Results for “Radiation protection” — Page 8

NASA NTRS2005

Managing Space Radiation Risks on Lunar and Mars Missions: Risk Assessment and Mitigation

Radiation-induced health risks are a primary concern for human exploration outside the Earth's magnetosphere, and require improved approaches to risk estimation and tools for mitigation including shielding and biological countermeasures. Solar proton events are the major concern for short-term lunar missions (<60 d), and for long-term missions (>60 d) such as Mars exploration, the exposures to the high energy and charge (HZE) ions that make-up the galactic cosmic rays are the major concern. Health risks from radiation exposure are chronic risks including carcinogenesis and degenerative tissue risks, central nervous system effects, and acute risk such as radiation sickness or early lethality. The current estimate is that a more than four-fold uncertainty exists in the projection of lifetime mortality risk from cosmic rays, which severely limits analysis of possible benefits of shielding or biological countermeasure designs. Uncertainties in risk projections are largely due to insufficient knowledge of HZE ion radiobiology, which has led NASA to develop a unique probabilistic approach to radiation protection. We review NASA's approach to radiation risk assessment including its impact on astronaut dose limits and application of the ALARA (As Low as Reasonably Achievable) principle. The recently opened NASA Space Radiation Laboratory (NSRL) provides the capability to simulate the cosmic rays in controlled ground-based experiments with biological and shielding models. We discuss how research at NSRL will lead to reductions in the uncertainties in risk projection models. In developing mission designs, the reduction of health risks and mission constraints including costs are competing concerns that need to be addressed through optimization procedures. Mitigating the risks from space radiation is a multi-factorial problem involving individual factors (age, gender, genetic makeup, and exposure history), operational factors (planetary destination, mission length, and period in the solar cycle), and shielding characteristics (materials, mass, and topology). We review optimization metrics for radiation protection including scenarios that integrate biophysics models of radiation risks, operational variables, and shielding design tools needed to assess exploration mission designs. We discuss the application of a crosscutting metric, based on probabilistic risk assessment, to lunar and Mars mission trade studies including the assessment of multi-factorial problems and the potential benefits of new radiation health research strategies or mitigation technologies.

Cucinotta, F. A.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Managing Space Radiation Risks on Lunar and Mars Missions: Risk Assessment and Mitigation

Radiation-induced health risks are a primary concern for human exploration outside the Earth's magnetosphere, and require improved approaches to risk estimation and tools for mitigation including shielding and biological countermeasures. Solar proton events are the major concern for short-term lunar missions (<60 d), and for long-term missions (>60 d) such as Mars exploration, the exposures to the high energy and charge (HZE) ions that make-up the galactic cosmic rays are the major concern. Health risks from radiation exposure are chronic risks including carcinogenesis and degenerative tissue risks, central nervous system effects, and acute risk such as radiation sickness or early lethality. The current estimate is that a more than four-fold uncertainty exists in the projection of lifetime mortality risk from cosmic rays, which severely limits analysis of possible benefits of shielding or biological countermeasure designs. Uncertainties in risk projections are largely due to insufficient knowledge of HZE ion radiobiology, which has led NASA to develop a unique probabilistic approach to radiation protection. We review NASA's approach to radiation risk assessment including its impact on astronaut dose limits and application of the ALARA (As Low as Reasonably Achievable) principle. The recently opened NASA Space Radiation Laboratory (NSRL) provides the capability to simulate the cosmic rays in controlled ground-based experiments with biological and shielding models. We discuss how research at NSRL will lead to reductions in the uncertainties in risk projection models. In developing mission designs, the reduction of health risks and mission constraints including costs are competing concerns that need to be addressed through optimization procedures. Mitigating the risks from space radiation is a multi-factorial problem involving individual factors (age, gender, genetic makeup, and exposure history), operational factors (planetary destination, mission length, and period in the solar cycle), and shielding characteristics (materials, mass, and topology). We review optimization metrics for radiation protection including scenarios that integrate biophysics models of radiation risks, operational variables, and shielding design tools needed to assess exploration mission designs. We discuss the application of a crosscutting metric, based on probabilistic risk assessment, to lunar and Mars mission trade studies including the assessment of multi-factorial problems and the potential benefits of new radiation health research strategies or mitigation technologies.

Cucinotta, F. A.↗

DOE OSTI2022

Nevada National Security Site Radiological Control Manual

Please have this STIP assigned, documented, and recorded in OSTI as Report Number DOE/NV/03624--0257 Revision 1 and Author as Radiological Control Managers' Council. This manual contains the radiological control requirements to be used for all radiological activities conducted by programs under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO). (Activities conducted under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management Nevada[(EM Nevada] may require additional approval authorities as described in the EM Nevada Prime Contractor’s implementation plan.) Compliance with these requirements will ensure compliance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, “Occupational Radiation Protection.” This manual represents policies, guidelines, and best practices for implementing the DOE/NV/03624--0082, “Nevada National Security Site Radiation Protection Program,” (NNSS RPP) according to the requirements of 10 CFR 835.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2023

MARSAME Radiological Release Report for Weapons Facility Operations #4 Decontamination and Demolition Project: TA-14-0005, TA-15-0009, TA-15-0202, TA-15-0233, TA-36-0019

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship (EPC-ES) has identified materials associated with Weapons Facility Operations (WFO) #4 that meet the criteria for unrestricted release to the public under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1, Radiation Protection for the Public and the Environment (DOE, 2020) and materials in one building that do not meet the criteria for unrestricted release and are to be treated as low level waste (LLW). These conclusions are based on the known history of the buildings combined with radiation survey data data collected in 2022 and 2023. The findings are consistent with DOE Order 458.1 and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Functional Series Document EPC-ES-FSD-004, Environmental Radiation Protection (LANL, 2021). Sampling and data analysis, as described in this report, were sufficient to meet measurement quality objectives (MQOs) under the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment (MARSAME) manual (NUREG, 2009) and LANL procedures (LANL, 2020). Final approvals for waste disposition will come from LANL’s Waste Management Program. The scope of this final release report includes Technical Area (TA) 14 Building 5 (TA-14-0005), TA-15 Buildings 9, 202, and 233 (TA-15-0009/0202/0233), and TA-36 Building 19 (TA-36-0019). MARSAME provides guidance on statistical sampling for residual radionuclides in bulk materials; smaller, miscellaneous items can be released via the release procedures outlined in LANL Policy 121 Radiation Protection (LANL, 2023).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2021

RCT: 2.01 Radiological Documentation [Slides]

10 CFR 835 establishes radiation protection standards, limits, and program requirements for protecting individuals from ionizing radiation resulting from the conduct of DOE activities. It is important to maintain the proper documentation to ensure that these standards and requirements are being met. An RCT plays a vital role in supporting these requirements through proper documentation.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2023

RCT Continuing Training: Unit 1 Exam Review [Slides]

Terminal Objective: Given the need to perform duties as an RCT, recognize fundamental concepts of radiation protection, in accordance with DOE-HDBK-1122, Radiation Control Technician Training.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2024

RCT Module: 2.01 Radiological Documentation [Slides]

10 CFR 835 establishes radiation protection standards, limits, and program requirements for protecting individuals from ionizing radiation resulting from the conduct of DOE activities. It is important to maintain the proper documentation to ensure that these standards and requirements are being met. An RCT plays a vital role in supporting these requirements through proper documentation.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

NASA NTRS2008

Spacecraft Radiator Freeze Protection Using a Regenerative Heat Exchanger with Bypass Setpoint Temperature Control

Spacecraft radiators are sized for their maximum heat load in their warmest thermal environment, but must operate at reduced heat loads and in colder environments. For systems where the radiator environment can be colder than the working fluid freezing temperature, radiator freezing becomes an issue. Radiator freezing has not been a major issue for the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station (ISS) active thermal control systems (ATCSs) because they operate in environments that are warm relative to the freezing point of their external coolants (Freon-21 and ammonia, respectively). For a vehicle that lands at the Lunar South Pole, the design thermal environment is 215K, but the radiator working fluid must also be kept from freezing during the 0 K sink of transit. A radiator bypass flow control design such as those used on the Space Shuttle and ISS requires more than 30% of the design heat load to avoid radiator freezing during transit - even with a very low freezing point working fluid. By changing the traditional ATCS architecture to include a regenerating heat exchanger inboard of the radiator and by using a regenerator bypass flow control valve to maintain system setpoint, the required minimum heat load can be reduced by more than half. This gives the spacecraft much more flexibility in design and operation. The present work describes the regenerator bypass ATCS setpoint control methodology. It includes analytical results comparing the performance of this system to the traditional radiator bypass system. Finally, a summary of the advantages of the regenerator bypass system are presented.

Ungar, Eugene K.↗

NASA NTRS2001

Measurement of Charged Particle Interactions in Spacecraft and Planetary Habitat Shielding Materials

The Microgravity Materials Program, through its 98-HEDS-04 Research Announcement, has called for research to support 'enhanced human radiation protection through the development of light weight soft goods with high radiation protection characteristics.' Given the nature of the particle flux from the Galactic Cosmic Radiation (GCR), and the many constraints on the depth and type of shielding in spacecraft and planetary habitats, it is clear that the health risks these particles present to astronauts in deep space cannot be entirely eliminated. It is the objective of this project to develop a highly accurate model of GCR transport so that NASA can develop and validate the properties of protective shielding materials with the best available information. The validity of the GCR transport model depends in large part on having accurate and precise input data in the form of the charge-changing and fragment production cross sections for the heavy ions of greatest biological significance. The accuracy of the transport model can be evaluated and enhanced by employing the following a three-step strategy: (1) New cross section data will be made available to the NASA-Langley scientists responsible for the transport codes, and will be used as inputs to the codes; (2) The codes will be used to predict additional cross sections and/or details of the radiation field behind realistic shielding arrangements, where the materials and configurations may be quite complex. Mock-ups of the shielding configurations suitable for use in accelerator experiments will obtained by the NASA-Langley co-investigators; and (3) The transport model predictions will be tested in accelerator-based experiments. The time scale for one pass through these steps is well-suited to a four-year schedule. Over a longer term, these steps may be repeated, leading to still further refinements of the transport code, new predictions, and an additional round of measurements, until the desired predictive accuracy is achieved. The focus of this work is primarily on the first of these steps, the determination of fragmentation cross sections, which will be the main task in years one and two. The detailed strategy for carrying out the remainder of the program is more difficult to specify, as it depends on unpredictable factors such as the extent to which the transport model must be modified, schedules for accelerator time, target fabrication, etc.

Zeitlin, C.↗

DOE OSTI2021

LANL Environmental ALARA Program Status Report for CY 2020

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) ensures that radiation exposures to members of the public and the environment from LANL operations, past and present, are below regulatory thresholds and are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) through compliance with Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1 Radiation Protection for the Public and the Environment (DOE 2020), and LANL Functional Series Documents EPC-ES-FSD-004,Environmental Radiation Protection, (LANL 2020a) and EPC-ES-FSD-003, Los Alamos National Laboratory Environmental ALARA Program (LANL 2020b). These documents provide related program authorities, responsibilities, descriptions, processes, and thresholds for conducting qualitative and quantitative ALARA analyses for prospective and actual radiation exposures to the public and to the environment resulting from DOE activities conducted on the LANL site.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2020

Partner program with local college is a gateway to lasting careers

The first graduates of a newly revised associate degree program at Northern New Mexico College (NNMC) are starting their careers in radiation protection at the Laboratory. NNMC has long provided courses in radiation protection, but last year partnered with the Associate Laboratory Directorate of Weapons Production (ALDWP) to invigorate the college’s offerings.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Confirmation of Radiological Non-Impact Status for TA-37 Magazines

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship (EPC-ES) has evaluated radiological process knowledge and surveys and found that the structures and associated building materials in magazines at Technical Area 37 (TA-37) are candidates for unrestricted use and public release. TA-37 magazines included in this analysis are: buildings TA- 0006, -0008, -0009, -0019, and -0020. This finding is consistent with the requirements of DOE Order 458.1 Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment and LANL Procedure FSD-004 Environmental Radiation Protection.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2023

MARSAME Radiological Release Report for Metal Items from Technical Area 53, Set 25

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship Group (EPC-ES) has evaluated the survey results for metal items from the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) at Technical Area 53 (TA-53) and found that the metal items described in Table 1 of this report (identified by Radiation Protection [RP] Tracking Numbers) meet the criteria for unrestricted release under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1 Chg 4, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment (DOE 2020) and can be recycled. This conclusion is based on the known history of the metal items and radiation survey data (see the completed RP-Form-031 LANSCE Metals Clearance Log [LANL 2021a] for each item in Attachment 1). None of the items in this report are located within radiological areas. Therefore, the items are considered unencumbered and are not subject to the moratorium suspension on metal recycling from DOE facilities. Additionally, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has determined that there is no practical opportunity for internal DOE reuse of this metal.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2023

MARSAME Radiological Release Report for Metal Items from Technical Area 53, Set 26

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship Group (EPC-ES) has evaluated the survey results for metal items from the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) at Technical Area 53 (TA-53) and found that the metal items described in Table 1 of this report (identified by Radiation Protection [RP] Tracking Numbers) meet the criteria for unrestricted release under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1 Chg 4, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment (DOE 2020) and can be recycled. This conclusion is based on the known history of the metal items and radiation survey data. None of the items in this report are located within radiological areas. Therefore, the items are considered unencumbered and are not subject to the moratorium suspension on metal recycling from DOE facilities. Additionally, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has determined that there is no practical opportunity for internal DOE reuse of this metal. Process knowledge indicates that these metal items were unlikely to ever be in direct contact with the beam and thus are unlikely to have become activated. Surface contamination measurements (both total and removable) showed either no detectable radioactivity or activity levels within the range of background. All measurements for volumetric contamination were indistinguishable from background based on calculated decision limits. Additionally, all gamma isotopic surveys conducted for defense-in depth showed no identifiable gamma radiation from beam activation.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2024

MARSAME Radiological Release Report for Metal Items from Technical Area 53, Set 28

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship Group (EPC-ES) has evaluated the survey results for metal items from the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) at Technical Area 53 (TA-53) and found that the metal items described in Table 1 of this report (identified by Radiation Protection [RP] Tracking Numbers) meet the criteria for unrestricted release under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1 Chg 4, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment (DOE 2020) and can be recycled. This conclusion is based on the known history of the metal items and radiation survey data (see the completed RP-Form-031 LANSCE Metals Clearance Log [LANL 2021a] for each item in Attachment 1). Process knowledge indicates that items were released from radiological areas, including radiation areas, prior to the implementation of the 2000 metals moratorium. Therefore, the items are considered unencumbered and are not subject to the moratorium suspension on metal recycling from DOE facilities. Additionally, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has determined that there is no practical opportunity for internal DOE reuse of this metal. Process knowledge indicates that these metal items were unlikely to ever be in direct contact with the beam and thus are unlikely to have become activated. Surface contamination measurements (both total and removable) showed either no detectable radioactivity or activity levels within the range of background. All measurements for volumetric contamination were indistinguishable from background based on calculated decision limits. Additionally, all gamma isotopic surveys conducted for defense-in depth showed no identifiable gamma radiation from beam activation.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2021

Confirmation of Radiological Non-Impact Status for TA-22 Magazines

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship (EPC-ES) has evaluated radiological process knowledge and surveys and found that the structures and associated building materials in magazines and process building at Technical Area 22 (TA-22) are candidates for unrestricted use and public release. TA-22 magazines included in this analysis are: buildings TA-0011, -0012, -0014, -0015, -0016, -0017, -0019, -0021, -0022, -0023, -0024, -0035, and -0069 and building TA-22-0025, which is an a process building. This finding is consistent with the requirements of DOE Order 458.1 Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment and LANL Procedure FSD-004 Environmental Radiation Protection.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2021

MARSAME Release Report for TA-03 Building 16

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship (EPC-ES) has determined that materials associated with technical area 3, Buildings 16 and 18 (collectively known as TA-3-16) (Figure 1) do not meet the criteria for unrestricted release to the public under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1, Radiation Protection for the Public and the Environment (DOE 2020) and are to be treated as Low Level Waste (LLW). These conclusions are based on the known history of the building combined with radiation survey data collected in 2020 and 2021, and findings are consistent with DOE Order 458.1 and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Functional Series Document EPC-ES-FSD-004, Environmental Radiation Protection (LANL 2020a). Sampling and data analysis, as described in this report, were sufficient to meet measurement quality objectives under the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment (MARSAME) manual (MARSAME 2000) and LANL procedures (LANL 2020b). Final approvals for waste disposition will come from LANL’s Waste Management Program.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

NTS-SS-SNL-NMSITE-2017-0004 "Contamination Monitor Left in Service After Inadequate Calibration" Causes Not Fully Addressed (Causal Analysis Report)

On June 5th, 2020 Sandia National Laboratories signed and recommended for closure the evidence package for the Noncompliance Tracking System NTS—SS-SNL-NMSITE-2017-0004, Contamination Monitor Left in Service After Inadequate Calibration. On July 16th, 2020 the Sandia Field Office sent a follow-up question list to the Radiation Protection Instrumentation Program Lead to clarify some points while reviewing the evidence package. The follow-up questions readily identified deficiencies with all three calibrations of the iPCM12 systems. On July 30th, 2020 Radiation Protection hosted a meeting to better understand the exact nature of the concerns, determine if the iPCM12 machines were out of calibration and therefore would have to be taken out of service. One result of this meeting was to determine if SNL could withdraw the evidence package. SNL transmitted a letter on August 26th, 2020 recalling the evidence package and committed to performing a thorough causal analysis and invoke the required issues management processes to ensure that corrective actions are sustained.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗