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At least 145 records · Page 8

Toward a Resilient Cybersecure Hydropower Fleet: Cybersecurity Landscape and Roadmap 2021

With this roadmap, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) hopes to assist the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Water Power Technologies Office (WPTO) in improving the cybersecurity of hydropower plants across the nation. This effort draws upon collected data from the dams sector, from industrial control system cybersecurity threat reports, from similar work focused on neighboring sectors, and from frank discussions with owners, operators, and vendors. While remaining tightly focused on the needs of hydropower projects, during this landscape study and development of the resulting roadmap, the research team sought to remain informed by the larger energy sector’s vision and direction so that the topics and milestones may fit within a larger vision common to the whole.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Managing NASA Cybersecurity

Externally-focused, strategic presentation on how NASA's cybersecurity program aligns with NASA's overall mission and its vision for information technology. Presentation also touches on challenges to cybersecurity implementation, as well as noting publicly-reported improvements to NASA's cybersecurity program.

Cybersecurity↗

Explore: An Advanced Computing Agenda for Competitiveness

Over the course of this three-year grant, the Council on Competitiveness (Council) hosted six meetings of its Advanced Computing Roundtable made up of experts from a broad cross section of advanced computing users and manufacturers, and four Advanced Computing for Competitiveness Regional Forums to explore issues related to advanced computing in regions, states and localities. More than two hundred experts, stakeholders and policymakers from the federal and state levels participated in this work and provided their time and expertise to help define the opportunity in advanced computing and the barriers to it reaching its full potential as a game-changing competitive advantage for the United States economy and national security. Building on the insights of the Council’s Advanced Computing Roundtable and findings and recommendations from the four U.S. Department of Energy-supported Forums, the Council has identified several broad policy objectives for the United States related to advanced computing leadership and implementation. The United States must: Compete at the high end of advanced computing. Continue investing to be a technology leader as the world moves toward exascale computing, including in hardware, software and applications. America also must lead in strategic areas like extending Moore’s Law and quantum computing. Improve the ability of HPC-using firms to leverage advanced computing. The Council recommends steps to improve computational skills, increase industry partnerships with laboratories and academia, and expand and strengthen software partnerships. Regulatory agencies also should accelerate efforts to use modeling and simulation within the regulatory process. Expand the number of HPC-using companies in America. Too few firms are able to leverage advanced computing to innovate and compete. Federal, state and local economic development efforts should be utilized to lower barriers and teach small and medium-sized firms, particularly manufacturers, to use advanced modeling, simulation and analytics. Coordinate federal action. Federal agencies should continue to act in a coordinated fashion on advanced computing challenges through the Joint Program Office for Strategic Computing. Leverage HPC to compete in strategic technologies and applications. Leadership in advanced computing is tightly linked to leadership in artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things, cybersecurity, additive manufacturing and other emerging technologies. Public and private sector leaders should collaborate on research and partnership efforts that ensure world-class computing environments for strategic technology leadership.

advanced computing↗

An Authentication Vulnerability Assessment of Connected Lighting Systems

Emerging connected lighting systems (CLS) that incorporate distributed intelligence, network interfaces, and sensors can become data-collection platforms that enable a wide range of valuable new capabilities as well as greater energy savings in buildings and cities. However, CLS technology is currently at an early stage of development, and its increased connectivity introduces cybersecurity risks that are new to the lighting industry and that must be addressed for successful integration with other systems. While a number of existing frameworks, guidelines, and tests for evaluating cybersecurity vulnerability may apply to CLS in whole or in part, there is currently no mandatory requirement for cybersecurity testing or certification. The lighting industry, including technology developers and specification organizations, is currently evaluating the suitability of existing frameworks and guidelines for CLS. To support these efforts, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is conducting a series of studies intended to educate lighting industry stakeholders on specific cybersecurity practices and characterize their implementation in commercially available CLS with varying system architectures, network-communication technologies, and degrees of maturity. This study demonstrates that tests for authentication vulnerabilities can be developed with objective pass/fail criteria, therby facilitating comparisons between CLS. Based on the limited results of this study, it appears that the CLS that are being brought to market have varying levels of authentication vulnerability. It is hoped that these evaluations will support and perhaps accelerate industry discussions on the risks of specific security vulnerabilities, what vulnerabilities should be addressed by in-development of future lighting-specific best practices, and whether any such practices should be included in voluntary lighting standards.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Integrating a Microgrid Controller with a Local OpenADR Server

When military microgrids isolate themselves from the main electrical grid, they must locally balance electricity supply and demand. Since local generation may be limited, the current strategy is to shed all but the most critical loads by tripping smart circuit breakers, which must then be reset manually (e.g., ESTCP project EW-201350). This strategy is typically applied at the building level, meaning that entire buildings housing mission critical activities must be excluded from any load management, while those considered non-critical may lose service entirely. The remotely controlled switchgear needed to manage load in this way is very expensive ($\$30,000$-$\$50,000$ per building). While effective at shedding load, this strategy disrupts installation operation and risks damaging equipment during both disconnection and re-energization. With the goals of lowering costs, protecting equipment, and enhancing the agility of DoD microgrids, this report demonstrates the use of cybersecure automated demand response (ADR) technology to manage microgrid loads during grid-independent (a.k.a. "islanded") operation. This automated approach achieves load shedding and shifting through communication signals sent to equipment controllers rather than by cutting off the flow of electricity within the microgrid itself. Because it operates only on the base network, with no connection to external entities, this strategy avoids the main cybersecurity concern raised by past applications of ADR on military bases.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop various cybersecurity tools, trainings, and reports to aid federal facility managers – and other building owners and operators – in better applying frameworks and lessons learned from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), risk management framework (RMF), DOE’s cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2), and a wide variety of industry best practices and guidance documents (i.e., NIST 800 series, Department of Defense United Facilities Criteria). This set of tools, collectively known as the FEMP Facility-Related Control System Cyber Toolkit (FRCS Cyber Toolkit)2, is focused on cybersecurity concerns from facility-related control systems and other operational technology (OT), such as industrial control systems (ICS). The FRCS Cyber Toolkit can be applied across six of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors designated by the Department of Homeland Security, including government facilities, healthcare and public health, commercial facilities (e.g., public assembly, offices, lodging), financial services (e.g., banking and insurance), emergency services (e.g., fire and police stations), and information technology. With increasingly converged IT and OT systems, it is crucial to address OT cybersecurity considerations and assess how the seam of these two systems could impact the overall cybersecurity posture of a facility. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of the best possible method to use FRCS Cyber Toolkit (section 2.0) and distilled cybersecurity best practices for the federal facilities to address growing non-linear cyber threats (section 3.0). Recommendations in this document are aggregated from several NIST and other documents (see Appendix A for additional details).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cybersecurity Considerations for Hydrogen Infrastructure in Airport Environments

This report explores key cybersecurity concerns and best practices within environments that serve as reference points for the development of hydrogen fueling infrastructure for aviation. This cybersecurity analysis leverages prior NREL studies: 1) hydrogen fueling station component validation to identify vulnerabilities and failure events documented in physical equipment, and 2) electric aircraft charging infrastructure analysis to explore primary cybersecurity vulnerabilities. It reviews the criticality of digitized technologies in sustaining hydrogen fuel production, storage, and fueling systems, noting cybersecurity concerns that are universal to power systems and industrial control systems in general. In considering cybersecurity vulnerabilities within a future landscape of hydrogen energy for aviation applications, a reference architecture was intended to reveal the points of connection between assets and the potential sensors that are vulnerable to manipulation in the event of compromised access or communication within a SCADA system. A generalized reference architecture can help stakeholders, engineers, or strategists understand connections, criticalities, and standard practices when it comes to designing and planning for new systems. There are several gaps to account for in assessing the future of hydrogen production, storage, and fueling for aviation. Engaging stakeholders, including aircraft manufacturers, electric utilities, site property owners, and local communities, will inform decision-making around site structure, operations, and resources for future hydrogen fueling infrastructure to understand operational needs and cybersecurity awareness. Cybersecurity mitigation strategy must consider physical attack vectors that emerge with the integration of hydrogen systems into existing airport security requirements. The cybersecurity risk assessment contained in this report is an entry point into potential future granular-level analyses to be conducted as part of hazard and risk assessments for safe aviation hydrogen infrastructure, determining how the scale of hydrogen fuel infrastructure for aviation impacts the volume of cyber attack vectors, and what, if any, are the vulnerabilities associated with different types of on-board hydrogen systems. In this nascent development phase, assessing how best to integrate cybersecurity practices into an evolving U.S. aviation landscape provides critical insights into building increased awareness and stakeholder engagement to support a cyber-resilient infrastructure.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Advanced Reactor Control and Operations (ARCO): A University Research Facility for Developing Optimized Digital Control Rooms

The Advanced Reactor Control and Operations (ARCO) facility was constructed in January 2018 to serve as a test bed for advanced reactor control rooms and operator support systems. Since then, it has supported human-machine interface user experience research, fault detection and mitigation technology development, control room concept of operations development, and remote operations research. ARCO serves as the control room for the Compact Integral Effects Test (CIET) facility, which replicates the primary-side flow paths and thermal-hydraulic behavior of a fluoride-salt-cooled high-temperature reactor (FHR) using simulant fluids and scaling principles. New reactor designs feature different operating conditions and scenarios than those in existing reactors. ARCO supports the research and development of digital tools for operator communications, intuitive real-time data analysis, online health monitoring and prognostics, and control room cybersecurity. By integrating these different technologies, ARCO acts as a prototypical control system to iteratively develop methods and tools of operation in advanced small modular nuclear reactors. This paper describes the features of and challenges to operating advanced small modular reactors underlying the design basis for ARCO and its operator support systems.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Measuring success for a future vision: Defining impact in science gateways/virtual research environments

Scholars worldwide leverage science gateways/virtual research environments (VREs) for a wide variety of research and education endeavors spanning diverse scientific fields. Evaluating the value of a given science gateway/VRE to its constituent community is critical in obtaining the financial and human resources necessary to sustain operations and increase adoption in the user community. In this article, we feature a variety of exemplar science gateways/VREs and detail how they define impact in terms of, for example, their purpose, operation principles, and size of user base. Further, the exemplars recognize that their science gateways/VREs will continuously evolve with technological advancements and standards in cloud computing platforms, web service architectures, data management tools and cybersecurity. We also present a number of technology advances that could be incorporated in next-generation science gateways/VREs to enhance their scope and scale of their operations for greater success/impact. The exemplars are selected from owners of science gateways in the Science Gateways Community Institute (SGCI) clientele in the United States, and from the owners of VREs in the International Virtual Research Environment Interest Group (VRE-IG) of the Research Data Alliance. Thus, community-driven best practices and technology advances are compiled from diverse expert groups with an international perspective to envisage futuristic science gateway/VRE innovations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DER Cybersecurity Standards: Assessment and Gap Analysis

The purpose of this report is to share the comprehensive gap analysis of existing cybersecurity standards applicable to Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) within the electric power sector. This analysis aims to identify critical deficiencies in current standards, assess their alignment with industry needs, and provide actionable recommendations for enhancing cybersecurity measures. The scope encompasses various DER technologies, including solar, wind, energy storage, and hydrogen fuel cells, and emphasizes the significance of establishing robust cybersecurity frameworks and standards to safeguard these increasingly integrated systems. The report provides valuable insights for stakeholders in the DER ecosystem, including manufacturers, utilities, and regulators. It underscores the importance of continued development and refinement of cybersecurity standards to keep up with the technical advances in DERs and associated cybersecurity challenges. The analysis evaluated IEC, IEEE, ISA, ISO, and UL standards relevant to DER cybersecurity. Standards were assessed on their coverage of key requirements including data availability, integrity, confidentiality, access control, authentication, encryption, and system hardening. For each standard, the analysis assessed its alignment with current industry practices, regulatory compliance, effectiveness in addressing known risks, coverage of emerging risks, and how it promotes interoperability. The evaluation also considered potential integration challenges and barriers to adoption.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cybersecurity Vulnerability Mitigation Framework through Empirical Paradigm: Enhanced Prioritized Gap Analysis

Existing cybersecurity vulnerability assessment tools were designed based on the policies and standards defined by organizations such as the U.S. Department of Energy and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Frameworks such as the cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2) and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) are often used by the critical infrastructure owners and operators to determine the cybersecurity maturity of their facility. Although these frameworks are exceptional at performing qualitative cybersecurity analysis and identifying vulnerabilities, they do not provide a means to perform prioritized mitigation of those vulnerabilities in order to achieve a desired cybersecurity maturity. To address that challenge, we developed a framework and software application called the cybersecurity vulnerability mitigation framework through empirical paradigm (CyFEr). This paper presents the detailed architecture of CyFEr’s enhanced prioritized gap analysis (EPGA) methodology and its application to CSF. The efficacy of the presented framework is demonstrated by comparing against existing similar models and testing against the cyber injects from a real-world cyber-attack that targeted industrial control systems (ICS) in critical infrastructures.

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil G.↗

PV Cyber Security Research (Final Report)

Extensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) on power systems is increasing the power system cyber security attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid support functions which can drastically influence power quality, voltage, and bulk system frequency. This project was split into two phases. The first provided a survey and roadmap of the cybersecurity for the solar industry. The second investigated multiple PV cybersecurity research and development (R&D) concepts identified in the first phase. In the first year, the team created a roadmap for improving cybersecurity for distributed solar energy resources. This roadmap was intended to provide direction for the nation over the next five years and focused on the intersection of industry and government and recommends activities in four related areas: stakeholder engagement, cyber security research and development, standards development, and industry best practices. At the same time, the team produced a primer for DER vendors, aggregators, and grid operators to establish a common taxonomy and describe basic principles of cyber security, encryption, communication protocols, DER cyber security recommendations and requirements, and device-, aggregator-, and utility-level security best practices to ensure data confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This material was motivated by the need to assist the broader PV industry with cybersecurity resilience and describe the state-of-the-art for securing DER communications. Lastly, an adversary-based assessment of multiple PV devices was completed at the Distributed Energy Technologies Laboratory at Sandia National Laboratories to determine the status of industry cybersecurity practices. The team found multiple deficiencies in the security features of the assessed devices. In the second year, a set of recommendations was created for DER communication protocols— especially with respect to the state-of-the-art requirements in IEEE 2030.5. Additionally, several cybersecurity R&D technologies related to communications-enabled photovoltaic systems were studied to harden DER communication networks. Specifically, the team investigated (a) using software defined networking to create a moving target defense system for DER communications, and (b) engineering controls that prevent misprogramming or adversary action on DER devices/networks by disallowing setpoints that will generate unstable power system operations.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Introduction: Cybersecurity and Software Assurance Minitrack

Modern society is dependent on software systems of remarkable scope and complexity. Yet methods for assuring their security and functionality have not kept pace. The result is persistent compromises and failures despite best efforts. Cybersecurity methods must work together for situational awareness, attack prevention and detection, threat attribution, minimization of consequences, and attack recovery. Because defective software cannot be secure, assurance technologies must play a central role in cybersecurity approaches. There is increasing recognition of the need for rigorous methods for cybersecurity and software assurance. The goal of this minitrack is to develop science foundations, technologies, and practices that can improve the security and dependability of complex systems.

Burns, Luanne↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Power Generation Guide [Slides]

This guide offers suggestions for applying CIE principles to technologies used to generate electric power. It addresses issues of design, implementation, and maintenance, preemptively addressing cybersecurity threats to electric generation. The intended audience for this guide includes practitioners across the energy and cybersecurity sectors, such as energy industry professionals (e.g., engineers, system designers, operators, and researchers) and cybersecurity experts (e.g., communication system designers, information technology/operational technology [IT/OT] administrators, and penetration testers).

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Design of a Novel Information System for Semi-Automated Management of Cybersecurity in Industrial Control Systems

There is an urgent need in many critical infrastructure sectors, including the energy sector, for attaining detailed insights into cybersecurity features and compliance with cybersecurity requirements related to their Operational Technology (OT) deployments. Frequent feature changes of OT devices interfere with this need, posing a great risk to customers. One effective way to address this challenge is via a semi-automated cyber-physical security assurance approach, which enables verification and validation of the OT device cybersecurity claims against actual capabilities, both pre- and post-deployment. To realize this approach, this paper presents new methodology and algorithms to automatically identify cybersecurity-related claims expressed in natural language form in ICS device documents. Here, we developed an identification process that employs natural language processing (NLP) techniques with the goal of semi-automated vetting of detected claims against their device implementation. We also present our novel NLP components for verifying feature claims against relevant cybersecurity requirements. The verification pipeline includes components such as automated vendor identification, device document curation, feature claim identification utilizing sentiment analysis for conflict resolution, and reporting of features that are claimed to be supported or indicated as unsupported. Our novel matching engine represents the first automated information system available in the cybersecurity domain that directly aids the generation of ICS compliance reports.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

International Cybersecurity: Capabilities and Overview [Slides]

Innovations in clean energy technology are beginning to transform electric grids around the world. It is more important than ever to understand and improve the resiliency and security of the grid against natural and human disruptions as our energy systems become more distributed, intelligent, and interconnected. Through its advanced cybersecurity technical assistance portfolio, experts at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) work with international governments to support secure and resilient deployment of renewable energy assets and address grid interconnection challenges. Cybersecurity technical assistance is tailored to the needs of our international partners.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

A Method of Synchrophasor Technology for Detecting and Analyzing Cyber-Attacks

Studying cybersecurity events and analyzing their impacts encourage planners and operators to develop innovative approaches for preventing attacks in order to avoid outages and other disruptions. This work considers two parts in security studies; detecting an integrity attack and examining its effects on power system generators. The detection was conducted through employing synchrophasor technology to provide authentication of ACG commands based on observed system operating characteristics. The examination of an attack is completed via a detailed simulation of a modified IEEE 68-bus benchmark model to show the associated power system dynamic response. The results of the simulation are discussed for assessing the impacts of cyber threats.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗