A New Network Modeling Tool for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization.
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Nuclear weapon arms control treaty verification is a key aspect of any agreement between signatories to establish that the terms and conditions spelled out in the treaty are being met. Historically, arms control negotiations have focused more on the rules and protocols for reducing the numbers of warheads and delivery systems - sometimes resorting to complex and arcane procedures for counting forces - in an attempt to address perceived or real imbalances in a nation's strategic posture that could lead to instability. Verification procedures are generally defined in arms control treaties and supporting documents and tend to focus on technical means and measures designed to ensure that a country is following the terms of the treaty and that it is not liable to engage in deception or outright cheating in an attempt to circumvent the spirit and the letter of the agreement. As the Obama Administration implements the articles, terms, and conditions of the recently ratified and entered-into-force New START treaty, there are already efforts within and outside of government to move well below the specified New START levels of 1550 warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and nondeployed strategic launchers (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) tubes on submarines, and bombers). A number of articles and opinion pieces have appeared that advocate for significantly deeper cuts in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, with some suggesting that unilateral reductions on the part of the U.S. would help coax Russia and others to follow our lead. Papers and studies prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense and at the U.S. Air War College have also been published, suggesting that nuclear forces totaling no more than about 300 warheads would be sufficient to meet U.S. national security and deterrence needs. (Davis 2011, Schaub and Forsyth 2010) Recent articles by James M. Acton and others suggest that the prospects for maintaining U.S. security and minimizing the chances of nuclear war, while deliberately reducing stockpiles to a few hundred weapons, is possible but not without risk. While the question of the appropriate level of cuts to U.S. nuclear forces is being actively debated, a key issue continues to be whether verification procedures are strong enough to ensure that both the U.S. and Russia are fulfilling their obligations under the current New Start treaty and any future arms reduction treaties. A recent opinion piece by Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft (2012) raised a number of issues with respect to governing a policy to enhance strategic stability, including: in deciding on force levels and lower numbers, verification is crucial. Particularly important is a determination of what level of uncertainty threatens the calculation of stability. At present, that level is well within the capabilities of the existing verification systems. We must be certain that projected levels maintain - and when possible, reinforce - that confidence. The strengths and weaknesses of the New START verification regime should inform and give rise to stronger regimes for future arms control agreements. These future arms control agreements will likely need to include other nuclear weapons states and so any verification regime will need to be acceptable to all parties. Currently, China is considered the most challenging party to include in any future arms control agreement and China's willingness to enter into verification regimes such as those implemented in New START may only be possible when it feels it has reached nuclear parity with the U.S. and Russia. Similarly, in keeping with its goals of reaching peer status with the U.S. and Russia, Frieman (2004) suggests that China would be more willing to accept internationally accepted and applied verification regimes rather than bilateral ones. The current verification protocols specified in the New START treaty are considered as the baseline case and are contrasted with possible alternative verification protocols that could be effective in a post-New START era of significant reductions in U.S. and other countries nuclear stockpiles. Of particular concern is the possibility of deception and breakout when declared and observed numbers of weapons are below the level considered to pose an existential threat to the U.S. In a regime of very low stockpile numbers, 'traditional' verification protocols as currently embodied in the New START treaty might prove less than adequate. I introduce and discuss a number of issues that need to be considered in future verification protocols, many of which do not have immediate solutions and so require further study. I also discuss alternatives and enhancements to traditional verification protocols, for example, confidence building measures such as burden sharing against the common threat of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism, joint research and development.
On-site inspection (OSI) is one of the four verification provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Under the provisions of the CTBT, once the Treaty has entered into force, any signatory party can request an on-site inspection, which can then be carried out after approval (by majority voting) of the Executive Council. Once an OSI is approved, a team of 40 inspectors will be assembled to carry out an inspection to ''clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of Article I''. One challenging aspect of carrying out an on-site inspection (OSI) in the case of a purported underground nuclear explosion is to detect and locate the underground effects of an explosion, which may include an explosion cavity, a zone of damaged rock, and/or a rubble zone associated with an underground collapsed cavity. The CTBT (Protocol, Section II part D, paragraph 69) prescribes several types of geophysical investigations that can be carried out for this purpose. One of the methods allowed by the CTBT for geophysical investigation is referred to in the Treaty Protocol as ''resonance seismometry''. This method, which was proposed and strongly promoted by Russia during the Treaty negotiations, is not described in the Treaty. Some clarification about the nature of the resonance method can be gained from OSI workshop presentations by Russian experts in the late 1990s. Our understanding is that resonance seismometry is a passive method that relies on seismic reverberations set up in an underground cavity by the passage of waves from regional and teleseismic sources. Only a few examples of the use of this method for detection of underground cavities have been presented, and those were done in cases where the existence and precise location of an underground cavity was known. As is the case with many of the geophysical methods allowed during an OSI under the Treaty, how resonance seismology really works and its effectiveness for OSI purposes has yet to be determined. For this experiment, we took a broad approach to the definition of ''resonance seismometry''; stretching it to include any means that employs passive seismic methods to infer the character of underground materials. In recent years there have been a number of advances in the use of correlation and noise analysis methods in seismology to obtain information about the subsurface. Our objective in this experiment was to use noise analysis and correlation analysis to evaluate these techniques for detecting and characterizing the underground damage zone from a nuclear explosion. The site that was chosen for the experiment was the Mackerel test in Area 4 of the former Nevada Test Site (now named the Nevada National Security Site, or NNSS). Mackerel was an underground nuclear test of less than 20 kT conducted in February of 1964 (DOENV-209-REV 15). The reason we chose this site is because there was a known apical cavity occurring at about 50 m depth above a rubble zone, and that the site had been investigated by the US Geological Survey with active seismic methods in 1965 (Watkins et al., 1967). Note that the time delay between detonation of the explosion (1964) and the time of the present survey (2010) is nearly 46 years - this would not be typical of an expected OSI under the CTBT.
Future nuclear arms - control agreements may place numerical limits on the total number of warheads in the nuclear arsenals of states. Verifying these limits may require inspectors to account for individual warheads, both deployed and non-deployed. This task could be accomplished with unique identifiers, but standard tagging techniques may be unacceptable in this case due to host concerns about safety and intrusiveness. To resolve this dilemma, we revisit the so - called Buddy Tag concept first proposed by Sandia National Laboratories in the early 1990s. The conceptual innovation in the Buddy Tag was to by separate the tag from the treaty limited item itself. Verification of the pairings between tags and limited items would take place during a short-notice inspection, where the host would be required to produce one buddy tag for each item. Sensors on the Buddy Tag would show that it had not been moved to the inspected site after the inspection was declared (e.g., within the last 24-48 hours). If the inspector counted more (or fewer) treaty limited items than Buddy Tags at the inspected site, a treaty violation could be asserted. Using a number of single-site inspections, an inspecting party can hold the host at risk for discovery of violating the treaty at an enterprise level by possessing more treaty limited items than the treaty allows. In this project, we developed a buddy-tag prototype for demonstration and evaluation purposes. This paper summarizes the performance requirements for an advanced Buddy Tag, the proposed conduct of operations, the design choices and functionalities of the different subsystems, and initial testing results. The report also summarizes peer review feedback obtained throughout the project.
As the United States embarks on a new era of nuclear arms control, the tools for treaty verification must be accurate and reliable, and must work at stand-off distances. The National Center for Nuclear Security, or NCNS, at the Nevada National Security Site, is poised to become the proving ground for these technologies. The center is a unique test bed for non-proliferation and arms control treaty verification technologies. The NNSS is an ideal location for these kinds of activities because of its multiple environments; its cadre of experienced nuclear personnel, and the artifacts of atmospheric and underground nuclear weapons explosions. The NCNS will provide future treaty negotiators with solid data on verification and inspection regimes and a realistic environment in which future treaty verification specialists can be trained. Work on warhead monitoring at the NCNS will also support future arms reduction treaties.
A core concern of the Department of Energy is protecting sensitive information in the face of verification agreements that may make use of increasingly sophisticated and intrusive sensors. The conflict between intrusiveness and information protection is evident in existing treaties, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Additional Protocol (AP), where Congress has seen a need to step in and enact implementing legislation to protect, for example, sensitive information such as certain unique chemical signatures, but in so doing has introduced complexities into U.S. treaty compliance policy. Information barriers or filters (IFs) – broadly defined as physical and/or encryption mechanisms that preclude acquisition of sensitive, quantitative information while allowing the acquisition of treaty-relevant qualitative information by an inspectorate – could play a useful role in avoiding this type of conflict. In order to stimulate new thinking on ways to meet existing and future safeguard challenges, this scoping study investigates how IFs – a technique borrowed from the realm of arms control verification - might contribute to international safeguards activities. Information filters (IFs) have long been recognized as an important tool for the protection of sensitive signals and other data in the verification of bilateral and multilateral arms control treaties. The implementation of NPT safeguards, while differing somewhat in context from arms control verification, involves similar sensitivity concerns. This report examines whether or not IFs can be useful in the world of international safeguards, and provides a survey of methods of barring or filtering information that could be applied. The study finds that while many safeguards activities involve non sensitive data, there are also a number of areas where IFs are already in use and others where IFs could make a useful contribution. Examples include verification of enrichment plants, complementary access inspections, and the Additional Protocol (AP) to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).
When governing bodies seek to reduce the spread and development of nuclear material and weapons, arms control and safeguards technologies play an important role in preventing proliferation within a state that has already developed a nuclear weapon. Arms control treaties work to control the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation, distribution, or the usage of a certain weapon type or delivery system. Treaty guidelines are met using combinations of monitoring, detection, and verification technologies. 1 To verify compliance, a country must determine if the activities of another country are within the limits and obligations established by the treaty. A verifiable treaty contains an interlocking web of constraints and provisions designed to deter cheating, to make cheating more complicated and more expensive, or to make its detection timelier. In the past, the U.S. has deemed treaties to be effectively verifiable if there is confidence that significant violations can be detected in time to respond and offset any threat that the violation may create for the U.S.
Introduction: This virtual special issue stems from 36 presentations given at the Fourth Chemical Forensics Symposium held 3 - 4 April 2017 as part of the 253rd American Chemical Society (ACS) National Meeting & Exposition in San Francisco, CA, USA. Since 2011, the ACS Division of Analytical Chemistry has hosted symposia that review developments and topics arising in chemical forensics. Chemical forensics is a developing scientific discipline that aims to attribute a chemical (or mixture) of interest to its source by the analysis of the chemical itself or associated material constituents to address investigative, legal or intelligence questions. “Source” refers to how, where and when a chemical was handled or produced. Given past and recent attacks with chemical warfare agents (CWAs) and other toxic chemicals there is a strong need for research and development in chemical forensics for the purpose of finding those responsible for chemical attacks. Hence, many of the papers in this issue deal with the source attribution of toxic chemicals that can be used as weapons. However, given the needs, principles and methods that are shared across different application areas of material provenance or authentication, papers that deal with the source attribution of other illicitly used chemicals and materials are included.
Arms control treaties are necessary to reduce the large stockpiles of the nuclear weapons that constitute one of the biggest dangers to the world. However, an impactful treaty hinges on effective inspection exercises to verify the participants’ compliance to the treaty terms. Such procedures would require verification of the authenticity of a warhead undergoing dismantlement. Previously proposed solutions lacked the combination of isotopic sensitivity and information security. Here we present the experimental feasibility proof of a technique that uses neutron induced nuclear resonances and is sensitive to the combination of isotopics and geometry. The information is physically encrypted to prevent the leakage of sensitive information. Our approach can significantly increase the trustworthiness of future arms control treaties while expanding their scope to include the verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads themselves.
An ultra-low-background proportional counter design has been developed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) using clean materials, primarily electro-chemically-purified copper. This detector, along with an ultra-low-background counting system (ULBCS), was developed to complement a new shallow underground laboratory (30 meters water-equivalent) at PNNL. The ULBCS design includes passive neutron and gamma shielding, along with an active cosmic-veto system. This system provides a capability for making ultra-sensitive measurements to support applications like age-dating soil hydrocarbons with {sup 14}C/{sup 3}H, age-dating of groundwater with {sup 39}Ar, and soil-gas assay for {sup 37}Ar to support On-Site Inspection (OSI). On-Site Inspection is a key component of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Measurements of radionuclides created by an underground nuclear explosion are valuable signatures of a Treaty violation. For OSI, the 35-day half-life of {sup 37}Ar, produced from neutron interactions with calcium in soil, provides both high specific activity and sufficient time for inspection before decay limits sensitivity. This work describes the calibration techniques and analysis methods developed to enable quantitative measurements of {sup 37}Ar samples over a broad range of proportional counter operating pressures. These efforts, along with parallel work in progress on gas chemistry separation, are expected to provide a significant new capability for {sup 37}Ar soil gas background studies.