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At least 145 records · Page 8

Spacecraft Line-Of-Sight Jitter Management and Mitigation Lessons Learned And Engineering Best Practices

Predicting, managing, controlling, and testing spacecraft line-of-sight (LoS) jitter caused by micro-vibrations due to on-board internal disturbance sources is a formidable multidisciplinary engineering task. It is especially challenging for those missions hosting high-performance (e.g., nano-radian/milli-arcsecond class), vibration-sensitive optical sensor payloads with stringent pointing stability requirements. The Nation Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the European Space Agency (ESA) are planning technically aggressive spaceflight missions that include ultra-high-performance optical payloads with delicate, highly vibration-sensitive scientific and observational instruments. The guidance, navigation, and control community of practice will need to leverage collective experiences and document their best practices and lessons learned to address future micro-vibration challenges. To identify lessons learned and best practices the NASA Engineering & Safety Center sponsored a 2-day Spacecraft LoS Jitter Workshop in late 2019. The workshop’s goal was to provide a multidisciplinary forum to elicit deeper understanding of the issues related to addressing the spacecraft LoS jitter/micro-vibration problem. The primary objective was to identify, document, and share lessons learned, best practices, and preferred options for jitter-related analysis and test activities. Representatives from NASA, ESA, along with NASA’s industrial partners, independent consultant subject matter experts, and members of academia participated in the workshop. This paper will describe the motivation for the workshop and summarize the identified findings and recommendations.

Swanson, Davin K.↗

Gateway Power Quality Lessons Learned

Power Quality is a physical description of the electrical characteristics that allow the system to function properly without significant loss of performance or life. This physical description includes steady state voltage limits, transient voltage limits in normal/abnormal conditions, ripple voltage, stability, fault conditions, and more. All which are vital for improving reliability, ensuring stable operation, defining proper fault recovery, and ensuring a ‘plug and play’ approach to design and integration. Typically, a specification for Power Quality is created based on expected system performance or an existing standard, such as the International Space Power System Interoperability Standards (ISPSIS). One example of such a specification is the Gateway Power Quality Specification. It defines the requirements and characteristics of the 120 Volt direct current electrical power system for the Gateway Electrical Power System (EPS) and the Gateway Electrical Power Consuming Equipment (EPCE). This specification also maintains a separate requirement verification section that defines test methods for requirement verification. The test methods include analysis, test, inspection, and demonstration. These test methodologies and requirements are used to ensure that the loads operate when connected to the specified power quality and performance as defined by this specification. The challenge with developing a specification is that desired system characteristics are not always fully matured before the specification is needed and many performance requirements may be application specific. This drives the need to utilize lessons learned through extensive analysis and testing as well as historical knowledge to finalize requirements. Some example requirements where this is important are Small and Large Signal Stability, Ripple Voltage, Inrush/Surge Currents, and Fault Containment. Lessons learned are also important in the testing, analysis, and verification to ensure consistent and accurate results to verify performance. This presentation will cover the lessons learned for power quality relative to ripple, inrush/surge, fault containment, testing/verification, and more.

Power Quality↗

Lessons Learned in Designing A Proposed Ultraviolet Sterilization System for Space

This paper presents a number of lessons learned while designing a proposed sterilization system for Mars Sample Return. This sterilization system is needed to inactivate any potentially hazardous Mars material on the exterior surface of the vessel containing sealed sample tubes filled with Mars rock cores, regolith and atmosphere. These returned samples would provide information on the geologic history of Mars, the evolution of its climate and the potential for ancient life. Mars Sample Return is categorized at Planetary Protection Category V Restricted Earth Return, so it is required to protect the Earth–Moon system from the biological impact of returning samples from Mars to Earth. This article reviews lessons learned in the development of a particular engineering implementation to support the protection of the Earth–Moon biosphere: the use of in situ ultraviolet LED illumination. The details of the biological efficacy of this approach or the policy-related impacts are outside of the scope of this manuscript. The lessons learned presented here include establishing design requirements for the system, the selection of a light source, optical design options, contamination control and approaches to thermal and power management.

Planetary Protection↗

The Collection, Usage, and Preliminary Examination of the Apollo Sample Suite: Lessons for Artemis

Apollo Sample Collection and Usage: From 1969 to 1972 there were six Apollo missions to the surface of the Moon during which the astronauts collected 382 kg of rock and regolith (~2200 samples). The samples collected fall into these general categories: rocks (~66% by mass), rake samples (~4%), bulk regolith (~24%), and specialty regolith (deep drill cores, drive tubes, sealed bulk regolith) samples (~6%). In each category there are a variety of different subtypes available for study, e.g., among the bulk regolith samples there are also skim, trench, and (partially) shaded regolith samples each sampling unique types or depths of regolith. This variety of subsamples has enabled a multitude of different studies over the past 55 years (>3400 individual requests). We are still averaging ~50 unique requests and have allocated >500 individual Apollo samples annually for the past 10 years (2020 excepted). Looking at the 4,675 non-ANGSA (Apollo Next Generation Sample Analysis) samples allocated over the past 10 years, the proportions of allocated samples do not precisely align with the abundance (by mass) of those samples withing the collection: Rock (69.4 %); Rake (10.8 %); Bulk Regolith (15.5 %); Drive Tube (3.3 %); Core/Specialty (1.0 %). Apollo Preliminary Examination (PE): The PE process differs significantly for the various sample types enumerated above; we focus on regolith and rock samples here. During the Apollo mission era, the PE process evolved over the course of the missions; below is what was done for the Apollo 17 mission. For regolith samples, the PE process was: (1) documented bags containing regolith are opened, photographed, and described; (2) large rocks are removed and treated separately; (3) 25% to 33% of the bulk soil is scooped out, weighed, and stored in reserve; (4) the remaining sample is sieved to produce the size fractions <1, 1- 2, 2-4, and 4-10 mm, all of which are weighed. For rock samples, the process is: (1) removing rocks from the container(s) it came back from the Moon in; (2) rematching any materials that spalled off the rock to their original location; (3) numbering, weighing, and basic photographic documentation; (4) dusting with a gentle N2 gas jet; (5) Orthogonal photography; (6) detailed description of the textures and features of the rock; (7) rock modelling and measurement; (8) stereophotography; (9) determination of the orientation of the rock on the lunar surface. Drive tubes and deep drill cores were not characterized during PE beyond an initial weight and a sketch of the interior tube materials derived from 2D medical X-ray images. Catalogs: The ongoing utility of the Apollo samples is enabled by the robust cataloguing process for the samples [3-5], which allows the scientific community to accurately request samples uniquely suited to their proposed studies. A common misconception, however, is the amount of detail that goes into the initial catalog (e.g., [6]) for a collection from the preliminary examination (PE) period, versus what goes into the catalogs that come later in the life cycle of the samples from that mission (e.g., [7]). The only required data for a PE catalog is a weight, a basic photograph, and a description of the nature of the sample. Artemis PE: Over the past few years, the ongoing ANGSA project studied previously unopened Apollo 17 double drive tube samples 73001/2 [1], and a PE of the drive tubes was done. The PE took the existing core dissection process (developed during PE of Apollo cores in the 1970s, 1980s), and modernized it [7]. The main lesson from the ANGSA PE relative to future missions was that the physical work done during PE of lunar samples has not changed much over the past 5 decades. The use of “modern” technology during PE (e.g., XCT; multispectral analyses) resulted in an enhanced initial understanding of the 73001 and 73002 drive tubes, but greatly increased the time required. The lessons learned from recent astromaterial PEs (e.g., ANGSA and OREx) are important to consider when planning for Artemis, but the unique nature of the Artemis Campaign means many lessons learned from these mission will not be applicable. Given the time constraints (6 months) and likely number of samples that will be returned by Artemis (>200), the Artemis PE catalog will necessarily look much more like [4] than [6].

J Gross↗

Lessons-Learned from D and D Activities at the Five Gaseous Diffusion Buildings (K-25, K- 27, K-29, K-31 and K-33) East Tennessee Technology Park, Oak Ridge, TN - 13574

The East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) is the site of five former gaseous diffusion plant (GDP) process buildings that were used to enrich uranium from 1945 to 1985. The process equipment in the original two buildings (K-25 and K-27) was used for the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU), while that in the three later buildings (K-29, K-31 and K-33) produced low enriched uranium (LEU). Equipment was contaminated primarily with uranium and to a lesser extent technetium (Tc). Decommissioning of the GDP process buildings has presented several unique challenges and produced many lessons-learned. Among these is the importance of good, up-front characterization in developing the best demolition approach. Also, chemical cleaning of process gas equipment and piping (PGE) prior to shutdown should be considered to minimize the amount of hold-up material that must be removed by demolition crews. Another lesson learned is to maintain shutdown buildings in a dry state to minimize structural degradation which can significantly complicate characterization, deactivation and demolition efforts. Perhaps the most important lesson learned is that decommissioning GDP process buildings is first and foremost a waste logistics challenge. Innovative solutions are required to effectively manage the sheer volume of waste generated from decontamination and demolition (D and D) of these enormous facilities. Finally, close coordination with Security is mandatory to effectively manage Special Nuclear Material (SNM) and classified equipment issues. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Lessons Learned From a Decade of Design, Construction, and Operations of the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee - 12062

The Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) is the Department of Energy's on-site disposal facility for radioactive and hazardous waste generated by the CERCLA cleanup of the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR). EMWMF recently completed building out to its maximum site capacity and is approaching a decade of operating experience. In meeting the challenges of design, construction, and operation of a mixed waste and low-level radioactive waste disposal facility within the framework of CERCLA, the Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC) project team learned valuable lessons that may be beneficial to other disposal facilities. Since project inception in 1998, the scope of the effort includes five regulator-approved designs, four phases of construction, and utilization of half of EMWMF's 1.63 M m{sup 3} of airspace during disposal of waste streams from across the ORR. Funding came from the broadest possible range of sources - privatization, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and two funding appropriation accounts. In the process of becoming the cost effective disposal outlet for the majority of the ORR cleanup waste, EMWMF overcame numerous challenges. Lessons learned were a key factor in achieving that success. Many of EMWMF's challenges are common to other disposal facilities. Sharing the successes and lessons learned will help other facilities optimize design, construction, and operations. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Peer Review Lessons Learned - DOE and Regulator Perspectives - 17140

The DOE NNSA Nevada Field Office (NFO) Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity requires an external peer review to complete an extensive stage of site characterization and groundwater flow and contaminant transport model(s) development. The external peer review evaluates whether assumptions, methods, and conclusions derived from model(s) outputs are based on sound scientific principles and examines the scientific appropriateness of the model(s) outputs for informing the regulatory decision. The regulatory decision which is made by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) is whether the model is acceptable to advance to the next UGTA strategy stage. Depending on the specific corrective action unit, the next stage is a Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan or Closure Stage. Three external peer reviews have taken place to date for the UGTA Activity. The first one resulted in a second phase of characterization and model development. The second external peer review resulted in advancement to the next UGTA strategy stage. While advancement to the next strategy stage was recommended by the third external peer review, a series of supplemental data collection and analyses and model simulation activities to address external peer review comments, including drilling three new wells and sampling multiple wells, occurred before moving into the next UGTA strategy stage. Twelve participants representing different aspects of the peer reviews (NDEP, NNSA/NFO, science advisors, presenters, and external peer reviewers) were interviewed to generate a combined lessons learned. Questions were asked regarding their experience with the process including panel selection, focused questions, presentations, interactions between UGTA Activity participants and reviewers, and results. The interview results were combined with the outcome of a published lessons learned report developed following the first external peer review. In general, those interviewed believed that all three external peer reviews were satisfactory and met the goals of the FFACO process. The following seven lessons learned were identified: (1) Ensure the panel is not biased and has a balance of technical and regulatory background; (2) Clearly state the review objective(s) at the start of the review; (3) Ask focused questions that support the peer review objective(s) but that do not ask the specific regulatory question; (4) Establish a peer review panel earlier in the strategy process; (5) Establish one point of contact for the entire review and conduct periodic meetings with the peer review panel to ensure focus remains on the review objective(s) and to ensure that pertinent information is provided; (6) Ensure that presentations are well coordinated, anomalous data or analysis results are addressed, and are focused on supporting the peer review objective(s); and (7) Carefully consider the panel's recommendations prior to embarking on a particular path forward. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Lessons Learned Concerning the Onsite Disposal Facility at the Fernald Preserve, Harrison, Ohio - 16176

An onsite disposal facility (OSDF) was constructed at the Fernald Preserve, Ohio, for the disposal of contaminated soil and debris generated during a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act site cleanup. Completed in October of 2006, the 30 ha facility contains 2.26 million m{sup 3} of waste materials, has a maximum height of approximately 19.8 m, and consists of eight individual cells. The dimensions of cells 1-7 are approximately 213 m x 122 m each, or 26,000 m{sup 2} (2.60 ha). The dimensions of cell 8 (the last cell constructed) are larger than those of the other cells (approximately 3.8 ha). Each cell was constructed with a leachate collection system (LCS) that collected rainwater and storm-water runoff during waste placement and prevented it from entering the underlying environment. Other engineered features include a multilayer composite liner system, a leak detection system (LDS) positioned beneath the primary liner, and a multilayer composite cover that was placed over each cell following the completion of waste-placement activities. The LCS and LDS layers are designed to convey (by gravity) any leachate/fluid that enters the system through pipes to the west side of the facility and into tanks located in valve houses. From there, leachate can be sampled and conveyed to treatment. Groundwater is monitored beneath each cell via monitoring wells. In November 2006, the US DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) assumed responsibility for the long-term care and maintenance of the OSDF. LM has nine years of monitoring and maintenance experience with the Fernald OSDF. Monitoring data is reported each year in the Fernald Annual Site Environmental Report. The data collected and inspections conducted indicate that the facility is operating as designed. The past nine years has provided LM with the opportunity to evaluate how well many of the design and as-built features of the facility have functioned over time as they pertain to environmental monitoring, valve-house operation and maintenance, and leachate transmission. Lessons learned concerning the long-term care and maintenance of the OSDF at the Fernald Preserve are presented. The main lessons learned include the following: How bivariate plots can be used to address environmental monitoring challenges created by installing an engineered disposal facility in a location where contamination is above the background level but below cleanup standards. How valve-house design decisions can help to alleviate long-term monitoring challenges. How scale buildup can lead to leachate transmission issues. Some additional minor lessons learned are also presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Fabrication Lessons Learned of Transportation Packaging from the Perspective of a Design Authority - 20322

This paper presents lessons learned regarding fabricating packaging systems from the perspective of a design authority (DA). Capturing and implementing lessons learned is critical for an organization to reduce systematic project risk and thereby promote the likelihood of project success. This paper defines the design authority as the organization responsible for technical design, resolving technical design issues, quality assurance program, and maintenance of the packaging system license. A package system is defined as the packaging, its contents, and auxiliary equipment. Packages are certified by the NRC under 10 CFR 71[1] for transportation by ground. The following lessons learned subjects are presented in the paper: quality assurance, interpretation of drawing dimensional requirements, execution of manufacturing processes, hardware dimensional inspection, and leakage rate testing. All discrepancies presented in this paper have been resolved as described in the appropriate final data package. All described package systems are in compliance with their Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and certificate of conformance requirements. The intent of this paper is to identify opportunities for improving the outcome of future projects and to mitigate fabrication challenges proactively. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Lessons Learned from Demolition of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant - 20507

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC), a Jacobs owned company, is making significant progress demolishing the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), which has long been known as one of the most hazardous buildings in the DOE Environmental Management Complex (DOE Complex). The facility is located on the Hanford Site and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1989, the facility was formally shut down in 1996, and material processing was completed in 2004. After approximately 25 years of demolition preparations, open-air demolition of the main portions of the Hazard Category II nuclear facility began in November 2016. To prepare the PFP for demolition, CHPRC employees performed some of the most hazardous work across the DOE Complex. In addition to extensive demolition preparations, including a wide-reaching communication strategy across the Hanford Site, CHPRC implemented robust controls and monitoring during demolition, and when necessary, adjusted demolition practices and sequence to maintain employee safety and project efficiency. Demolition of the main PFP building began in November 2016. The technical complexity, high hazards and radiological concerns have all led to a difficult demolition environment. Following a spread of contamination at the project site beyond the radiological boundaries in December 2017, work was halted and a recovery plan was generated to allow the demolition work to continue. After the implementation of additional controls and concurrence from regulatory agencies and DOE, the demolition was ready to resume work and reinitiated in August 2018. There are a number of lessons learned from the demolition activities and recovery plan process. This paper allows CHPRC and DoE's Richland Operations Office (RL) to share lessons learned and progress to date with other challenging and hazardous projects across the DOE Complex. Understanding the risk acceptance level is critical to execution of any open-air demolition project and is unique to each facility. Four key lessons learned from this project include: 1) plan execution issues, 2) stakeholder communication issues, 3) watching for summit fever and 4) minimizing exposed contaminated surfaces during demolition. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Lessons Learned—Fluoride Exposure and Response

Laboratory research can expose workers to a wide variety of chemical hazards. Researchers must not only take personal responsibility for their safety but also inevitably rely on coworkers to also work safely. The foundations for protocols, requirements, and behaviors come from our history and lessons learned from others. For that reason, here, a recent incident is examined in which a researcher suffered hydrofluoric acid (HF) burns while working with an inorganic digestion mixture of aqueous HF (8%) and nitric acid (HNO 3 , 58%). HF education is critical for workers because delays in treatment, improper treatment, and delay of symptoms are all factors in unfavorable outcomes in case reports. Furthermore, while the potential severity of the incident was elevated due to bypassed engineered controls and lack of proper personal protective equipment, only minor injuries were sustained. We discuss the results of a causal analysis of the incident that revealed areas of improvement in protocols, personal protective equipment, and emergency response that could help prevent similar accidents from occurring. We also present simple improvements that anyone can implement to reduce the potential consequences of an accident, based upon our lessons learned.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

618-10 Burial Ground Trench Remediation and 618-10 and 618-11 Burial Ground Nonintrusive Characterization of Vertical Pipe Units Lessons Learned

A “lessons learned” is a noteworthy practice or innovative approach that is captured and shared to promote repeat application, or an adverse work practice/experience that is captured and shared to avoid reoccurrence. This document provides the lessons learned identified by the 618-10 Burial Ground trench remediation and the 618-10 and 618-11 Burial Ground nonintrusive characterization of the vertical pipe units (VPUs).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Solid-State Lighting: Early Lessons Learned on the Way to Market

Analysis of issues and lessons learned during the early stages of solid-state lighting market introduction in the U.S., which also summarizes early actions taken to avoid potential problems anticipated based on lessons learned from the market introduction of compact fluorescent lamps.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Lessons Learned from MARVEL Initial Fabrication and Testing

The Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation (MARVEL) project is intended to be amongst the first U.S. advanced reactor demonstrations in four decades. By virtue of being sponsored directly by the U.S. Department of Energy, the reactor is intended to benefit the broader nuclear community by exercising design processes, safety reviews, and supply chains. This project is intent on publicly documenting key lessons learned along the way toward demonstration. Building on a 2024 report that focused on lessons learned from the design and project management phase, this 2025 edition focuses on findings from the MARVEL guard vessel fabrication and primary coolant apparatus test (PCAT) testing.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

MARVEL Lessons Learned – 2026 Edition Fabrication, Fuel Procurement, Quality Assurance, and Safety Basis

The Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation (MARVEL) project is intended to be among the first U.S. advanced reactor demonstrations in four decades. By virtue of being sponsored directly by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the reactor is expected to benefit the broader nuclear community by exercising design processes, safety reviews, and supply chains. This project is committed to publicly documenting key lessons learned along the way toward demonstration. Building on a 2025 report that focused on lessons learned from guard vessel fabrication and Primary Coolant Apparatus Test (PCAT) testing (Abou-Jaoude et al. 2025), this 2026 edition captures findings spanning structural fabrication, quality assurance (QA), reactivity control system (RCS) assembly, fuel fabrication and shipment, safety basis development, balance-of-plant design, and overall reactor design.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

Heritage Adoption Lessons Learned, Active Mirror Telescope Cover Deployment and Latch Mechanism

The Active Mirror Telescope (AMT) task adopted the Cover Deployment and Latch Mechanism (CDLM) design as used on the Galaxy Evolution Explorer (GALEX) project. The three separate mechanisms that comprise the CDLM will be discussed in this paper in addition to a focus on heritage adoption lessons learned and specific examples. These lessons learned will be valuable to any project considering the use of heritage designs.

heritage adoption↗

Lessons Learned Implementing Multi-Mission Sequencing Software

This paper will describe the software and its uses to provide context for its criticality. The different approaches that have been taken to implement the software in a multi-mission format will be outlined. The advantages and disadvantages as well as the lessons learned during development and maintenance of these different architectures will be discussed, Finally. the use of multi-mission software in operations and the lessons learned from using it will be discussed.This paper will provide valuable information to organizations exploring the use of multi-mission software. regardless of whether the change is to minimize spacecraft ground software development time or cost reduction. Similarly. the paper will provide insight into some of the steps that can be taken during software development and operational use that will minimize difficulty later.

software↗

MAVEN Information Security Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance (GRC): Lessons Learned

As the first interplanetary mission managed by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, the Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) had three IT security goals for its ground system: COMPLIANCE, (IT) RISK REDUCTION, and COST REDUCTION. In a multiorganizational environment in which government, industry and academia work together in support of the ground system and mission operations, information security governance, risk management, and compliance (GRC) becomes a challenge as each component of the ground system has and follows its own set of IT security requirements. These requirements are not necessarily the same or even similar to each other's, making the auditing of the ground system security a challenging feat. A combination of standards-based information security management based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management Framework (RMF), due diligence by the Mission's leadership, and effective collaboration among all elements of the ground system enabled MAVEN to successfully meet NASA's requirements for IT security, and therefore meet Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) mandate on the Agency. Throughout the implementation of GRC on MAVEN during the early stages of the mission development, the Project faced many challenges some of which have been identified in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to document these challenges, and provide a brief analysis of the lessons MAVEN learned. The historical information documented herein, derived from an internal pre-launch lessons learned analysis, can be used by current and future missions and organizations implementing and auditing GRC.

FISMA↗