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At least 145 records · Page 8

Extraction of the worm-gear TMD g1t from COMPASS , HERMES and JLab data on semi-inclusive DIS

Transverse momentum dependent parton distributions (TMDs) are an important class of functions required to understand the 3D structure of hadrons in terms of their underlying partons. One of the least known TMDs in terms of a global QCD analysis is the worm-gear TMD g1t . It carries the probabilistic interpretation of finding longitudinally polarized quarks inside transversely polarized hadrons. In this proceedings, we present the first-ever global QCD analysis of the semi-inclusive DIS $A^ {cos(φ_h-φ_S)}_{LT}$ data using Monte Carlo techniques to extract the worm-gear TMD g1T . The relevant data are available from COMPASS, HERMES and JLab. We compare our results for g1T with different theoretical approaches, including the large-N c approximation, the Wandzura Wilczek-type approximation, and lattice QCD.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Sensitivity and Importance Measure Analyses for Various Design Architectures for High Safety-Significant Safety-Related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants

A transition from analog instrumentation and control (I&C) technologies to digital I&C technologies is taking place for license renewals of existing nuclear power plants and for operating licenses of new advanced reactors. This transition necessitates research on risk and economic assessments of digital I&C technologies to ensure the long-term safety and reliability of vital systems, reduce uncertainty in licensing costs in addition to timeline, support integration of digital I&C systems in the plant, and find the most efficient technology upgrades. Adding redundancy within systems or components is a common means of improving design safety; however, it can also make designs more prone to common-cause failures (CCFs). Introducing diversity into redundant systems or components is a way to mitigate and possibly eliminate CCFs, but it also increases plant complexity and may be costly. The balance between redundancy and diversity remains a challenge for digital I&C systems. This study performs sensitivity and importance analyses for four design architectures of two digital I&C systems—the reactor-trip system and the engineered safety features actuation system. For each system, two architectures are examined, including a redundant, non-diverse configuration and a redundant, diverse configuration. The sensitivity analysis will provide insights on the impact of introducing diversity to system reliability. The importance results will help identify risk-significant and risk-sensitive components and failure modes, which may be good candidates for future design improvement.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Radioisotope Identification with List-Mode Gamma-Ray Data

This work explores the potential of utilizing temporal data from gamma-ray detectors, known as list-mode data, to enhance radioisotope identification. Traditional identification methods, which rely on full gamma-ray spectrum analysis, often require long dwell times and struggle with spectra containing similarly spaced spectral peaks. We hypothesize that by leveraging the probabilistic nature of nuclear decay and the time-encoded information from decay sequences and interactions with surrounding materials, we can improve classification accuracy over static spectral analysis. This research examines the temporal content of list-mode data through exploratory data analysis via correlation discovery and qualitative distribution analysis. Additionally, we propose a probabilistic classification model that can utilize spectral data, temporal data, or both to determine if the incorporation of temporal information improves radioisotope identification. Our findings suggest that the temporal information present in list-mode gamma-ray data has merit and should be further investigated to develop more robust and optimal methods for utilizing this temporal information in applications requiring radioisotope identification.

List-mode data↗

Probabilistic Failure Criterion of SiC/SiC Composites Under Multiaxial Loading

Owing to its excellent mechanical properties and stability under high temperature and neutron irradiation conditions, SiC/SiC composites have emerged as a promising material for light water reactors (LWRs) in the development of accident-tolerant fuel (ATF) systems. Structural integrity and retention of hermeticity are two crucial requirements for SiC/SiC claddings during normal operations, and both of them are closely related to the proportional limit stress (PLS) of the material. Understanding the behavior of SiC/SiC composites under multiaxial stress states and developing a probabilistic approach for evaluating the structural vulnerability are of paramount importance for reliability-based analysis and design of SiC/SiC composite claddings. So far, there has been very limited effort towards experimental and analytical investigations of probabilistic failure of SiC/SiC claddings. This critical knowledge gap motivates this research. A probabilistic failure criterion for SiC/SiC composites under multi-axial loading is developed, and this criterion is incorporated into reliability analysis of the structural integrity of SiC/SiC fuel cladding. The research consists of two parts: 1) experimental investigation of multiaxial failure behavior of SiC/SiC composites, and 2) theoretical modeling of time-dependent probabilistic failure of SiC/SiC cladding. In the experimental investigation, the PLS is determined through the examination of stress-strain response, the acoustic emission measurement, as well as the X-ray computed tomography. The theoretical framework is derived by combin- ing the finite weakest-link statistical model and the subcritical damage growth model. This theoretical model captures the time-dependent failure mechanism of the material, which has a major consequence for predicting the lifetime distribution of the cladding. Meanwhile, the model also predicts that the failure statistics of the cladding depends strongly on the cladding length. The results of the multiaxial experiments reveal the level of statistical variation of the PLS of SiC/SiC materials under different stress states. The theoretical model provides a robust analytical tool for extrapolation of small-scale laboratory test results to the behavior of full-scale claddings. These findings establish a scientific foundation for the development of reliability-based design of SiC/SiC fuel claddings, which will play an essential role in improving the structural safety and integrity of LWRs.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Analysis of historic fires to determine most frequent challenging events

The fire probabilistic risk assessment framework for nuclear power plants relies on experimental data to determine expected fire behavior or to validate models to predict fire conditions in the plant. To support reducing the uncertainty in this experimental data, a research effort was conducted to identify the most frequent and challenging fire scenarios using historic fire data from nuclear power plants in the United States. To support this effort, an electronic version of the publicly available Updated Fire Event Database developed by Electric Power Research Institute was produced resulting in data on 2111 fire events, 540 events were labelled as being challenging fires with 74.2% of these challenging fire events being due to eleven selected fire types. In conclusion, of these fire types, electrical and electronic equipment, transient combustibles, and liquid fires were the most frequent of the challenging fires. The fire scenario specifics were characterized for each of the eleven selected types and then related to existing fire experiments.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Dynamic probabilistic risk assessment for electric grid cybersecurity

Electric grid cybersecurity risk has become a significant concern of industries and governments. This paper proposes a dynamic probabilistic risk assessment method for electric grid cybersecurity risk analysis. The proposed method helps reduce the reliance on expert judgment, capture a broad range of components and system dynamics, and model the interactions between various contributing entities (e.g., attacker, operator). In addition, the scenarios with multiple events, such as the occurrence of both cyberattacks and failures of physical components, the occurrence of both cyberattacks and operators’ (in)correct reactions, are considered and analyzed. Further, for each cyberattack scenario, Monte Carlo simulations are used to obtain possible sequences of the system's evolution under study and then derive risk estimates. As an application of the proposed method, the risk assessment method serves as the basis of risk-informed defense resource allocation to improve electric grid cybersecurity. The proposed method is verified using the IEEE 14-bus system by evaluating different security resource allocations for selected cyberattack scenarios.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

User's Manual for RESRAD-BUILD Code Version 4: Vol. 2 - User's Guide for RESRAD-BUILD Code Version 4

The RESRAD-BUILD computer code is designed to assess radiological doses to individuals who live or work in a building contaminated with radioactive material. The code is equipped with a user-friendly interface that has many features to facilitate using the computer code and understanding the results. The design of the interface provides various options, from entering data and performing calculations to displaying calculation results. General and context-specific help are available, providing information on editing and viewing the radionuclide database, the definitions of input parameters and their use in the calculations, and the selection of the calculation results for placement into other applications. Two types of sensitivity analysis are supported by the code, i.e., deterministic and probabilistic, that can be used to study the influence of input parameters on the calculation results. This user’s guide provides instructions to help users on how to install the RESRAD-BUILD code, navigate the interface, and use the various features to set up a dose/risk analysis and to view/print the results in text and graphical outputs.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Probabilistic Deep Learning Approach to Automate the Interpretation of Multi-phase Diffraction Spectra

Autonomous synthesis and characterization of inorganic materials requires the automatic and accurate analysis of X-ray diffraction spectra. For this task, we designed a probabilistic deep learning algorithm to identify complex multi-phase mixtures. At the core of this algorithm lies an ensemble convolutional neural network trained on simulated diffraction spectra, which are systematically augmented with physics-informed perturbations to account for artifacts that can arise during experimental sample preparation and synthesis. In this work, larger perturbations associated with off-stoichiometry are also captured by supplementing the training set with hypothetical solid solutions. Spectra containing mixtures of materials are analyzed with a newly developed branching algorithm that utilizes the probabilistic nature of the neural network to explore suspected mixtures and identify the set of phases that maximize confidence in the prediction. Our model is benchmarked on simulated and experimentally measured diffraction spectra, showing exceptional performance with accuracies exceeding those given by previously reported methods based on profile matching and deep learning. We envision that the algorithm presented here may be integrated in experimental workflows to facilitate the high-throughput and autonomous discovery of inorganic materials.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

Evaluation of Physical Security Risk for Potential Implementation of FLEX using Dynamic Simulation Methods

The requirements for United States nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their large operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Physical Security Pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. This pathway will analyze and minimize the conservatisms built into current security postures in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within this pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force (FOF) modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrated them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an overview of lessons learned in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available FOF simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific FOF models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System or Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations, and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance of the use of the framework. Such an assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants. NOTE: The work performed in this report is based on a generic EMRALD model with actual plant data used for the analysis. However, only the generic model and general results of the analysis are in the report. No plant’s sensitive information is discussed in this report. The discussion shows examples of insights that can be obtained from the MASS-DEF methodology.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Analysis of Loss-of-Offsite-Power Events: Update

Loss-of-offsite power (LOOP) can have a negative impact on a nuclear power plant’s ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. LOOP event frequencies and times required for subsequent restoration of offsite power are important inputs to plant probabilistic risk assessments. This report presents a statistical and engineering analysis of LOOP frequencies and durations at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study were based on the operating experience during calendar years 1987–2020, while the most recent 15-year data (i.e., from 2006–2020) were used for most analyses in this report. LOOP events during critical operation that did not result in a reactor trip are not included. Frequencies and durations were determined for four LOOP event categories: plant-centered, switchyard-centered, grid-related, and weather related. Highly significant decreasing trends in the LOOP occurrence rates were identified for All-LOOPs during critical operation (p-value = 0.001) and switchyard-centered LOOPs during critical operation (p-value = 0.002) for the most recent 10-year period (2011–2020). Adverse trends in LOOP durations continue for switchyard-centered LOOPs (p-value = 0.005), All-LOOPs (p-value = 0.019), as well as All-LOOPs during shutdown operation (p-value = 0.003). Statistical tests show the LOOP counts are not uniformly distributed across the 12 months, and variation among the months exists for plant-centered LOOPs (p-value = 0.028), grid-related LOOPs (p-value = 0.021), All-LOOPs (p-value = 0.003), and All-LOOPs during critical operation (p-value = 0.008). The engineering analysis of LOOP data showed for the period of 2006–2020, the equipment failure events were dominated by failures of circuits and relay; human errors have been less frequent and occurred primarily in maintenance; and weather events were dominated by tornadoes and lightning.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Analysis of Loss-of-Offsite-Power Events: 2021 Update

Loss-of-offsite power (LOOP) can have a negative impact on a nuclear power plant’s ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. LOOP event frequencies and times required for subsequent restoration of offsite power are important inputs to plant probabilistic risk assessments. This report presents a statistical and engineering analysis of LOOP frequencies and durations at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study were based on the operating experience during calendar years 1987–2021, while the most recent 15-year data (i.e., from 2007–2021) were used for most analyses in this report. LOOP events during critical operation that did not result in a reactor trip are not included. Frequencies and durations were determined for four LOOP event categories: plant-centered, switchyard-centered, grid-related, and weather-related. These categories (and the All-LOOPs group which contains all LOOPs without regarding of the four categories) could be further grouped by whether a LOOP event occurred during critical operation, during shutdown operation, or during all operations. The following decreasing trends in the LOOP occurrence rates were identified for the most recent 10-year period (2012–2021): All-LOOPs during critical operation, switchyard-centered LOOPs during critical operation, and grid-related LOOPs during critical operation. Adverse trends in LOOP durations continue for switchyard-centered LOOPs during all operations, All-LOOPs during all operations, and All-LOOPs during shutdown operation for the 1997–2021 period. Statistical tests show the LOOP counts for the period of 2007–2021 are not uniformly distributed across the 12 months, and variation among the months exists for grid-related LOOPs during all operations, All-LOOPs during all operations, and All-LOOPs during critical operation. The engineering analysis of LOOP data showed for the period of 2007–2021, the equipment failure events were dominated by failures of relay and other; human errors have been less frequent and occurred primarily in maintenance and switching; and weather were dominated by tornadoes then by lightning and hurricane. Weather was the cause for 45% of LOOPs for the last fifteen years (2007– 2021) but only for 20% of LOOPs for the previous 20 years (1987–2006) .

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Summary of the 5th IAEA technical meeting on fusion data processing, validation and analysis (FDPVA)

The purpose of the 5th International Atomic Energy Agency technical meeting on fusion data processing, validation and analysis (FDPVA) (Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium, 12–15 June 2023) was to provide a platform during which a set of topics relevant to FDPVA were discussed with the view of meeting the needs of next step fusion devices such as ITER. The validation and analysis of experimental data obtained from diagnostics used to characterize fusion plasmas are crucial for a knowledge-based understanding of the physical processes governing the dynamics of these plasmas. This paper presents the recent progress and achievements in the domain of plasma diagnostics data analysis and synthetic diagnostics reported at the meeting, including concept description of new devices; fusion databases; integrated data analysis; inverse problems; uncertainty propagation, verification and validation; probabilistic methods and machine learning. The relevant results underline trends observed in the current major fusion confinement devices.

fusion databases↗

Evaluation of Joint Cyber/Safety Risk in Nuclear Power Systems

This report presents an analysis of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) for a generic Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)-4 NPP. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed Hazards and Consequences Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS) process is applied to the ECCS and its subsystems to identify unsafe control actions (UCAs) which act as possible cyber events of concern. The analysis is performed for two design basis events: Small-break Loss of Coolant Accident (SLOCA) and general transients (TRANS), such as unintended reactor trip. In previous work, HAZCADS UCAs were combined with other cyber-attack analysis to develop a risk-informed approach; however, this was for a single system. This report explores advanced systems engineering modeling approaches to model the interactions between digital assets across multiple systems which may be targeted by cyber adversaries. The complex and interdependent design of digital systems has the potential to introduce emergent cyber properties that are generally not covered by hazard analyses nor formal nuclear Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). The R&D and supporting analysis presented here explores approaches to predict and manage how interdependent system properties effect risk. To show the potential impact of a successful cyber-attack to formal PRA event tree probabilities, HAZCADS analysis was also used. HAZCADS was also used to model the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automatic actuation. This analysis extended to an integrated system analysis for common-cause failure (CCF). In this aspect, the HAZCADS analysis continued by analyzing plant design details for system connectivity in support of critical plant functions. A dependency matrix was developed to depict the integrated functionality of the interconnected systems. Areas of potential CCF are indicated. Future work could include adversary attack development to show how CCF could be caused, resulting in PRA events. Across the multiple systems that comprise the ECCS, the analysis shows that the change in such probabilities was very different between systems. This indicates that some systems have a larger potential risk impact from successful cyber-attack or digital failure, which indicates a need for these systems to have a higher priority for design and defensive measures. Furthermore, we were able to establish that a risk analysis using any arbitrary threat model establishes an ordering of components with regard to cyber-risk. This ordering can be used to influence the overall system design with an eye to lowering risk, or as a way to understand real-time risk to operational systems based on a current threat landscape. Expert knowledge of both the analysis process and the system being analyzed is required to perform a HAZCADS analysis. The need for a tiered risk analysis is demonstrated by the results of this report.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Stage-local partitioned two-step runge-kutta methods for large systems of ordinary differential equations

We introduce stage-local partitioned two-step Runge-Kutta methods are an extension of standard two-step Runge-Kutta methods, which are an alternative to the standard additive two-step Runge-Kutta methods currently existing in the literature. Furthermore, these new schemes are designed with an eye towards truly N-partitioned systems and leverage local stage approximations to make several computationally interesting approximations viable. Specifically, the focus on local stage approximations makes possible the construction of truly asynchronous schemes, in the parallel sense, possible. In addition, we show that an implicit-explicit approach to these schemes can lead to methods that require the inversion of only local nonlinear systems.

Applied Dynamical Systems↗

Ensemble models for circuit topology estimation, fault detection and classification in distribution systems

This paper presents a methodology for simultaneous fault detection, classification, and topology estimation for adaptive protection of distribution systems. The methodology estimates the probability of the occurrence of each one of these events by using a hybrid structure that combines three sub-systems, a convolutional neural network for topology estimation, a fault detection based on predictive residual analysis, and a standard support vector machine with probabilistic output for fault classification. The input to all these sub-systems is the local voltage and current measurements. A convolutional neural network uses these local measurements in the form of sequential data to extract features and estimate the topology conditions. The fault detector is constructed with a Bayesian stage (a multitask Gaussian process) that computes a predictive distribution (assumed to be Gaussian) of the residuals using the input. Since the distribution is known, these residuals can be transformed into a Standard distribution, whose values are then introduced into a one-class support vector machine. The structure allows using a one-class support vector machine without parameter cross-validation, so the fault detector is fully unsupervised. Finally, a support vector machine uses the input to perform the classification of the fault types. All three sub-systems can work in a parallel setup for both performance and computation efficiency. In conclusion, we test all three sub-systems included in the structure on a modified IEEE123 bus system, and we compare and evaluate the results with standard approaches.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗