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Big Data For Operation and Maintenance Cost Reduction

The purpose of this research is to develop a first-of-a-kind framework for integrating Big Data capability into the daily activities of our current fleet of nuclear power plants. Big Data is traditionally defined as data sets with high volume, velocity, and heterogeneity, and the existing Big Data analytics capabilities are now widely popular in fields such as finance, weather, e-commerce, healthcare and sports. In the nuclear industry, while the volume and velocity of data may present computational challenges for existing analytics capabilities, data heterogeneity are seen to present the major challenge. This research project mainly focuses on incorporating the wide range of data heterogeneities in nuclear power plants into an integrated Big Data Analytics capability. The primary end-product of this project is a Big Data framework that is capable of dealing with the large volume and heterogeneity of the data found in nuclear power plants to extract timely and valuable information on equipment performance. The framework can generate system insights that are actionable relations between measurable impacts and the corresponding maintenance action plans and enable optimization of plant operation and maintenance based on the extracted information. The developed framework is capable of handling heterogeneous data including both image data and time-series sensor data. Specifically, this developed framework includes the following components. The first component is an overarching maintenance ontology which includes system insights required by maintenance optimization. The maintenance ontology interacts with other components in the developed framework. The second component handles Piping & Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) data. It can be used to extract system components and their relations automatically from the P&IDs. This extracted information is stored in the first component, i.e., maintenance ontology, and is also used as input to the third component, i.e., a tool for generating the fault tree for the corresponding system. The generated fault tree in turn is stored in the ontology for assessing risk that is used as a criterion in maintenance policy optimization. The fourth component is a tool for inferring the parameters in the Markov degradation model for a nuclear system. It uses basic information from the ontology. The fifth component is a tool for assessing the degradation level using sensor measurement data, for example, pressure, flowrate. This tool can be used for determining corrective maintenance actions. The results obtained from components four and five are returned to the ontology. The sixth component of the framework is a tool for optimizing the maintenance policy for a nuclear system of interest. It takes certain basic information from the ontology, e.g., costs of maintenance actions and system failures, as input, and returns the optimal maintenance policy to the ontology. This tool can be used for determining predictive maintenance actions. A set of experiments have also been conducted to verify the algorithms developed in this project for nuclear system degradation monitoring. The experiments are based on four solenoid valves, similar to the ones used in nuclear power plants. The analyses based on the experimental data using two algorithms, i.e., the Randomized Window Decomposition (RWD) algorithm and the particle filtering algorithm, and the results are introduced in the report. The Big Data framework developed in this project can be used as a support tool in daily activities of plant operation and maintenance and will reduce current costs while maintaining or improving safety levels. Overall, the project will not only benefit existing reactors, however it will open new frontiers to realize the long overdue value of Big Data Analytics in the nuclear sphere.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command and Sensing

Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command and Sensing (CARACaS) is a recent product of a continuing effort to develop architectures for controlling either a single autonomous robotic vehicle or multiple cooperating but otherwise autonomous robotic vehicles. CARACaS is potentially applicable to diverse robotic systems that could include aircraft, spacecraft, ground vehicles, surface water vessels, and/or underwater vessels. CARACaS incudes an integral combination of three coupled agents: a dynamic planning engine, a behavior engine, and a perception engine. The perception and dynamic planning en - gines are also coupled with a memory in the form of a world model. CARACaS is intended to satisfy the need for two major capabilities essential for proper functioning of an autonomous robotic system: a capability for deterministic reaction to unanticipated occurrences and a capability for re-planning in the face of changing goals, conditions, or resources. The behavior engine incorporates the multi-agent control architecture, called CAMPOUT, described in An Architecture for Controlling Multiple Robots (NPO-30345), NASA Tech Briefs, Vol. 28, No. 11 (November 2004), page 65. CAMPOUT is used to develop behavior-composition and -coordination mechanisms. Real-time process algebra operators are used to compose a behavior network for any given mission scenario. These operators afford a capability for producing a formally correct kernel of behaviors that guarantee predictable performance. By use of a method based on multi-objective decision theory (MODT), recommendations from multiple behaviors are combined to form a set of control actions that represents their consensus. In this approach, all behaviors contribute simultaneously to the control of the robotic system in a cooperative rather than a competitive manner. This approach guarantees a solution that is good enough with respect to resolution of complex, possibly conflicting goals within the constraints of the mission to be accomplished by the vehicle(s).

Huntsberger, Terrance↗

Robonaut 2 and Watson: Cognitive Dexterity for Future Exploration

Future exploration missions will dictate a level of autonomy never before experienced in human spaceflight. Mission plans involving the uncrewed phases of complex human spacecraft in deep space will require a coordinated autonomous capability to be able to maintain the spacecraft when ground control is not available. One promising direction involves embedding intelligence into the system design both through the employment of state-of-the-art system engineering principles as well as through the creation of a cognitive network between a smart spacecraft or habitat and embodiments of cognitive agents. The work described here details efforts to integrate IBM's Watson and other cognitive computing services into NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC)'s Robonaut 2 (R2) anthropomorphic robot. This paper also discusses future directions this work will take. A cognitive spacecraft management system that is able to seamlessly collect data from subsystems, determine corrective actions, and provide commands to enable those actions is the end goal. These commands could be to embedded spacecraft systems or to a set of robotic assets that are tied into the cognitive system. An exciting collaboration with Woodside provides a promising Earth-bound testing analog, as controlling and maintaining not normally manned off-shore platforms have similar constraints to the space missions described.

Badger, Julia M.↗

Application of Fault Management Theory to the Quantitative Selection of a Launch Vehicle Abort Trigger Suite

The theory of System Health Management (SHM) and of its operational subset Fault Management (FM) states that FM is implemented as a "meta" control loop, known as an FM Control Loop (FMCL). The FMCL detects that all or part of a system is now failed, or in the future will fail (that is, cannot be controlled within acceptable limits to achieve its objectives), and takes a control action (a response) to return the system to a controllable state. In terms of control theory, the effectiveness of each FMCL is estimated based on its ability to correctly estimate the system state, and on the speed of its response to the current or impending failure effects. This paper describes how this theory has been successfully applied on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Launch System (SLS) Program to quantitatively estimate the effectiveness of proposed abort triggers so as to select the most effective suite to protect the astronauts from catastrophic failure of the SLS. The premise behind this process is to be able to quantitatively provide the value versus risk trade‐off for any given abort trigger, allowing decision makers to make more informed decisions. All current and planned crewed launch vehicles have some form of vehicle health management system integrated with an emergency launch abort system to ensure crew safety. While the design can vary, the underlying principle is the same: detect imminent catastrophic vehicle failure, initiate launch abort, and extract the crew to safety. Abort triggers are the detection mechanisms that identify that a catastrophic launch vehicle failure is occurring or is imminent and cause the initiation of a notification to the crew vehicle that the escape system must be activated. While ensuring that the abort triggers provide this function, designers must also ensure that the abort triggers do not signal that a catastrophic failure is imminent when in fact the launch vehicle can successfully achieve orbit. That is, the abort triggers must have low false negative rates to be sure that real crew‐threatening failures are detected, and also low false positive rates to ensure that the crew does not abort from non‐crew‐threatening launch vehicle behaviors. The analysis process described in this paper is a compilation of over six years of lessons learned and refinements from experiences developing abort triggers for NASA's Constellation Program (Ares I Project) and the SLS Program, as well as the simultaneous development of SHM/FM theory. The paper will describe the abort analysis concepts and process, developed in conjunction with SLS Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) to define a common set of mission phase, failure scenario, and Loss of Mission Environment (LOME) combinations upon which the SLS Loss of Mission (LOM) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models are built. This abort analysis also requires strong coordination with the Multi‐Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) and SLS Structures and Environments (STE) to formulate a series of abortability tables that encapsulate explosion dynamics over the ascent mission phase. The design and assessment of abort conditions and triggers to estimate their Loss of Crew (LOC) Benefits also requires in‐depth integration with other groups, including Avionics, Guidance, Navigation and Control(GN&C), the Crew Office, Mission Operations, and Ground Systems. The outputs of this analysis are a critical input to SLS S&MA's LOC PRA models. The process described here may well be the first full quantitative application of SHM/FM theory to the selection of a sensor suite for any aerospace system.

Lo, Yunnhon↗

Optimal scheduling for profit maximization of energy storage merchants considering market impact based on dynamic programming

This paper analyzes how electricity merchants' market impact affects merchants' profit. Energy storage has long been studied for its role in maximizing profit, and merchant decisions are assumed to have no impact on market prices. However, the trading decisions of large-scale energy storage merchants (e.g., pumped storage hydro) will affect the market prices. This paper employs dynamic programming theory to investigate merchants' optimal economic dispatch considering the market impact and physical characteristics of storage systems. Our findings show that the State-of-Charge (SOC) based analytical solution significantly facilitates energy storage merchants' decision-making. The SOC range is segmented into three regions by two optimal SOC reference points, which depend on the available energy in storage, given prices, and market impact. By comparing the current storage SOC with the reference points, the merchant can get the corresponding optimal actions. We analytically show that if the merchant neglects the market impact on the power market, she will exaggerate her expected profit when the price-taker and price-maker merchants have the same generating and pumping upper limits offered to Independent System Operators (ISOs). Furthermore, the profit-maximizing merchant must, therefore, assay to balance the trade-off correctly between the intensity of market impact and the dispatched power. Our findings are verified by numerical simulation, and results demonstrate the ramifications for electricity merchants in energy arbitrage decisions.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Wilson Corners Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) 001: 2021 Annual Long-Term Monitoring Report, Kennedy Space Center, Florida

This report presents a summary of the long-term monitoring (LTM) activities that occurred in 2021 at Wilson Corners, Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) 001, at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. The site is monitored under KSC’s Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Corrective Action Program. Adaptive site management is being utilized through ongoing assessment, design, and interim measures (IM). Annual LTM of the groundwater is also being conducted at the site. This approach also meets the requirements of Chapter 62-780, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.). The goal of LTM at this site is threefold: to determine groundwater flow characteristics, monitor the downgradient concentration trends, and monitor select locations internal to the groundwater plume. Every 5 years, upgradient and side-gradient monitoring wells are sampled to verify delineation. The last time this was performed was in 2015. The sampling of these wells in 2020 was replaced with the direct push technology (DPT) investigations completed in October 2020 and April 2021. This DPT groundwater data was presented in an Advance Data Package (ADP) in September 2021 and discussed in the Implementation Work Plan (IWP) dated November 2021 for installation of an air sparge (AS) system. Based on results from groundwater sampling activities performed during the previous reporting period, including the 2020 and 2021 DPT groundwater sampling, it was determined that the LTM sampling plan was no longer meeting the goal of LTM because delineation was not verified. The 2021 LTM sampling plan was modified to include the sampling of monitoring wells located around the perimeter of the low concentration plume (LCP); the area with concentrations of contaminants of concern [COCs] greater than Groundwater Cleanup Target Levels [GCTLs]), and sampling of 10 monitoring wells proposed for installation (April 2021 KSC Remediation Team (KSCRT) Meeting, Decision 2104-D32). The modified LTM plan received team consensus at the September 2021 KSCRT Meeting (Decision Number 2109-D03), and sampling of the existing monitoring wells was completed in December 2021. The proposed monitoring wells are planned for installation in late 2022, concurrent with ongoing IM construction activities. December 2021 LTM data was presented at the May 2022 KSCRT Meeting, and activities are summarized in this report. The activities presented in this report include the December 2021 groundwater gauging of 42 monitoring wells and sampling of 44 monitoring wells. During the December 2021 event, the low flow sampling method was used, and samples were analyzed for a select list of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), including 1,1,2-trichloro-1,2,2-trifluoroethane (Freon 113). The following conclusions can be made based on the 2021 LTM results: - In December 2021, groundwater flow for the site was generally to the west at all intervals. This is generally consistent with historical observations at the site, with the exception of a southwest and southeast flow component observed at 34 to 48 feet below land surface (bls). - The vertical extent of VOCs was historically delineated by monitoring wells screened greater than 48 feet bls. The results from the two vertical extent monitoring wells, WILC-MW0078 (screened 65 to 70 feet bls) and WILC-MW0130 (screened 56 to 66 feet bls) that were sampled during the 2021 LTM indicate that groundwater vinyl chloride (VC) concentrations in both wells were greater than the GCTL. The Remediation Team has previously agreed to delay deeper DPT investigations in this area to prevent the creation of additional pathways for vertical migration. - The LCP continues to extend both horizontally, predominantly to the west, and vertically beyond the current monitoring well network, with some retraction observed to the southeast. Evaluation of this data combined with data from the 2020 and 2021 DPT sampling event indicate that the LCP encompasses an estimated 20.7 acres based on an expanded sampling area, as compared to the 2020 LCP footprint of 17.0 acres. - Freon 113 was not detected above GCTLs during the 2021 LTM event. Based on groundwater sampling activities performed in 2021, including April 2021 DPT groundwater sampling, the following recommendations are provided: - Perform the next LTM sampling event, targeted to occur in 2023, concurrently with the IM baseline sampling prior to AS system installation; - Include sampling from nine monitoring wells that are planned to be installed in late 2022, concurrent with upcoming IM construction activities. Installation of one deep vertical well, screened 70 to 80 feet bls, will be delayed to prevent the creation of an additional pathway for vertical migration; - Continue to sample under the modified annual LTM plan as presented in Table 4-1 concurrently with IM baseline sampling; and - Once the AS system install and start-up is complete, select monitoring wells from the LTM program will transition into the performance monitoring plan, and LTM will be temporarily discontinued. Performance monitoring will be performed quarterly, and the monitoring well network will be evaluated following the first performance monitoring sampling event.

long-term monitoring (LTM)↗

Implementing JEDI into NASA GMAO’s Real Time Production Suite

NASA’s Global Modeling and Assimilation Office (GMAO) has prepared their first production system involving the Joint Effort for Data assimilation Integration (JEDI) framework. In this system the central analysis, that drives the deterministic forecast, will be provided using JEDI. This talk outlines the phased approach to implementing JEDI into production that GMAO has designed, and how this approach will allow for a careful analysis of the system against the existing data assimilation framework (GSI). In the first phase of implementation the existing data assimilation system will perform certain actions that are still under development in JEDI. These include thinning the observations and producing satellite bias correction coefficients. JEDI is hooked up to the existing workflow so a single line switch can activate whether the existing or JEDI-based analysis is cycled. Outside of the monumental effort to construct JEDI that is ongoing at the Joint Center for Satellite Data Assimilation (JCSDA), GMAO have undertaken two areas of considerable effort. The talk will describe these efforts and highlight the main challenges that have been encountered. The first area of work is to implement the background error model from the existing data assimilation system into JEDI. The second is to validate the observing system in JEDI against the one in GSI, which has involved several new features being added to the observation operators in JEDI. While the longer-term plans involve trying to improve on the GSI in these two areas, GMAO is keen to have JEDI start from a trusted baseline. This is also key to implementing JEDI quickly so other priorities, such as increasing the number of model levels, can be easily worked on in parallel. GMAO is actively working on a framework to shepherd in the next generation coupled data assimilation system and model. As JEDI is implemented for the first time the plan is to ambitiously cycle through implementations, frequently bringing JEDI features to production. Details of these plans will be given in the talk and we will highlight key implementation and product milestones that we hope to achieve, as well as touch on the development environment that we will use to support frequent refreshing of the production system.

JEDI↗

Errors in Aviation Decision Making: Bad Decisions or Bad Luck?

Despite efforts to design systems and procedures to support 'correct' and safe operations in aviation, errors in human judgment still occur and contribute to accidents. In this paper we examine how an NDM (naturalistic decision making) approach might help us to understand the role of decision processes in negative outcomes. Our strategy was to examine a collection of identified decision errors through the lens of an aviation decision process model and to search for common patterns. The second, and more difficult, task was to determine what might account for those patterns. The corpus we analyzed consisted of tactical decision errors identified by the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) from a set of accidents in which crew behavior contributed to the accident. A common pattern emerged: about three quarters of the errors represented plan-continuation errors, that is, a decision to continue with the original plan despite cues that suggested changing the course of action. Features in the context that might contribute to these errors were identified: (a) ambiguous dynamic conditions and (b) organizational and socially-induced goal conflicts. We hypothesize that 'errors' are mediated by underestimation of risk and failure to analyze the potential consequences of continuing with the initial plan. Stressors may further contribute to these effects. Suggestions for improving performance in these error-inducing contexts are discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗

Soil Interim Measures Implementation Report Q6 Radar Station – Solid Waste Management Unit 112 Locations of Concern 3 and 10 Kennedy Space Center, Florida

This report presents a summary of the soil interim measures (IM) implementation activities that occurred from January 23 through June 6, 2023, at the Q6 Radar Station (Q6RS) Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) 112, located at the John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. The site is monitored under KSC’s Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Program, which also meets the requirements of Chapter 62-780, Florida Administrative Code. Assessment activities have previously been performed at 10 Q6RS Locations of Concern (LOCs), identified during a SWMU assessment in 2013 (NASA 2013). Since the SWMU assessment, further confirmatory sampling and assessment was conducted for each LOC, and based on the data collected during these assessments, it was determined that Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Facility Investigation to further evaluate soil and groundwater was to be conducted at two LOCs: LOC 1 – Former Underground Storage Tanks (groundwater) and LOC 3 – Radar Antenna Refurbishment Area (soil). The LOC 1 groundwater assessment is ongoing, and the results will be presented under a separate cover. It was also determined that soil IM would be completed at two of the LOCs, LOC 3 and LOC 10 – Compressor Building Condensate Discharge. A Soil IM Work Plan was prepared and submitted in October 2021 (NASA 2021). The plan proposed excavation and disposal of barium and copper impacted soil in the LOC 3 and 10 areas. This report presents a summary and results of the soil IM implementation activities conducted at LOCs 3 and 10. The site contaminates of concern for this soil IM are barium and copper. The activities presented in this report includes soil IM implementation and groundwater sampling. From January 23 through March 24, 2023, AECOM Technical Services, Inc. (AECOM) field personnel conducted IM implementation activities in the LOC 3 and 10 areas. As presented in the IM Work Plan, shallow soils, impacted with metals, were excavated to a depth of 2 feet below land surface in the central area of the site around the radar antenna and associated equipment. AECOM personnel excavated 77.43 tons of soil using hand tools and, when able, heavy equipment. The soils were placed into lined roll-off containers, which were covered and transported under manifest to the Cedar Trail Landfill in Bartow, Florida. The site was restored to original condition using certified clean backfill material (sand), with filter fabric, and gravel. Areas outside of the excavation were restored with grass seed. On June 6, 2023, AECOM field personnel conducted groundwater sampling activities within the soil IM excavation area. AECOM personnel collected one groundwater sample from monitoring well Q6RS-MW0003. The sample was submitted to a fixed-based laboratory for analysis by United States Environmental Protection Agency Method 6020B for metals (barium and copper). Barium and copper were detected at 18 micrograms per liter (µg/L) and 14 µg/L, respectively, and were below the State of Florida Groundwater Cleanup Target Levels (GCTLs) for barium at 2,000 µg/L and copper at 1,000 µg/L.

Chadwick Sloan Lee↗

Automated Fiber Placement Defect Identity Cards: Cause, Anticipation, Existence, Significance, and Progression

Automated Fiber Placement (AFP), a major composite manufacturing process, can result in many defects during the layup process that often require manual corrective action to produce a part with acceptable quality. These defects are the main limitation of the technology and can be hard to categorize or define in many situations. This paper provides a thorough definition and classification of all AFP defects. This effort constitutes a comprehensive and extensive library relevant to AFP defects. The defects selected and defined in this work are based on understanding and experience from the manufacture and research of advanced composite structure. Proper classification of these defects required an in-depth literature review and consideration of various viewpoints ranging from designers, manufacturers, analysts, and inspection professionals. Collectively, these sources were utilized to develop the most accurate view of each of the individual defect types. The results are presented as identity cards for each defect type, intended to provide researchers and the manufacturing industry a clear understanding of the (1) cause, (2) anticipation, (3) existence, (4) significance, and (5) progression of the defined AFP defects. The link between AFP defects and process planning, layup strategies, and machining was also investigated. Categorization of all important automated fiber placement defects is presented.

Harik, Ramy↗

General Services Administration Reclamation Yard Solid Waste Management Unit 010: 2022 Groundwater Monitoring Report Kennedy Space Center, Florida

This report presents a summary of the groundwater monitoring activities that occurred in September and October 2022 at General Services Administration Reclamation Yard, Solid Waste Management Unit 010, located at the John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. The site is monitored under KSC’s Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Program. This approach also meets the requirements of Chapter 62-780, Florida Administrative Code. For the purposes of this report, two separate plumes, known as the Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB)/Volatile Organic Aromatic (VOA) Plume and the Chlorinated Volatile Organic Compound (VOC) Plume, were identified for this site. The contaminants of concern (COCs) for the PCB/VOA Plume consist of PCBs, 1,2,4-trichlorobenzene, and breakdown products of 1,2,4-trichlorobenzene. The COCs for the Chlorinated VOC Plume were tetrachloroethene, trichloroethene, cis-1,2-dichloroethene, and vinyl chloride. Groundwater monitoring for VOCs in the Chlorinated VOC Plume area was discontinued following the December 2021 annual monitoring event. Annual groundwater monitoring for underground injection control (UIC) parameters continues for both the PCB/VOA Plume and the Chlorinated VOC Plume areas. The activities presented in this report include one field event: September and October 2022, which includes sitewide semi-annual water level measurements of 55 monitoring wells, redevelopment of all monitoring wells listed in the sampling plan, and groundwater sampling of 28 monitoring wells. The sampling and analysis demonstrated that the PCB/VOA plume is not expanding and is significantly reduced compared to before a 2018 source removal interim measure. Recommendations are made for the 2023 groundwater monitoring program.

groundwater↗

Cloudy with a Chance of Solar Flares: The Sun as a Natural Hazard

Space weather is a naturally occurring phenomenon that represents a quantifiable risk to space- and ground-based infrastructure as well as society at large. Space weather hazards include permanent and correctable faults in computer systems, Global Positioning System (GPS) and high-frequency communication disturbances, increased airline passenger and astronaut radiation exposure, and electric grid disruption. From the National Space Weather Strategy, published by the Office of Science and Technology Policy in October 2015, space weather refers to the dynamic conditions of the space environment that arise from emissions from the Sun, which include solar flares, solar energetic particles, and coronal mass ejections. These emissions can interact with Earth and its surrounding space, including the Earth's magnetic field, potentially disrupting technologies and infrastructures. Space weather is measured using a range of space- and ground-based platforms that directly monitor the Sun, the Earth's magnetic field, the conditions in interplanetary space and impacts at Earth's surface, like neutron ground-level enhancement. The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center's Space Weather Research Center and their international collaborators in government, industry, and academia are working towards improved techniques for predicting space weather as part of the strategy and action plan to better quantify and mitigate space weather hazards. In addition to accurately measuring and predicting space weather, we also need to continue developing more advanced techniques for evaluating space weather impacts on space- and ground-based infrastructure. Within the Earth's atmosphere, elevated neutron flux driven by atmosphere-particle interactions from space weather is a primary risk source. Ground-based neutron sources form an essential foundation for quantifying space weather impacts in a variety of systems.

neutron flux↗

The International Space Station (ISS) Port 1 (P1) External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS) Ammonia Leak

From 2011 to 2017, the crew onboard the International Space Station (ISS) was at risk of dire consequences due to an external ammonia leak. Ammonia is used in the External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS) to cool the pressurized modules and external electrical systems. Engineers at NASA's Johnson Space Center (JSC) initially detected the leak in one of two cooling loops by monitoring the system ammonia inventory decay over time. White flakes seen on High Definition (HD) cameras were also thought to be associated with the leakage but not confirmed. Initially, the leak was small enough that the ammonia inventory and system operations were not in jeopardy. However, the leak began to accelerate to the point where troubleshooting and corrective action were vital to the sustainability of the ISS. Therefore, it became imperative that the leak be located and repaired for ISS operations to continue. No tools were readily available on the ISS to locate such a leak when it was initially detected, however NASA engineers were already in the process of developing a new device for this purpose called the Robotic External Leak Locator (RELL). The RELL is a robotic instrument package with a mass spectrometer and an ion pressure gauge. Initial checkout operations with RELL happened to coincide with the increasing leak, and ammonia vapors were measured around the P1 EATCS Radiator #3 flexible jumper hoses. The leak stopped after the radiator and its flexible hoses were remotely isolated from the loop and the ammonia from the isolated segment was vented to space. Astronauts conducted a spacewalk that successfully removed the hoses, which were returned to ground for further investigation. The purpose of this paper is to review the leak detection and isolation efforts, investigation results, lessons learned and the recovery plan.

Cowan, Darnell T.↗

The International Space Station (ISS) Port 1 (P1) External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS) Ammonia Leak

From 2011 to 2017, the crew onboard the International Space Station (ISS) was at risk of dire consequences due to an external ammonia leak. Ammonia is used in the External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS) to cool the pressurized modules and external electrical systems. Engineers at NASA's Johnson Space Center (JSC) initially detected the leak in one of two cooling loops by monitoring the system ammonia inventory decay over time. White flakes seen on High Definition (HD) cameras were also thought to be associated with the leakage but not confirmed. Initially, the leak was small enough that the ammonia inventory and system operations were not in jeopardy. However, the leak began to accelerate to the point where troubleshooting and corrective action were vital to the sustainability of the ISS. Therefore, it became imperative that the leak be located and repaired for ISS operations to continue. No tools were readily available on the ISS to locate such a leak when it was initially detected, however NASA engineers were already in the process of developing a new device for this purpose called the Robotic External Leak Locator (RELL). The RELL is a robotic instrument package with a mass spectrometer and an ion pressure gauge. Initial checkout operations with RELL happened to coincide with the increasing leak, and ammonia vapors were measured around the P1 EATCS Radiator #3 flexible jumper hoses. The leak stopped after the radiator and its flexible hoses were remotely isolated from the loop and the ammonia from the isolated segment was vented to space. Astronauts conducted a spacewalk that successfully removed the hoses, which were returned to ground for further investigation. The purpose of this paper is to review the leak detection and isolation efforts, investigation results, lessons learned and the recovery plan.

Cowan, Darnell T.↗

Postflight Evaluation of Atlas-Centaur AC-5 (Launched 2 March 1965)

The Atlas-Centaur AC-5 vehicle was launched from ETR Complex 36A on March 2., 1965 at 8:25.04 a.m. EST. Within about 1 second after launch the thrust of the Atlas booster engine decayed rapidly; the vehicle settled back on the launch pad and was quickly destroyed by fire and explosion. Considerable damage was sustained by the launch complex and its associated equipment. Loss of booster engine thrust was due to fuel depletion at the turbopump inlets, which is attributed to closure of the fuel prevalve or the staging valve. To preclude the recurrence of either of these fuel valving malfunctions, the following corrective action has been taken: The remote control actuator has been replaced by manual operation of the Atlas fuel prevalve; the internal passage dimensions in the staging valve have been increased to lessen the hydraulic load on the valve poppet. In addition to the Atlas fuel system malfunction, a failure in the power control circuitry of the Centaur guidance computer resulted in partial removal of power at umbilical ejection. To prevent such a guidance system failure on future flights some redundant circuitry has been eliminated and more rigorous checkout procedures have been adopted. No further anomalies were discovered in the telemetered data prior to the Atlas booster thrust decay. A prime objective of the AC-5 flight was to place a dynamic model of the Surveyor spacecraft in a simulated lunar transfer trajectory. An important facet of this problem is the demonstration of a launch-on-time capability in accordance with the proper Earth-moon relation. The window opening time was established at 8:25 a.m. EST; thus the actual launch occurred within 4 seconds of the planned time.

Source record↗

Launch Complex 34, SWMU Cc054 2021 DNAPL Source Zone Operations, Maintenance, and Monitoring, and Hot Spot 6 Air Sparge System Annual Performance Monitoring Report Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Florida

This Annual Performance Monitoring Report (PMR) for the Dense Non-Aqueous Phase Liquid (DNAPL) Source Zone (DSZ) and Hot Spot 6 (HS 6) Air Sparge (AS) System presents the results of Year 12 operation of the hydraulic containment (HC) Interim Measure (IM), the results of performance monitoring direct-push technology (DPT) sampling and monitoring well sampling conducted in the DSZ, and the results of operations and performance sampling of the HS 6 AS IM at Launch Complex 34 (LC34), located at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station (CCSFS), Florida. Site-wide biennial LTM sampling was not conducted during this reporting period and is scheduled to be conducted in December 2022. The timeframe for activities documented in this PMR extends from April 1, 2021 to March 31, 2022. LC34 has been designated Solid Waste Management Unit CC054 under the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Program. The objective of the HC IM at LC34 is to contain the DSZ and deep dissolved-phase trichloroethene (TCE) high concentration plume via operation of a hydraulic containment system (HCS). The pre-IM design 300 micrograms per liter (μg/L) TCE groundwater contour was used to establish the deep zone capture area for deep recovery wells, and the shallow zone capture area was defined by the DSZ. The system began operating in 2010, and in 2015, the system was expanded to provide HC for areas within the 300 μg/L TCE groundwater isocontours of HS 3 and 4. In 2018 and 2019, an investigation was conducted to re-characterize the DSZ, which included investigating TCE mass in Layer 7. This data was subsequently used to optimize the pumping rates of the HCS to more adequately capture residual contaminant mass. The operational period for Year 12 of the HCS was from April 1, 2021 to March 31, 2022. Operational runtime for the system was 94 percent during Year 12, with downtime events attributed to planned maintenance, system repairs, and power outages. As of March 31, 2022, a total of 285,712,801 gallons of groundwater containing 84,933 pounds of VOCs have been removed by the HCS. Influent concentrations of TCE have decreased since startup from approximately 280,000 µg/L (January 2010) to 12,000 µg/L (March 2022). During the reporting period, all effluent concentrations from the HCS (aqueous and vapor) were below regulatory reporting limits, indicating the system continues to operate as intended. Performance monitoring was conducted in December 2021 within the DSZ to evaluate TCE contamination. Groundwater samples were collected via DPT at nine locations, consistent with previous events in 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020. Full vertical profile sampling was completed at each DPT from 8 to 98 ft bls, at 5 foot intervals. The DPT performance monitoring results are summarized in this PMR. The results revealed TCE remains at concentrations greater than 11,000 µg/L in the DSZ (1-percent solubility, indicative of DNAPL) at eight of the nine DPT locations at depths ranging from 8 to 98 ft bls. An overall increasing trend of TCE concentrations was observed in DPT samples during this reporting period, which may be due to several recovery wells that were turned off during the AS Pilot Study in the DSZ that operated from July 2021 to February 2022 (documented separately from this report). The maximum TCE concentration in 2021 was 15,400,000 µg/L in the 58 ft bls depth interval at DPT597 (previous maximum result in 2020 was 1,690,000 at 48 ft bls at DPT596). During the 2021 DPT event, the overall majority of TCE contamination was identified in the 58 ft bls interval (below Layer 4), where in the previous year the majority of mass was observed in Layer 4. This trend appears to indicate continued mass discharge from Layer 4 (fine-grained unit). In addition to DPT sampling, monitoring well samples were collected from deep wells in the DSZ area (Layers 7 and 8) to verify vertical delineation. All monitoring well results were non-detect or below cleanup levels, with exception of one well (IW0162, screened 105 to 115 ft bls, which is below the existing recovery well capture zone) where TCE was identified above cleanup target levels. The HS 6 AS system remained operational during the reporting period covered under this report. The HS 6 AS IM was initiated in 2018 with 160 AS wells, and expanded in 2019 with an additional 140 AS wells. Quarterly performance monitoring was reduced to semi-annual prior to this operational period. The results of the HS 6 system operation and semi-annual performance monitoring are summarized in this report. Semi-annual monitoring results collected in April and October 2021 show concentrations of contaminants of concern (cis-1,2-dichloroethene, trans-1,2- dichloroethene, and vinyl chloride) are generally decreasing and not impacting the surface water drainage canal, indicating the HS 6 IM is meeting objectives. Overall, the tasks associated with Year 12 operation of the HC IM and operation of the HS 6 AS IM were performed in accordance with the recommendations of the 2020 LC34 (Year 11) Operations, Maintenance, and Monitoring Report for DNAPL Source Zone, Site Wide LongTerm Monitoring, and Hot Spot 6 Air Sparging System PMR (NASA, 2021c). Evaluation of results from the HC IM and HS 6 IM show that these systems are operating as designed and meeting performance objectives.

trichloroethene↗

Hypergol Maintenance Facility North, SWMU 090, Year 3 Air Sparge System Performance Monitoring Report, Kennedy Space Center, Florida

This Performance Monitoring Report (PMR) presents Year 3 Air Sparge (AS) System operation, maintenance, and monitoring (OM&M) activities and performance monitoring results for the AS Interim Measure (IM) at the Hypergol Maintenance Facility North (HMFN) at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. HMFN has been designated Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) 090 under the KSC Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Program. The timeframe for activities included in this report extends from September 2022 to August 2023. The HMFN AS IM was implemented in 2019-2020 to treat a chlorinated solvent groundwater plume that resulted from historical operations supporting the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Space Program. The system includes 213 AS wells, with screen depths ranging from 25 feet to 45 feet below land surface (bls) and treats approximately 1.62 acres of contaminated groundwater. The objective of the AS IM is to actively reduce groundwater concentrations exceeding Florida Department of Environmental Protection Natural Attenuation Default Concentrations (NADCs) (identified as the High Concentration Plume [HCP]) to levels that facilitate transition into a Long-Term Monitoring program. The AS IM targets all of the HCP, except for a source zone area within the HCP where trichloroethene (TCE) concentrations exceed 11,000 micrograms per liter (μg/L) at depths greater than 45 feet bls. This is because site lithology was found to not be conducive to the AS treatment technology at these deeper depths. NASA will re-visit plans for potentially utilizing another remedial technology for residual deeper contamination following completion of the AS IM. OM&M activities and results from Year 3 indicate that the AS system at HMFN is operating as designed and is meeting performance criteria. Groundwater performance monitoring results indicate that following the third year of AS system operation, TCE concentrations in wells across all treated depth intervals have been reduced by an average of more than 99 percent. Overall, the areal extent of the plume showed a reduction following Year 3 of AS operations; however, continued operation of the AS system is required to meet the IM objective.

VOCs↗

Launch Complex 34, SWMU CC054 2023 DNAPL Source Zone Operations, Maintenance, and Monitoring, Site-Wide Long-Term Monitoring, and Hot Spot 6 Air Sparge System Annual Performance Monitoring and Phase Two Expansion Construction Completion Report Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Florida

This Annual Performance Monitoring Report (PMR) for the Dense Non-Aqueous Phase Liquid (DNAPL) Source Zone (DSZ), Site-Wide Long-Term Monitoring (LTM), and Hot Spot 6 (HS 6) Air Sparge (AS) System presents the results of Year 14 operations and performance monitoring of the hydraulic containment (HC) Interim Measure (IM), details associated with construction and implementation of the HS 6 AS system expansion (Phase Two), and the results of operations and performance sampling of the HS 6 AS IM at Launch Complex 34 (LC34), located at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station (CCSFS), Florida. The timeframe for activities documented in this PMR extends from April 1, 2023 to March 31, 2024. LC34 has been designated Solid Waste Management Unit CC054 under the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Program. The objective of the HC IM at LC34 is to contain the shallow and deep DSZ and surrounding dissolved-phase trichloroethene (TCE) high concentration plume via operation of a hydraulic containment system (HCS). The pre-IM design 300 micrograms per liter (μg/L) TCE groundwater contour was used to establish the deep zone capture area for deep recovery wells, and the shallow zone capture area was defined by the DSZ. The system began operating in 2010, and in 2015, the system was expanded to provide HC for areas within the 300 μg/L TCE groundwater isocontours of HS 3 and 4. In 2018 and 2019, an investigation was conducted to recharacterize the DSZ, which included investigating TCE mass in Layer 7. This data was subsequently used to optimize the pumping rates of the HCS and install additional recovery wells in Layer 7 to more adequately capture residual contaminant mass. The operational period for Year 14 of the HCS was from April 1, 2023 to March 31, 2024. Operational runtime for the system was 94 percent during Year 14, with downtime events attributed to planned maintenance, system repairs, and power outages. As of March 31, 2024, a total of 344,849,634 cumulative gallons of groundwater containing 94,656 pounds of chlorinated volatile organic compounds (CVOCs) have been removed by the HCS. During the reporting period covered under this report, the HCS recovered 31,176,393 gallons and approximately 6,319 pounds of CVOC mass. Total combined influent concentrations of TCE have decreased since startup from approximately 280,000 µg/L (January 2010) to 25,000 µg/L (March 2024). During the reporting period, all effluent concentrations from the HCS (aqueous and vapor) were below regulatory reporting limits, indicating the system continues to operate as intended. Performance monitoring was conducted in January 2024 within the DSZ to evaluate TCE contamination. Groundwater samples were collected via DPT at nine locations, consistent with previous events between 2017 and 2022. Full vertical profile sampling was completed at each DPT from 8 to 98 feet below land surface (bls), at 5-foot intervals. The DPT performance monitoring results are summarized in this PMR. The results revealed TCE remains at concentrations greater than 11,000 µg/L in the DSZ (1-percent solubility, indicative of DNAPL) at eight of the nine DPT locations and at depths ranging from 28 to 98 feet bls. An overall decreasing trend of TCE concentrations was observed in DPT samples during this reporting period, which is a reduction from the previous event (December 2022) and the peak event in December 2021, where TCE percentages appeared to increase in all depth zones because several recovery wells were turned off during the AS pilot study in the DSZ. The maximum TCE concentration in January 2024 was 1,600,000 µg/L in the 53 feet bls depth interval at DPT594 (previous maximum result in 2022 was 1,800,000 µg/L in the 48 feet bls depth interval at DPT599). This maximum concentration in the 53 feet bls depth interval is in the deep capture zone. During the January 2024 DPT event, the largest portion of TCE mass was observed in the 48 feet bls interval above/within Layer 4. This trend remains consistent with previous years and appears to indicate continued mass discharge from Layer 4 (fine-grained unit). In addition to DPT sampling, annual groundwater samples were collected from 11 deep monitoring wells in the DSZ area (Layers 7 and 8) in December 2023 to verify vertical and horizontal delineation. Three of the wells were also sampled biweekly to evaluate operations of recovery well RW21D (screened 86 to 106 feet bls), which was installed in January 2023. Of the Layer 7/8 monitoring sampled only annually, results were non-detect or less than groundwater cleanup target levels GCTLs in December 2023, with the exception of one well, IW45D2, which had a cis-1,2-dichloroethene (cDCE), detection greater than the GCTL. Of the three wells sampled biweekly during the operational period, the well located closest to Layer 7 recovery well RW21D (IW44D2, screened 105 to 115 feet bls) had concentrations of TCE, cDCE and vinyl chloride (VC) greater than GCTLs throughout the operational period, but displayed a decreasing trend since the peak concentrations in September 2023. The maximum TCE concentration during this operational period was 190,000 µg/L at IW44D2 in September 2023, but reduced to 700 µg/L in March 2024, indicating the HCS is still effectively removing mass from the source area. Expansion of the HCS and addition of new recovery wells is ongoing and will continue to be evaluated as the groundwater recovery scheme is optimized. Details of the expansion and optimization will be provided in a future PMR. The HS 6 AS IM was initiated in 2018 with 160 AS wells and expanded in 2019 with another 140 AS wells. An additional expansion of the HS 6 AS IM was completed during the reporting period covered under this report and details of the construction implementation and startup of the expansion are detailed in Section III of this report. The new expansion, referred to as Phase Two, was implemented between August 17, 2022 and August 28, 2023, and included the installation of 190 air sparge wells to treat an additional 11.2 acres. The original configuration (referred to as Phase One) operated until Phase Two came online, then all but 52 AS wells were turned off so the components could be moved and utilized in the Phase Two area. The 52 AS wells that remain on are in a barrier configuration preventing contaminated groundwater from impacting the treated area. The HS 6 AS system (both Phase One and Two) operated normally during the reporting period covered under this report. Semi-annual performance monitoring of the Phase One configuration was conducted in April and November 2023, consistent with previous years. For the Phase Two configuration, 21 new monitoring wells were installed and sampled quarterly, with a baseline event in July 2023, and quarterly events in November 2023 and February 2024 summarized in this report. Semi-annual monitoring results collected in April and October 2023 show concentrations of contaminants of concern (cDCE, trans-1,2-dichloroethene, and VC) have decreased to less than GCTLs in nearly all wells and not impacting the surface water drainage canal, indicating the HS 6 IM continues to meet objectives. The baseline and quarterly sampling for the Phase Two configuration indicate generally decreasing concentrations in wells within and around the perimeter of the treatment area. At least two more quarters of monitoring will be conducted and once those results are evaluated a reduced the sampling frequency may be considered. Overall, the tasks associated with Year 14 operation of the HC IM and operation of the HS 6 AS IM were performed in accordance with recommendations included in the previous 2022 LC34 (Year 13) PMR. Evaluation of results from the HC IM and HS 6 IM show that these systems are operating as designed and meeting performance objectives.

groundwater remediation↗