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NASA NTRS1972

Meteoroid impacts on Mars and the secondary particle environment

The degree to which the thin Martian atmosphere filters out meteoroids approaching the Martian surface was calculated by using a model of the meteoroid environment, a model of the Martian atmosphere, and equations of meteor physics. The secondary particle environment on the surface of Mars caused by the material ejected from meteoroid craters was modeled. The model consists of the mass distribution and the speed distribution of the secondary particles. Calculations were made of the penetration flux for aluminum structures on the Martian surface. The penetration hazard on the Martian surface was compared with the penetration hazard in space near Mars and on the lunar surface.

Humes, D. H.↗

NASA NTRS1993

Hypervelocity impact effects on solar cells

One of the space hazards of concern is the problem of natural matter and space debris impacting spacecraft. This phenomena has been studied since the early sixties and a methodology has been established to determine the relative abundance of meteoroids as a function of mass. As the mass decreases, the probability of suffering collisions increases, resulting in a constant bombardment from particles in the sub-micron range. The composition of this 'cosmic dust' is primarily Fe, Ni, Al, Mg, Na, Ca, Cr, H, O, and Mn. In addition to mechanical damage, impact velocities greater than 5 k m/sec can produce shock induced ionization effects with resultant surface charging and complex chemical interactions. The upper limit of the velocity distribution for these particles is on the order of 70 km/sec. The purpose of this work was to subject samples from solar power arrays to debris flux typical of what would be encountered in space, and measure the degradation of the panels after impact.

Rose, M. Frank↗

NASA NTRS2003

Impacts and evolution: future prospects

The discipline of astrobiology includes the dynamics of biological evolution. One of the major ways that the cosmos influences life is through the catastrophic environmental disruptions caused when comets and asteroids collide with a planet. We now recognize that such impacts have caused mass extinctions and played a major role in determining the evolution of life on Earth. The time-averaged impact flux as a function of projectile energy can be derived from lunar cratering statistics as well as the current population of near Earth asteroids (NEAs). Effects of impacts of various energies can be modeled, using data from historic impacts [such as the Cretaceous-Tertiary (KT) impactor 65 million years ago] and the observed 1994 bombardment of Jupiter by fragments of Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9. It is of particular interest to find from such models that the terrestrial environment is highly vulnerable to perturbation from impacts, so that even such a small event as the KT impact (by a projectile 10-15 km in diameter) can lead to a mass extinction. Similar considerations allow us to model the effects of still smaller (and much more likely) impacts, down to the size of the asteroid that exploded over Tunguska in 1908 (energy approximately 10 megatons). Combining the impact flux with estimates of environmental and ecological effects reveals that the greatest contemporary hazard is associated with impactors near 1 million megatons in energy (approximately 2 km in diameter for an asteroid). The current impact hazard is significant relative to other natural hazards, and arguments can be developed to illuminate a variety of public policy issues. The first priority in any plan for defense against impactors is to survey the population of Earth-crossing NEAs and project their orbits forward in time. This is the purpose of the Spaceguard Survey, which has already found more than half of the NEAs >1 km in diameter. If there is an NEA on a collision course with Earth, it can be discovered and the impact predicted with decades or more of warning. It is then possible to consider how to deflect or disrupt the NEA. Unlike other natural hazards, the impact risk can be largely eliminated, given sufficient advanced knowledge to take action against the threatening projectile.

Directed Molecular Evolution↗

NASA NTRS1970

Meteor research program

An overview of research on radio and radar meteors accomplished during the past decade is presented, and the work of the past year is highlighted. Velocity distribution and mass flux data are obtained for meteors in the range 10 to 0.0001 g, the size believed to be the principal hazard to space missions. The physical characteristics of mass, structure and density, luminosity, and ablation are briefly described, and the formulation of a theory for interactions of ionization and excitation during collision of atomic particles is mentioned. Five classes of meteoroids are identified, including the two of iron and stone meteorites. Stream meteors associated with known comets are Classes A or C, and parent comets of Class B streams are not observed. Class A meteoroids are identified with the core of a cometary nucleus, Class C with less dense surface of the nucleus after sublimation of ices, and Class B with less dense cores of smaller cometary nuclei. Atmospheric meteor phenomena associated with winds and gravity waves, density and temperature, atomic oxygen, and meteor rate changes are mentioned.

Southworth, R. B.↗

NASA NTRS1982

Recent researches into solid bodies and magnetic fields in the solar system; Proceedings of the Topical Meeting and Symposium, Ottawa, Canada, May 16-June 2, 1982

Topics discussed include the magnetic history of the early solar system, impact processes in solid bodies (e.g., meteoroids and asteroids), and topics related to cometary missions. The section devoted to cometary missions lays particular stress on missions to Comet Halley; attention is given to such aspects of these missions as the investigation of hypervelocity impact on the Giotto Halley mission dust shield, the detection of energetic cometary and solar particles by the EPONA instrument on the Giotto mission, the dust hazard near Comet Halley in regard to the Vega project, and cometary ephemerides for spacecraft flyby missions.

Vette, J. I.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Phase transition energetics-based mass loss modeling of chondritic Near Earth Objects

Mitigating potentially hazardous asteroids relies on accurate knowledge of their composition and critical physical characteristics such as shape and mass. Ground-based observatories and sample return missions in recent years have focused on such characterization to track Near Earth Objects. Historically, entry speeds of asteroids or mass change due to break-up/airburst have been considered in risk assessment studies as critical parameters. To this effect, most hydrocode simulations that consider energy deposition techniques rely on gross meteor modeling with simplistic spherical shapes while neglecting heat of ablation considerations. This is the general approach for fragment-cloud, pancake and hybrid fragmentation models. Alternatively, aerothermal fragmentation modeling that accounts for meteoritic shape change have typically focused on environmental modeling to understand break-up points primarily due to radiative heating. A physics-based risk assessment could benefit by modeling the environment and material response of typical meteoroidal materials as precursors to fragmentation. A greater focus on the material response to applied environmental heating will be emphasized here. This work presents a forward analysis of thermal and material response of stony meteorites by ac-counting for mass loss and shape change effects through a boundary layer formalism. This allows for simulations starting from simplistic shapes that could eventually lead to alterations in contours due to ablation. These effects would be characterized through phase transitions of the surface, such as melting and vaporization, in response to aerodynamic heating. Coupled ablation and radiative heating effects have been found to lead to reduced heat transfer coefficients in the computation of meteor mass loss rates. This has the potential to increase ground damage footprints for hazardous impacts. The effort here quantifies the heat transfer coefficient by accounting for ablation assisted by phase transition. The melt and vaporization mediated ablation of chondritic meteors provides essential recession estimates based upon surface environments. The altered mass due to such phenomena would be presented for a H-chondrite meteoritic sample.

Pratibha Raghunandan↗

NASA NTRS2001

An Experimental Investigation of the Effects of Charging on the International Space Station

An experimental investigation has been undertaken to determine the effects associated with operating the International Space Station (ISS) without a Plasma Contactor Unit (PCU). The role of the PCU is to maintain the potential of the ISS to within 40 volts of the ambient plasma potential. In the event of a PCU failure, ISS structure may charge to - 160 volts with respect to the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) plasma, due to the use of high voltage photovoltaic solar arrays. Operation without a PCU will result in the charging of the oxide layers on anodized aluminum components facing into the RAM direction. In this investigation, arcs were observed as a result of anodized materials charging in a plasma environment. Actual ISS materials were used in the investigation. The materials included meteoroid and debris shield samples, as well as components from the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU). Results show that the occurrence of arcs was dependent on several factors including material composition and applied voltage. The breakdown thresholds for the materials tested will be shown, as well as the voltage and current waveforms during an arc event. The damage resulting from an arc will also be described. In addition, a description of associated operational hazards resulting from arcing on the spacecraft will be provided.

Schneider, Todd↗

NASA NTRS2019

Micro-meteoroid and orbital debris radar from Goldstone Radar observations

Micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) refers to millions of micrometeoroids and orbital debris orbiting the Earth, which can come from remaining parts of spacecraft from previous missions. These debris objects keep colliding and creating new pieces of debris, with very different sizes ranging from millimeters to meters. About 99.3% of the debris objects have a size < 1 cm. These debris objects, traveling at speeds of 10 km/s, can cause significant damage to spacecraft, satellites, and astronauts. Despite the historic use of shielding to protect vital spacecraft components, MMOD still present a potential hazard for future missions and operations involving humans in space. Goldstone’s orbital debris radar (ODR) enhances the NASA orbital debris model with radar observation data, providing vital information on orbital debris detections: size, Doppler, range, and orbit inclination angle. These observations currently provide the only access to information about this size class (2 mm to 10 mm) of orbital debris. Goldstone’s ODR experiments operate as a bistatic radar, with overlapping beams providing a wide distribution of ranges. From 2004 to early 2018, Goldstone’s ODR has been collecting orbital debris data from altitudes covering 280 km to 3000 km. Since the decommissioning of the receive antenna in early 2018, Goldstone’s range coverage is reduced to a 300 km window within a 600 km to 1000 km potential range coverage, depending on the pointing geometry and antenna station used. We are investigating alternative transmit receive configurations at Goldstone to recover our previous wide range coverage.

Rodriguez-Alvarez, Nereida↗

NASA NTRS2019

A Ground Footprint Eccentricity Model For Asteroid Airbursts

Uncertainties in early observations of potentially hazardous asteroids result in preliminary impact corridors that can stretch across large portions of the Earth’s surface. At this early stage of detection, the corridor width and potential for damage are typically estimated using techniques from nuclear weapons research. These estimates often employ spherical blast assumptions resulting in a constant width impact corridor. In actuality, however, the ground damage footprint of obliquely entering asteroids is generally roughly elliptical or “butterfly” shaped, with the major axis extending in the cross range direction and the minor axis aligned with ground-track of the meteoroid. Since actual ground footprints for oblique entries may have aspect ratios greater than two or three, the assumption of a circular blast may significantly underestimate the area of the impact swath and the at-risk population. This work develops an engineering model that can be used to quickly estimate the eccentricity of the ground footprint as a function of local impact parameters. This yields vastly improved local estimates of the corridor width and can significantly enhance the accuracy of risk analysis.

Aftosmis, Michael J.↗

NASA NTRS2021

Role of Cyber-Physical Testing in Developing Resilient Extraterrestrial Habitats

Extraterrestrial long-term habitat systems (henceforth referred to as habitat systems) require groundbreaking technological advances to overcome the extreme demands introduced by isolation and challenging environments. A habitat system must operate as intended under continuous disruptive conditions. Designing for the demands that challenging environments will place on habitat systems (e.g., wild temperature fluctuations, galactic cosmic rays, destructive dust, meteoroid impacts, vibrations, and solar particle events) represents one of the greatest challenges in this endeavor. This engineering problem necessitates that we design and manage habitat systems to be resilient. System resilience requires a comprehensive approach that accounts for disruptions through the design process and adapts to them in operation. As the habitat system evolves—growing in physical size, complexity, population, and connectivity—and diversifies in operations, it must continue to be safe and resilient. In this endeavor, we should take advantage of lessons learned in developing civil infrastructure responsive to catastrophic natural hazards, autonomous robotics platforms, smart buildings, cyber-physical testing, complex systems, and diagnostics and prognostics for intelligent health management. This study highlights the importance of system resilience and cyber-physical testing to address the grand challenge of developing habitat systems.

Public health and safety↗

NASA NTRS2007

Lunar Habitat Optimization Using Genetic Algorithms

Long-duration surface missions to the Moon and Mars will require bases to accommodate habitats for the astronauts. Transporting the materials and equipment required to build the necessary habitats is costly and difficult. The materials chosen for the habitat walls play a direct role in protection against each of the mentioned hazards. Choosing the best materials, their configuration, and the amount required is extremely difficult due to the immense size of the design region. Clearly, an optimization method is warranted for habitat wall design. Standard optimization techniques are not suitable for problems with such large search spaces; therefore, a habitat wall design tool utilizing genetic algorithms (GAs) has been developed. GAs use a "survival of the fittest" philosophy where the most fit individuals are more likely to survive and reproduce. This habitat design optimization tool is a multiobjective formulation of up-mass, heat loss, structural analysis, meteoroid impact protection, and radiation protection. This Technical Publication presents the research and development of this tool as well as a technique for finding the optimal GA search parameters.

SanScoucie, M. P.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs.) An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. The xEMU shares similarities with the legacy Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuit that is currently used for ISS EVAs, however differences in the layup (e.g., materials, thicknesses, and layers) of the fabric environmental protection garment (EPG), portable life support system (xPLSS) and helmet required an extensive test program to determine ballistic performance. Over 100 hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for MMOD impacts. Additionally, over 50 low speed tests (< 1km/s) were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate BLEs for lunar ejecta impacts. Post testing, ballistic limit equations (BLEs) used to define the performance of the various regions on the xEMU spacesuit were developed from a generic set of BLEs. The HVI and low speed testing was performed to establish a physical basis for the equations with the coefficients and exponents of the generic BLEs adjusted to fit the test data. The xEMU BLEs were added to the NASA/JSC software application used for spacecraft MMOD risk assessments (BUMPER-3). A finite element model (FEM) of the xEMU spacesuit, which defines the size and shape of the spacesuit as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations, was created based on a solid model provided by the xEMU program office. Using the FEM file and added xEMU BLEs, BUMPER-3 assessments of the xEMU spacesuit for probability of no penetration (PNP) were performed. For the LEO assessment of a typical ISS EVA, the orbital debris and meteoroids environments were defined using the latest engineering models, ORDEM 3.2 and MEM-3 respectively. The lunar surface assessment again used the MEM-3 engineering model to define the meteoroid environment along with the current released lunar surface ejecta model, NASA SP-8013 (developed during the Apollo Program). The Space Team in the Natural Environments Branch at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will soon release the new Lunar Meteoroid Ejecta Engineering Model (LMEEM), at which time the xEMU lunar surface EVA will be reassessed. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds. Similar to the legacy EMU spacesuit, the majority of the MMOD risk (96% of the LEO EVA risk and 99% of the lunar surface EVA risk) is concentrated in regions of xEMU that are comprised primarily of softgoods (arms, legs, and gloves) rather than the hardgoods (xPLSS, hard upper torso and helmet).

Micrometeoroid↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Equation Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs.) An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. This paper will expand on the hypervelocity impact (HVI) testing and ballistic limit equation (BLE) definition work that was partially presented at the 2nd International Orbital De-bris (IOC-II) Conference held in Sugar Land, TX in December 2023. The xEMU shares similarities with the legacy Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuit that is currently used for ISS EVAs, however differences in the layup (e.g., materials, thicknesses, and layers) of the fabric environmental protection garment (EPG), portable life support system (xPLSS) and helmet required an extensive test program to determine ballistic performance. Over 100 hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for MMOD impacts. Additionally, over 50 low speed tests (< 1km/s) were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate BLEs for lunar ejecta impacts. Post testing, ballistic limit equations used to define the performance of the various regions on the xEMU spacesuit were developed from a generic set of BLEs. The HVI and low speed testing was performed to establish a physical basis for the equations with the co-efficients and exponents of the generic BLEs adjusted to fit the test data. The xEMU BLEs were added to the NASA/JSC software application used for space-craft MMOD risk assessments (BUMPER-3). A finite element model (FEM) of the xEMU spacesuit, which defines the size and shape of the spacesuit as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations, was created based on a solid model provided by the xEMU program office. Using the FEM file and added xEMU BLEs, BUMPER-3 assessments of the xEMU spacesuit for probability of no penetration (PNP) were performed. For the LEO assessment of a typical ISS EVA, the orbital debris and meteoroids environments were defined using the latest engineering models, ORDEM 3.2 and MEM-3 respectively. The lunar sur-face assessment again used the MEM-3 engineering model to define the meteoroid environ-ment along with the current released lunar surface ejecta model, NASA SP-8013 (developed during the Apollo Program). The Space Team in the Natural Environments Branch at Mar-shall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will soon release the new Lunar Meteoroid Ejecta Engineering Model (LMEEM), at which time the xEMU lunar surface EVA will be reassessed. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds. Similar to the legacy EMU spacesuit, the majority of the MMOD risk (96% of the LEO EVA risk and 99% of the lunar surface EVA risk) is concentrated in regions of xEMU that are comprised primarily of softgoods (arms, legs, and gloves) rather than the hardgoods (xPLSS, hard upper torso and helmet).

Micrometeoroid↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Equation Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (XEMU)

Micrometeoroid↗

NASA NTRS2011

Ballistic Performance of Porous-Ceramic, Thermal Protection Systems

Porous-ceramic, thermal protection systems are used heavily in current reentry vehicles like the Orbiter, and they are currently being proposed for the next generation of US manned spacecraft, Orion. These systems insulate reentry critical components of a spacecraft against the intense thermal environments of atmospheric reentry. Additionally, these materials are highly exposed to space environment hazards like solid particle impacts. This paper discusses impact studies up to 10 km/s on 8 lb/cu ft alumina-fiber-enhanced-thermal-barrier (AETB8) tiles coated with a toughened-unipiece-fibrous-insulation/ reaction-cured-glass layer (TUFI/RCG). A semi-empirical, first principals impact model that describes projectile dispersion is described that provides excellent agreement with observations over a broad range of impact velocities, obliquities and projectile materials. Model extensions to look at the implications of greater than 10 GPa equation of state is also discussed. Predicted penetration probabilities for a vehicle visiting the International Space Station is 60% lower for orbital debris and 95% lower for meteoroids with this model compared to an energy scaled approach.

Miller, J. E.↗

NASA NTRS2015

SLS-SPEC-159 Cross-Program Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE) Revision D

This document is derived from the former National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Constellation Program (CxP) document CxP 70023, titled "The Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE), Revision C." The original document has been modified to represent updated Design Reference Missions (DRMs) for the NASA Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Programs. The DSNE completes environment-related specifications for architecture, system-level, and lower-tier documents by specifying the ranges of environmental conditions that must be accounted for by NASA ESD Programs. To assure clarity and consistency, and to prevent requirements documents from becoming cluttered with extensive amounts of technical material, natural environment specifications have been compiled into this document. The intent is to keep a unified specification for natural environments that each Program calls out for appropriate application. This document defines the natural environments parameter limits (maximum and minimum values, energy spectra, or precise model inputs, assumptions, model options, etc.), for all ESD Programs. These environments are developed by the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Natural Environments Branch (MSFC organization code: EV44). Many of the parameter limits are based on experience with previous programs, such as the Space Shuttle Program. The parameter limits contain no margin and are meant to be evaluated individually to ensure they are reasonable (i.e., do not apply unrealistic extreme-on-extreme conditions). The natural environments specifications in this document should be accounted for by robust design of the flight vehicle and support systems. However, it is understood that in some cases the Programs will find it more effective to account for portions of the environment ranges by operational mitigation or acceptance of risk in accordance with an appropriate program risk management plan and/or hazard analysis process. The DSNE is not intended as a definition of operational models or operational constraints, nor is it adequate, alone, for ground facilities which may have additional requirements (for example, building codes and local environmental constraints). "Natural environments," as the term is used here, refers to the environments that are not the result of intended human activity or intervention. It consists of a variety of external environmental factors (most of natural origin and a few of human origin) which impose restrictions or otherwise impact the development or operation of flight vehicles and destination surface systems. These natural environments include the following types of environments: Terrestrial environments at launch, abort, and normal landing sites (winds, temperatures, pressures, surface roughness, sea conditions, etc.); Space environments (ionizing radiation, orbital debris, meteoroids, thermosphere density, plasma, solar, Earth, and lunar-emitted thermal radiation, etc.); Destination environments (Lunar surface and orbital, Mars atmosphere and surface, near Earth asteroids, etc.). Many of the environmental specifications in this document are based on models, data, and environment descriptions contained in the CxP 70044, Constellation Program Natural Environment Definition for Design (NEDD). The NEDD provides additional detailed environment data and model descriptions to support analytical studies for ESD Programs. For background information on specific environments and their effects on spacecraft design and operations, the environment models, and the data used to generate the specifications contained in the DSNE, the reader is referred to the NEDD paragraphs listed in each section of the DSNE. Also, most of the environmental specifications in this document are tied specifically to the ESD DRMs in ESD-10012, Revision B, Exploration Systems Development Concept of Operations (ConOps). Coordination between these environment specifications and the DRMs must be maintained. This document should be compatible with the current ESD DRMs, but updates to the mission definitions and variations in interpretation may require adjustments to the environment specifications.

Roberts, Barry C.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Secondary impact hazard assessment

A series of light gas gun shots (4 to 7 km/sec) were performed with 5 mg nylon and aluminum projectiles to determine the size, mass, velocity, and spatial distribution of spall and ejecta from a number of graphite/epoxy targets. Similar determinations were also performed on a few aluminum targets. Target thickness and material were chosen to be representative of proposed Space Station structure. The data from these shots and other information were used to predict the hazard to Space Station elements from secondary particles resulting from impacts of micrometeoroids and orbital debris on the Space Station. This hazard was quantified as an additional flux over and above the primary micrometeoroid and orbital debris flux that must be considered in the design process. In order to simplify the calculations, eject and spall mass were assumed to scale directly with the energy of the projectile. Other scaling systems may be closer to reality. The secondary particles considered are only those particles that may impact other structure immediately after the primary impact. The addition to the orbital debris problem from these primary impacts was not addressed. Data from this study should be fed into the orbital debris model to see if Space Station secondaries make a significant contribution to orbital debris. The hazard to a Space Station element from secondary particles above and beyond the micrometeoroid and orbital debris hazard is categorized in terms of two factors: (1) the 'view factor' of the element to other Space Station structure or the geometry of placement of the element, and (2) the sensitivity to damage, stated in terms of energy. Several example cases were chosen, the Space Station module windows, windows of a Shuttle docked to the Space Station, the habitat module walls, and the photovoltaic solar cell arrays. For the examples chosen the secondary flux contributed no more than 10 percent to the total flux (primary and secondary) above a given calculated critical energy. A key assumption in these calculations is that above a certain critical energy, significant damage will be done. This is not true for all structures. Double-walled, bumpered structures are an example for which damage may be reduced as energy goes up. The critical energy assumption is probably conservative, however, in terms of secondary damage. To understand why the secondary impacts seem to, in general, contribute less than 10 percent of the flux above a given critical energy, consider the case of a meteoroid impact of a given energy on a fixed, large surface. This impact results in a variety of secondary particles, all of which have much less energy than the original impact. Conservation of energy prohibits any other situation. Thus if damage is linked to a critical energy of a particle, the primary flux will always deliver particles of much greater energy. Even if all the secondary particles impacted other Space Station structures, none would have a kinetic energy more than a fraction of the primary impact energy.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2013

Calculating and Mitigating the Risk of a Cut Glove to a Space Walking Astronaut

One of the high risk operations on the International Space Station (ISS) is conducting a space walk, or an Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA). Threats to the space walking crew include airlock failures, space suit failures, and strikes from micro ]meteoroids and orbital debris (MM/OD). There are risks of becoming untethered from the space station, being pinched between the robotic arm and a piece of equipment, tearing your suit on a sharp edge, and other human errors that can be catastrophic. For decades NASA identified and tried to control sharp edges on external structure and equipment by design; however a new and unexpected source of sharp edges has since become apparent. Until recently, one of the underappreciated environmental risks was damage to EVA gloves during a spacewalk. The ISS has some elements which have been flying in the environment of space for over 14 years. It has and continues to be bombarded with MM/OD strikes that have created small, sharp craters all over the structure, including the dedicated EVA handrails and surrounding structure. These craters are capable of cutting through several layers of the EVA gloves. Starting in 2006, five EVA crewmembers reported cuts in their gloves so large they rendered the gloves unusable and in some cases cut the spacewalk short for the safety of the crew. This new hazard took engineers and managers by surprise. NASA has set out to mitigate this risk to safety and operations by redesigning the spacesuit gloves to be more resilient and designing a clamp to isolate MM/OD strikes on handrails, and is considering the necessity of an additional tool to repair strikes on non ]handrail surfaces (such as a file). This paper will address how the ISS Risk Team quantified an estimate of the MM/OD damage to the ISS, and the resulting likelihood of sustaining a cut glove in order to measure the effectiveness of the solutions being investigated to mitigate this risk to the mission and crew.

Castillo, Theresa↗