Results for “failure mode analysis” — Page 8

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the landing/deceleration subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Landing/Deceleration Subsystem hardware. The Landing/Deceleration Subsystem is utilized to allow the Orbiter to perform a safe landing, allowing for landing-gear deploy activities, steering and braking control throughout the landing rollout to wheel-stop, and to allow for ground-handling capability during the ground-processing phase of the flight cycle. Specifically, the Landing/Deceleration hardware consists of the following components: Nose Landing Gear (NLG); Main Landing Gear (MLG); Brake and Antiskid (B and AS) Electrical Power Distribution and Controls (EPD and C); Nose Wheel Steering (NWS); and Hydraulics Actuators. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Due to the lack of redundancy in the Landing/Deceleration Subsystems there is a high number of critical items.

Compton, J. M.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the pyrotechnics subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Pyrotechnics (PYRO) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Pyrotechnics hardware.

Robinson, W. M.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the elevon subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results for the Orbiter Elevon system hardware. The elevon actuators are located at the trailing edge of the wing surface. The proper function of the elevons is essential during the dynamic flight phases of ascent and entry. In the ascent phase of flight, the elevons are used for relieving high wing loads. For entry, the elevons are used to pitch and roll the vehicle. Specifically, the elevon system hardware comprises the following components: flow cutoff valve; switching valve; electro-hydraulic (EH) servoactuator; secondary delta pressure transducer; bypass valve; power valve; power valve check valve; primary actuator; primary delta pressure transducer; and primary actuator position transducer. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 25 failure modes analyzed, 18 were determined to be PCIs.

Wilson, R. E.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the rudder/speed brake subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Mechanism is documented. The function of the Rudder/Speedbrake (RSB) is to provide directional control and to provide a means of energy control during entry. The system consists of two panels on a vertical hinge mounted on the aft part of the vertical stabilizer. These two panels move together to form a rudder but split apart to make a speedbrake. The Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Mechanism consists of the following elements: (1) Power Drive Unit (PDU) which is composed of hydraulic valve module and a hydraulic motor-powered gearbox which contains differentials and mixer gears to provide PDU torque output; (2) four geared rotary actuators which apply the PDU generated torque to the rudder/speedbrake panels; and (3) ten torque shafts which join the PDU to the rotary actuators and interconnect the four rotary actuators. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failures and causes. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Critical RSB failures which result in potential loss of vehicle control were mainly due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid contaminators, and mechanical failures in gears and shafts.

Wilson, R. E.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the active thermal control subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical (PCIs) items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Active Thermal Control Subsystem (ATCS) are documented. The major purpose of the ATCS is to remove the heat, generated during normal Shuttle operations from the Orbiter systems and subsystems. The four major components of the ATCS contributing to the heat removal are: Freon Coolant Loops; Radiator and Flow Control Assembly; Flash Evaporator System; and Ammonia Boiler System. In order to perform the analysis, the IOA process utilized available ATCS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 310 failure modes analyzed, 101 were determined to be PCIs.

Sinclair, S. K.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the hydraulics/water spray boiler subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results for the Orbiter Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Subsystem. The hydraulic system provides hydraulic power to gimbal the main engines, actuate the main engine propellant control valves, move the aerodynamic flight control surfaces, lower the landing gear, apply wheel brakes, steer the nosewheel, and dampen the external tank (ET) separation. Each hydraulic system has an associated water spray boiler which is used to cool the hydraulic fluid and APU lubricating oil. The IOA analysis process utilized available HYD/WSB hardware drawings, schematics and documents for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 430 failure modes analyzed, 166 were determined to be PCIs.

Duval, J. D.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the communication and tracking subsystem, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed and analysis of the Communication and Tracking hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Communication and Tracking hardware. The IOA product for the Communication and Tracking consisted of 1,108 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 298 critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consists of 697 FMEAs and 239 CIL items. The comparison determined if there were any results which had been found by IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This comparison produced agreement on all but 407 FMEAs which caused differences in 294 CIL items. Volume 1 contains the subsystem description, assessment results, ground rules and assumptions, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Long, W. C.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power generation/fuel cell powerplant subsystem

Results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Generation (EPG)/Fuel Cell Powerplant (FCP) hardware. The EPG/FCP hardware is required for performing functions of electrical power generation and product water distribution in the Orbiter. Specifically, the EPG/FCP hardware consists of the following divisions: (1) Power Section Assembly (PSA); (2) Reactant Control Subsystem (RCS); (3) Thermal Control Subsystem (TCS); and (4) Water Removal Subsystem (WRS). The IOA analysis process utilized available EPG/FCP hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Brown, K. L.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the nose wheel steering subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) hardware are documented. The NWS hardware provides primary directional control for the Orbiter vehicle during landing rollout. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. The original NWS design was envisioned as a backup system to differential braking for directional control of the Orbiter during landing rollout. No real effort was made to design the NWS system as fail operational. The brakes have much redundancy built into their design but the poor brake/tire performance has forced the NSTS to upgrade NWS to the primary mode of directional control during rollout. As a result, a large percentage of the NWS system components have become Potential Critical Items (PCI).

Mediavilla, Anthony Scott↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the extravehicular mobility unit

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware. The EMU is an independent anthropomorphic system that provides environmental protection, mobility, life support, and communications for the Shuttle crewmember to perform Extravehicular Activity (EVA) in Earth orbit. Two EMUs are included on each baseline Orbiter mission, and consumables are provided for three two-man EVAs. The EMU consists of the Life Support System (LSS), Caution and Warning System (CWS), and the Space Suit Assembly (SSA). Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. The majority of these PCIs are resultant from failures which cause loss of one or more primary functions: pressurization, oxygen delivery, environmental maintenance, and thermal maintenance. It should also be noted that the quantity of PCIs would significantly increase if the SOP were to be treated as an emergency system rather than as an unlike redundant element.

Raffaelli, Gary G.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis featured a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compared the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues were discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. Unresolved issues were elevated to the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office manager, Configuration Control Board (CCB), or Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) for further resolution. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode. The worst case effect could cause loss of crew/vehicle when the microwave landing system is not active. It is concluded that NASA and Prime Contractor Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation assessed by IOA is believed to be technically accurate and complete. All CIL issues were resolved. No FMEA issues remain that have safety implications. Consideration should be given, however, to upgrading NSTS 22206 with definitive ground rules which more clearly spell out the limits of redundancy.

Hinsdale, L. W.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the life support and airlock support subsystems

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Life Support System (LSS) and Airlock Support System (ALSS). Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. The LSS provides for the management of the supply water, collection of metabolic waste, management of waste water, smoke detection, and fire suppression. The ALSS provides water, oxygen, and electricity to support an extravehicular activity in the airlock.

Arbet, Jim↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the orbiter main propulsion system

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware are documented. The Orbiter MPS consists of two subsystems: the Propellant Management Subsystem (PMS) and the Helium Subsystem. The PMS is a system of manifolds, distribution lines and valves by which the liquid propellants pass from the External Tank (ET) to the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) and gaseous propellants pass from the SSMEs to the ET. The Helium Subsystem consists of a series of helium supply tanks and their associated regulators, check valves, distribution lines, and control valves. The Helium Subsystem supplies helium that is used within the SSMEs for inflight purges and provides pressure for actuation of SSME valves during emergency pneumatic shutdowns. The balance of the helium is used to provide pressure to operate the pneumatically actuated valves within the PMS. Each component was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticalities were assigned based on the worst possible effect of each failure mode. Of the 690 failure modes analyzed, 349 were determined to be PCIs.

Mcnicoll, W. J.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the reaction control system, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results for the Reaction Control System (RCS). The purpose of the RCS is to provide thrust in and about the X, Y, Z axes for External Tank (ET) separation; orbit insertion maneuvers; orbit translation maneuvers; on-orbit attitude control; rendezvous; proximity operations (payload deploy and capture); deorbit maneuvers; and abort attitude control. The RCS is situated in three independent modules, one forward in the orbiter nose and one in each OMS/RCS pod. Each RCS module consists of the following subsystems: Helium Pressurization Subsystem; Propellant Storage and Distribution Subsystem; Thruster Subsystem; and Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem. Of the failure modes analyzed, 307 could potentially result in a loss of life and/or loss of vehicle.

Burkemper, V. J.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the purge, vent and drain subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter PV and D (Purge, Vent and Drain) Subsystem hardware. The PV and D Subsystem controls the environment of unpressurized compartments and window cavities, senses hazardous gases, and purges Orbiter/ET Disconnect. The subsystem is divided into six systems: Purge System (controls the environment of unpressurized structural compartments); Vent System (controls the pressure of unpressurized compartments); Drain System (removes water from unpressurized compartments); Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDS) (monitors hazardous gas concentrations); Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS) (maintains clear windows and provides pressure control of the window cavities); and External Tank/Orbiter Disconnect Purge System (prevents cryo-pumping/icing of disconnect hardware). Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Four of the sixty-two failure modes analyzed were determined as single failures which could result in the loss of crew or vehicle. A possible loss of mission could result if any of twelve single failures occurred. Two of the criticality 1/1 failures are in the Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS) outer window cavity, where leakage and/or restricted flow will cause failure to depressurize/repressurize the window cavity. Two criticality 1/1 failures represent leakage and/or restricted flow in the Orbiter/ET disconnect purge network which prevent cryopumping/icing of disconnect hardware. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Bynum, M. C., III↗

NASA NTRS2009

A Diagnostic Approach for Electro-Mechanical Actuators in Aerospace Systems

Electro-mechanical actuators (EMA) are finding increasing use in aerospace applications, especially with the trend towards all all-electric aircraft and spacecraft designs. However, electro-mechanical actuators still lack the knowledge base accumulated for other fielded actuator types, particularly with regard to fault detection and characterization. This paper presents a thorough analysis of some of the critical failure modes documented for EMAs and describes experiments conducted on detecting and isolating a subset of them. The list of failures has been prepared through an extensive Failure Modes and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) reference, literature review, and accessible industry experience. Methods for data acquisition and validation of algorithms on EMA test stands are described. A variety of condition indicators were developed that enabled detection, identification, and isolation among the various fault modes. A diagnostic algorithm based on an artificial neural network is shown to operate successfully using these condition indicators and furthermore, robustness of these diagnostic routines to sensor faults is demonstrated by showing their ability to distinguish between them and component failures. The paper concludes with a roadmap leading from this effort towards developing successful prognostic algorithms for electromechanical actuators.

Balaban, Edward↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power distribution and control/electrical power generation subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C)/Electrical Power Generation (EPG) hardware. The EPD and C/EPG hardware is required for performing critical functions of cryogenic reactant storage, electrical power generation and product water distribution in the Orbiter. Specifically, the EPD and C/EPG hardware consists of the following components: Power Section Assembly (PSA); Reactant Control Subsystem (RCS); Thermal Control Subsystem (TCS); Water Removal Subsystem (WRS); and Power Reactant Storage and Distribution System (PRSDS). The IOA analysis process utilized available EPD and C/EPG hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Patton, Jeff A.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the displays and controls subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items Llist (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Displays and Control hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison for the Orbiter D and C hardware are documented.

Trahan, W. H.↗