS1992

Rapid development of the X-31 simulation to support flight-testing

The X-31 Enhanced Fighter Maneuverability Program has been recognized to form the International Test Organization, with the NASA Dryden Flight Research Facility (NASA-Dryden) as the responsible test organization. The two X-31 research aircraft and engineering support personnel were colocated at NASA-Dryden, with flight test operations beginning in Apr. 1992. Therefore, rapid development of a hardware-in-the-loop simulation was needed to support the flight test operations at NASA-Dryden, and to perform verification and validation of flight control software. The X-31 simulation system requirements, distributed simulation system architecture, simulation components math models to the visual system, and the advanced capabilities the X-31 simulation provides. In addition, unique software tools and the methods used to rapidly develop this simulation system will be highlighted.

Mackall, Dale↗

NASA NTRS1992

Rapid development of the X-31 simulation to support flight-testing

The X-31 Enhanced Fighter Maneuverability Program has been recognized to form the International Test Organization, with the NASA Dryden Flight Research Facility (NASA-Dryden) as the responsible test organization. The two X-31 research aircraft and engineering support personnel were colocated at NASA-Dryden, with flight test operations beginning in Apr. 1992. Therefore, rapid development of a hardware-in-the-loop simulation was needed to support the flight test operations at NASA-Dryden, and to perform verification and validation of flight control software. The X-31 simulation system requirements, distributed simulation system architecture, simulation components math models to the visual system, and the advanced capabilities the X-31 simulation provides. In addition, unique software tools and the methods used to rapidly develop this simulation system will be highlighted.

Mackall, Dale↗

NASA NTRS1990

Space Station module Power Management And Distribution (PMAD) system

This project consists of several tasks which are unified toward experimentally demonstrating the operation of a highly autonomous, user-supportive power management and distribution system for Space Station Freedom (SSF) habitation/laboratory modules. This goal will be extended to a demonstration of autonomous, cooperative power system operation for the whole SSF power system through a joint effort with NASA's Lewis Research Center, using their Autonomous Power System. Short term goals for the space station module power management and distribution include having an operational breadboard reflecting current plans for SSF, improving performance of the system communications, and improving the organization and mutability of the artificial intelligence (AI) systems. In the middle term, intermediate levels of autonomy will be added, user interfaces will be modified, and enhanced modeling capabilities will be integrated in the system. Long term goals involve conversion of all software into Ada, vigorous verification and validation efforts and, finally, seeing an impact of this research on the operation of SSF. Conversion of the system to a DC Star configuration is now in progress, and should be completed by the end of October, 1989. This configuration reflects the latest SSF module architecture. Hardware is now being procured which will improve system communications significantly. The Knowledge-Based Management System (KBMS) is initially developed and the rules from FRAMES have been implemented in the KBMS. Rules in the other two AI systems are also being grouped modularly, making them more tractable, and easier to eventually move into the KBMS. Adding an intermediate level of autonomy will require development of a planning utility, which will also be built using the KBMS. These changes will require having the user interface for the whole system available from one interface. An Enhanced Model will be developed, which will allow exercise of the system through the interface without requiring all of the power hardware to be operational. The functionality of the AI systems will continue to be advanced, including incipient failure detection. Ada conversion will begin with the lowest level processor (LLP) code. Then selected pieces of the higher level functionality will be recorded in Ada and, where possible, moved to the LLP level. Validation and verification will be done on the Ada code, and will complete sometimes after completion of the Ada conversion.

Walls, Bryan↗

NASA NTRS1997

Formal Methods of V&V of Partial Specifications: An Experience Report

This paper describes our work exploring the suitability of formal specification methods for independent verification and validation (IV&V) of software specifications for large, safety critical systems. An IV&V contractor often has to perform rapid analysis on incomplete specifications, with no control over how those specifications are represented. Lightweight formal methods show significant promise in this context, as they offer a way of uncovering major errors, without the burden of full proofs of correctness. We describe an experiment in the application of the method SCR. to testing for consistency properties of a partial model of requirements for Fault Detection Isolation and Recovery on the space station. We conclude that the insights gained from formalizing a specification is valuable, and it is the process of formalization, rather than the end product that is important. It was only necessary to build enough of the formal model to test the properties in which we were interested. Maintenance of fidelity between multiple representations of the same requirements (as they evolve) is still a problem, and deserves further study.

Easterbrook, Steve↗

NASA NTRS1997

Formal Methods for Verification and Validation of Partial Specifications: A Case Study

This paper describes our work exploring the suitability of formal specification methods for independent verification and validation (IV&V) of software specifications for large, safety critical systems. An IV&V contractor often has to perform rapid analysis on incomplete specifications, with no control over how those specifications are represented. Lightweight formal methods show significant promise in this context, as they offer a way of uncovering major errors, without the burden of full proofs of correctness. We describe a case study of the use of partial formal models for V&V of the requirements for Fault Detection Isolation and Recovery on the space station. We conclude that the insights gained from formalizing a specification are valuable, and it is the process of formalization, rather than the end product that is important. It was only necessary to build enough of the formal model to test the properties in which we were interested. Maintenance of fidelity between multiple representations of the same requirements (as they evolve) is still a problem, and deserves further study.

Easterbrook, Steve↗

NASA NTRS2001

RIACS Workshop on the Verification and Validation of Autonomous and Adaptive Systems

The long-term future of space exploration at NASA is dependent on the full exploitation of autonomous and adaptive systems: careful monitoring of missions from earth, as is the norm now, will be infeasible due to the sheer number of proposed missions and the communication lag for deep-space missions. Mission managers are however worried about the reliability of these more intelligent systems. The main focus of the workshop was to address these worries and hence we invited NASA engineers working on autonomous and adaptive systems and researchers interested in the verification and validation (V&V) of software systems. The dual purpose of the meeting was to: (1) make NASA engineers aware of the V&V techniques they could be using; and (2) make the V&V community aware of the complexity of the systems NASA is developing.

Pecheur, Charles↗

NASA NTRS2008

Space Computing Systems Validation Challenges

To examine the challenges of spaceborne computing systems and the past, present and future approaches to verification and validation in hardware and software systems.

Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS)↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Survey of ISS and Visiting Vehicle Returned Surfaces for Environmental Characterization and Computer Model Development

The Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM) developed by the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) is a data-driven model — extensive radar, optical, laboratory, and in situ measurement data sets have been used to build the model since its earliest versions. A salient aspect of professional software development is the verification and validation (V&V) process. Verification answers the question “Is the model built correctly?” while validation addresses the question “Did we build the correct model?” Less extensive, reserved, or independent data sets serve the validation requirement. Due to the dynamic nature of the orbital debris environment, it is critical to use contemporaneous data sources that represent the current environment to support ORDEM development and validation. ORDEM has utilized in situ data collected from Space Shuttle and Hubble Space Telescope surface inspections, now over a decade old. This historical dataset is fundamental for providing baseline in situ measurement data for sizes between 10 to 300 microns, but new data sources are being evaluated using returned surfaces from or near the International Space Station (ISS). This paper reviews a general microscopic survey of ISS soft goods, the Pressurized Mating Adapter 2 (PMA-2) blanket, and a limited-scope feasibility study conducted on the Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) Dragon capsule’s Thermal Protection System (TPS) material. The PMA-2 blanket, exposed to the space environment between 09 July 2013 and 25 February 2015, is an approximately 3.7 m2-area blanket composed of a betacloth outer layer and multiple ballistic fabric inner layers. The SpaceX Cargo Dragon capsule regularly visited the ISS from 2012 through 2020 and potentially provides a timely and well-characterized source of data for modeling purposes. The capsule’s lateral surfaces use SpaceX Proprietary Ablative Material (SPAM) TPS material, a syntactic foam, for thermal management during all mission phases. Seven SPAM extracted samples have been analyzed to date. This paper will provide an overview of the characterization completed for impact features by size, depth, impactor diameter, and the impactor residues chemical analyses, allowing a differentiation between micrometeoroids and orbital debris and a categorization by mass density and density class. Impactor diameter is estimated using damage equations generated from ground-based hypervelocity impact testing. The orbital debris impactors are compared to the current ORDEM 3.2 model of the environment at ISS altitudes. We briefly discuss the meteoroid impactors, including constituents and mass densities, in the general context of current models.

Phillip Anz-meador↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Survey of ISS and Visiting Vehicle Returned Surfaces for Environmental Characterization and Computer Model Development

The Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM) developed by the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) is a data-driven model — extensive radar, optical, laboratory, and in situ measurement data sets have been used to build the model since its earliest versions. A salient aspect of professional software development is the verification and validation (V&V) process. Verification answers the question “Is the model built correctly?” while validation addresses the question “Did we build the correct model?” Less extensive, reserved, or independent data sets serve the validation requirement. Due to the dynamic nature of the orbital debris environment, it is critical to use contemporaneous data sources that represent the current environment to support ORDEM development and validation. ORDEM has utilized in situ data collected from Space Shuttle and Hubble Space Telescope surface inspections, now over a decade old. This historical dataset is fundamental for providing baseline in situ measurement data for sizes between 10 to 300 microns, but new data sources are being evaluated using returned surfaces from or near the International Space Station (ISS). This paper reviews a general microscopic survey of ISS soft goods, the Pressurized Mating Adapter 2 (PMA-2) blanket, and a limited-scope feasibility study conducted on the Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) Dragon capsule’s Thermal Protection System (TPS) material. The PMA-2 blanket, exposed to the space environment between 09 July 2013 and 25 February 2015, is an approximately 3.7 m2-area blanket composed of a betacloth outer layer and multiple ballistic fabric inner layers. The SpaceX Cargo Dragon capsule regularly visited the ISS from 2012 through 2020 and potentially provides a timely and well-characterized source of data for modeling purposes. The capsule’s lateral surfaces use SpaceX Proprietary Ablative Material (SPAM) TPS material, a syntactic foam, for thermal management during all mission phases. Seven SPAM extracted samples have been analyzed to date. This paper will provide an overview of the characterization completed for impact features by size, depth, impactor diameter, and the impactor residues chemical analyses, allowing a differentiation between micrometeoroids and orbital debris and a categorization by mass density and density class. Impactor diameter is estimated using damage equations generated from ground-based hypervelocity impact testing. The orbital debris impactors are compared to the current ORDEM 3.2 model of the environment at ISS altitudes. We briefly discuss the meteoroid impactors, including constituents and mass densities, in the general context of current models.

Phillip Anz-Meador↗

NASA NTRS1991

Translating expert system rules into Ada code with validation and verification

The purpose of this ongoing research and development program is to develop software tools which enable the rapid development, upgrading, and maintenance of embedded real-time artificial intelligence systems. The goals of this phase of the research were to investigate the feasibility of developing software tools which automatically translate expert system rules into Ada code and develop methods for performing validation and verification testing of the resultant expert system. A prototype system was demonstrated which automatically translated rules from an Air Force expert system was demonstrated which detected errors in the execution of the resultant system. The method and prototype tools for converting AI representations into Ada code by converting the rules into Ada code modules and then linking them with an Activation Framework based run-time environment to form an executable load module are discussed. This method is based upon the use of Evidence Flow Graphs which are a data flow representation for intelligent systems. The development of prototype test generation and evaluation software which was used to test the resultant code is discussed. This testing was performed automatically using Monte-Carlo techniques based upon a constraint based description of the required performance for the system.

Becker, Lee↗

NASA NTRS2009

Baseline Assessment and Prioritization Framework for IVHM Integrity Assurance Enabling Capabilities

Fundamental to vehicle health management is the deployment of systems incorporating advanced technologies for predicting and detecting anomalous conditions in highly complex and integrated environments. Integrated structural integrity health monitoring, statistical algorithms for detection, estimation, prediction, and fusion, and diagnosis supporting adaptive control are examples of advanced technologies that present considerable verification and validation challenges. These systems necessitate interactions between physical and software-based systems that are highly networked with sensing and actuation subsystems, and incorporate technologies that are, in many respects, different from those employed in civil aviation today. A formidable barrier to deploying these advanced technologies in civil aviation is the lack of enabling verification and validation tools, methods, and technologies. The development of new verification and validation capabilities will not only enable the fielding of advanced vehicle health management systems, but will also provide new assurance capabilities for verification and validation of current generation aviation software which has been implicated in anomalous in-flight behavior. This paper describes the research focused on enabling capabilities for verification and validation underway within NASA s Integrated Vehicle Health Management project, discusses the state of the art of these capabilities, and includes a framework for prioritizing activities.

Cooper, Eric G.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Software Health Management: A Short Review of Challenges and Existing Techniques

Modern spacecraft (as well as most other complex mechanisms like aircraft, automobiles, and chemical plants) rely more and more on software, to a point where software failures have caused severe accidents and loss of missions. Software failures during a manned mission can cause loss of life, so there are severe requirements to make the software as safe and reliable as possible. Typically, verification and validation (V&V) has the task of making sure that all software errors are found before the software is deployed and that it always conforms to the requirements. Experience, however, shows that this gold standard of error-free software cannot be reached in practice. Even if the software alone is free of glitches, its interoperation with the hardware (e.g., with sensors or actuators) can cause problems. Unexpected operational conditions or changes in the environment may ultimately cause a software system to fail. Is there a way to surmount this problem? In most modern aircraft and many automobiles, hardware such as central electrical, mechanical, and hydraulic components are monitored by IVHM (Integrated Vehicle Health Management) systems. These systems can recognize, isolate, and identify faults and failures, both those that already occurred as well as imminent ones. With the help of diagnostics and prognostics, appropriate mitigation strategies can be selected (replacement or repair, switch to redundant systems, etc.). In this short paper, we discuss some challenges and promising techniques for software health management (SWHM). In particular, we identify unique challenges for preventing software failure in systems which involve both software and hardware components. We then present our classifications of techniques related to SWHM. These classifications are performed based on dimensions of interest to both developers and users of the techniques, and hopefully provide a map for dealing with software faults and failures.

Pipatsrisawat, Knot↗

NASA NTRS2002

Formal Verification for a Next-Generation Space Shuttle

This paper discusses the verification and validation (V&2) of advanced software used for integrated vehicle health monitoring (IVHM), in the context of NASA's next-generation space shuttle. We survey the current VBCV practice and standards used in selected NASA projects, review applicable formal verification techniques, and discuss their integration info existing development practice and standards. We also describe two verification tools, JMPL2SMV and Livingstone PathFinder, that can be used to thoroughly verify diagnosis applications that use model-based reasoning, such as the Livingstone system.

Nelson, Stacy D.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Technical Reference Suite Addressing Challenges of Providing Assurance for Fault Management Architectural Design

Research into complexities of software systems Fault Management (FM) and how architectural design decisions affect safety, preservation of assets, and maintenance of desired system functionality has coalesced into a technical reference (TR) suite that advances the provision of safety and mission assurance. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program, with Software Assurance Research Program support, extracted FM architectures across the IV&V portfolio to evaluate robustness, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods applied to the architectures and designs. This investigation spanned IV&V projects with seven different primary developers, a wide range of sizes and complexities, and encompassed Deep Space Robotic, Human Spaceflight, and Earth Orbiter mission FM architectures. The initiative continues with an expansion of the TR suite to include Launch Vehicles, adding the benefit of investigating differences intrinsic to model-based FM architectures and insight into complexities of FM within an Agile software development environment, in order to improve awareness of how nontraditional processes affect FM architectural design and system health management. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated IV&V techniques provides a TR suite that enables greater assurance that critical software systems will adequately protect against faults and respond to adverse conditions. Additionally, the role FM has with regard to strengthened security requirements, with potential to advance overall asset protection of flight software systems, is being addressed with the development of an adverse conditions database encompassing flight software vulnerabilities. Capitalizing on the established framework, this TR suite provides assurance capability for a variety of FM architectures and varied development approaches. Research results are being disseminated across NASA, other agencies, and the software community. This paper discusses the findings and TR suite informing the FM domain in best practices for FM architectural design, visibility observations, and methods employed for IV&V and mission assurance.

Fitz, Rhonda↗

NASA NTRS1987

Verification issues for rule-based expert systems

Verification and validation of expert systems is very important for the future success of this technology. Software will never be used in non-trivial applications unless the program developers can assure both users and managers that the software is reliable and generally free from error. Therefore, verification and validation of expert systems must be done. The primary hindrance to effective verification and validation is the use of methodologies which do not produce testable requirements. An extension of the flight technique panels used in previous NASA programs should provide both documented requirements and very high levels of verification for expert systems.

Culbert, Chris↗