Results for “Risk Analyses” — Page 8

DOE OSTI2023

Risk Ratio and Risk Difference Estimation in Case-cohort Studies

Background: In case-cohort studies with binary outcomes, ordinary logistic regression analyses have been widely used because of their computational simplicity. However, the resultant odds ratio estimates cannot be interpreted as relative risk measures unless the event rate is low. The risk ratio and risk difference are more favorable outcome measures that are directly interpreted as effect measures without the rare disease assumption. Methods: We provide pseudo-Poisson and pseudo-normal linear regression methods for estimating risk ratios and risk differences in analyses of case-cohort studies. These multivariate regression models are fitted by weighting the inverses of sampling probabilities. Also, the precisions of the risk ratio and risk difference estimators can be improved using auxiliary variable information, specifically by adapting the calibrated or estimated weights, which are readily measured on all samples from the whole cohort. Finally, we provide computational code in R (R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria) that can easily perform these methods. Results: Through numerical analyses of artificially simulated data and the National Wilms Tumor Study data, accurate risk ratio and risk difference estimates were obtained using the pseudo-Poisson and pseudo-normal linear regression methods. Also, using the auxiliary variable information from the whole cohort, precisions of these estimators were markedly improved. Conclusion: The ordinary logistic regression analyses may provide uninterpretable effect measure estimates, and the risk ratio and risk difference estimation methods are effective alternative approaches for case-cohort studies. These methods are especially recommended under situations in which the event rate is not low.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS2023

IMPACTing Medical System Design with a Risk Analysis Tool [“IMPACT” sur la Conception du Système Médical avec un Outil d'Analyse des Risques]

Background: Following the success of Artemis I, NASA is preparing for human extended duration missions. Ongoing efforts are focused on mitigating mission-related risks, including those affecting crew health and performance. Communication latency, logistics of resupply and time frame of medical evacuation are barriers to provision of healthcare for these missions, especially with respect to constraints in mass, volume, and crew training. An in-depth assessment of medical risks, capabilities and resources for a specific mission design is necessary to determine an optimal balance that maximizes likelihood of mission success. Overview: IMPACT (Informed Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces) is a dynamic tool designed to estimate medical risk and outcomes for a specific mission design. In its current iteration, a list of medical conditions selected based on likelihood of occurrence and/or consequence was linked to a set of clinical capabilities and resources necessary for diagnosis and management. A probabilistic risk analysis tool was then used to identify and estimate the likelihood and consequence of risks through the following outcome metrics: loss of crew life (inflight mortality due to medical conditions), need for medical evacuation (return to definitive care), and crew disability (task time affected based on how medical conditions influence the ability to perform specific exploration mission crew tasks). Finally, the model’s optimization algorithm provides recommendations for medical capabilities that maximize risk mitigation relative to mass and volume constraints. In the Spring of 2023, IMPACT was utilized to estimate outcome metrics for a design reference mission that would be representative of an extended duration Artemis mission. Notional data generated were then used to determine a recommended set of medical capabilities and resources relative to user-defined mass and volume constraints. A multidisciplinary team has also been updating IMPACT to strengthen the model’s fidelity. Figure 1 shows how updates to outcome metric inputs for the conditions resulted in different capability and resource allocation recommendations. Discussion: This presentation will discuss the IMPACT tool and share the latest data generated for a representative extended duration Artemis mission. Efforts to improve the fidelity of data generated by the model’s algorithm will also be discussed.

K A Shair↗

NASA NTRS2006

Meteoroid Risk Assessment of Lunar Habitat Concepts

Preliminary analyses have been performed of meteoroid impacts on lunar surface structures built with elements made from in situ materials. The SPHC hydrodynamic code was used to simulate impacts, and was validated against hypervelocity impact test results. Impact risk will affect necessary wall thicknesses, depth of burial, and placement of lunar base structures.

Evans, Steven W.↗

DOE OSTI2022

Identification of Novel, Replicable Genetic Risk Loci for Suicidal Thoughts and Behaviors Among US Military Veterans

Importance: Suicide is a leading cause of death; however, the molecular genetic basis of suicidal thoughts and behaviors (SITB) remains unknown. Objective: To identify novel, replicable genomic risk loci for SITB. Design, Setting, and Participants: This genome-wide association study included 633 778 US military veterans with and without SITB, as identified through electronic health records. GWAS was performed separately by ancestry, controlling for sex, age, and genetic substructure. Cross-ancestry risk loci were identified through meta-analysis. Study enrollment began in 2011 and is ongoing. Data were analyzed from November 2021 to August 2022. Main Outcome and Measures: SITB. Results: A total of 633 778 US military veterans were included in the analysis (57 152 [9%] female; 121 118 [19.1%] African ancestry, 8285 [1.3%] Asian ancestry, 452 767 [71.4%] European ancestry, and 51 608 [8.1%] Hispanic ancestry), including 121 211 individuals with SITB (19.1%). Meta-analysis identified more than 200 GWS (P < 5 × 10 -8 ) cross-ancestry risk single-nucleotide variants for SITB concentrated in 7 regions on chromosomes 2, 6, 9, 11, 14, 16, and 18. Top single-nucleotide variants were largely intronic in nature; 5 were independently replicated in ISGC, including rs6557168 in ESR1, rs12808482 in DRD2, rs77641763 in EXD3, rs10671545 in DCC, and rs36006172 in TRAF3. Associations for FBXL19 and AC018880.2 were not replicated. Gene-based analyses implicated 24 additional GWS cross-ancestry risk genes, including FURIN, TSNARE1, and the NCAM1-TTC12-ANKK1-DRD2 gene cluster. Cross-ancestry enrichment analyses revealed significant enrichment for expression in brain and pituitary tissue, synapse and ubiquitination processes, amphetamine addiction, parathyroid hormone synthesis, axon guidance, and dopaminergic pathways. Seven other unique European ancestry–specific GWS loci were identified, 2 of which (POM121L2 and METTL15/LINC02758) were replicated. Two additional GWS ancestry-specific loci were identified within the African ancestry (PET112/GATB) and Hispanic ancestry (intergenic locus on chromosome 4) subsets, both of which were replicated. Further, no GWS loci were identified within the Asian ancestry subset; however, significant enrichment was observed for axon guidance, cyclic adenosine monophosphate signaling, focal adhesion, glutamatergic synapse, and oxytocin signaling pathways across all ancestries. Within the European ancestry subset, genetic correlations (r > 0.75) were observed between the SITB phenotype and a suicide attempt-only phenotype, depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder. Additionally, polygenic risk score analyses revealed that the Million Veteran Program polygenic risk score had nominally significant main effects in 2 independent samples of veterans of European and African ancestry.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2020

A Tool for the Risk-Informed Management of Critical Mission Resilience

We describe a methodology and tool for the risk-informed management and planning of mission resilience. By mapping concepts of resilience onto the elements of a streamlined risk model we are able to tap the substantial portfolio of established risk concepts to provide rapid insights in the evaluation and high-level screening of prospective resilience enhancement measures. This provides a risk-informed, levelized basis for the comparison of disparate resilience solutions and the means of establishing preferences. The methodology begins with identification of critical missions met by a site, and establishment of the supporting physical assets. Scenarios that would result in failure of these assets are systematically identified. Each scenario comprises three elements: realization of a hazard or threat resulting in loss of resources (the current focus being on power, natural gas, and water) to the asset, failure of measures in place to protect the asset against those losses, and realization of the consequent impacts. These scenarios are quantified in terms of their probabilities of occurrence and the magnitude of the resultant consequences (mission outage time), allowing risk-prioritization to focus resilience enhancement considerations. What-If? analyses are conducted through adjusting elements of the risk calculation to reflect the deployment of prospective resilience measures, by which means the efficacies of each of those measures can be compared using common risk metrics across diverse resilience strategies. This paper will also describe the insights from example applications.

resilience, risk, risk assesment, energy, water↗

NASA NTRS1990

Similarity of urinary risk factors among stone-forming patients in five regions of the United States

Study Objective: To compare urinary biochemical risk factors among stone-forming patients in the Southeast (SE) or "stone belt" versus four other regions of the United States. Design: Prospective biochemical survey for regional comparisons. Setting: Referral-based nephrolithiasis clinics, urologists, nephrologists, and family practitioners. Patients: Consecutive sample of 3473 stone-forming patients who submitted 24-hour urine collections for biochemical analyses of stone-forming risk factors. Interventions: None. Subjects taking medication known to interfere with stone-forming risk factors were deleted from the final data compilation. Measurements and Main Results: Overall, the mean values for each urinary parameter spanned a narrow range without significant difference between the five regions. Among "metabolic" factors, 40% in the SE had hypercalciuria (> 6.25 mmol/d), compared to 35%-43% in other regions, and hyperuricosuria (> 4.2 mmol/d) was found in 16% in the SE versus 17%-19% elsewhere. Among "environmental" factors, low urine volume ( < 2 L/d) was found in 77% patients in the SE compared to 69%-78% elsewhere, and high sodium was encountered in 27% in the SE versus 24%-29% elsewhere. No differences were noted in occurrence of other abnormal risk factors: hyperoxaluria, hypocitraturia, low pH, high sulfate, high phosphorus, or low magnesium. Conclusions: Despite expected regional differences in nutritional and environmental influences, the results of this study showed a striking similarity in urinary biochemical risk factor profiles of stone-formers in all five regions of the United States.

NASA Discipline Number 18-10↗

DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of Joint Cyber/Safety Risk in Nuclear Power Systems

This report presents an analysis of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) for a generic Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)-4 NPP. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed Hazards and Consequences Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS) process is applied to the ECCS and its subsystems to identify unsafe control actions (UCAs) which act as possible cyber events of concern. The analysis is performed for two design basis events: Small-break Loss of Coolant Accident (SLOCA) and general transients (TRANS), such as unintended reactor trip. In previous work, HAZCADS UCAs were combined with other cyber-attack analysis to develop a risk-informed approach; however, this was for a single system. This report explores advanced systems engineering modeling approaches to model the interactions between digital assets across multiple systems which may be targeted by cyber adversaries. The complex and interdependent design of digital systems has the potential to introduce emergent cyber properties that are generally not covered by hazard analyses nor formal nuclear Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). The R&D and supporting analysis presented here explores approaches to predict and manage how interdependent system properties effect risk. To show the potential impact of a successful cyber-attack to formal PRA event tree probabilities, HAZCADS analysis was also used. HAZCADS was also used to model the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automatic actuation. This analysis extended to an integrated system analysis for common-cause failure (CCF). In this aspect, the HAZCADS analysis continued by analyzing plant design details for system connectivity in support of critical plant functions. A dependency matrix was developed to depict the integrated functionality of the interconnected systems. Areas of potential CCF are indicated. Future work could include adversary attack development to show how CCF could be caused, resulting in PRA events. Across the multiple systems that comprise the ECCS, the analysis shows that the change in such probabilities was very different between systems. This indicates that some systems have a larger potential risk impact from successful cyber-attack or digital failure, which indicates a need for these systems to have a higher priority for design and defensive measures. Furthermore, we were able to establish that a risk analysis using any arbitrary threat model establishes an ordering of components with regard to cyber-risk. This ordering can be used to influence the overall system design with an eye to lowering risk, or as a way to understand real-time risk to operational systems based on a current threat landscape. Expert knowledge of both the analysis process and the system being analyzed is required to perform a HAZCADS analysis. The need for a tiered risk analysis is demonstrated by the results of this report.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

NASA NTRS2010

Overview of EVA PRA for TPS Repair for Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission

Following the Columbia accident in 2003, NASA developed techniques to repair the Thermal Protection System (TPS) in the event of damage to the TPS as one of several actions to reduce the risk to future flights from ascent debris, micro-meteoroid and/or orbital debris (MMOD). Other actions to help reduce the risk include improved inspection techniques, reduced shedding of debris from the External Tank and ability to rescue the crew with a launch on need vehicle. For the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Servicing Mission the crew rescue capability was limited by the inability to safe haven on the International Space Station (ISS), resulting in a greater reliance on the repair capability. Therefore it was desirable to have an idea of the risk associated with conducting a repair, where the repair would have to be conducted using an Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA). Previously, focused analyses had been conducted to quantify the risk associated with certain aspects of an EVA, for example the EVA Mobility Unit (EMU) or Space Suit; however, the analyses were somewhat limited in scope. A complete integrated model of an EVA which could quantify the risk associated with all of the major components of an EVA had never been done before. It was desired to have a complete integrated model to be able to assess the risks associated with an EVA to support the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) in making risk informed decisions. In the case of the HST Servicing Mission, this model was developed to assess specifically the risks associated with performing a TPS repair EVA. This paper provides an overview of the model that was developed to support the HST mission in the event of TPS damage. The HST Servicing Mission was successfully completed on May 24th 2009 with no critical TPS damage; therefore the model was not required for real-time mission support. However, it laid the foundation upon which future EVA quantitative risk assessments could be based.

Bigler, Mark↗

NASA NTRS2017

Evidence Report: Risk of Renal Stone Formation

The formation of renal stones poses an in-flight health risk of high severity, not only because of the impact of renal colic on human performance but also because of complications that could potentially lead to crew evacuation, such as hematuria, infection, hydronephrosis, and sepsis. Evidence for risk factors comes from urine analyses of crewmembers, documenting changes to the urinary environment that are conducive to increased saturation of stone-forming salts, which are the driving force for nucleation and growth of a stone nidus. Further, renal stones have been documented in astronauts after return to Earth and in one cosmonaut during flight. Biochemical analysis of urine specimens has provided indication of hypercalciuria and hyperuricemia, reduced urine volumes, and increased urine saturation of calcium oxalate and calcium phosphate. A major contributor to the risk for renal stone formation is bone atrophy with increased turnover of the bone minerals. Dietary and fluid intakes also play major roles in the risk because of the influence on urine pH (more acidic) and on volume (decreased). Historically, specific assessments on urine samples from some Skylab crewmembers indicated that calcium excretion increased early in flight, notable by day 10 of flight, and almost exceeded the upper threshold for normal excretion (300mg/day in males). Other crewmember data documented reduced intake of fluid and reduced intake of potassium, phosphorus, magnesium, and citrate (an inhibitor of calcium stone formation) in the diet. Hence, data from both short-duration and long-duration missions indicate that space travel induces risk factors for renal stone formation that continue to persist after flight; this risk has been documented by reported kidney stones in crewmembers.

Sibonga, Jean D.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Application of Probabilistic Methods to Assess Risk Due to Resonance in the Design of J-2X Rocket Engine Turbine Blades

The LOX-Hydrogen J-2X Rocket Engine, which is proposed for use as an upper-stage engine for numerous earth-to-orbit and heavy lift launch vehicle architectures, is presently in the design phase and will move shortly to the initial development test phase. Analysis of the design has revealed numerous potential resonance issues with hardware in the turbomachinery turbine-side flow-path. The analysis of the fuel pump turbine blades requires particular care because resonant failure of the blades, which are rotating in excess of 30,000 revolutions/minutes (RPM), could be catastrophic for the engine and the entire launch vehicle. This paper describes a series of probabilistic analyses performed to assess the risk of failure of the turbine blades due to resonant vibration during past and present test series. Some significant results are that the probability of failure during a single complete engine hot-fire test is low (~1%) because of the small likelihood of resonance, but that the probability increases to around 30% for a more focused turbomachinery-only test because all speeds will be ramped through and there is a greater likelihood of dwelling at more speeds. These risk calculations have been invaluable for use by program management in deciding if risk-reduction methods such as dampers are necessary immediately or if the test can be performed before the risk-reduction hardware is ready.

Brown, Andrew M.↗

NASA NTRS1998

Methods and Techniques for Risk Prediction of Space Shuttle Upgrades

Since the Space Shuttle Accident in 1986, NASA has been trying to incorporate probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in decisions concerning the Space Shuttle and other NASA projects. One major study NASA is currently conducting is in the PRA area in establishing an overall risk model for the Space Shuttle System. The model is intended to provide a tool to predict the Shuttle risk and to perform sensitivity analyses and trade studies including evaluation of upgrades. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and its prime contractors including Pratt and Whitney (P&W) are part of the NASA team conducting the PRA study. MSFC responsibility involves modeling the External Tank (ET), the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), the Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). A major challenge that faced the PRA team is modeling the shuttle upgrades. This mainly includes the P&W High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) and the High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP). The purpose of this paper is to discuss the various methods and techniques used for predicting the risk of the P&W redesigned HPFTP and HPOTP.

Hoffman, Chad R.↗

DOE OSTI2023

Mapping brucellosis risk in Kenya and its implications for control strategies in sub-Saharan Africa

In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), effective brucellosis control is limited, in part, by the lack of long-term commitments by governments to control the disease and the absence of reliable national human and livestock population-based data to inform policies. Therefore, we conducted a study to establish the national prevalence and develop a risk map for Brucella spp. in cattle to contribute to plans to eliminate the disease in Kenya by the year 2040. We randomly generated 268 geolocations and distributed them across Kenya, proportionate to the area of each of the five agroecological zones and the associated cattle population. Cattle herds closest to each selected geolocation were identified for sampling. Up to 25 cattle were sampled per geolocation and a semi-structured questionnaire was administered to their owners. We tested 6,593 cattle samples for Brucella immunoglobulin G (IgG) antibodies using an Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). We assessed potential risk factors and performed spatial analyses and prevalence mapping using approximate Bayesian inference implemented via the integrated nested Laplace approximation (INLA) method. The national Brucella spp. prevalence was 6.8% (95% CI: 6.2–7.4%). Exposure levels varied significantly between agro-ecological zones, with a high of 8.5% in the very arid zone with the lowest agricultural potential relative to a low of 0.0% in the agro-alpine zone with the highest agricultural potential. Additionally, seroprevalence increased with herd size, and the odds of seropositivity were significantly higher for females and adult animals than for males or calves. Similarly, animals with a history of abortion, or with multiple reproductive syndromes had higher seropositivity than those without. At the herd level, the risk of Brucella spp. transmission was higher in larger herds, and herds with a history of reproductive problems such as abortion, giving birth to weak calves, or having swollen testes. Geographic localities with high Brucella seroprevalence occurred in northern, eastern, and southern regions of Kenya all primarily characterized by semi-arid or arid agro-ecological zones dominated by livestock pastoralism interspersed with vast areas with mixed livestock-wildlife systems. The large spatial extent of our survey provides compelling evidence for the widespread geographical distribution of brucellosis risk across Kenya in a manner easily understandable for policymakers. Our findings can provide a basis for risk-stratified pilot studies aiming to investigate the cost-effectiveness and efficacy of singular and combined preventive intervention strategies that seek to inform Kenya’s Brucellosis Control Policy.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS2024

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

DOE OSTI2020

A global analysis on the systemic effects of antibiotics in cultured fish and their potential human health risk: a review

Abstract The rearing of fish in intensive systems reduces their immunity leading to eruption of diseases, consequently prompting the use of antibiotics. Antibiotics are currently used in cultured fish globally to treat/prevent diseases. On the one hand, antibiotics used in aquaculture help to improve fish health by killing or inhibiting pathogenic bacteria proliferation. However, on the other hand, they cause multiple side effects. To date, information on systemic effects of antibiotics in cultured fish is scattered and their potential human health risk remains elusive. This review critically analyses and discusses the available information in the literature on the positive and negative effects of antibiotics in cultured fish and their potential human health risk via fish consumption. The review found 44 different antibiotics dominated by oxytetracycline were studied in various fish species worldwide. Antibiotics used in global aquaculture either decrease or increase fish growth and survival rates. They induce oxidative stress, which affect antioxidant and detoxification responses and cause host–microbiota dysbiosis. These changes compromise the fish immunity system, which ultimately lead to cellular damage. The toxicities generated inhibit the fish aerobic glycolysis, suppress lipogenesis and fatty acid β‐oxidation while increase energy demand by initiating gluconeogenesis and anaerobic glycolysis. Consumption of fish treated with antibiotics causes human health risk. Future studies are required on agents to restore dysfunctions induced by antibiotics in cultured fish, while attempts to limit their utilisation in aquaculture production are underway. [Correction added on 21 November 2020, after first online publication: The abstract has been amended to clarify the scope of the review.]

Limbu, Samwel Mchele↗

DOE OSTI2022

Composition, Emissions, and Air Quality Impacts of Hazardous Air Pollutants in Unburned Natural Gas from Residential Stoves in California

The presence of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) entrained in end-use natural gas (NG) is an understudied source of human health risks. We performed trace gas analyses on 185 unburned NG samples collected from 159 unique residential NG stoves across seven geographic regions in California. Our analyses commonly detected 12 HAPs with significant variability across region and gas utility. Mean regional benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and total xylenes (BTEX) concentrations in end-use NG ranged from 1.6–25 ppmv–benzene alone was detected in 99% of samples, and mean concentrations ranged from 0.7–12 ppmv (max: 66 ppmv). By applying previously reported NG and methane emission rates throughout California’s transmission, storage, and distribution systems, we estimated statewide benzene emissions of 4,200 (95% CI: 1,800–9,700) kg yr –1 that are currently not included in any statewide inventories–equal to the annual benzene emissions from nearly 60,000 light-duty gasoline vehicles. Additionally, we found that NG leakage from stoves and ovens while not in use can result in indoor benzene concentrations that can exceed the California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment 8-h Reference Exposure Level of 0.94 ppbv–benzene concentrations comparable to environmental tobacco smoke. This study supports the need to further improve our understanding of leaked downstream NG as a source of health risk.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRS2020

Changes in Frequency of the Severity and Type of Aviation Accidents (1987 to 2016)

This document reports the fourth analysis to identify the types of accidents with the greatest impact on the overall safety risk in U.S. civil aviation. The first three analyses examined accidents in 1997-20061, in 2001-20102 and in 2005-20143. The safety risks herein are defined to include four elements: (1) the number of total accidents; (2) the number of fatal accidents; (3) the number of total injuries; (4) the number of fatal injuries. Two of the previous analyses also included the number of incidents, but incident data since 2007 are difficult to separate by flight operation. Other incident details are no longer recorded as well. Due to these changes, the author’s working copy of the incident data has not been updated since 2011 (for incidents through 2010), and the incident data were not included in this analysis. Powerplant and non-powerplant system component failures were the only categories with a greater contribution to the overall safety risk from incidents than from accidents. Accident types, as well as accident rates, have been shown to vary considerably among different flight operations (e.g., large air carriers versus general aviation). For this reason, all analyses were done separately for four types of flight operations (Part 121, Scheduled Part 135, Non- Scheduled Part 135 and Part 91).

Evans, Joni K.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Risk Assessment of Cassini Sun Sensor Integrity Due to Hypervelocity Impact of Saturn Dust Particles

A sophisticated interplanetary spacecraft, Cassini is one of the heaviest and most sophisticated interplanetary spacecraft humans have ever built and launched. Since achieving orbit at Saturn in 2004, Cassini has collected science data throughout its four-year prime mission (2004-08), and has since been approved for first and second extended missions through September 2017. In late 2016, the Cassini spacecraft will begin a daring set of ballistic orbits that will hop the rings and dive between the upper atmosphere of Saturn and its innermost D-ring twenty-two times. The "dusty" environment of the inner D-ring region the spacecraft must fly through is hazardous because of the possible damage that dust particles, travelling at speeds as high as 31.4 km/s, can do to spacecraft hardware. During hazardous proximal ring-plane crossings, the Cassini mission operation team plans to point the high-gain antenna to the RAM vector in order to protect most of spacecraft instruments from the incoming energetic ring dust particles. However, this particular spacecraft attitude will expose two Sun sensors (that are mounted on the antenna dish) to the incoming dust particles. High-velocity impacts on the Sun sensor cover glass might penetrate the 2.54-mm glass cover of the Sun sensor. Even without penetration damage, craters created by these impacts on the surface of the cover glass will degrade the transmissibility of light through it. Apart from being directly impacted by the dust particles, the Sun sensors are also threatened by some fraction of ricochet ejecta that are produced by dust particle impacts on the large antenna dish (made of graphite fiber epoxy composite material). Finally, the spacecraft attitude control system must cope with disturbances due to both the translational and angular impulses imparted on the large antenna dish and the long magnetometer boom by the incoming high-velocity projectiles. Analyses performed to quantify the risks the Sun sensors must contend with during these hazardous ring-plane crossings are given in this paper

Lee, Allan Y.↗