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NASA NTRS2008

Designing a Composable Geometric Toolkit for Versatility in Applications to Simulation Development

Conceived and implemented through the development of probabilistic risk assessment simulations for Project Constellation, the Geometric Toolkit allows users to create, analyze, and visualize relationships between geometric shapes in three-space using the MATLAB computing environment. The key output of the toolkit is an analysis of how emanations from one "source" geometry (e.g., a leak in a pipe) will affect another "target" geometry (e.g., another heat-sensitive component). It can import computer-aided design (CAD) depictions of a system to be analyzed, allowing the user to reliably and easily represent components within the design and determine the relationships between them, ultimately supporting more technical or physics-based simulations that use the toolkit. We opted to develop a variety of modular, interconnecting software tools to extend the scope of the toolkit, providing the capability to support a range of applications. This concept of simulation composability allows specially-developed tools to be reused by assembling them in various combinations. As a result, the concepts described here and implemented in this toolkit have a wide range of applications outside the domain of risk assessment. To that end, the Geometric Toolkit has been evaluated for use in other unrelated applications due to the advantages provided by its underlying design.

Reed, Gregory S.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Technical Excellence and Communication: The Cornerstones for Successful Safety and Mission Assurance Programs

The paper describes the role of technical excellence and communication in the development and maintenance of safety and mission assurance programs. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) organization is used to illustrate philosophies and techniques that strengthen safety and mission assurance efforts and that contribute to healthy and effective organizational cultures. The events and conditions leading to the development of the MSFC S&MA organization are reviewed. Historic issues and concerns are identified. The adverse effects of resource limitations and risk assessment roles are discussed. The structure and functions of the core safety, reliability, and quality assurance functions are presented. The current organization s mission and vision commitments serve as the starting points for the description of the current organization. The goals and objectives are presented that address the criticisms of the predecessor organizations. Additional improvements are presented that address the development of technical excellence and the steps taken to improve communication within the Center, with program customers, and with other Agency S&MA organizations.

Malone, Roy W.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Assurance of Fault Management: Risk-Significant Adverse Condition Awareness

Fault Management (FM) systems are ranked high in risk-based assessment of criticality within flight software, emphasizing the importance of establishing highly competent domain expertise to provide assurance for NASA projects, especially as spaceflight systems continue to increase in complexity. Insight into specific characteristics of FM architectures seen embedded within safety- and mission-critical software systems analyzed by the NASA Independent Verification Validation (IVV) Program has been enhanced with an FM Technical Reference (TR) suite. Benefits are aimed beyond the IVV community to those that seek ways to efficiently and effectively provide software assurance to reduce the FM risk posture of NASA and other space missions. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated IVV techniques provides a TR suite that enables greater assurance that critical software systems will adequately protect against faults and respond to adverse conditions. The role FM has with regard to overall asset protection of flight software systems is being addressed with the development of an adverse condition (AC) database encompassing flight software vulnerabilities.Identification of potential off-nominal conditions and analysis to determine how a system responds to these conditions are important aspects of hazard analysis and fault management. Understanding what ACs the mission may face, and ensuring they are prevented or addressed is the responsibility of the assurance team, which necessarily should have insight into ACs beyond those defined by the project itself. Research efforts sponsored by NASAs Office of Safety and Mission Assurance defined terminology, categorized data fields, and designed a baseline repository that centralizes and compiles a comprehensive listing of ACs and correlated data relevant across many NASA missions. This prototype tool helps projects improve analysis by tracking ACs, and allowing queries based on project, mission type, domain component, causal fault, and other key characteristics. The repository has a firm structure, initial collection of data, and an interface established for informational queries, with plans for integration within the Enterprise Architecture at NASA IVV, enabling support and accessibility across the Agency. The development of an improved workflow process for adaptive, risk-informed FM assurance is currently underway.

Software Verification & Validation↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Testing a Run-Time Assurance Framework Coupled with Integrated Risk Mitigation Capabilities for Autonomous Urban UAS Flights

The In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) Concept of Operations (ConOps) envisions new capabilities to monitor, assess, and mitigate flight safety risks. Systems will be tailored to mission type, vehicle/equipage type, operational environment, and safety risk tolerance. Within an IASMS framework, several capabilities may be implemented spanning three operational phases (pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight/off-line); and consisting of lower level functions and information services which may reside onboard the aircraft, on third-party server(s), and/or on ground/operator station(s). Each capability will be designed to produce and disseminate safety-relevant information; perform detection, diagnosis, and prediction of unsafe situations; and/or execute mitigation actions when hazardous events warrant such changes. This paper focuses on recent testing of airborne capabilities that demonstrate inflight aspects of the overarching concept for autonomous unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operations in urban environments. A flight test architecture is described that applies run-time assurance principles (e.g., executes independent of the unassured autopilot), real-time risk assessment, and a technique to execute contingencies if necessary either automatically or via pilot intervention. Several tests using small UAS were conducted to verify the assured in-flight risk mitigation capability. The paper draws significantly from a larger NASA technical report and recent prior conference papers, providing additional details. Data is analyzed for two representative flights to illustrate the performance for various sequential and simultaneous hazards used during testing. During each automated flight, several hazards are encountered at various points along the flight path. At each point, the hazard is mitigated by the system, with the vehicle then continuing to subsequent points. The paper concludes with lessons-learned regarding relevant aspects of the overarching IASMS concept and how it may be updated and further advanced in the future.

population activity↗

NASA NTRS2024

DSS Security Assessment

The Discovery and Synchronization service (DSS) has implemented some reasonable technical controls that help improve security and there are very few technical findings. The use of Docker and Kubernetes helps simplify the deployment process, and the DSS uses mutual TLS (mTLS) to connect. Much of the security risk across the DSS is a factor of its nature, a distributed environment that relies on all members to secure their parts correctly. As such, the DSS team should attempt to emphasize security controls that reduce complexity for securing entities’ Cockroach DB (CRDB) instances properly and improve coordination among DSS members for things like security patching, incident response, detecting, and removing bad actors. The DSS team must recognize that operating a DSS instance securely will require a combination of technical and procedural controls. Each DSS entity must configure their instance properly and follow standard operating procedures to ensure that the DSS service is secure.

threat modeling↗

NASA NTRS1995

Non-GEO mobile satellite systems: A risk assessment

Since 1991, The MITRE Corporation has performed several independent evaluations of proposed mobile satellite service (MSS) systems that would operate from low Earth orbit (LEO) or medium Earth orbit (MEO), also known as intermediate circular orbit (ICO). This paper introduces a top level Risk Taxonomy tailored to summarize the technical and programmatic risks that MITRE has identified. In general, as risks are identified and addressed, a system's technical characteristics, cost and schedule are affected. This paper traces changes in three key parameters - satellite launch mass, system cost, and system schedule - for each of the five original non-GEO MSS systems for which license applications were made to the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from November 1990 until June 1991. Finally, specific risk areas are identified using the Risk Taxonomy as a framework for discussion.

Gaffney, Leah M.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Model-Based Systems Engineering Evaluation of the Evolution to an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System

In 2018, as result of a recommendation from the National Academies, NASA began to prototype an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System(IASMS). The purpose of the IASMS is to enable innovative aviation operations and greater heterogeneity of the overall National Airspace (NAS) by automating much of the safety monitoring, assessment, and risk and hazard mitigation functionspresent in today’s Safety Management Systems (SMS). NASA has worked together with early industry collaborators to understand how such a system might work and has published several early Concepts of Operation (ConOps) and other technical memoranda that illustrate the primary considerations for selected aviation domains. The shift from an SMS to an IASMS is predicated on several assumptions, including: 1.) automating safety functions will decrease the amount of time necessary for risk and hazard identification and analysis, making it more likely that safety concerns are understood ‘in-time’ to mitigate them, and 2.) an IASMS will allow easier tailoring of safety management processes to the particular risks and hazards inherent to that aviation operation. In this paper, we begin to validate these assumptions through the use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE).

In-time Aviation Safety Management System↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Model-Based Systems Engineering Evaluation of the Evolution to an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System

In 2018, as result of a recommendation from the National Academies, NASA began to prototype an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). The purpose of the IASMS is to enable innovative aviation operations and greater heterogeneity of the overall National Airspace (NAS) by automating much of the safety monitoring, assessment, and risk and hazard mitigation function present in today’s Safety Management Systems (SMS). NASA has worked together with early industry collaborators to understand how such a system might work and has published several early Concepts of Operation (ConOps) and other technical memoranda that illustrate the primary considerations for selected aviation domains. The shift from an SMS to an IASMS is predicated on several assumptions, including: 1.) automating safety functions will decrease the amount of time necessary for risk and hazard identification and analysis, making it more likely that safety concerns are understood ‘in-time’ to mitigate them, and 2.) an IASMS will allow easier tailoring of safety management processes to the particular risks and hazards inherent to that aviation operation. In this paper, we begin to validate these assumptions through the use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE).

IASMS↗

NASA NTRS2000

Lay and Expert Perceptions of Planetary Protection

As space scientists and engineers plan new missions to Mars and other planets in our solar system, they will face critical questions about the potential for biological contamination of planetary surfaces. In a society that places ever-increasing importance on the role of public involvement in science and technology policy, questions about risks of biological contamination will be examined and debated in the media, and will lead to the formation of public perceptions of planetary-contamination risks. These perceptions will, over time, form an important input to the development of space policy. Previous research in public and expert perceptions of technological risks and hazards has shown that many of the problems faced by risk-management organizations are the result of differing perceptions of risk (and risk management) between the general public and scientific and technical experts. These differences manifest themselves both as disagreements about the definition (and level) of risk associated with a scientific, technological or industrial enterprise, and as distrust about the ability of risk-management organizations (both public and private) to adequately protect people's health and safety. This report presents the results of a set of survey studies designed to reveal perceptions of planetary exploration and protection from a wide range of respondents, including both members of the general public and experts in the life sciences. The potential value of this research lies in what it reveals about perceptions of risk and benefit that could improve risk-management policies and practices. For example, efforts to communicate with the public about Mars sample return missions could benefit from an understanding of the specific concerns that nonscientists have about such a mission by suggesting areas of potential improvement in public education and information. Assessment of both public and expert perceptions of risk can also be used to provide an advanced signal of aspects of planetary exploration and protection that may be particularly sensitive or controversial and that could prove problematic from a risk-management standpoint, perhaps warranting a more stringent risk-management approach than would otherwise be the case based on technical considerations alone. The design of the study compares perceptions and attitudes about space exploration relevant to a Mars sample return mission between three respondent groups: (1) members of The Planetary Society, a group representing individuals with a strong interest in space-related issues, (2) a group of university-aged students, representing a population relatively sensitive to environmental hazards, and (3) a group of life scientists outside of the space research community. Members of The Planetary Society received the survey as part of a special issue of The Planetary Report on planetary protection, which contained a number of background articles on planetary protection and related topics. A synopsis of the issue was prepared as an introduction to the survey for the other two groups.

Race, Margaret S.↗

NASA NTRS2025

Private Astronaut Post-Mission Debrief Interviews Study

BACKGROUND The commercialization of space will increasingly include individuals that are not rigorously-selected, highly-trained professional astronauts. Private astronaut missions (PAMs), such as Axiom-1 in 2022, will continue to travel to the International Space Station in the coming years, but the risk of integrating private astronauts with NASA astronauts has not been clearly quantified nor mitigated. An earlier internal NASA operations assessment, which consisted of a comprehensive literature review and interviews of current NASA experts, found that PAMs are likely to increase the risk to NASA astronauts during integrated missions (Landon, Whiting, Russell, Schorn, Passmore, & Roma, 2022). There are ongoing efforts at NASA to mitigate concerns from a medical, psychological, and technical perspective. NASA experts are working closely with PAM providers to offer recommendations and best practices beyond the limits of requirements to ensure crew health and safety. However, efforts are siloed between groups to some extent, and with the rate of PAMs likely to increase, a more comprehensive and integrated process is needed to reduce the burden on NASA resources. AIMS The purpose of this project is to understand private astronauts’ motivations for journeying to space, their pre-mission preparation period, and their experiences in space. Data will be collected via private astronaut post-mission debrief interviews. This data will inform training needs and in-mission support needed for missions that include private astronauts; the preparation NASA astronauts and mission support personnel will need to work with these integrated crews; and gaps in knowledge to guide research and countermeasure development. Our study aims to (1) Characterize risks posed by commercialization and private astronaut crew integration in spaceflight operations, as it relates to Team, Human Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA), and Behavioral Medicine (BMed) Risks, (2) Recommend potential countermeasures and identify gaps in current research. Countermeasures may be related to crew selection and composition, training, crew support systems (e.g., medical/psychological support, support from Mission Control, on-board resources), and habitability and human factors design. METHOD The BHP Lab will conduct 30-minute interviews with up to eight (8) private astronaut mission (PAM) astronauts (e.g., Axiom) and spaceflight participants (e.g., SFPs or “free flyers” on Polaris Dawn) per year from 2024-2030 to discuss knowledge gaps and needs related to selection and assessment, crew composition, training, crew support systems (e.g., medical/psychological support, support from Mission Control, onboard resources), and habitability and human factors design, which may influence the risk to NASA astronauts. Interviews will then be coded using thematic analysis and interpreted with the assistance of lexical analysis software (e.g., LIWC). As of the end of 2024, we have collected data from one PAM crew. At the conclusion of data collection in 2030, a final report will be prepared integrating all data collected by 2031. SUMMARY Post-return interviews of private astronauts are being conducted to understand their experiences and inform training and countermeasures to ensure the safety of all who journey to the ISS.

Private Astronaut Missions↗

NASA NTRS2024

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Lunar Rover Design Concepts Assessments

Mass is a significant risk to programs and projects as they transition from formulation to implementation, especially in larger human space systems where delivery mass or volume can be a constrained commodity. • Concepts developed without an adequate systems-engineering basis, including design and operations experience, may miss significant functionality and subsequent mass required for integration or operations. • Further uncertainty can be associated with not fully understanding design best practices and standards that drive mass, such as design for minimum risk or fault tolerance.1 • Finally, the appropriate systems engineering mass properties management rigor and technical discipline insight are required to set the mass baseline, including appropriate mass growth allowance (MGA) to ensure program success. Mass is a key quantity that should be constantly monitored by the systems engineer and the program/project management stakeholder to ensure mission compatibility throughout the project life cycle. In addition, mass is a key programmatic performance metric monitored by the NASA Chief Financial Officer for current and future program cost estimating. NASA Exploration Systems sought an assessment of reasonableness with respect to different potential rover concepts that balances mass needs and human-class cargo lander capabilities. Appropriate systems engineering mass properties management rigor and technical discipline insight were used, and are required to set the mass baseline, including appropriate MGA to ensure program success. Two independent Lunar rover concepts were evaluated, with a goal to understand concept credibility and the Lunar rover designs potential extensibility for Mars surface operations. A notional generic rover concept is shown in Figure 1.

Systems Engineering↗

NASA NTRS2022

Regolith Simulant Preparation and Geotechnical Characterization for Plume Surface Interaction Testing

Descent engine plumes interact with the lunar surface and accelerate regolith particles to potentially high velocities. These ejecta create risks to surface assets that have yet to be fully assessed. To better understand these risks, plume surface interactions can be simulated on the ground by firing a test engine plume into a bin of lunar regolith simulant under vacuum conditions. The dynamics of the resultant ejecta can then be recorded. In this technical memorandum we discuss the processes used in preparing a 150 kg bin of lunar regolith simulant for plume surface interaction ground tests under vacuum conditions for the NASA STMD Plume Surface Interaction project. We present our approach to mitigating regolith simulant eruptions during pump-down, the methods used to fill and reset the regolith simulant bin for each test, and the techniques used to characterize the consistency of regolith simulant geotechnical properties before each new firing. The challenges of preparing a regolith simulant test bin below an ambient pressure of one atmosphere, particularly on the large scale, could largely be overcome with a system that could fill the test bin with simulant inside the chamber and under vacuum conditions.

lunar regolith↗

NASA NTRS1984

Assessment of medical risk in space flight

Among the various manned space missions expected during the next 10 years are flights of up to 6 months duration in low earth orbit as well as short excursions to geosynchronous orbit. Research activities are described which cover the full spectrum of physiological and psychological problems presented by such flights as well as by ongoing Shuttle flights. This paper includes a summary of the major technical thrusts needed for habitation in space. It concludes that there is a high probability of developing countermeasures that will alleviate the neurophysiological and cardiovascular effects encountered during Shuttle flights and that the resolution of musculoskeletal, psychological and radiobiological problems will also prove possible.

Nicogossian, A.↗

NASA NTRS1976

Space-based solar power conversion and delivery systems study. Volume 1: Executive summary

The technical and economic aspects of satellite solar power systems are presented with a focus on the current configuration 5000 MW system. The technical studies include analyses of the orbital system structures, control and stationkeeping, and the formulation of program plans and costs for input to the economic analyses. The economic analyses centered about the development and use of a risk analysis model for a system cost assessment, identification of critical issues and technologies, and to provide information for programmatic decision making. A preliminary economic examination of some utility interface issues is included. Under the present state-of-knowledge, it is possible to formulate a program plan for the development of a satellite solar power system that can be economically justified. The key area of technological uncertainty is man's ability to fabricate and assemble large structures in space.

Hazelrigg, G. A., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS1980

Technology alternatives for the SPS

Emerging technologies may offer advantages over those selected for the reference design adopted for the SPS. While it is not possible to list all the technological innovations that may affect the SPS, it is feasible to develop a systematic methodology for assessing technical alternatives. This may be of value in evaluating proposed technologies and identifying high priority areas for research. Such a methodology includes involves (1) variation of guidelines; (2) analysis of system functions; (3) analysis of system sensitivity; (4) analysis of technology status and risk; and (5) external costs, problem areas, and criticisms of the SPS concept. The methodology is a first step towards the creation of a formal decision analytic framework which can support design choices and program decisions as development proceeds.

Glaser, P.↗

NASA NTRS2011

An Evaluation of Ultra-High Pressure Regulator for Robotic Lunar Landing Spacecraft

The Robotic Lunar Lander Development (RLLD) Project Office at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) has studied several lunar surface science mission concepts. These missions focus on spacecraft carrying multiple science instruments and power systems that will allow extended operations on the lunar surface. Initial trade studies of launch vehicle options for these mission concepts indicate that the spacecraft design will be significantly mass-constrained. To minimize mass and facilitate efficient packaging, the notional propulsion system for these landers has a baseline of an ultra-high pressure (10,000 psig) helium pressurization system that has been used on Defense missiles. The qualified regulator is capable of short duration use; however, the hardware has not been previously tested at NASA spacecraft requirements with longer duration. Hence, technical risks exist in using this missile-based propulsion component for spacecraft applications. A 10,000-psig helium pressure regulator test activity is being carried out as part of risk reduction testing for MSFC RLLD project. The goal of the test activity is to assess the feasibility of commercial off-the-shelf ultra-high pressure regulator by testing with a representative flight mission profile. Slam-start, gas blowdown, water expulsion, lock-up, and leak tests are also performed on the regulator to assess performance under various operating conditions. The preliminary test results indicated that the regulator can regulate helium to a stable outlet pressure of 740 psig within the +/- 5% tolerance band and maintain a lock-up pressure less than +5% for all tests conducted. Numerous leak tests demonstrated leakage less than 10-3 standard cubic centimeters per second (SCCS) for internal seat leakage at lock-up and less than10-5 SCCS for external leakage through the regulator ambient reference cavity. The successful tests have shown the potential for 10,000 psig helium systems in NASA spacecraft and have reduced risk associated with hardware availability and hardware ability to meet RLL mission requirements.

Burnside, Christopher↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Tailoring Early Concept Maturity Levels for Small Satellite Missions

The Concept Maturity Level (CML) framework has gained widespread acceptance as a process to assess mission concept maturity, particularly for early mission concepts in the formulation phase. Popularized by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory almost 15 years ago to evaluate large NASA science mission concepts, the CML method offers wide-ranging programmatic and technical evaluation criteria to assess and measure the progress of mission concepts at all stages of maturity. It also provides a useful tool to facilitate stakeholder relationships through effective engagement, interaction, and communication. The CML approach is modeled largely after the widespread Technology Readiness Level (TRL) scale, a measure of how new technology progresses from early concept through to being operational at the mission flight system level. Tailoring the CML framework for small satellites allows for more relevant technical and programmatic evaluations for these missions. Given the diversity of small satellite mission objectives, cost constraints, complexity, and risk tolerance, this modified CML framework enables study teams and stakeholders to determine the appropriate CML fidelity to implement based upon the opportunity and strategic investment approach. A decision process flow method is proposed to guide teams through the logic of determining what CML fidelity to implement in evaluating small satellite mission concepts. The goal is to provide enhanced stakeholder engagement such that CML assessments are clearly articulated and understood early in the design study. This would allow for more appropriate application of CML methodology by study teams developing University led missions, technology demonstrations, commercial constellations, and more complex planetary science missions.

Concept Maturity Level↗

NASA NTRS2010

Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) Battery Operations Problem Resolution Team (PRT)

The NASA Technical Discipline Fellow for Electrical Power, was requested to form a Problem Resolution Team (PRT) to help assess the health of the flight battery that is currently operating aboard NASA's Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) and provide recommendations for battery operations to mitigate the risk of impacting science operations for the rest of the mission. This report contains the outcome of the PRT's assessment.

Keys, Denney J.↗