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At least 145 records · Page 8

A Methodology for defining intermediate level waste package characteristics that ensure criticality safety in a geological disposal facility - 14599

Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) is responsible for implementing geological disposal of the UK's higher activity radioactive wastes. These wastes include fissile nuclides and, therefore, demonstration of the criticality safety of the wastes under disposal conditions forms an important component of RWM's disposal system safety case. The basis for ensuring criticality safety of intermediate level waste (ILW) packages is to specify controls on the fissile material content of individual packages through the application of deterministic criticality safety assessments (CSAs). The approach is defined and controlled through RWM's Disposability Assessment process, which aims to ensure that: criticality is prevented during waste package transport to a GDF; the risk of criticality is tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) during GDF operations; and the likelihood and consequences of criticality arising from the evolution of waste packages after GDF closure are low. The most restrictive phase determines the package fissile material limit and, until now, in many cases the GDF post-closure phase has provided the most restrictive limit. Currently, the GDF post-closure limits are derived deterministically using highly stylised and conservative assumptions about fissile material accumulations occurring on very long timescales into the future. RWM, waste producers and regulators do not currently consider this approach to be yielding an appropriate balance of risk. Therefore, RWM is modifying the process for setting fissile material limits on ILW packages by making use of the outcomes of its recent research projects to establish the likelihood of post-closure criticality in a GDF and the consequences of hypothetical post-closure criticality events (presented in companion papers). This paper presents the revised methodology, which is based on the requirement that criticality in a GDF can be demonstrated to be of low and tolerable consequences with regard the performance of a GDF. A probabilistic 'low-likelihood package envelope' is proposed that establishes the packaging and disposal facility conditions under which post-closure criticality is considered to be of low likelihood and low consequence. The bounding conditions for establishing the extent of the package envelope have been evaluated through application of the methodologies and models developed in RWM's Likelihood of Criticality research project. It is expected that the vast majority of ILW packages would meet the package envelope requirements. The methodology also allows the use of other options, such as deterministic CSAs, for waste packages that fall outside the low-likelihood package envelope. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Generation IV nuclear energy system initiative; air-cooled option RCCS studies and NSTF preparation

The Reactor Cavity Cooling System (RCCS) is an important system to the passive safety case being incorporated in the overall safety strategy for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP). The RCCS will be one of the new safety systems specifically designed for the next generation of nuclear power plants. In particular, it is being developed and incorporated into the proposed reactor and plant designs for the very high temperature reactor (VHTR)—a helium gas cooled nuclear plant with a thermal-spectrum reactor. The RCCS forms a passive heat sink external to the reactor, and is located within the reactor cavity/silo surrounding the metal vessel. During emergency accident conditions when all ac (alternating current) power is lost, natural convection of the RCCS coolant removes the heat radiated or naturally convected from the metal vessel wall to the inner boundary of the RCCS facing the vessel. RCCS will be a first-of-a-kind (FOAK) passive safety system for core decay heat removal when the FOAK VHTR is built.

Lomperski, S.↗

Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization Case Study: Selection of Electrical Equipment To Be Subjected to Environmental Qualification

In general, the margins-based safety case helps the decision-maker manage plant margins most effectively. It tells the plant decision-maker such things as what margin is present (at the plant level, at the functional level, at the barrier level, at the component level), and where margin is thin or perhaps just degrading. If the plant is safe, it tells the decision-maker why the plant is safe and where margin needs to be maintained, and perhaps where the plant can afford to relax.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization Case Study: Selection of Electrical Equipment To Be Subjected to Environmental Qualification

In general, the margins-based safety case helps the decision-maker manage plant margins most effectively. It tells the plant decision-maker such things as what margin is present (at the plant level, at the functional level, at the barrier level, at the component level), and where margin is thin or perhaps just degrading. If the plant is safe, it tells the decision-maker why the plant is safe and where margin needs to be maintained, and perhaps where the plant can afford to relax.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Evaluation of Engineered Barrier Systems (Mid-year Status Report)

This document is a summary of the R&D activities associated with the Engineered Barrier Systems Work Package. Multiple facets of Engineered Barrier Systems (EBS) research were examined in the course of FY19 activities. This report is focused on delivering an update on the status and progress of modelling tools and experimental methods, both of which are essential to understanding and predicting long-term repository performance as part of the safety case. Specifically, the work described herein aims to improve understanding of EBS component evolution and interactions. Ultimately, the EBS Work Package is working towards producing process models for distinct processes that can either be incorporated into performance assessment (PA), or provide critical information for implementing better constraints on barrier performance. The main objective of this work is that the models being developed and refined will either be implemented directly into the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) platform, or can otherwise be indirectly linked to the performance assessment by providing improved bounding conditions. In either the case, the expectation is that validated modelling tools will be developed that provide critical input to the safety case.

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International Approaches for Nuclear Waste Disposal in Geological Formations: Geological Challenges in Radioactive Waste Isolation—Fifth Worldwide Review

The overall objective of the Fifth Worldwide Review (WWR-5) is to document the current state-of-the-art of major developments in a number of nations throughout the World pursuing geological disposal programs, and to summarize challenging problems and experience that have been obtained in siting, preparing and reviewing cases for the operational and long-term safety of proposed and operating nuclear waste repositories. The scope of the Review is to address current specific technical issues and challenges in safety case development along with the interplay of technical feasibility, siting, engineering design issues, and operational and post-closure safety. In particular, the chapters included in the report present the following types of information: the current status of the deep geological repository programs for high level nuclear waste and low- and intermediate level nuclear waste in each country, concepts of siting and radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management in different countries (with the emphasis of nuclear waste disposal under different climatic conditions and different geological formations), progress in repository site selection and site characterization, technology development, buffer/backfill materials studies and testing, support activities, programs, and projects, international cooperation, and future plans, as well as regulatory issues and transboundary problems.

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Towards a Rigorous Basis for Specific Operations Risk Assessment of UAS

The Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) guidance represents the consensus of various national aviation authorities on a common process to identify, qualitatively assess, and manage the safety risk posed by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), when preparing the safety case required for regulatory approval to conduct certain types of operations. As such, it can be considered a de facto standard, being increasingly adopted by various relevant stakeholders. This paper first gives an overview of the SORA process and associated methods, identifying a number of inconsistencies in risk identification and assessment, also discussing plausible strategies to close the associated gaps. Then, we give a well-founded basis for the applicable concepts, such as barrier integrity, assurance, and robustness, following which we present a preliminary and simple probabilistic formalization of the underpinning barrier-based safety model. We illustrate our overall approach through a worked example, also discussing how a Bayesian framework can facilitate extending and enhancing our initial formalization. We conclude with a discussion of the opportunities afforded by our approach, such as a well-founded basis for barrier selection, whilst addressing the associated challenges. The main objective of this work is to complement the current SORA guidance through a principled, mathematicallybased approach to risk assessment, particularly when it is applied to higher-risk operational concepts that warrant greater rigor in safety assessment and assurance.

Safety Cases↗

Damage tolerance in the graphite cores of UK power reactors and implications for new build

The United Kingdom has been operating graphite-moderated gas-cooled commercial nuclear power reactors for more than 60 years. Both Generation I Magnox reactors and Generation II Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors have operated beyond their nominal design lifetimes and the safety cases for continued operation have had to address the issue of damage tolerance of the graphite cores. This review describes the designs of the reactors and the methodologies employed for their assessment. Emerging issues arising from extended operation and ageing of the cores are discussed together with the evolution of assessment methodologies to address predicted and observed damage. The UK nuclear regulator perspective is summarised and some conclusions are drawn on the implications for new build.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

"Evidence" Under a Magnifying Glass: Thoughts on Safety Argument Epistemology

Common definitions of "safety case" emphasize that evidence is the basis of a safety argument, yet few widely referenced works explicitly define "evidence". Their examples suggest that similar things can be regarded as evidence. But the category evidence seems to contain (1) processes for finding things out, (2) information resulting from such processes, and (3) relevant documents. Moreover, any item of evidence could be replaced by further argument. Normative models of informal argumentation do not offer clear guidance on when a safety argument should cite evidence rather than appeal to a more detailed argument. Disciplines such as the law address the problem with a practical, domain-specific epistemology. In this paper, we explore these problems associated with evidence citations in safety arguments, identify goals for a theory of safety argument evidence and a practical safety argument epistemology, propose a model of safety evidence citation that advances the identified goals, and present a related extension to the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN).

Graydon, P. J.↗

FUELEAP Model-Based System Safety Analysis

NASA researchers, in a partnership with Boeing, are investigating a fuel-cell powered variant of the X-57 “Maxwell” Mod-II electric propulsion aircraft, which is itself derived from a stock Tecnam P2006T. The “Fostering Ultra-Efficient Low-Emitting Aviation Power” (FUELEAP) project will replace the X-57 power subsystem with a hybrid Solid-Oxide Fuel Cell (SOFC) system to increase the potential range of the electric-propulsion aircraft while dramatically improving efficiency and emissions over stock internal-combustion engines. Our FUELEAP safety analysis faces two primary challenges. First, the Part 23 certificated Tecnam P2006T is undergoing significant modifications to host the hybrid electric-propulsion system, and the challenge is to assure that the safety inherent in the stock aircraft (and subsequently in X-57 Mod-II) is not compromised by changes in avionics, aircraft structural loading, weight and balance, or other considerations. Secondly, because the SOFC power system has little (if any) relevant in-service precedent, our challenge is to assure that we identify and mitigate all reasonably plausible hazards introduced by unique FUELEAP equipage. We are investigating and utilizing Model-Based Safety Analysis (MBSA) methods to help us address these FUELEAP safety challenges. We captured aircraft-level system hazard conditions using instances of a SysML hazard block via aircraft-level Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA). Then, using SysML models of the FUELEAP architecture, we related the hazard conditions to initiating system events and possible mitigations, such as design architecture modifications or operational constraints. We are continuing to define our approach to MBSA by developing a component-by-component inventory of local failure modes and tracing their possible contribution to hazard conditions. Finally, we are applying an argument-based approach to FUELEAP assurance. Through a FUELEAP “safety case,” we are providing an explicit argument for FUELEAP safety by associating assurance evidence with overarching safety claims through a structured argument.

Woodham, Kurt P.↗

Iso standardization of theoretical activity evaluation method for low and intermediate level activated waste generated at nuclear power plants

Disposal of low-and intermediate-level activated waste generated at nuclear power plants is being planned or carried out in many countries. The radioactivity concentrations and/or total quantities of long-lived, difficult-to-measure nuclides (DTM nuclides), such as C-14, Ni-63, Nb-94, α emitting nuclides etc., are often restricted by the safety case for a final repository as determined by each country's safety regulations, and these concentrations or amounts are required to be known and declared. With respect to waste contaminated by contact with process water, the Scaling Factor method (SF method), which is empirically based on sampling and analysis data, has been applied as an important method for determining concentrations of DTM nuclides. This method was standardized by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and published in 2007 as ISO21238 'Scaling factor method to determine the radioactivity of low and intermediate-level radioactive waste packages generated at nuclear power plants' [1]. However, for activated metal waste with comparatively high concentrations of radioactivity, such as may be found in reactor control rods and internal structures, direct sampling and radiochemical analysis methods to evaluate the DTM nuclides are limited by access to the material and potentially high personnel radiation exposure. In this case, theoretical calculation methods in combination with empirical methods based on remote radiation surveys need to be used to best advantage for determining the disposal inventory of DTM nuclides while minimizing exposure to radiation workers. Pursuant to this objective a standard for the theoretical evaluation of the radioactivity concentration of DTM nuclides in activated waste, is in process through ISO TC85/SC5 (ISO Technical Committee 85: Nuclear energy, nuclear technologies, and radiological protection; Subcommittee 5: Nuclear fuel cycle). The project team for this ISO standard was formed in 2011 and is composed of experts from 11 countries. The project team has been conducting technical discussions on theoretical methods for determining concentrations of radioactivity, and has developed the draft International Standard of ISO16966 'Theoretical activation calculation method to evaluate the radioactivity of activated waste generated at nuclear reactors' [2]. This paper describes the international standardization process developed by the ISO project team, and outlines the following two theoretical activity evaluation methods:? Point method? Range method. (authors)

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DETAILED DESIGN OF AN EPITHERMAL/INTERMEDIATE CRITICAL EXPERIMENT USING THE SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES CRITICAL FACILITY

Nuclear criticality safety evaluations commonly take credit for neutron-absorbing materials. The normal practice for validating the calculational process to develop safety limits and margins of safety is to compare the safety case models with calculations of various critical experiments of a similar composition. Because there is a lack of critical experiments with various relevant neutron-absorbing materials mixed with fissile material, a new approach is being developed. This new approach uses small amounts of these credited materials in a critical assembly and assesses their worth and neutron energy spectral characteristics using absorption reaction rates. This approach is proposed as a new method for nuclear data validation. The assessment will involve measured central reactivity worth in a critical or near-critical assembly and subsequent comparison with calculated values from Monte Carlo computer analyses. Additionally, four configurations are proposed which replace fuel rods in the driver region with absorber rods. These configurations will allow for examination of the effects of the material in a more thermalized spectrum experiment selection in these scenarios. This paper presents some case studies examining the impact of these changes on some hypothetical safety analysis systems.This paper documents the detailed design portion of the critical experiment design process, focusing on development of a capability to test epithermal/ intermediate energy cross sections for materials using the 7uPCX critical experiment facility. Tantalum is specified as the test material to be examined.

Clarity, Justin↗

NGNP Project 2011 Status and Path Forward

High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR) technology can play an important role in the United States’ energy future by extending the use of nuclear energy for non-electricity energy production missions as well as continuing to provide a considerable base load electric power generation capability. Extending nuclear energy into the industrial and transportation sectors through the co-production of process heat and electricity provides safe and reliable energy for these sectors in an environmentally responsible manner. The safety case for the modular HTGR provides a substantial improvement in nuclear plant safety for the protection of the public and the environment, and supports collocation of the HTGR with major industrial facilities. The NGNP Project at the Idaho National Laboratory has been working toward an objective of commercializing the HTGR technology under DOE direction since 2006. The Project is undergoing a quantum shift in direction and scope as a result of recent DOE decisions. This paper summarizes where the Project has been, where it is at the time of this writing and what is needed in future activities to commercialize HTGR technology.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Accelerated Materials Deployment in Advanced Nuclear Power Plants

The purpose of this report is to begin the development of a maximally efficient process for licensing and deploying new materials in Advanced Non-Light-Water Reactors (ANLWRs). Some new materials that are to be used in some new plants are seen as possibly introducing risks, because our understanding of those new materials’ behavior in the conditions generated by some novel plant designs is less complete than our understanding of the behavior of materials with long use histories in existing designs. In these cases, an approved code/standard or a code case to support the use of these materials in the novel design’s safety case may not exist for the regulator to utilize as part of the licensing determination. This circumstance creates the potential for an extremely long licensing process for new designs using new materials. The present strategy is to show how to manage these risks proactively, in such a way as to permit licensing decisions to be made in a timely manner, based on this risk management process. The present report outlines the gaps in the current codes to support deployment and use of novel materials and begins the development of the necessary risk management framework that is focused on the subject materials issues; it is based on risk-informed in-service surveillance practices, carried out in such a way as to compensate for current limitations in our state of knowledge. This development will enable licensing and deployment of the subject materials, conditional on the proactive surveillance process to be established. While this report is occasioned by limitations in our knowledge of certain materials issues that may arise in advanced designs, in-service surveillance is always done in order to compensate for a lack of knowledge: if we knew that components were not already failed and not trending toward failure, we would not perform surveillance, even in current-generation plants (except that prescriptive requirements would force us to do so). What is different about the surveillance program discussed here is that the issues are newer and the relevant experience base is less complete, so the surveillance presently contemplated may need to measure new things and/or measure them more often than has been traditional for surveillance coupons. The present report is devoted to the risk management framework and applies American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI, Division [1] to establish the structure of a protocol for carrying out the necessary surveillance. These documents are generic: they do not tell us how often to surveille, or what to surveille, or what to measure, but rather how to determine those things, given certain technical inputs. The Regulatory Development R&D Program [2] is currently developing the companion supporting technical basis for the materials surveillance technology that, when completed and validated, can be used by owner/operator and NRC to implement a materials degradation management program for ANLWRs. This report also outlines salient points of discussion, positive potential outcomes, and potential concerns from industry and the USNRC. These aspects of the report intend to inform future work to develop a proposed technical process for adoption by the industry and endorsement by the USNRC to allow developers to propose a risk informed and conservative approach for the use of materials where operating experience/data and codes and standards may not exist for use of a novel material in an operating reactor environment. Additionally, such a technology could be leveraged to potentially reduce part of the upfront materials data requirements from ongoing long-term materials testing so that early action on license application could be undertaken by NRC, in parallel with the continuation of long-term data collection. This could accelerate the schedule for a first-of-a-kind ANLWR deployment or a nth-of-a-kind new materials insertion for established ANLWR designs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Uncertainty Propagation from Experiment Measurements to Modeling Approaches: A Case for SMR Steam Entrainment Testing

To license new and advanced reactor designs, regulators must be convinced that their unique safety cases—relative to existing large scale reactors—have been adequately addressed by the designed reactor protection systems. In water cooled small modular reactors (SMRs), droplet entrainment in steam flow has significant implications on the progression of accident scenarios due to its compact design features, which requires representative test data applicable to SMR designs. Computer code, modeling and simulation (M&S) tools and models require adequate verification, assessment, and qualification. This includes M&S results validation against scaled empirical data within allowable uncertainty bands to gain regulatory approvals during the various stages of reactor system design, demonstration, and commercialization. However, measurement uncertainty within the empirical datasets and test data applicability ranges requires careful consideration of M&S inputs (i.e., boundary conditions, and initial conditions), and verification and validation efforts. This study focuses on uncertainty quantification in designing scaled test facilities for SMR applications with appropriate measurements and a standard data-reduction method to estimate thermal hydraulics characteristics parameters that incorporate physics phenomena of interest. In addition, this study supports the evaluation model development and assessment process using M&S that interfaces with advanced computing tools and digital twin capabilities. This will allow synchronization between experiment and modeling approaches for droplet entrainment testing and analysis, improving diagnostics, prognostics, and decision-making to accelerate regulatory approval.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Technology Solutions Case Study: Combustion Safety for Appliances Using Indoor Air

This case study describes how to assess and carry out the combustion safety procedures for appliances and heating equipment that uses indoor air for combustion in low-rise residential buildings. Only appliances installed in the living space, or in an area freely communicating with the living space, vented alone or in tandem with another appliance are considered here. This document is for inspectors, auditors, and technicians working in homes where energy upgrades are being conducted whether or not air infiltration control is included in the package of measures being applied. In the indoor combustion air case, guidelines summarized here are based on language provided in several of the codes to establish minimum requirements for the space using simplified prescriptive measures. In addition, building performance testing procedures are provided by testing agencies. The codes in combination with the test procedures offer comprehensive combustion safety coverage to address safety concerns, allowing inexperienced residential energy retrofit inspectors to effectively address combustion safety issues and allow energy retrofits to proceed.

Building America↗

Review of the Safety Analyses of the Konrad Repository - 20530

The Bundesgesellschaft fuer Endlagerung (BGE) is the license holder of all geological repository sites in Germany since 2017. Besides the construction of the Konrad repository for the emplacement of low- and intermediate-level waste (LILW), the operation of the Asse II mine including the retrieval of the emplaced waste, and the preparation for the closure of the Morsleben repository, BGE is responsible to carry out the operative tasks of selecting a site for a high-level waste (HLW) repository. The Konrad repository is Germany's first repository for radioactive waste with negligible heat generation, which was fully licensed under atomic law within the scope of a plan approval procedure from the original application in 1982 until the license was granted in 2002 and finally confirmed by the Federal Administrative Court in 2007. The emplacement of LILW was licensed up to a volume of 303,000 m{sup 3} with a total β/γ-activity of 5 x 10{sup 18} Bq and a total α-activity of 1.5 x 10{sup 17} Bq. Currently, the former iron ore mine Konrad is being converted to a repository and is expected to come into operation in 2027. But what if there is no safety case in place nor a regulatory framework tailored for a change of documents in order to ensure the safety according to the state-of-the-art of science and technology during the evolution of a long-term project such as a geological repository? In this presentation, a review procedure of the safety analyses, that have been the basis of the plan approval decision for the Konrad repository at that time, will be described. Furthermore, the first results of this graduated review procedure for updating the safety analyses will be presented. (authors)

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Current Status of the Nuclear Waste Management Programme in Finland - 13441

Pursuant to the Decision-in-Principle of 2001 the Finnish programme for geologic disposal of spent fuel has now moved to the phase of applying for construction licence to build up the encapsulation plant and underground repository. The main objective of former programme phase, underground characterisation phase, was to confirm - or refute - the suitability of the Olkiluoto site by investigations conducted underground at the actual depth of the repository. The construction work of the access tunnel to the rock characterisation facility (ONKALO) started in the late summer of 2004. The site research and investigations work aimed at the maturity needed for submission of the application for construction license of the actual repository in end of 2012. This requires, however, that also the technology has reached the maturity needed. The design and technical plans form the necessary platform for the development of the safety case for spent fuel disposal. A plan, 'road map', has been produced for the portfolio of reports that demonstrates the safety of disposal as required by the criteria set by the government and further detailed by the safety authority, STUK. (authors)

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