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NASA NTRS2016

Architecture Modeling on the Europa Project

In 2015 NASA chartered a partnership between the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) to begin planning a mission to study the Jovian moon Europa. The project has adopted a Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach to its architecting process since its early formulation, developing certain modeling practices and tools as needed, with the expectation that this process would result in a more consistent and verifiable architecture than with a more traditional document-based approach. A sound architecture is essential to provide the rationale for requirements on the system design, and to define the trade space of acceptable design points within which technical and programmatic concerns as well as project objectives can be addressed. This paper provides an overview of the framework used by the Europa project to describe the mission architecture and discusses how a system model was instrumental in providing a single-source-of-truth for this description. Several key modeling patterns to represent the architecture are presented, along with audit methods to ensure the consistency and the correctness of the model. Finally, the benefits and challenges of using a model-based approach to generate traditional requirements documents and other gate products are assessed.

Dubos, Gregory F.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Exposing Hidden Parts of the SE Process: MBSE Patterns and Tools for Tracking and Traceability

An interesting benefit of applying Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) is that the rigor and coordination intrinsic to MBSE forces us to apply Systems Engineering to our own traditional activities, processes, and products, which results in richer, more expressive models, more powerful reasoning, and a clearer and more effective Systems Engineering (SE) process. Our MBSE frameworks and languages contain semantic richness sufficient to describe our systems at any particular point in time, often with an emphasis on the description of the system at major milestones. This is unarguably a real asset. However, when we apply MBSE in service of missions that are in development, rapidly evolving, of a larger scale, and where interpersonal communication is a critical part of the design process, we discover that our frameworks and languages are still not quite rich enough to enable us to ask the kinds of questions and get the kinds of answers we want in order to address the concerns of day to day work. This paper will discuss some patterns and tools we have developed to help address some of the not-always-explicit SE concerns that we have identified through our MBSE work. Particularly, this paper will discuss flexible yet practical methods for defining and capturing maturity, workflow, and agreement traceability within our system models, extensible ways to perform and track model audits, and ways to report and interact with this knowledge in the context of MBSE applied to support NASA’s Europa Project.

Jackson, Maddalena↗
NASA NTRS2016

Exposing Hidden Parts of the SE Process: MBSE Patterns and Tools for Tracking and Traceability

An interesting benefit of applying Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) is that the rigor and coordination intrinsic to MBSE forces us to apply Systems Engineering to our own traditional activities, processes, and products, which results in richer, more expressive models, more powerful reasoning, and a clearer and more effective Systems Engineering (SE) process. Our MBSE frameworks and languages contain semantic richness sufficient to describe our systems at any particular point in time, often with an emphasis on the description of the system at major milestones. This is unarguably a real asset. However, when we apply MBSE in service of missions that are in development, rapidly evolving, of a larger scale, and where interpersonal communication is a critical part of the design process, we discover that our frameworks and languages are still not quite rich enough to enable us to ask the kinds of questions and get the kinds of answers we want in order to address the concerns of day to day work. This paper will discuss some patterns and tools we have developed to help address some of the not-always-explicit SE concerns that we have identified through our MBSE work. Particularly, this paper will discuss flexible yet practical methods for defining and capturing maturity, workflow, and agreement traceability within our system models, extensible ways to perform and track model audits, and ways to report and interact with this knowledge in the context of MBSE applied to support NASA’s Europa Project

Jackson, Maddalena↗
NASA NTRS2020

SAGE III ISS Contamination Monitoring Package: Observations in Orbit

The Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment III (SAGE III) telescope and instrument assembly employ the methods of solar occultation and lunar occultation to retrieve near-global vertical profiles of atmospheric ozone, water vapor, nitrogen dioxide, aerosol extinctions, and other gaseous species and atmospheric state parameters. The SAGE III grating spectrometer measures light within the spectral range of 280 nm to 1037 nm at approximately 1 nm resolution, but retrievals in the Ultraviolet (UV) are particularly sensitive to contamination of the optical train. Therefore, a contamination door that contains a quartz optical window can be closed over the telescope aperture during periods of enhanced external contaminant flux. This optically transparent window permits continued science event acquisition at an acceptably diminished signal-to-noise ratio, which is expected to decline with ongoing accretion of contaminant material. To date, this impact has been short term, and science quality through the window returns to baseline performance after a contamination source is removed and spontaneous desorption removes material from the low-affinity quartz surface. Two Contamination Monitoring Packages (CMPs) consisting of eight Thermoelectric Quartz Crystal Microbalances (TQCMs) from QCM Research provide characterization and redundant monitoring of contaminant deposition from the 2π steradian solid angle on the payload side of the Expedite the Processing of Experiments to the Space Station (ExPRESS) Payload Adapter. CMP data are closely examined by the SAGE III team to determine when the contamination door should remain closed during science events and in what direction the instrument assembly scan head should stow when not acquiring science measurements. Additionally, should the CMPs indicate an unacceptable accretion rate, the ight computer will close the contamination door as part of the automatic fault detection system. Along with spectrometer measurements of the quartz window's transmission, the payload CMPs enable auditing of the mission contamination budget. The process of Thermogravimetric Analysis (TGA) can be used to help identify chemical constituents accreted on the CMP sensors. To be presented here along with an explanation of the CMP systems are the first two and a half years of observations of the contaminant deposition environment around the payload in quiescence and during special events like docking vehicles.

Tyler T Dawson↗
NASA NTRS2020

SAGE III/ISS Contamination Monitoring Package: Observations in Orbit

The Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment III (SAGE III) telescope and instrument assembly employ the methods of solar occultation and lunar occultation to retrieve near-global vertical profiles of atmospheric ozone, water vapor, nitrogen dioxide, aerosol extinctions, and other gaseous species and atmospheric state parameters. The SAGE III grating spectrometer measures light within the spectral range of 280 nm to 1037 nm at approximately 1 nm resolution, but retrievals in the Ultraviolet (UV) are particularly sensitive to contamination of the optical train. Therefore, a contamination door that contains a quartz optical window can be closed over the telescope aperture during periods of enhanced external contaminant flux. This optically transparent window permits continued science event acquisition at an acceptably diminished signal-to-noise ratio, which is expected to decline with ongoing accretion of contaminant material. To date, this impact has been short term, and science quality through the window returns to baseline performance after a contamination source is removed and spontaneous desorption removes material from the low-affinity quartz surface. Two Contamination Monitoring Packages (CMPs) consisting of eight Thermoelectric Quartz Crystal Microbalances (TQCMs) from QCM Research provide characterization and redundant monitoring of contaminant deposition from the 2pi steradian solid angle on the payload side of the Expedite the Processing of Experiments to the Space Station (ExPRESS) Payload Adapter. CMP data are closely examined by the SAGE III team to determine when the contamination door should remain closed during science events and in what direction the instrument assembly scan head should stow when not acquiring science measurements. Additionally, should the CMPs indicate an unacceptable accretion rate, the flight computer will close the contamination door as part of the automatic fault detection system. Along with spectrometer measurements of the quartz window's transmission, the payload CMPs enable auditing of the mission contamination budget. The process of Thermogravimetric Analysis (TGA) can be used to help identify chemical constituents accreted on the CMP sensors. To be presented here along with an explanation of the CMP systems are the first two and a half years of observations of the contaminant deposition environment around the payload in quiescence and during special events like docking vehicles.

Tyler T Dawson↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

HAT m:N Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA)

This Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) study was designed to understand the capability of the m:N Tactical Operator (TO) interfaces developed by the Human-Autonomy Teaming Laboratory at NASA Ames to support operators responsible for simplified pilot operations of 100 independently operated small UAS (sUAS) in a constrained geographic area. The m:N sUAS TO interface includes a central Tactical Situation Display (TSD) digital map with moving icons reflecting the sUAS location and planned flight route. The interface also has two side panels. The left panel includes a tabular list of UAS assets and mission tasking, a list of recently viewed assets, and a list of events and alerts. The right panel includes a tabular list of UAS assets and their associated telemetry, text-based chat communication window, and a tabbed checklist window. This CTA was adapted from the incident-based applied cognitive task analysis (Militello & Hutton, 1998) and included demographics questions, scenario-based simulations, a task diagram and knowledge audit methods. In addition to examining the support provided by this m:N sUAS TO interface, this CTA study, conducted with aviation subject matter experts in analogous roles to the future tactical operator, was designed to illuminate and project likely cognitive requirements of the tactical operator. Interviewees participated in two scenario-based simulations using the m:N sUAS TO interfaces. In the first simulation, the interviewees supervised 12 sUAS operating in downtown San Diego, California transiting to and from a central sUAS Hive, restaurant locations, and customer drop off locations. Interviewees were asked to react to a UAS Volume Reservation (UVR) event with a two-phase impact on food delivery operations. In the second scenario, the interviewees supervised 100 sUAS operating in the same airspace and with the same mission. Interviewees used the interfaces to recognize and react to two sUAS air vehicle problems. After each scenario, we asked the interviewees a semi-structured list of questions to elicit their reflections about using the interfaces. Interviewees were confident in their ability to respond to two off-nominal situations in each simulation. Interviewees felt that, given high levels of automation on the sUAS, they would be able to manage the events without requiring additional support or handing off the sUAS to a colleague or supervisor in both the n=12 or n=100 sUAS settings. In the n=12 sUAS condition, interviewees used the center map to understand the asset location and progress along with mission tasking. An additional display window, Asset Telemetry, helped interviewees understand battery state and sUAS altitude. When the number of sUAS increased, interviewees altered their behavior. Rather than maintaining awareness of individual assets, interviewees appeared to become more reactive, managing exceptions. Interviewees reported that they spent less time looking at the nominal aircraft, and focused their attention primarily on the off-nominal aircraft. In addition, in the second simulation with n=100 sUAS, interviewees reported that they relied more on the side panels (Mission Timeline and Asset Telemetry) to gather information.

human-autonomy teaming↗
NASA NTRS2021

Modernizing NASA’s Space Flight Safety and Mission Success (S&MS) Assurance Framework In Line With Evolving Acquisition Strategies and Systems Engineering Practices

This paper presents the objectives-driven, case-based safety and mission success (S&MS) assurance framework being developed by the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), including its motivations and its implementation via a S&MS Assurance Standard that is under development, supplemented by supporting standards including an S&MS Analysis Management Standard that is also under development. A need to evolve NASA’s S&MS assurance framework has emerged in recent years, resulting from the need to accommodate new acquisition models; the need to accommodate evolving systems engineering (SE) practices; the need to stipulate acceptable levels of S&MS risk; the need for improved integration of S&MS into SE; and the need for clearer risk acceptance accountability. The objectives-driven, case-based S&MS assurance framework proposed here is responsive to that need. Its key features include: • The establishment, by NASA Acquirers, of fundamental S&MS performance objectives that define limits of acceptability for the likelihoods that mission technical objectives will be accomplished and that people, assets, and environments put at risk by the mission will not be adversely affected; • The development and approval of Providers’ S&MS plans for meeting Acquirers’ S&MS performance objectives, including commitments to support Acquirer audit, investigation, and reporting needs; • The development, by Providers, of S&MS assurance cases that argue, supported by evidence, that the Provider has met, or is on track to meeting, the fundamental S&MS objectives; • The evaluation, throughout the program/project life cycle, of Provider S&MS assurance cases as the primary S&MS-related technical basis for Acquirer risk acceptance and the granting to the Provider of authority to proceed through the program/project life cycle. This proposed S&MS assurance framework is notable for its lack of prescription of traditional S&MS requirements and strategies such as defined failure tolerances, margins, or analysis requirements. Instead, Providers are given latitude to propose their own strategies for meeting the fundamental S&MS performance objectives, subject to independent review and Acquirer approval. The result is a framework for S&MS assurance that is at once both rigorous and flexible.

Assurance Case↗
NASA NTRS2022

Assessing Several Non-Traditional Data Sources for Value in Aviation Safety

The NASA System-Wide Safety (SWS) project and its predecessor projects have been developing Machine Learning (ML) algorithms for commercial aviation safety for many years. These algorithms have been applied to Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA); radar track data (e.g., Threaded Track); and safety reports, including Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and Aviation Safety Action Plan (ASAP). SWS is working with partners to get access to other data that air carriers provide, such as maintenance data, and has been assisting carriers in working with other data, such as Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) data, using manual methods. However, the project has discussed whether there are other data that are not traditionally used in aviation safety analysis that may be useful. This paper discusses four sets of data and models that are not traditionally used in aviation safety but that have shown promise for such use. In the future, we plan to incorporate such data into ML algorithms to use with data that we have used before and determine the additional benefit that is actually achieved under different contexts from the inclusion of these non-traditional data sources.

Nikunj C. Oza↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗
NASA NTRS2025

Identifying Cognitive Capabilities Required for Optimal Exploration EVA Performance: A Cognitive Task Analysis

BACKGROUND Extravehicular activity (EVA) is one of the most dangerous and cognitively demanding actions that astronauts can execute, and the cognitive demands associated with future exploration EVA on the Moon and Mars are expected to be higher compared to EVA currently conducted from the International Space Station (ISS). Decrements in cognitive performance present an important risk to crew safety during exploration mission class EVA. Yet there is currently insufficient characterization of the cognitive capabilities required prior to, during, and following EVA. Furthermore, it is unclear which cognitive domains are most important for conducting mission critical decisions with crew safety implications. To address this gap, we conducted a cognitive task analysis of exploration EVA to characterize the cognitive capabilities, critical safety decisions, and contributing factors (e.g., lunar communications delay) important to monitor for optimal performance in future exploration EVA. This cognitive task analysis was conducted through interviews with astronauts and subject matter experts in EVA research and operations. Interviews focused on exploration EVA and elicited feedback on the cognitive capabilities required for specific EVA tasks and subtasks. The information from this cognitive task analysis will help close the gap in our understanding of the key cognitive capabilities required for safe decision-making during exploration mission class EVA on the Moon and Mars. METHOD We used an applied cognitive task analysis method1 over the course of interviews with a total of 15 NASA astronauts and subject matter experts in EVA. Each interview was led by a scientist with expertise in cognitive neuroscience from the Behavioral Health & Performance (BHP) Laboratory at NASA Johnson Space Center. Notes were taken by a research coordinator in the BHP Laboratory and interviews were recorded on Microsoft Teams to ensure the accuracy of notetaking. In the first interview protocol, participants were asked about the specific tasks and cognitive demands associated with EVA. This provided a high-level overview of the steps involved in the major tasks conducted during exploration EVA, as well as which of the steps require the most cognitive skill. Next, participants completed a knowledge audit, which employs a set of probes designed to describe types of domain knowledge of skill and elicit appropriate examples. In the second interview protocol, completed with a separate set of subject matter experts, interviewees were asked to complete a simulated incapacitated crew rescue (ICR) scenario2, which provided specific context that allowed probing around relevant issues such as situational awareness and potential errors. Experts were then asked to identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) underlying each EVA task and to provide ratings on the importance and cognitive demand of each KSA. Finally, participants also described the most likely and consequential critical safety incidents related to decrements in cognitive performance during exploration EVA and assessed the impact of lunar communication delay on cognitive performance. RESULTS & DISCUSSION Interviews for this cognitive task analysis are nearly complete and results will be presented in full at IWS 2025. Results will include a summary of all expert ratings of EVA tasks and subtasks, qualitative summaries of content from each interview part, and a discussion of future directions for products addressing cognitive performance monitoring and cognitive domain mapping in exploration EVA.

S R Anderson↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Contracting Quality Early in the Lifecycle Using AS9145 Data Deliverables

Development schedules and a highly dynamic supply chain are a challenge to developers of complex systems produced at low volume. Flaws in designs, parts and materials availability problems, poor manufacturability, and a lack of knowledge about critical items and key process attributes can be realized well before traditional second-party quality assurance activities begin. Supplier audits and product inspections may have little mitigating effect once these foundational problems have been realized. Their impacts can be significant lifecycle disruption, cost overruns, inability to deliver to plan, and even project cancellation. AS9145, Requirements for Advanced Product Quality Planning and Production Part Approval Process, can be used to drive quality engineering practices into early development lifecycles to significantly reduce this late-cycle risk and to reduce the cost of quality overall. Since its initial publication in 2016, it has had very limited adoption by the DoD, no adoption by NASA, and sparse adoption in the aerospace and defense supply chain. A task group within the Aerospace Industries Association's (AIA) Joint Strategic Quality Council (JSQC) identified that both acquirers and suppliers see as AS9145 as a cost-adder and are hesitant to use it as an alternative to late-stage-heavy quality assurance approaches. A lack of prior use creates large capability gaps in request-for-proposal (RFP) teams, proposal teams, suppliers’ quality management systems (QMS), and in experienced personnel executing the early lifecycle approach. To create a more realizable on-ramp for using AS9145 in the space and defense sectors, the AIA JSQC task team created five deliverable requirements descriptions (DRDs) that can be used in a contract to begin to engage both parties in early lifecycle quality engineering and quality assurance activities, that reduce exposure to late-stage cost and schedule collapse due to unidentified risks in design, supply chain, and manufacturability. These DRDs drive the parties to engage in planning and analysis discussions early on to understand what production risks can be known and how they will focus resources based on safety criticality and the key elements of design and construction. The suppliers and acquirers who will produce the data and information required by the DRD will be able to incrementally evolve their QMS and the acquirer will incrementally be able to track and understand the benefits of cost shifting from late to early development phases. A white paper describing this approach and the five recommended DRDs will be published by the AIA in late 2024 or early 2025.

Jeannette Plante↗