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Autonomous Tools for Attack Surface Reduction (Final Report)

The electric power grid is a complex critical infrastructure that forms the lifeline of modern society, and its secure and reliable operation is of paramount importance to national security and economic wellbeing. However, recent findings documented in authoritative sources indicate the threat of cyber-based attacks growing in numbers and sophistication. However, securing the grid against stealthy cyberattacks is a challenging task due to legacy nature of the infrastructure coupled with dynamic nature of threat landscape and ever-growing sophistication of the adversaries. Additionally, the grid’s attack surface continues to grow with the increased dependence on digital communications and control that now extends to each consumer through smart meters and distributed energy resources. Unfortunately, this expansive surface increases the grid’s vulnerability and further exposes critical control systems in both substations and control centers. To respond to this emerging need, we had successfully assembled an interdisciplinary team with academic- industry partnership to successfully conduct research, development, evaluation, demonstration, and commercialization of attack surface reduction tools, whose goal was to significantly reduce the cyber attack surface in the North American power grid. Our proposed project was a synergistic collaborative effort leveraging the synergistic expertise of the team members across power systems, cyber security and CPS security, testbeds, field deployments and demonstration, and successful commercialization. The following are the specific tasks that have been successfully completed two phases (2016-2020). Phase I: Task 1: Developed and implemented a robust Project Management and Data Management Plan, coupled with a well thought out Risk Mitigation Plan. Task 2.1: Developed a comprehensive framework that continually assesses and autonomously reduces the attack surface for the power grid control environment spanning across substations, control center and the SCADA network to significantly reduce the risks of cyber attacks. Task 2.2: Developed attack surface analysis techniques, metrics, and tools that assess the attack surface at multiple levels including the control center, substations, and the SCADA network. Task 2.3: Developed attack surface reduction techniques and tools that dynamically reduce attack surface and hence increase attacker’s cost without interfering in the critical functions of the system. Task 2.4: Prototyped, implemented, and quantitatively evaluated/validated the techniques and tools on a realistic industrial CPS security testbed environment by leveraging the unique resources of the team. Task 3: Developed Commercialization plan to transition the developed tools into power system industry stakeholders for a broader adoption by leveraging the expertise of our industrial members. Phase II: Task 4: Successfully completed field demonstration, verification, and evaluation of the effectiveness of the attack surface analysis and reduction techniques on a realistic utility testbed environment. This also involved the development of realistic scenarios, sound metrics, data sets, evaluation criteria, and documentation. Technology integration & Field demonstration: The project had significantly advanced the state-of-the-art research and practice in improving the cybersecurity of our nation’s power grid infrastructure against cyber threats. In particular, the proposed, designed, and deployed attack surface analysis and reduction algorithms and tools have contributed to significantly reducing the exposure and risk of the devices, substations, and the integrated SCADA/EMS/ DMS grid environment to cyber threat. Strong demonstration and evaluation techniques have verified the feasibility of the developed techniques on realistic cyber-physical testbeds and utility partner's real grid environment, and collaborative research and evaluation of attack surface reduction techniques (for wide-are monitoring and control) within a vendor (GE) EMS platform. The Attack Host Analyzer (AHA) tool that was developed through this project was made available through GitHub.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Advanced Measurements for Resilient Integration of Inverter-Based Resources: PROGRESS MATRIX Year-1 Report

As nearly every aspect of the electric power grid undergoes rapid change, measurement technologies that support grid operation and planning must evolve as well. Recent large-scale deployments of inverter-based resources (IBRs) have brought to the forefront the critical need for new measurement technologies. Though these IBRs are vital to achieving the nation’s clean energy goals, their rapid deployment has in some cases led to negative impacts on the reliability and security of the bulk power system (BPS). Advanced power system measurements, including synchronized phasor and waveform measurements, are key to making IBR integration secure and reliable. To this end, the Department of Energy (DOE) initiated a project in 2022 to develop advanced measurement capabilities and analytics that will accelerate adoption of IBRs while improving the reliability and resilience of the BPS. This report discusses a portion of the findings from the project’s first year, which focused on surveying existing measurement capabilities of partner utilities and comparing these capabilities with the requirements of applications that support IBR integration. This report also discusses how these findings will guide the development and demonstration of a set of applications in the project’s second year.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Advanced Measurements for Resilient Integration of Inverter-Based Resources: PROGRESS MATRIX Final Report

As nearly every aspect of the electric power grid undergoes rapid change, measurement technologies that support grid operation and planning must evolve as well. The rapid large-scale deployment of inverter-based resources (IBRs) vital to achieving the nation’s clean energy goals has in some cases led to negative impacts on the reliability and security of the bulk power system (BPS). Advanced power system measurements, including synchronized phasor and waveform measurements, are key to making IBR integration secure and reliable. To this end, the Department of Energy (DOE) initiated the PROGRESS MATRIX project to develop advanced measurement capabilities and analytics that will accelerate adoption of IBRs while improving the reliability and resilience of the BPS. This report discusses the outcomes of the project, which was a joint effort between the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL). In the project’s first year, PNNL, NREL, and ORNL partnered with the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), and Kauai Island Utility Cooperative (KIUC) to understand their existing measurement capabilities and the gaps limiting deployment of IBR-focused measurement systems and analytics. The other primary activity in the first year was deployment of GridSweep instruments, which provide unprecedented precision in waveform measurement while probing distribution systems. The instruments were deployed at Dominion Energy and the University of California, Riverside. In the project’s second year, the input from partner utilities and collected measurements were used to advance measurement capabilities. Twelve analytical methods spanning disturbance analysis, power plant evaluation, feeder evaluation, and modeling were developed. Two software tools were developed, one to analyze GridSweep measurements and another to automatically evaluate the control performance of power plants connected to the BPS. Testbeds at ORNL and NREL were augmented to better enable studies of IBR integration. The project culminated in demonstrations of these analytical methods, software tools, and testbeds, both in the field and in the laboratory. This report discusses these various accomplishments and documents the significant progress in developing advanced measurement capabilities to support the secure, reliable, and accelerated adoption of IBRs in the BPS.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Real-Time Testbed for Transmission Line Protection

Hardware in the loop (HIL) testing is crucial for designing and managing electric power grids. These grids are becoming larger and more complex. The importance for students to have safe and intuitive ways to interact with the devices associated with the power grids has never been more crucial. Since most of these tests involve high voltages, this can be a deterrent for instructors and students in undergraduate programs. HIL testing is a solution to these common issues. This method has become one of the most popular methods for testing these power systems. With the use of Western Michigan University’s (WMU) Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) and SEL-421-7 protection relay, a HIL testbed has been created. These devices were interconnected using the communication protocol known as Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE). A simulated transmission line system was modeled in an RTDS software RSCAD as the basis for this testbed. This model simulated different types of faults that could occur in a transmission line while in operation. The SEL-421-7 relay is connected to the RSCAD simulation via GOOSE to protect our simulated transmission line. This testbed was set up to give students a clear understanding of how distance protection works as well as how the SEL-421-7 will react to various kinds of faults, in addition to how useful the RTDS can be when testing different power systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Solid State Transformer Architecture and Control Compensation for Common Mode Currents

A high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) or similar geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) has the potential to impact the operation of large-scale electric power grids. By introducing low-frequency common-mode (CM) currents, these events can degrade the performance of critical system components, such as large power transformers by introducing CM currents which can lead to magnetic saturation of the transformer core. In this work, a solid-state transformer (SST) is developed to replace susceptible equipment and improve grid resiliency by safely absorbing these CM disturbances. This device will be referred to as a common-mode solid-state transformer (CM-SST). An SST architecture based on a four-legged AC/DC converter is developed. This architecture enables active control of CM signals without disturbing the AC voltages or the real and reactive power delivery capabilities. A system-level model of this architecture is created, and time-domain simulations are performed to evaluate the SST’s performance in response to simulated CM disturbances. A control strategy for mitigating CM current is also investigated. Hamiltonian surface shaping and power flow control (HSSPFC) is used to design a nonlinear controller for the SST’s output inverter. The objectives of the controller are to suppress CM-induced AC current offsets and regulate AC currents to desired setpoints. Nonlinear system analysis is applied to design and validate the controller. Two cases are tested: (a) the proposed four-leg inverter and (b) a standard three-leg inverter. The results show that the proposed controller rapidly mitigates CM disturbances while maintaining high-quality AC current waveforms in the four-leg configuration. Finally, the hardware performance of an SST prototype is evaluated. In particular, the ability of the SST to safely redirect and absorb CM currents is demonstrated, showing how it can protect neighboring conventional transformers in the system. The study confirms that appropriate control laws allow the SST to protect both itself and adjacent transformers during a HEMP or GMD event.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Fast, Controllable, and Modular Solid-State Circuit Breaker Design for Battery Management Systems

Electric power grid is experiencing a growing number of distributed and inertia-free generation resources. To facilitate the growing generation and load demands, and ensure stable operation, energy storage systems, especially behind-themeter-storage (BTMS), have emerged as a potential candidate. BTMS plays a vital role in the grid storage sector and supports high power charging for EVs. However, the potential of thermal runaway and associated safety concerns in the batteries can hamper their widespread adoption. In this work, we provide a solution for a fast and controllable discharge of a cell that was identified as a stressful/faulty, in the battery pack, and fast circuit breaking leveraging the Solid-State Circuit Breaker (SSCB) technology which provides active control over the cell connection as opposed to conventional passive solutions. Testing on the simulation platform successfully validated the concept, demonstrating its efficacy. Controlled discharge testing with 20Ah LiFePO4 Lithium Iron Phosphate (LFP) cells from 1C-10C current rate on the hardware prototype corroborated simulation results, demonstrating design feasibility and providing essential data for its performance and thermal characteristics, while also revealing limitations that inform areas for further optimization.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Form EIA-923 Data Reformatted

Form EIA-923 data collection provides a centralized and comprehensive source for monthly operating data about the high-voltage bulk electric power grid in the Lower 48 states.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Form EIA-930 Data Reformatted

Form EIA-930 data collection provides a centralized and comprehensive source for hourly operating data about the high-voltage bulk electric power grid in the Lower 48 states.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

IM3 Projected US Data Center Locations

IM3 Projected US Data Center Locations This dataset contains model projections of new data center facilities in the contiguous United States (CONUS) through 2035 using the CERF – Data Centers model. Data center locations are modeled across four data center electricity demand growth scenarios (low, moderate, high, higher) and five market gravity scenarios (0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 100%). Projected locations are intended to be regional representations of feasible siting locations in the future to assess potential grid and water stress impacts. The data center load growth scenarios correspond with the rates outlined in EPRI (2024) and include 3.71%, 5%, 10%, and 15% annual growth of electricity demand for data centers from 2023 values in 37 states across the CONUS. Market gravity scenarios correspond to the relative importance of proximity to data center markets or high population areas compared to locational cost in the siting algorithm. 0% market gravity means that siting decisions were entirely determined by the locational cost in each feasible location. 100% market gravity means that only market proximity was considered when siting. Other scenarios have weight placed on both components where total weight always equals 100%. Locational cost is dependent on facility cooling type and corresponding electricity cost, taxes, and other factors. Facility cooling type is spatially determined where high water stress and/or areas with high summer wet bulb temperatures are assumed to operate with mechanical cooling for a higher fraction of the year rather than evaporative cooling. Feasible data center siting areas are based on geospatial suitability raster data developed with open-source information. The following areas are excluded from siting: Areas within 300 m of a federal airport runway Waterbodies Areas with slope >16% Areas susceptible to sinkholes High coastal or inland flood risk areas Local, state, and federal parks, leisure areas, and cemeteries Areas >2 km away from electric substations Areas >5 km away from a municipal water supplier service area Areas >2 km away from high-speed fiber provider service territory Protected Areas Database of the United States (PAD-US) areas Railroads, major roadways, and minor roadways Military areas and training grounds NLCD developed lands Areas >0.8 km (0.5 miles) from NLCD developed lands Because we use open-source information, proprietary information that can influence siting decisions such as individual tax agreements with cities, detailed fiber line connectivity, electric grid power capacity agreements, and others, are not currently accounted for in the modeling process. Using specific building locations and footprints in the dataset for local planning purposes is not advised. Technical Information Geospatial data is provided in geojson format using the Albers Equal Area Conic (ESRI:102003) coordinate reference system. The datasets contain the following parameters: id - unique identification number within given scenario file growth_scenario – data center demand growth scenario market_gravity_weight – market gravity weight scenario (%) region – name of region (i.e., US State) total_cost_million_usd – locational siting cost ($million) campus_size_square_ft – total land acquired for data center facility (square ft) data_center_it_power_mw – IT power of data center facility (MW) mechanical_cooling_frac – fraction of year when data center uses mechanical cooling system water_cooling_frac– fraction of year when data center uses evaporative cooling system cooling_energy_demand_mwh – total annual facility energy demand for cooling (MWh) cooling_water_demand_mgy – total annual facility water demand for cooling (MG) cooling_water_consumption_mgy – total annual facility water consumed (MG) normalized_locational_cost – normalized total locational cost score for location normalized_gravity_score – normalized market gravity score for location weighted_siting_score – total weighted siting score of locational cost and gravity score geometry – polygon geometry of facility Acknowledgment IM3 is a multi-institutional effort led by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and supported by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Science as part of research in MultiSector Dynamics, Earth and Environmental Systems Modeling Program. License This data is made available under a CCBY4.0 License Disclaimer This material was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the United States Department of Energy, nor the Contractor, nor any or their employees, nor any jurisdiction or organization that has cooperated in the development of these materials, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness or any information, apparatus, product, software, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof, or Battelle Memorial Institute. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof. PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORYoperated byBATTELLEfor theUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYunder Contract DE-AC05-76RL01830

Mongird, Kendall (ORCID:0000000328077088)↗

IM3 Projected US Data Center Locations

IM3 Projected US Data Center Locations This dataset contains model projections of new data center facilities in the contiguous United States (CONUS) through 2035 using the CERF – Data Centers model. Data center locations are modeled across four data center electricity demand growth scenarios (low, moderate, high, higher) and five market gravity scenarios (0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 100%). Projected locations are intended to be regional representations of feasible siting locations in the future to assess potential grid and water stress impacts. The data center load growth scenarios correspond with the rates outlined in EPRI (2024) and include 3.71%, 5%, 10%, and 15% annual growth of electricity demand for data centers from 2023 values in 37 states across the CONUS. Market gravity scenarios correspond to the relative importance of proximity to data center markets or high population areas compared to locational cost in the siting algorithm. 0% market gravity means that siting decisions were entirely determined by the locational cost in each feasible location. 100% market gravity means that only market proximity was considered when siting. Other scenarios have weight placed on both components where total weight always equals 100%. Locational cost is dependent on facility cooling type and corresponding electricity cost, taxes, and other factors. Facility cooling type is spatially determined where high water stress and/or areas with high summer wet bulb temperatures are assumed to operate with mechanical cooling for a higher fraction of the year rather than evaporative cooling. Feasible data center siting areas are based on geospatial suitability raster data developed with open-source information. The following areas are excluded from siting: Areas within 300 m of a federal airport runway or within an airport area boundary Waterbodies Areas with slope >16% Areas susceptible to sinkholes High coastal or inland flood risk areas Local, state, and federal parks, leisure areas, and cemeteries Areas >2 km away from electric substations Areas >5 km away from a municipal water supplier service area Areas >2 km away from high-speed fiber provider service territory USGS Protected Areas Database of the United States (PAD-US) GAP status 1, 2, or 3 areas US National Parks Wetlands USFWS critical habitats BIA land areas Railroads, major roadways, and minor roadways Military areas and training grounds NLCD developed lands Areas >0.8 km (0.5 miles) from NLCD developed lands Because we use open-source information, proprietary information that can influence siting decisions such as individual tax agreements with cities, detailed fiber line connectivity, electric grid power capacity agreements, and others, are not currently accounted for in the modeling process. Using specific building locations and footprints in the dataset for local planning purposes is not advised. Technical Information Geospatial data is provided in geojson format using the Albers Equal Area Conic (ESRI:102003) coordinate reference system. The datasets contain the following parameters: id - unique identification number within given scenario file growth_scenario – data center demand growth scenario market_gravity_weight – market gravity weight scenario (%) region – name of region (i.e., US State) total_cost_million_usd – locational siting cost ($million) campus_size_square_ft – total land acquired for data center facility (square ft) data_center_it_power_mw – IT power of data center facility (MW) mechanical_cooling_frac – fraction of year when data center uses mechanical cooling system water_cooling_frac– fraction of year when data center uses evaporative cooling system cooling_energy_demand_mwh – total annual facility energy demand for cooling (MWh) cooling_water_demand_mgy – total annual facility water demand for cooling (MG) cooling_water_consumption_mgy – total annual facility water consumed (MG) normalized_locational_cost – normalized total locational cost score for location normalized_gravity_score – normalized market gravity score for location weighted_siting_score – total weighted siting score of locational cost and gravity score geometry – polygon geometry of facility Acknowledgment IM3 is a multi-institutional effort led by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and supported by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Science as part of research in MultiSector Dynamics, Earth and Environmental Systems Modeling Program. License This data is made available under a CCBY4.0 License Disclaimer This material was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the United States Department of Energy, nor the Contractor, nor any or their employees, nor any jurisdiction or organization that has cooperated in the development of these materials, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness or any information, apparatus, product, software, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof, or Battelle Memorial Institute. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof. PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORYoperated byBATTELLEfor theUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYunder Contract DE-AC05-76RL01830

Mongird, Kendall (ORCID:0000000328077088)↗

The Final Proceedings of the DOE/NASA Solar Power Satellite Program Review

The solar power satellite (SPS) concept defined as 'placing gigantic satellites in geosynchronous orbit to capture sunlight, changing the energy into an appropriate form for transmission to Earth, and introducing the energy into the electric power grid' is evaluated in terms of costs and benefits. The concept development and evaluation program is reviewed in four general areas: systems definition; environmental; societal; and comparative assessments. Specific factors addressed include: transportation, construction in space, methods of conversion of sunlight into energy, transmission to Earth, maintenance in orbit and decommissioning of satellites; environmental, political, and economic effects; and comparison of SPS to other forms of power generation, both terrestrial and in space.

Source record↗

Control and Observation in Distributed Environments

This viewgraph presentation provides information on the ideas surrounding the control and observation of a distributed computing environment based on the design of the electrical power grid. The implementation of a reliable control system for the management of the computational grid is crucial. Different architectures have been suggested.

Smith, Warren↗

Real-Time 3D Visualization

Butler Hine, former director of the Intelligent Mechanism Group (IMG) at Ames Research Center, and five others partnered to start Fourth Planet, Inc., a visualization company that specializes in the intuitive visual representation of dynamic, real-time data over the Internet and Intranet. Over a five-year period, the then NASA researchers performed ten robotic field missions in harsh climes to mimic the end- to-end operations of automated vehicles trekking across another world under control from Earth. The core software technology for these missions was the Virtual Environment Vehicle Interface (VEVI). Fourth Planet has released VEVI4, the fourth generation of the VEVI software, and NetVision. VEVI4 is a cutting-edge computer graphics simulation and remote control applications tool. The NetVision package allows large companies to view and analyze in virtual 3D space such things as the health or performance of their computer network or locate a trouble spot on an electric power grid. Other products are forthcoming. Fourth Planet is currently part of the NASA/Ames Technology Commercialization Center, a business incubator for start-up companies.

Source record↗

Space Weather: What is it, and Why Should a Meteorologist Care?

"Space weather" is a term coined almost 15 years ago to describe environmental conditions ABOVE Earth's atmosphere that affect satellites and astronauts. As society has become more dependent on technology, we nave found that space weather conditions increasingly affect numerous commercial and infrastructure sectors: airline operations, the precision positioning industry, and the electric power grid, to name a few. Similar to meteorology where "weather" often refers to severe conditions, "space weather" includes geomagnetic storms, radiation storms, and radio blackouts. But almost all space weather conditions begin at the Sun--our middle-age, magnetically-variable star. At NASA, the science behind space weather takes place in the Heliophysics Division. The Space Weather Prediction Center in Boulder, Colorado, is manned jointly by NCAA and US Air Force personnel, and it provides space weather alerts and warnings for disturbances that can affect people and equipment working in space and on Earth. Organizationally, it resides in NOAA's National Weather Service as one of the National Centers for Environmental Prediction. In this seminar we hope to give the audience a brief introduction to the causes of space weather, discuss some of the effects, and describe the state of the art in forecasting. Our goal is to highlight that meteorologists are increasingly becoming the "first responders" to questions about space weather causes and effects.

SaintCyr, Chris↗

The Hazards of Our Star

The Sun's magnetic field permeates its atmosphere - ranging from the solar photosphere (the visible "surface") to the corona above. Think of this field as a collection of invisible rubber bands that are slowly stretched and twisted until they eventually reach a breaking point, When the field breaks, it releases a small amount of energy, known as a nanoflare. Millions of nanoflares occur every second, and the combined effect heats the solar corona to more than 1 million kelvins, hundreds of times hotter than the photosphere. The super-heated gas emits X-ray and ultraviolet radiation; Earth's upper atmosphere absorbs it, which changes our atmosphere's properties. This can disrupt communication, navigation, and surveillance systems, and also alter the orbits of satellites. On much larger scales, huge sections of the corona explosively erupt in coronal mass ejections (CMEs) and solar flares. CMEs directed toward Earth cause geomagnetic storms, which can wreck havoc on electrical power grids and produce widespread blackouts. Highly energetic particles can damage or even disable critical spacecraft components. Intense radiation from flares has the same effects as nanoflares, but to a greater degree. The need to understand how solar phenomena impact Earth has led to an important science field called space weather.

Klimchuk, James A.↗

How are Space Weather and Space Climate Connected to Solar Phenomena?

Many aspects of modern society are susceptible to space weather effects. Pertinent space weather effects include high-energy electromagnetic and particle radiation, changes of atmospheric drag, reduction of GPS accuracy or complete loss of GPS signals, communication outages, and the generation of potentially harmful DC currents in our electric power grid. Beginning in the early 1990s, researchers and government have been increasingly aware of the need to understand the causes of space weather, and to find ways to mitigate deleterious effects associated with it. New research and development programs have been created to address space weather primarily at NASA but also at other agencies. This investment has been very fruitful by generating a new class of entirely new space weather specification and forecast capabilities. This presentation provides an overview of space weather causes and effects, as well as of research and development to forecast and mitigate space weather effects. It will include a discussion of modern space weather analysis and forecasting, and conclude by pointing out paths into the future.

Hesse, Michael↗

Solar Eruptive Events

It s long been known that the Sun plays host to the most energetic explosions in the solar system. But key insights into the forms that energy takes have only recently become available. Solar flares have been phenomena of both academic and practical interest since their discovery in 1859. From the academic point of view, they are the nearest events for studying the explosive release of energy in astrophysical magnetized plasmas. From the practical point of view, they disrupt communication channels on Earth, from telegraph communications in 1859 to radio and television signals today. Flares also wreak havoc on the electrical power grid, satellite operations, and GPS signals, and energetic charged particles and radiation are dangerous to passengers on high-altitude polar flights and to astronauts. Flares are not the only explosive phenomena on the Sun. More difficult to observe but equally energetic are the large coronal mass ejections (CMEs), the ejection of up to ten billion tons of magnetized plasma into the solar wind at speeds that can exceed 1000 km/s. CMEs are primarily observed from the side, with coronagraphs that block out the bright disk of the Sun and lower solar atmosphere so that light scattered from the ejected mass can be seen. Major geomagnetic storms are now known to arise from the interaction of CMEs with Earth's magnetosphere. Solar flares are observed without CMEs, and CMEs are observed without flares. The two phenomena often occur together, however, and almost always do in the case of large flares and fast CMEs. The term solar eruptive event refers to the combination of a flare and a CME. Solar eruptive events generate a lot of heat: They can heat plasma to temperatures as high at 50 million Kelvin, producing radiation across the electromagnetic spectrum. But that s not all. A fascinating aspect of solar eruptive events is the acceleration of electrons and ions to suprathermal often relativistic energies. The accelerated particles are primarily observed through their emissions in the higher energy x-ray, gamma-ray, and rf regimes. The radio and x-ray emissions are both from mildly relativistic electrons with energies of tens of keV and above. Gamma-ray line emission comes indirectly from accelerated protons and heavier ions with MeV and higher energies. The difficulty in collecting spatially and spectrally resolved x-ray and gamma-ray data has long been a barrier to learning about the accelerated particles. Considerable progress has been made in the last decade in understanding the relationship between the flare, the CME, energy release, and particle acceleration. But many new questions have also arisen. In this article, I describe those new insights and our evolving understanding of solar eruptive events.

Holman, Gordon D.↗

Analyzing Risks and Vulnerabilities of Various Computer Systems and Undergoing Exploitation using Embedded Devices

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere has heightened from airports to communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APTs) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated, patched and secured state in a launch control system environment. Attacks on critical systems are becoming more and more relevant and frequent. Nation states are hacking into critical networks that might control electrical power grids or water dams as well as carrying out advanced persistent threat (APTs) attacks on government entities. NASA, as an organization, must protect its self from attacks from all different types of attackers with different motives. Although the International Space Station was created, there is still competition between the different space programs. With that in mind, NASA might get attacked and breached for various reasons such as espionage or sabotage. My project will provide a way for NASA to complete an in house penetration test which includes: asset discovery, vulnerability scans, exploit vulnerabilities and also provide forensic information to harden systems. Completing penetration testing is a part of the compliance requirements of the Federal Information Security Act (FISMA) and NASA NPR 2810.1 and related NASA Handbooks. This project is to demonstrate how in house penetration testing can be conducted that will satisfy all of the compliance requirements of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), as outlined in FISMA. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out the tasks stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, as well as policies and procedures.

Penetration Testing↗