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At least 145 records · Page 8

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2026

Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems (ARIES) Cyber Range Overview and Threat-to-Consequence Demonstration

This presentation was presented at the Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop - held on June 17-18, 2025, at NREL in Golden, Colorado. The goal of the two-day workshop was to address the critical cybersecurity challenges for the future electric grid. The threat-to-consequence demonstration showcases NREL's capability to model, simulate, test, and evaluate cyberattacks targeting energy systems that coincide with natural hazards, as well as the ramifications for the energy grid as a whole.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

CIE Analysis Process for Engineered Systems

"CIE Analysis Process for Engineered Systems" outlines a comprehensive methodology for integrating Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into both new and existing engineered systems. Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (DOE CESER), the process aims to achieve cyber-informed decisions by producing functional security requirements for new systems and retrofitting existing systems to mitigate digital risks. The document details a step-by-step approach, including mission and function definition, digital asset awareness, consequence analysis, and mitigation analysis. It emphasizes the importance of documenting mechanical, electrical, programmable, and network components to protect system functions and provides examples and considerations for each step. The ultimate goal is to ensure that engineered systems remain resilient against cyber threats, maintaining safety, performance, and reliability.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2025

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 3 – Mitigations for Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 18, 2025, focused on developing mitigation strategies for digital assurance risks identified in previous workshops. Hosted by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and ScottMadden, the session emphasized the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) to data center infrastructure, particularly at the utility–data center interface. Participants revisited and ranked key digital assurance risks, including architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and AI-enabled threats. The workshop introduced the 12 principles of CIE, advocating for consequence-focused design, engineered controls, and secure information architecture to proactively reduce cyber-physical vulnerabilities. These principles were applied to critical data center systems such as power distribution, UPS, cooling, SCADA/BMS, and grid-forming batteries. The session also addressed governance challenges at the interconnection boundary, highlighting the need for clear roles in telemetry sharing, firmware management, and trip settings. Special attention was given to emerging risks from behind-the-meter (BTM) generation, including reverse-power flow and the integration of small modular reactors (SMRs), which shift data centers from large loads to complex generation nodes. Participants explored how interconnection agreements can serve as enforceable instruments for digital assurance, and reviewed gaps in current standards such as NERC CIP, IEC 62443, and IEEE 1547. The workshop concluded with pathways to standardization, including model agreement language, state-level programs, and expanded NERC guidance. INL also presented tools and frameworks for secure procurement and supplier risk management, reinforcing the need for integrated engineering and policy solutions to secure the evolving data center–grid ecosystem. Session 3 of 3.

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DOE OSTI2024

Cyber Informed Engineering (CIE) Principles Slide Presentation [Slides]

This document describes the concept and application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE), a methodology that integrates cyber threat awareness into all stages of the systems engineering life cycle. It delineates how CIE enhances the security posture of critical infrastructure systems, which are increasingly targeted by sophisticated cyber threats. The exposition proceeds to methodically walk through the twelve foundational principles of CIE, each serving as a strategic guidepost for embedding cybersecurity into the fabric of system design, development, operation, and maintenance. The principles highlight the importance of proactive and comprehensive security measures that span from risk assessment to continuous improvement, ensuring that systems are not only designed with security in mind but are also resilient in the face of evolving cyber threats.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2026

Supporting U.S. National Security Through Cybersecurity Partnerships

At NLR, we're studying energy evolutions and threats to understand the challenges they pose and uncover ways to leverage grid advancements to achieve more secure, defensible, and reliable systems. Our integrated research approach bridges the gap between cyber threats and real-world consequences to deliver actionable solutions that reduce vulnerabilities and help strengthen U.S. national security.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2024

The Design and Evaluation of Zero Trust Architecture for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure: EVs @ Scale Series on EV Charging Station Cybersecurity

Implementing a zero trust architecture can significantly bolster the security of electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure. EV charging infrastructure includes numerous networked interfaces, each of which can present potential vulnerabilities. When these vulnerabilities are exploited, they can compromise the entire system, leading to severe operational and security risks. Zero trust is a security model that operates on the principle of "never trust, always verify," which helps manage the attack surface and limit the scope of any potential compromises. Fundamentally, this model ensures that no entity, whether inside or outside the network, is trusted by default. The design principles of zero trust include continuous verification, strict deny-by-default access controls, and micro-segmentation. Continuous verification ensures that every request is thoroughly checked, regardless of its origin. Strict access controls enforce the principle of least privilege, allowing users and devices only the minimum necessary access to perform their functions. Micro-segmentation involves dividing the network into smaller, isolated segments to prevent lateral movement in case of a breach. In the context of EV charging infrastructure, zero trust can be implemented through various strategies. For example, multi-factor authentication (MFA) can be required for engineers to access the management interfaces and control systems of charging stations. Real-time monitoring and analysis of network traffic can help detect and respond to anomalies. Systems that do not need to communicate with each other can be micro-segmented to enhance security. All communications should adhere to predefined policies to be permitted. Additionally, encrypting communications can protect sensitive information exchanged between chargers and management systems. This paper presents a zero trust architecture specifically designed for EV charging infrastructure. Implementing zero trust not only mitigates risks but also builds a resilient infrastructure capable of withstanding and quickly recovering from cyber threats. The architecture addresses six defined security objectives. A comprehensive test plan is developed to assess the architecture against these objectives, and the results of the evaluation are reported. This approach is essential for maintaining the reliability and integrity of EV charging services in an increasingly interconnected and vulnerable digital landscape. This is the first in a planned series of papers exploring the implementation of zero trust in EV charging infrastructure. Each paper will delve into different aspects and applications of zero trust, highlighting how various work processes and requirements can lead to distinct architectural designs. These architectures will be tailored to address specific security challenges and operational needs within the EV charging ecosystem, ensuring a robust and adaptable security framework.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

DOE OSTI2026

CIEPAT for Photovoltaic System Resilience

The Cyber-Informed Engineering Photovoltaic Analysis Tool (CIEPAT) was developed in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER). This tool is an energy source subcomponent integrated into the CIEMAT ecosystem and is developed to enhance the security and resilience of Photovoltaic installations by incorporating Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into the deployment of PV systems.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

NASA NTRS2020

Partially Observable Games for Secure Autonomy

Technology development efforts in autonomy and cyber-defense have been evolving independently of each other, over the past decade. In this paper, we report our ongoing effort to integrate these two presently distinct areas into a single framework. To this end, we propose the two-player partially observable stochastic game formalism to capture both high-level autonomous mission planning under uncertainty and adversarial decision making subject to imperfect information. We show that synthesizing sub-optimal strategies for such games is possible under finite-memory assumptions for both the autonomous decision maker and the cyber-adversary. We then describe an experimental testbed to evaluate the efficacy of the proposed framework.

Ames, Aaron D.↗

DOE OSTI2026

CIEPAT (Cyber-Informed Engineering Photovoltaic Analysis Tool) [SWR-25-171]

The Cyber-Informed Engineering Photovoltaic Analysis Tool (CIEPAT) was developed in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER). This tool is a energy source subcomponent integrated into the CIEMAT ecosystem and is developed to enhance the security and resilience of Photovoltaic installations by incorporating Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into the deployment of PV systems.

Etigowni, Sriharsha [National Laboratory of the Ro↗

DOE OSTI2025

Digital Assurance Checklist for Homeowners and Installers

This document provides a comprehensive Digital Assurance Checklist for securing behind-the-meter energy assets, focusing on both installers and homeowners. As distributed energy resources (DERs) such as solar PV and battery storage become integral to residential energy systems, cybersecurity emerges as a critical component of reliability and safety. The guide outlines actionable steps for installers during pre-installation, commissioning, and post-installation phases, emphasizing practices like network segmentation, credential management, firmware validation, and homeowner education. For homeowners, the document introduces a tiered approach to cyber hygiene—from essential measures like strong Wi-Fi credentials and automatic updates to advanced strategies such as network segmentation, DNS filtering, and intrusion detection. By adopting these practices, stakeholders can mitigate cyber risks, safeguard energy infrastructure, and ensure resilient, secure operation of DER systems. Additional resources and references to industry standards are included to support implementation.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Digital Assurance Checklist for Homeowners and Installers

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2026

CIECAT (Cyber-Informed Engineering Commercial Buildings Analysis Tool) [SWR-25-172]

The Cyber-Informed Engineering Commercial Buildings Analysis Tool (CIECAT) was developed in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER). This tool is a energy source subcomponent integrated into the CIEMAT ecosystem and is developed to enhance the security and resilience of Commercial Buildings by incorporating Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into the Commercial Buildings.

Etigowni, Sriharsha [National Laboratory of the Ro↗

DOE OSTI2024

Total Power Factor Smart Contract with Cyber Grid Guard Using Distributed Ledger Technology for Electrical Utility Grid with Customer-Owned Wind Farm

In modern electrical grids, the numbers of customer-owned distributed energy resources (DERs) have increased, and consequently, so have the numbers of points of common coupling (PCC) between the electrical grid and customer-owned DERs. The disruptive operation of and out-of-tolerance outputs from DERs, especially owned DERs, present a risk to power system operations. A common protective measure is to use relays located at the PCC to isolate poorly behaving or out-of-tolerance DERs from the grid. Ensuring the integrity of the data from these relays at the PCC is vital, and blockchain technology could enhance the security of modern electrical grids by providing an accurate means to translate operational constraints into actions/commands for relays. This study demonstrates an advanced power system application solution using distributed ledger technology (DLT) with smart contracts to manage the relay operation at the PCC. The smart contract defines the allowable total power factor (TPF) of the DER output, and the terms of the smart contract are implemented using DLT with a Cyber Grid Guard (CGG) system for a customer-owned DER (wind farm). This article presents flowcharts for the TPF smart contract implemented by the CGG using DLT. The test scenarios were implemented using a real-time simulator containing a CGG system and relay in-the-loop. The data collected from the CGG system were used to execute the TPF smart contract. The desired TPF limits on the grid-side were between +0.9 and +1.0, and the operation of the breakers in the electrical grid and DER sides was controlled by the relay consistent with the provisions of the smart contract. The events from the real-time simulator, CGG, and relay showed a successful implementation of the TPF smart contract with CGG using DLT, proving the efficacy of this approach in general for implementing electrical grid applications for utilities with connections to customer-owned DERs.

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DOE OSTI2025

Security Assessment of an LBP16-Protocol-Based Computer Numerical Control Machine

Subtractive manufacturing systems, specifically, computer numerical control machines, have revolutionized the manufacturing industry. Computer numerical control machining is the preferred method for producing finished parts due to its efficiency, speed and suitability for high-volume production. Securing computer numerical control machines is a priority. Compromises or disruptions of these machines can result in significant downtime, loss of productivity and financial loss. This study examines the vulnerabilities and risks associated with computer numerical control machines, in particular, systems utilizing the LBP16 protocol for controller-machine communications. The study reveals that an adversary can execute cyber-physical attacks such as sabotage and denial of service. The potential security threats emphasize the importance of implementing robust security measures to mitigate the cyber risks to computer numerical control machines.

Forihat, Yahya [Virginia Commonwealth University, ↗

DOE OSTI2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk (O.T. Gagnon III) 9-18-2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: Why threats and security are just not that important! When dealing with cyber or physical risk within any critical infrastructure (CI) environment, don’t concern yourself with vulnerabilities and threats, at least not at first! Also, don’t be overly fixated on “securing the systems” within the organization. The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences in any critical infrastructure environment to include the complex Aviation ecosystem is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure environment in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure environment as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space. When it comes to cyber risks, before an organization can consider vulnerabilities within and threats to its operations, it must first have a solid understanding of the consequences existing inside its infrastructure environment. Idaho National Lab’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering is offered as an example of this approach to effective and efficient cyber risk mitigation.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Cyber Resiliency and the Implementation of a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System in an Urban Air Mobility Environment

With the growth in urban air mobility systems and the increasing reliance on interconnected technologies, ensuring the security of these complex infrastructures has become critical. As cities evolve into smart urban centers, the vulnerability to cyber threats escalates, possibly endangering citizens’ safety and the efficiency of transportation networks. In response to these challenges, this paper presents a study on implementing a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) tailored explicitly to urban mobility environments’ unique demands. This study explores the design, development, and deployment of the proposed HIDS, focusing on its adaptability to monitor the hybrid nature of the urban mobility environment. Leveraging machine learning algorithms and anomaly detection techniques, the HIDS is equipped to continuously monitor and analyze the behavior of individual host systems, vehicles, and devices, thereby providing a proactive approach to threat detection. Implementing a HIDS is a pivotal strategy for enhancing cyber resiliency, as it gives an organization granular visibility into internal system activities, enables rapid detection and response to anomalous behavior and cyber threats, and fortifies the organization’s overall cybersecurity posture. In conclusion, this paper highlights the significance of host-based intrusion detection in urban mobility environments and underscores the necessity of tailored security solutions to safeguard against emerging cyber threats.

UAM↗

DOE OSTI2026

Firmware Tampering Detection in Heavy-Duty Vehicles through J1939 CAN Analysis

Modern heavy-duty vehicles rely on complex networks of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that communicate using the J1939 protocol. While this system makes it easier to update and configure vehicle components, it also opens the door to serious cybersecurity risks if not properly secured. This work investigates the potential for firmware tampering through the J1939 communication protocol, which enables ECU configuration and reprogramming over the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. By monitoring CAN traffic during legitimate maintenance operations and reverse-engineering OEM diagnostic software, we identified common and proprietary J1939 message identifiers, authentication patterns, and vulnerabilities within Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS). These findings demonstrate that inadequate authentication mechanisms can allow malicious actors to alter ECU firmware or disable safety functions, posing severe operational and safety risks. Our analysis contributes to the development of vehicle intrusion detection systems capable of recognizing abnormal reprogramming activity and future firmware fingerprinting methods to verify software integrity across ECUs. This work highlights the importance of standardizing secure firmware authentication across manufacturers to strengthen cyber resilience in heavy-duty vehicle systems.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Transmission Technologies –GETs and HPCs Session 3: HPCs and Building Actions Plans to Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) program, held on November 11, 2025, centered on High Performance Conductors (HPCs) and the formulation of action plans to address digital assurance risks associated with Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs). This session convened experts from utilities, vendors, and government agencies to examine the technical, operational, and cybersecurity aspects of HPC deployment. Discussions highlighted the benefits of HPCs, such as their ability to rapidly increase transmission capacity using existing corridors, improve grid resilience, reduce system losses, and align with FERC Orders 2023 and 1920. Participants evaluated supply chain and digital assurance risks, including reliance on imported materials, limited domestic manufacturing capacity, workforce shortages, and traceability issues. The session also emphasized the importance of digital trust, integration-layer cybersecurity, and unified risk frameworks, introducing tools like intrusion detection systems, encryption, zero trust networking, and firmware integrity. Recaps of earlier workshops on Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs), Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC), and Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO) underscored institutional barriers and integration challenges. Action plans were proposed to mitigate issues such as inconsistent cybersecurity practices, SBOM usage, supply chain visibility, operator trust, and misaligned incentives. Additionally, INL presented its supply chain risk management tools and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to support secure procurement and system design. The session concluded with a commitment to share key takeaways, incorporate cohort feedback into future policy development, and continue collaborative engagement through upcoming pilot activities. Session 3 of 3.

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