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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Implementation of Cloud Services for Human Space Flight

Cloud is a tried-and-true technology used throughout United States government agencies, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). With reliable results and infrequent downtimes, cloud allows for secure remote access, customizability, and streamlined monitoring options, creating an environment for better data integrity and availability. As NASA increasingly migrates functions to the cloud, the Space Communications and Navigation Program (SCaN) program has been investigating how this capability can be leveraged to provide communication services to its users and customers. Currently, missions such as NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR), Plankton, Aerosol, Cloud, ocean Ecosystem (PACE), and Roman Space Telescope (RST) are planned to incorporate cloud into their data delivery architecture. However, SCaN is looking to expand further. This conversion to using cloud services allows for greater availability of mission data for both robotic and human space flight (HSF)missions. The SCaN program and the Near Space Network (NSN) are working to consolidate resources and create a cloud environment suitable for the entirety of the SCaN program network architecture. SCaN is in the process of finalizing its cloud architecture and soon will be implementing cloud services. The new services used will adhere to federal regulations including Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP), which is built upon National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)documentation. While keeping in mind these security requirements, an auxiliary objective of the cloud integration is to ensure the most cost-efficient solution; providing a scalable, robust and resilient system. Using cloud services, NASA will gain access to better centralized monitoring and management features, along with customizable services on a pay-per-use plan. With the ever-growing NASA mission data volume needs, maintaining ample storage space is another major constraint. Processing and storing such large amounts of data, on the order of terabytes a day, requires dynamic processing capability which is inherently a strength of cloud computing. By routing this data from ground stations through the cloud, there will be greater ease of access for both SCaN and the user community. Artificial intelligence and other built-in cloud functions can also enhance efficiency, improving data processing time. Thereby also allowing for better data availability. As we look to the future of cloud services, NASA will continue to leverage capabilities that will benefit NASA’s ability to provide cost-effective communication services. This paper further outlines the evolution of cloud use by SCaN in the context of Human Space Flight.

cloud storage↗
DOE OSTI2012

Remotely Monitored Sealing Array Software

The Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA) utilizes the Secure Sensor Platform (SSP) framework to establish the fundamental operating capabilities for communication, security, power management, and cryptography. In addition to the SSP framework the RMSA software has unique capabilities to support monitoring a fiber optic seal. Fiber monitoring includes open and closed as well as parametric monitoring to detect tampering attacks. The fiber monitoring techniques, using the SSP power management processes, allow the seals to last for years while maintaining the security requirements of the monitoring application. The seal is enclosed in a tamper resistant housing with software to support active tamper monitoring. New features include LED notification of fiber closure, the ability to retrieve the entire fiber optic history via translator command, separate memory storage for fiber optic events, and a more robust method for tracking and resending failed messages.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2022

Autonomous Energy Systems

Energy systems are increasingly complicated by the proliferation of clean energy technologies such as solar, wind, storage, electric vehicles, and building automations. Future energy systems will require secure, autonomous, and reliable communications, control, and interoperability among millions of distributed generation points and billions of buildings, vehicles, and more. To enable effective management of the anticipated growth of distributed devices and the deluge of data and extensive metering that will follow, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) has developed the concept of autonomous energy systems (AES).

autonomous↗
DOE OSTI2016

Cost Savings Resulting From Classified Component Disposal at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) - 16440

This paper discusses the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) capability to dispose of both radioactive and non-radioactive classified components and the tremendous cost-avoidance in storage, sanitization and/or demilitarization (Demil), and disposal that have been experienced by generators. One generator, The U.S. Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), 414. Supply Chain Management Squadron out of Hill Air Force Base (HAFB) experienced total cost-avoidance in the last two years of $218 million on an investment of $1.9 million for disposal at the NNSS. They also accelerated the planned component disposition schedule by 7 years. In 2012, the NNSS added the capability of meeting a key national resource for the safe, secure disposal of classified components that have been declared excess to national security requirements. Since that time the program has continued to grow and expand. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Major Achievements of the Springfields Decommissioning Program - 16512

Since the 1940's, Springfields has manufactured fuel products for the UK's nuclear power stations and for international customers. The early operations were in support of the atomic weapons program, closely followed by fuel manufacture for electricity generation via the Magnox power stations commencing in the late 1950's. In 2005, responsibility for the assets and liabilities of Springfields was transferred to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). A new company, Springfields Fuels Limited, was created to run the site, which was managed and operated by Westinghouse Electric UK Ltd on the NDA's behalf. On April 1, 2010, Westinghouse entered into an agreement with the NDA for a long-term lease of the Springfields site, which transferred responsibility for the commercial fuel manufacturing business and Springfields Fuels Limited to Westinghouse. Today, the main Springfields activities include: - Oxide fuels for Advanced Gas-cooled and Light Water Reactors, as well as intermediate fuel products, such as powders, granules and pellets, - Manufacture of Uranium Hexafluoride (now in Care and Maintenance), - Processing and recovery of Uranium residues, - Decommissioning and demolition of redundant plants and buildings. Some 120 plant buildings and support facilities have been successfully decommissioned and demolished in the period 1996 to date. These range from 1940's buildings, subsequently converted for nuclear fuel manufacture, together with some of the formerly sealed chemical agent manufacture and storage facilities. Decommissioning of the now redundant Magnox manufacturing facilities is ongoing at Springfields without compromising the other site operations. Westinghouse is managing all activities related to the whole lifecycle, planning, design, safety case, radiation protection, Post Operational Clean Out (POCO), service diversions, characterization, decommissioning all phases through to ground remediation, waste disposal and agreed end states. Decommissioning of process plants starts with the removal of the majority of radiological activity or hazard contained within the plant. This is known as Post Operational Clean Out. Once this is complete, the plant may be dismantled. Work is scoped and defined within packages (at plant or cell level) to aid control and commercial monitoring as the decommissioning is progressed. This package approach also enables clean or lightly contaminated items to be removed separately to aid potential re-cycling and minimize decontamination and waste disposal costs. Westinghouse is further optimising work package delivery by planning parallel POCO and Decommissioning work phases within plant at a cell level to systematically remove redundant plant and reduce hazard earlier, whilst optimising use of both internal and external resources to reduce total project cost. Waste and Residues from all phases are disposed of via authorized disposal routes and in accordance with our environmental authorizations. On completion of decommissioning and removal of plant and equipment the building is re-assessed radiologically, categorized and appropriate remediation work progressed to render it safe for conventional demolition. The major elements of the success achieved to date can be attributed to the following elements: - Overall programme management with extensive experience of planning, cost, and risk management. Integration of the programme within a major commercial site without compromising safety or operations. - Complete site EHS management working within a complex regulatory framework including the Nuclear Site Licenses, Environmental Authorisations and Security requirements. - Avoiding safety complacency by use of rigorous and systematic process to emphasise safety over competing goals. Including structured use of Human Performance and Corrective Action and Learning processes. - Unique safety experiences attained through complex hazard reduction across a broad range of uranium manufacturing and chemical hazard/agent facilities. - Project leadership and excellence utilizing a core site team to deploy repeatable processes and safe practices to deliver complex scope within budget and schedule. - Optimised use of internal and external resources, with extensive use of Operating Experience to drive continuous improvement and problem resolution. - Management of Contractors from initial selection, pre-qualification, tender assessment and Performance using varied contract forms across delivery phases. - Use of Westinghouse expertise for safety case, waste management, uranium recovery, health physics and design. - Implementation of a work package to ensure gated discreet manageable packages. Underpinned by package specific method statements, with appropriate hold points to maintain management and control of the works. - Continuous local safety focus via safety planning, induction, plant specific training, proactive risk assessment, and a defined approach to decoupling operating plant safety cases enabling focussed and usable documentation. This paper will provide an overview of the latest decommissioning activities achieved on the Springfields site and will focus on best practices that allowed Westinghouse to maintain the program on time and on budget. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Hardware-Based Randomized Encoding for Sensor Authentication in Power Grid SCADA Systems

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are utilized extensively in critical power grid infrastructures. Modern SCADA systems have been proven to be susceptible to cyber-security attacks and require improved security primitives in order to prevent unwanted influence from an adversarial party. One section of weakness in the SCADA system is the integrity of field level sensors providing essential data for control decisions at a master station. In this paper we propose a lightweight hardware scheme providing inferred authentication for SCADA sensors by combining an analog to digital converter and a permutation generator as a single integrated circuit. Through this method we encode critical sensor data at the time of sensing, so that unencoded data is never stored in memory, increasing the difficulty of software attacks. We show through experimentation how our design stops both software and hardware false data injection attacks occurring at the field level of SCADA systems.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2018

Keyless Infrastructure Security Solution (KISS) (Technology Landscape Analysis Report)

The following landscape analysis explores blockchain or distributed ledger technologies application to securing electricity infrastructure. The exploration of how distributed ledger technologies can be used to increase the trustworthiness and integrity of the grid’s edge is imperative to the economic, security and well-being of all modern societies that rely on electricity. Blockchain technology’s ability to secure, track and optimize complex data transactions provides an exciting value proposition to securing and optimizing the U.S. power grid. An energy delivery system (EDS) operating at the grid’s edge requires unprecedented levels of security and trustworthiness to verify integrity of data and manage complex transactive and distributed Energy Resources (DERs) exchanges. Moreover, grid-edge devices lack visibility, control and security to conduct real-time energy transactions with the required security, speed and scale. The U.S. power grid is a complex system of systems that requires secure, reliable and trustworthy EDSs. Grid modernization has increased the speed and size of data sets exchanged on these systems (Gordes and Mylrea 2014). Exasperating the challenge is these systems are increasingly distributed creating new data fidelity and interoperability challenges for grid operators struggling to balance and incorporate DERs. Blockchain technology provides an atomically verifiable cryptographic signature to help increase the trustworthiness of EDSs at the grid’s edge. This feature is especially important at distribution level since EDSs and field devices have increasing operational and security requirements that are often diametrically opposed. For example, as data, speed and analytic requirements increase, security and functionality requirements increase. Further, as the grid’s edge incorporate DERs and transacts in real time, availability is prioritized over the integrity and confidentially of that data. Blockchain presents the prospect of solving some of these complex challenges related to grid security and modernization. However, there are more questions about blockchain applicability than answers. There are number of theoretical blockchain applications to the energy sector, but few energy utilities have actually applied, implemented or even experimented with the underlying distributed ledger technology and consensus algorithms that enable blockchain to exchange data more efficiently and securely.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2016

The Interface of Safety and Security in Transport: A Regional Perspective

Security of nuclear and other radioactive material in transport continues to be a challenge for States that are working on strengthening their nuclear security regime. One reason for this is that State regulatory agencies and other organizations lack the resources and trained personnel to dedicate to this field. For over 50 years safety has been a major focus in the use, storage and transport of radioactive material. Only recently, since the late 1990s, has dedicated focus been given to the field of security. One way to assist States to advance nuclear security is to reach out to safety workers (regulators, inspectors, and safety compliance personnel) and showcase the need to better integrate safety and security practices. A recent IAEA regional workshop in Bangkok, Thailand (June 2015) yielded profound results when subject matter experts lectured on both the safety and the security of radioactive material in transport. These experts presented and discussed experiences and best practices for: 1) developing and implementing safety requirements and security recommendations for radioactive material in transport; 2) national and international cooperation; and 3) preventing shipment delays/denials of radioactive material. The workshop participants, who were predominantly from safety organizations, shared that they received the following from this event: 1. A clear understanding of the objectives of the IAEA safety requirements and security recommendations for radioactive material in transport. 2. A general understanding of and appreciation for the similarities and differences between safety requirements and security recommendations for radioactive material in transport. 3. A greater appreciation of the interface between transport safety and security and potential impacts of this interface on the efforts to strengthen the compliance assurance regime for the safe transport of radioactive material. 4. A general understanding of assessing the transport security scenarios and developing transport security plans. Many participants also reported their appreciation of the workshop exercises that specifically focused on practical aspects of safety and security of transport of radioactive material. These workshop outcomes highlight the important role professionals can offer when they receive additional safety training and education for radioactive material in transport. Moreover, these professionals can help to increase capacity in countries with developing nuclear security regimes. This paper explores workshop outcomes and transportation regulations and guidelines for radioactive material.

Welch, Tim↗
DOE OSTI2023

Physical Security Timeline Analysis in Support of Advanced Reactor Demonstration and Deployment

This report presents the regulatory requirements and directions on the physical security of advanced nuclear reactors in USA. Presently, a rule is being proposed that allows for a performance-based analysis. In determining the physical security requirements for an advanced reactor, new tools may be desired to conduct a performance-based analysis. These tools should incorporate dynamic analysis methods to provide as much realism as possible. In comparison, the security requirements for existing light water reactors (LWRs) are much more prescriptive and the analysis conducted to establish the required physical security strategies were more easily performed with static analysis. In order to achieve the cost goals that advanced reactors require for adoption; the nuclear security force required should not be excessive. Dynamic physical security analysis methods and tools have been developed by the US Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program. This report details how the dynamic risk analysis tools developed in the LWRS program using the dynamic risk modelling tool, EMRALD, may be adapted for use in analyzing the physical security designs for advanced reactors accounting for variable performance-based requirements. This report provides an example analysis of a hypothetical SFR using publicly available information and generic assumptions to demonstrate the methods and potential presentation and analysis of the results. No actual plant information is used in this example analysis. Future work in this area will create additional models that can be adapted for any advanced reactor concept and use various security features to create a physical security system that provides adequate protection from radiological theft and sabotage.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Security Architecture for Microgrid Integration

The purpose of this document is to present cyber security risk considerations and mitigations for community microgrids. The mitigations discussed herein specifically focus on cyber security technical requirements for the De-centralized Autonomous Community Controller (DAC) as part of the SECURE project’s technology development effort. These requirements also consider the associated security implementation challenges involved with the decentralized characteristics of microgrids where upstream communications to utility security management functions are lost. These security recommendations and technical requirements may be used by microgrid implementers and technology vendors to specify the security design of the microgrid systems and their components.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Quantification of storage required for preserving frequency security in wind‐integrated systems

Abstract The penetration of wind power generation into the power grid has been accelerated in recent times due to the aggressive emission targets set by governments and other regulatory authorities. Although wind power has the advantage of being environment‐friendly, wind as a resource is intermittent in nature. In addition, wind power contributes little inertia to the system as most wind turbines are connected to the grid via power electronic converters. These negative aspects of wind power pose serious challenges to the frequency security of power systems as penetration increases. In this work, an approach is proposed where an energy storage system (ESS) is used to mitigate frequency security issues of wind‐integrated systems. ESSs are well equipped to supply virtual inertia to the grid due to their fast‐acting nature, thus replenishing some of the energy storage capability of displaced inertial generation. In this work, a probabilistic approach is proposed to estimate the amount of inertia required by a system to ensure frequency security. Reduction in total system inertia due to the displacement of conventional synchronous generation by wind power generation is considered in this approach, while also taking into account the loss of inertia due to forced outages of conventional units. Monte Carlo simulation is employed for implementing the probabilistic estimation of system inertia. An ESS is then sized appropriately, using the system swing equation, to compensate for the lost inertia. The uncertainty associated with wind energy is modeled into the framework using an autoregressive moving average technique. Effects of increasing the system peak load and changing the wind profile on the expected system inertia are studied to illustrate various factors that might affect system frequency security. The proposed method is validated using the IEEE 39‐bus test system.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2015

Risk assessment for Industrial Control Systems quantifying availability using mean failure cost (MFC)

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are commonly used in industries such as oil and natural gas, transportation, electric, water and wastewater, chemical, pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, as well as discrete manufacturing (e.g., automotive, aerospace, and durable goods.) SCADA systems are generally used to control dispersed assets using centralized data acquisition and supervisory control. Originally, ICS implementations were susceptible primarily to local threats because most of their components were located in physically secure areas (i.e., ICS components were not connected to IT networks or systems). The trend toward integrating ICS systems with IT networks (e.g., efficiency and the Internet of Things) provides significantly less isolation for ICS from the outside world thus creating greater risk due to external threats. Albeit, the availability of ICS/SCADA systems is critical to assuring safety, security and profitability. Such systems form the backbone of our national cyber-physical infrastructure. We extend the concept of mean failure cost (MFC) to address quantifying availability to harmonize well with ICS security risk assessment. This new measure is based on the classic formulation of Availability combined with Mean Failure Cost (MFC). The metric offers a computational basis to estimate the availability of a system in terms of the loss that each stakeholder stands to sustain as a result of security violations or breakdowns (e.g., deliberate malicious failures).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS1993

NASA Electronic Library System (NELS): The system impact of security

This paper discusses security issues as they relate to the NASA Electronic Library System which is currently in use as the repository system for AdaNET System Version 3 (ASV3) being operated by MountainNET, Inc. NELS was originally designed to provide for public, development, and secure collections and objects. The secure feature for collections and objects was deferred in the initial system for implementation at a later date. The NELS system is now 9 months old and many lessons have been learned about the use and maintenance of library systems. MountainNET has 9 months of experience in operating the system and gathering feedback from the ASV3 user community. The user community has expressed an interest in seeing security features implemented in the current system. The time has come to take another look at the whole issue of security for the NELS system. Two requirements involving security have been put forth by MountainNET for the ASV3 system. The first is to incorporate at the collection level a security scheme to allow restricted access to collections. This should be invisible to end users and be controlled by librarians. The second is to allow inclusion of applications which can be executed only by a controlled group of users; for example, an application which can be executed by librarians only. The requirements provide a broad framework in which to work. These requirements raise more questions than answers. To explore the impact of these requirements a top down approach will be used.

Mcgregor, Terry L.↗
DOE OSTI2022

International Radiological/Nuclear Training for Emergency Response - Major Public Events Virtual Workshop: Nuclear Security Planning and Operations (Day 3) [Slides]

This module will provide an overview of best practices for nuclear security planning requirements to include building a nuclear security plan and a concept of operations. It will introduce best practices for nuclear security planning to include the following: (1) Develop a Nuclear Security Plan, (2) Review 10 key elements of a Concept of Operations, (3) Estimate resources for an MPE, and (4) Capture lessons learned and best practices.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2013

Analysis of ISO NE Balancing Requirements: Uncertainty-based Secure Ranges for ISO New England Dynamic Inerchange Adjustments

The document describes detailed uncertainty quantification (UQ) methodology developed by PNNL to estimate secure ranges of potential dynamic intra-hour interchange adjustments in the ISO-NE system and provides description of the dynamic interchange adjustment (DINA) tool developed under the same contract. The overall system ramping up and down capability, spinning reserve requirements, interchange schedules, load variations and uncertainties from various sources that are relevant to the ISO-NE system are incorporated into the methodology and the tool. The DINA tool has been tested by PNNL and ISO-NE staff engineers using ISO-NE data.

Etingov, Pavel V.↗