SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
We propose a new facility instrument, the Airborne Infrared Echelle Spectrometer or 'AIRES'. The scientific rationale, a preliminary optical and mechanical design, and the instrument's estimated performance are presented. Some of the major technical challenges are discussed.
Designers are increasingly using Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) in design processes; however, knowing how designers use GenAI--especially in professional design practice--is under-explored. This paper presents an ethnographic study of a design team at NASA that explores the natural variation of GenAI use across team members during a speculative design workflow. We aimed to uncover when, how, and why GenAI tools were or were not employed using ethnographic observations to map the team's speculative design process and follow-up interviews to provide deeper insights into team members' interactions (or lackthereof) with GenAI. Through inductive qualitative coding, our analysis revealed three strategies of GenAI use observed among professional engineers and designers--intimate co-design with GenAI, selective delegation to GenAI, and minimal use of GenAI--as well as factors that appeared to influence their decisions whether or not to use GenAI. This study proposes new theory in human-AI collaboration that sheds light on the strategies, rationale, and circumstances under which design professionals use GenAI. Future work that builds upon these insights include examining a larger sample size of engineering and design professionals in uncontrolled design process experiences and exploring the impact that design tasks, goals, and constraints have on a participants decision to leverage GenAI tools.
Imaging the Earth's magnetosphere from space will enable scientists to better understand the global shape of the inner magnetosphere, its components and processes. The proposed Inner Magnetosphere Imager (IMI) mission will obtain the first simultaneous images of the component regions of the inner magnetosphere and will enable scientists to relate these global images to internal and external influences as well as local observations. NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) is performing a concept definition study of the proposed mission. As currently envisioned, the baseline mission calls for an instrument complement of approximately seven imagers to be flown in an elliptical Earth orbit with an apogee of seven Earth Radii (RE). Several spacecraft concepts have been examined for the mission. The baseline concept utilizes a spinning spacecraft with a despun platform, the second uses a three-axis stabilized spacecraft with a spinning platform, while the third option splits the instruments onto two small satellites; a spinning spacecraft and a complementary three-axis stabilized spacecraft. This paper will address the mission objectives, the rationale for using proven spacecraft designs, and the preliminary concept definition study team results for all three options.
An orbit determination subsystem that will operate as an integral part of an autonomous, onboard navigation system is presented and analyzed. The navigation system is required to interface solely with the downlink telemetry stream and uplink command stream of an existing class of geostationary satellites. In particular, the orbit will be determined from a set of onboard sensors, which previously were used only for attitude determination. The design of the orbit determination subsystem is described in detail. The rationale behind the choice of each component of the design is given. Finally, the performance of the orbit determination subsystem, under a variety of assumptions, is determined by a combination of numerical simulation and analytical methods.
Development of a scientific rationale for an atmospheric probe designed to be capable of entry into either Saturn or Uranus. The effects of the NASA Monograph model atmospheres (SP 8091 and SP 8103) on the entry and descent trajectory specify instrument sampling design. The cool model atmospheres require descents to the vicinity of 20 bars to satisfy the objectives while about 4 bars is sufficient for the warm models. The measurement performance for a descent sampling time of 44 minutes shows that the atmosphere can be reconstructed from measured data. The required total probe entry weight is 103 kg, of which about 15 kg is for the science instruments. The descent data rate varies from 32 to 51 bps, depending upon the mode of transmitting preentry data. The resulting common probe can be redirected in flight between Saturn and Uranus.
The feasibility analysis of the atmospheric general circulation experiment (AGCE) are documented. The analysis performed in each technical area, the rationale and substantiation for the design approaches selected for the hardware, and the design details for the baseline AGCE are presented.
The development of optical telescopes from the age of astrology to those of today and the future is discussed. The rationales for changes in the design of telescopes during this time are explored. The cost drivers, and how to reduce them, are also discussed.
This slide presentation reviews the proposed Plant Physiology and Functional Types (PPFT) Mission. The National Academy of Sciences Decadal Survey, placed a critical priority on a Mission to observe distribution and changes in ecosystem functions. The PPFT satellite mission provides the essential measurements needed to assess drivers of change in biodiversity and ecosystem services that affect human welfare. The presentation reviews the science questions that the mission will be designed to answer, the science rationale, the science measurements, the mission concept, the planned instrumentation, the calibration method, and key signal to noise ratios and uniformity requirements.
This paper provides an overview of the Mission Tradespace Tool (MTT), a methodology and software framework developed to improve JPL's early design process by offering a rapid, structured, and inexpensive way to identify feasible design architectures from a wide array of candidate architectures. There has been a growing consensus at JPL that to improve the quality of service offered to design customers it is desirable to explore a wide tradespace of candidate architectures prior to forming a conceptual design baseline. This paper describes the rationale behind the MTT's approach to meet this need. Notable features of the framework are introduced and explained.
The need for both robust and unambiguous electronic designs is a direct requirement of the astonishing growth in design and manufacturing capability during recent years. In order to manage the plethora of designs, and have the design data both interchangeable and interoperable, the Very High Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC) program is developing two major standards for the electronic design community. The VHSIC Hardware Description Language (VHDL) is designed to be the lingua franca for transmission of design data between designers and their environments. The Engineering Information System (EIS) is designed to ease the integration of data betweeen diverse design automation systems. This paper describes the rationale for the necessity for these two standards and how they provide a synergistic expressive capability across the macrocosm of design environments.
A chronology is provided of the rationale leading from the early Mariner spacecraft to the CRAF/Cassini Mariner Mark II power subsystem architecture. The display pathway began with a hybrid including a solar photovoltaic array, a radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG), and a battery supplying a power profile with a peak loading of about 300 W. The initial concept was to distribute power through a new solid-state, programmable switch controlled by an embedded microprocessor. As the overall mission, science, and project design matured, the power requirements increased. The design evolved from the hybrid to two RTG plus batteries to meet peak loadings of near 500 W in 1989. Later that year, circumstances led to abandonment of the distributed computer concept and a return to centralized control. Finally, as power requirements continued to grow, a third RTG was added to the design and the battery removed, with the return to the discharge-controller for transients during fault recovery procedures.
The design effort for the electrothermal hydrazine thruster (ETH) is summarized. The EHT decomposes hydrazine thermally and expands the decomposition products through a nozzle to provide the impulse necessary to fulfill spacecraft propulsive requirements. The thruster is capable of operation at pulse widths from 0.050 second to steady state and delivers specific impulse values from 175 to greater than 225 seconds, depending upon the duty cycle. The design of the EHT is the result of an analytical effort combined with a series of design verification tests. The design requirements, design philosophy and detailed design methods are outlined. A discussion of the rationale behind the selection of materials for the EHT is included. The results of the design verification tests are also presented.
The Voyager spacecraft to Jupiter and beyond was designed with the intent that it would be immune to the deleterious effects of space plasma charging. Such effects include electrostatic fields disrupting science data, external electrostatic discharge (ESD) events, and also internal ESDs. This paper describes the design features incorporated into the Voyager spacecraft, the rationale for those features, the results in the Jovian environment, and present thinking about appropriate design to avoid ESD problems caused by space charging.
An integrated hardware/software fault tolerant system for an earth oriented, computer controlled spacecraft is described. The design philosophy as well as the rationale behind the chosen fault tolerant system is outlined. In-flight performance of the system is included for several different instances where the Failure Detection and Correction system acted autonomously to protect the spacecraft. This system exceeded the expectations of the designers by demonstrating the capability to provide a measure of safety to the spacecraft for inadvertent and undesirable ground commands as well as satisfying its primary function of monitoring the flight hardware and software for failures.
In December of 2005, one of two trailing umbilical cables used on the International Space Station (ISS) Mobile Transporter (MT) was inadvertently severed by an internal cutter system designed to free a snagged cable or jammed reel while transporting hazardous payloads. The mechanism s intended means of actuation is electrical; however, troubleshooting revealed a mechanical actuation occurred. The investigation of the failed component revealed several lessons learned in developing hardware requirements, understanding and following the rationale behind the requirements throughout the design life cycle, understanding the impacts of gaps and tolerances in a mechanism, and the importance of identifying critical steps during assembly.
In December of 2005, one of two trailing umbilical cables used on the International Space Station (ISS) Mobile Transporter (MT) was inadvertently severed by an internal cutter system designed to free a snagged cable or jammed reel while transporting hazardous payloads. The mechanism s intended means of actuation is electrical; however, troubleshooting revealed a mechanical actuation occurred. The investigation of the failed component revealed several lessons learned in developing hardware requirements, understanding and following the rationale behind the requirements throughout the design life cycle, understanding the impacts of gaps and tolerances in a mechanism, and the importance of identifying critical steps during assembly
The Cassini mission to Saturn is complex with 12 science teams conducting distributed operations across the United States and Europe. Each Team includes scientists from around the world who actively participate in operations, including observation design, instrument commanding, downlink processing, and archiving. This represents a change in how JPL complex deep-space missions have been operated. Since Saturn Orbit Insertion (SOI), the Cassini Project has spent 17 months conducting science operations and has gained realworld experience that has tested the assumptions and rationale for this approach. We have learned that many of the expected benefits have been realized, but there were numerous unexpected challenges as well. This paper will discuss the lessons learned from the Cassini Tour experience to date. It will revisit the assumptions and rationale behind the distributed instrument operations design and will describe the results, good and bad, of implementing this method of operations. We will describe how Instrument Teams are structured, their roles and responsibilities, what challenges they faced going into orbital operations (the “tour”) and what creative solutions were proposed when funding limitations and schedule milestones prevented optimum solutions. We will also discuss the problems that have been encountered both on the ground and with the instruments, how these problems and anomalies were overcome, and what was learned along the way about the characteristics of distributed instrument operations.
The Cassini mission to Saturn is complex with 12 science teams conducting distributed operations across the United States and Europe. Each Team includes scientists from around the world who actively participate in operations, including observation design, instrument commanding, downlink processing, and archiving. This represents a change in how JPL complex deep-space missions have been operated. Since Saturn Orbit Insertion (SOI), the Cassini Project has spent 17 months conducting science operations and has gained real-world experience that has tested the assumptions and rationale for this approach. We have learned that many of the expected benefits have been realized, but there were numerous unexpected challenges as well. This paper will discuss the lessons learned from the Cassini Tour experience to date. It will revisit the assumptions and rationale behind the distributed instrument operations design and will describe the results, good and bad, of implementing this method of operations. We will describe how Instrument Teams are structured, their roles and responsibilities, what challenges they faced going into orbital operations (the 'tour') and what creative solutions were proposed when funding limitations and schedule milestones prevented optimum solutions. We will also discuss the problems that have been encountered both on the ground and with the instruments, how these problems and anomalies were overcome, and what was learned along the way about the characteristics of distributed instrument operations.