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At least 145 records · Page 8
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Discrimination of Seismic Events (2006–2020) in North Korea Using P/Lg Amplitude Ratios from Regional Stations and a Bivariate Discriminant Function

Two events of magnitude (m b ) 3.6–3.8 occurred in southern North Korea (NK) on 27 June 2019 and 11 May 2020. Although these events were located ~330–400 km from the known nuclear test site, the fact that they occurred within the territory of NK, a country with a recent history of underground nuclear tests, made them events of interest for the monitoring community. In this work, we used P/Lg ratios from regional stations to categorize seismic events that occurred in NK from 2006 to May 2020, including these two recent events, the six declared NK nuclear tests, and the cavity collapse and triggered earthquakes that followed the 3 September 2017 nuclear explosion. We were able to separate the cavity collapse from the population of nuclear explosions. However, based on P/Lg ratios, the distinction between the earthquakes and the cavity collapse is ambiguous. The performed discriminant analyses suggest that combining Pg/Lg and Pn/Lg ratios results in improved discriminant power compared with any of the ratio types alone. We used the two ratio types jointly in a quadratic discriminant function and successfully classified the six declared nuclear tests and the triggered earthquakes that followed the September 2017 explosion. Our analyses also confirm that the recent southern events of June 2019 and May 2020 are both tectonic earthquakes that occurred naturally.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Microreactor Automated Control System Test Bed Digital Architecture for Real-Time, Hardware-in-the-Loop Simulation

This work describes progress made towards the development of a real-time hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) test bed for non-nuclear testing of microreactor control schemes and failure modes. Non-nuclear testing is a crucial step in developing robust control algorithms for managing microreactor dynamics. The creation of an HIL simulation harnesses the realistic dynamics of physical analogue systems while additionally considering the challenges of variable communication delay. This collaborative effort between Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Idaho National Laboratory has resulted in a LabVIEW-based gRPC communication protocol which couples a TRANSFORM Modelica simulation of nuclear components to the ViBRANT physical hardware for realistic feedback and visual representation of control action in real time. A modular python client structure is developed to manage FMU-based Modelica simulation and real-time gRPC communication. HIL testing suggests that the modeled reactor with natural convection molten salt loop coolant configuration responds well to PID control of drum positioning for modulation of reactor core power, however, future efforts will be made to explore the added thermal inertial delay of system level control and downstream demand changes. Development of this platform with a generalized methodology provides a foundation for exploring a variety of reactor configurations and failure modes in rapid order to provide insight into the most effective avenues of study for further research and development.

McConnell, Jono [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000238984741)↗
DOE OSTI2020

Achieving the End State for the Pahute Mesa Corrective Action Units at the Nevada National Security Site - 20355

Underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) ended in 1992. To address the impact of radionuclide contamination from underground nuclear testing on the groundwater resources of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program created the Underground Test Area (UGTA) activity to characterize the radionuclides in groundwater, understand the nature and extent of radionuclide migration, and forecast the distribution of radionuclides in groundwater for 1,000 years. The UGTA activity is regulated by the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO), an agreement negotiated between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), DOE, and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). DOE is close to achieving the end state (closure in place with monitoring and institutional control) for three of the five UGTA corrective action units (CAUs) on the NNSS. A number of challenges remain to achieve the end state of the other two CAUs, both located on Pahute Mesa. Pahute Mesa was the location of 82 underground nuclear tests, less than 10% of the total number of tests on the NNSS. Yet, Pahute Mesa contains slightly more than 60% of the total radionuclides (in curies). Based on groundwater sampling in monitoring wells, two radionuclide plumes have migrated several kilometers (km) in groundwater from selected test cavities and have crossed the boundary of the NNSS (yet remain within the boundaries of Federally controlled land). The path to achieve the end state continues to evolve as more data are collected and a better understanding of radionuclide migration in groundwater is developed. DOE has invested in drilling and sampling more than 50 characterization and monitoring groundwater wells over the past 25 years. The data indicate that the primary radionuclide of concern is tritium as it is about 89% of the total radionuclide inventory (in curies). As well, only tritium has been measured in groundwater outside of cavities at concentrations exceeding the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) standard. For one of the tritium plumes that has migrated across the NNSS boundary, the average rate of migration has been measured as about 45 meters (m) per year with the rate of migration at the leading edge of the plume of about 85 meters per year. At that rate of migration, the tritium plume will decay to safe levels and not reach the publicly accessible environment at concentrations above the SDWA standard. Other radionuclides, at concentrations below the SDWA standards, will be monitored to ensure they remain at safe levels. Consequently, the end state path forward for Pahute Mesa has evolved to take full advantage of the data from the monitoring network to constrain uncertainty in model forecasts and to reduce reliance on probabilistic simulations. The focus of the end state approach relies on developing a monitoring well network that is protective of human health by increasing confidence that no radionuclide plume in the groundwater will migrate undetected to the accessible environment, located about 22 km from the nearest up-gradient underground nuclear test. Using the measured data to remove uncertainty, the evaluation of radionuclide migration from Pahute Mesa is directed toward meeting the goals of the end state. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Interpretation of Mineralogical Diagenesis for Assessment of Radionuclide Transport at Pahute Mesa, Nevada National Security Site

Pahute Mesa (PM) in southern Nevada was one of the four principal underground nuclear testing areas at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), known as the “Nevada Test Site” until 2010 (Figure 1). Eighty-two underground nuclear tests were conducted at PM in northwestern corner of NNSS (USDOE, 2015). The PM area of underground nuclear testing is located near the center of the Pahute Mesa and Oasis Valley (PM-OV) groundwater basin, which discharges to the southwest near Oasis Valley (OV) north of Beatty, Nevada (Fenelon et al. 2016; Jackson et al., 2020). Most of the PM tests were located at depths near or below the regional water table and, therefore, present potential sources of groundwater contamination from release of test-related radionuclides.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Functional and Operating Requirements for the Microreactor Agile Non-Nuclear Experimental Test Bed (MAGNET)

Microreactors, or small, transportable reactors with a capacity of < 20 MWTH, are sought to provide heat and power for myriad applications in remote areas, military installations, emergency operations, humanitarian missions and disaster relief zones as illustrated in Figure 1. These small, transportable reactor designs, while offering many advantages, are largely untested and unproven. System and component testing is needed to demonstrate to regulators that these designs are safe and to convince customers that the systems are robust, reliable, and efficient. The microreactor agile non-nuclear experimental test bed (MAGNET) is being constructed at Idaho National Laboratory to assist with the development, demonstration, and validation of microreactor components and systems. MAGNET will support technology maturation to reduce uncertainty and risk relative to the operation and deployment of this unique class of systems. Stakeholders for this test bed include microreactor developers, energy users, and regulators. Regulators will be engaged early in the design and testing to expedite regulatory approval and licensing. Within MAGNET, systems and components can be safely tested, providing valuable information on operating regimes, failure modes, and thresholds. Since there are various types of microreactors being proposed, which can be classified according to their core cooling method, heat-pipes, gas-cooled (pebble bed or prismatic), molten salt, light water, or light water, the goal is to provide a test bed that is broadly applicable to multiple microreactor concepts. Each reactor type poses a different set of design and operational challenges and performance claims stated by commercial vendors have not been independently verified through rigorous testing. The initial set of tests to be performed in MAGNET are targeted towards demonstrating the feasibility and performance of heat-pipe cooled reactors, since this concept is unique to very small nuclear reactors. However, the testbed will be constructed to accommodate other designs in addition to heat-pipe cooled reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

DATASET RELEASE AND QUALITY CONTROL REVIEW OF LIVERMORE NEVADA NETWORK (LNN) RECORDINGS OF A SUBSET OF NEVADA NUCLEAR SECURITY SITE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FROM 1979 TO 1992.

Geophysical research on historical nuclear tests is an important aspect of future monitoring capabilities in seismic research. This research is challenging due to the limited number of digital seismic recordings during the peak of nuclear testing (1945-1992). These limited records are unique and non-reproducible data with potential high research impact. Releasing available nuclear explosion seismic records to the explosion monitoring community is thus of high value and is the motivation for this dataset release. The target of this effort was on compilation and quality control of regional seismic records of nuclear explosions recorded on Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory stations ELK, KNB, LAC, and MNV, known collectively as the Livermore National Network (LNN) (Figure 1). LNN was established in the early 1960s for the primary purpose of monitoring underground nuclear testing at the former Nevada Test Site (NTS), now known as the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS) following the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). LNN consisted initially of short-period vertical component Benioff’s recorded on film located at Mina, NV (MNV) and Kanab, Utah (KNB). LNN added two additional stations at Landers, CA (LAC) and Elko, NV (ELK) in 1967 and upgraded equipment to broadband seismometers recorded on frequency modulation (FM) tapes from 1967-1979, followed by digital recordings after 1979 (Jarpe, 1989). The digital recordings were on a variety of now obsolete media, including 9-track, Exabyte, and DAT tapes. Jarpe (1989) describes the seismic station instrumentation details over the period of deployment. LNN recorded valuable non-repeatable unique data of several hundreds of nuclear explosions at NNSS, as well as earthquakes and chemical and mining explosions (Walter, 2020). The details of these nuclear tests are provided in the Department of Energy Report NV-209 Rev 16 (DOE, 2015).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Hydrologic Data for the Groundwater Flow and Contaminant Transport Model of Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nye County, Nevada, Revision 1

This hydrologic data document (HDD) has been prepared for Corrective Action Units (CAUs) 101 and 102, Central and Western Pahute Mesa, in order to support the development of a groundwater flow and contaminant transport model. Central and Western Pahute Mesa are two of the five CAUs on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site [NTS]) used for underground nuclear testing (Figure 1-1). The nuclear tests resulted in groundwater contamination in the vicinity of the underground test areas. As a result, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program is currently conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) of the Pahute Mesa underground test areas. This work is a part of the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). The CAU groundwater flow and transport model is composed of two pieces, a flow model and a transport model, that together provide the contaminant boundary forecasts required by the FFACO. The hydrologic data necessary for the flow model portion of the CAU model are presented in this report. The transport data necessary for the transport model portion of the CAU model will be provided in a separate report.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Mitigation for Removal of Building 01-202681 in the Main Storage Yard of the Area 1 Subdock, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The Main Storage Yard was originally recorded as SHPO Resource No. S2772 in 2020 during an architectural survey of the Area 1 Subdock (Collins et al. 2022). It was recommended individually eligible for listing in the NRHP under Criteria A and C and as contributing to the significance of the potential Area 1 Subdock Historic District. The SHPO concurred with these determinations in a letter dated April 29, 2022 (Reed). The Main Storage Yard retains all seven aspects of integrity. The location, design, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association have not changed since the original construction. Since the purpose of the yard is to maintain storage equipment that is actively being used, the design and feeling will change each time equipment is moved. Such actions reinforce the integrity of design and feeling. Buildings 01-101 and 01-102 were removed (Collins and Menocal 2020), but the other buildings and storage yard remain. Therefore, the setting has been changed, but not to the degree that the Main Storage Yard no longer conveys its significance (see Figures 4 and 5 for comparison). The Main Storage Yard was designed to facilitate the relocation of the Area 3 Subdock to Area 1 in 1985. The design for the overall Subdock provided a centralized cluster of buildings surrounded by two large storage yards. While the North Storage Yard largely serves as overflow storage, the Main Storage Yard holds the majority of drill rigs and drilling equipment needed to support big hole drilling. The Main Storage Yard and its contents were essential elements of the nuclear testing drilling program on the NNSS thus making it eligible for the NRHP under Criterion A for its contribution to broad patterns of history by storing specially designed equipment for underground nuclear testing at the NNSS. It is also eligible under Criterion C as it is an engineered landscape that now serves as an open-air repository of drilling technology and nuclear testing. In addition to its individual significance, the Main Storage Yard also contributes to the significance of the Area 1 Subdock Historic District as it showcases a variety of big-hole drilling equipment, support facilities, and warehouses that were specially designed for nuclear testing at the NNSS. Despite the demolition of two contributing elements to date, the district still contains numerous examples of other facilities with the purpose of supporting big-hole drilling; therefore, the district still remains eligible under Criteria A and C.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS1974

Nuclear weapons tests and short-term effects on atmospheric ozone

Observations made when Nimbus 4 passed over a nuclear cloud about three hours after the bomb exploded are presented. Infrared and BUV measurements indicated that the atmospheric ozone level in the area of cloud was significantly less than in areas directly north and south of the cloud. It is noted, however, that it is not possible to state definitively that the ozone depletion was caused by nitrogen oxides released in the nuclear weapons test, and that further observations must be made to clarify the situation.

Miller, A. J.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Los Alamos studies of the Nevada test site facilities for the testing of nuclear rockets

The topics are presented in viewgraph form and include the following: Nevada test site geographic location; location of NRDA facilities, area 25; assessment program plan; program goal, scope, and process -- the New Nuclear Rocket Program; nuclear rocket engine test facilities; EMAD Facility; summary of final assessment results; ETS-1 Facility; and facilities cost summary.

Hynes, Michael V.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance Plan for the Salmon, Mississippi, Site

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) prepared this Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance Plan (LTS&M Plan) for the Salmon, Mississippi, Site (the Salmon site) to describe LM’s plan and policy for future site activities. The Salmon site consists of 1470 acres in Lamar County, Mississippi, approximately 10 miles west of Purvis, Mississippi, and about 21 miles southwest of Hattiesburg, Mississippi. The site is located over a large subsurface salt formation referred to as the Tatum Salt Dome. Two nuclear tests (Project Dribble) and two gas explosive tests (Project Miracle Play) were conducted in the salt dome between 1964 and 1970. Salmon, the first nuclear test, was conducted on October 22, 1964, and created a cavity approximately 2700 feet (ft) below ground surface (bgs). The second nuclear test, Sterling, was conducted on December 3, 1966. The Sterling test and the two gas explosions—Diode Tube on February 2, 1969, and Humid Water on April 19, 1970—were all conducted in the cavity created by the Salmon test. The four explosions were conducted as part of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission’s (AEC’s) Vela Uniform program. Testing at the site ended in 1970 after the second gas detonation. The tests resulted in residual contamination and postdetonation features that require long-term oversight.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2022

Options for Subscale Maturation of Advanced Reactor Technologies Testing for Nuclear Thermal Propulsion

Several options could be implemented to establish an irradiation testing capability suitable for investigation of the performance of multiple nuclear thermal propulsion fuel elements at prototypic conditions. The prototypic conditions of interest are based on the current needs of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Space Nuclear Power Program. The results of such testing are also intended to reduce the risks currently seen for any future subscale or full-scale ground testing of an engine-reactor system. The optimal solution is dependent upon several factors such as performance, cost, availability, schedule, technology readiness level, and plans for future testing in the SNP Program. Three options, based on different combinations of these factors, are considered in this report.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2021

A novel defoamer for processing nuclear waste: Testing and performance

Abstract Legacy radioactive waste from nuclear weapons material processing is the biggest environmental challenge in the state of South Carolina, and one of the biggest in the United States. Although substantial progress has been made in processing and vitrifying high‐level radioactive waste at the Savannah River site, approximately 35 million gallons remains to be treated and dispositioned. In this article, we show the development of a new defoamer for use in the processing of high‐level radioactive waste. The application of the new defoamer is not only more effective at controlling foam but will shorten the batch processing time leading to safer and more efficient processing. This has the potential to help shorten the overall site mission lifetime, saving the federal government hundreds of millions of dollars. The novel aspect of the new defoamer is its effectiveness and stability in the harsh conditions needed for processing high‐level radioactive waste: high temperatures, pH 4–13, strong oxidizing and reducing agents, and numerous metal catalysts. The defoamer will replace an existing antifoam agent that decomposes to form multiple flammable gases. Because the existing antifoam agent decomposes quickly, processing changes increased processing time. Statement of novelty We demonstrate that a new defoamer has been developed for use in processing high‐level radioactive waste. This novel defoamer is effective and stable in the harsh processing conditions with no detectable flammable by‐products. Because the existing antifoam agent decomposes quickly, processing changes, including lowering acid addition rates and evaporation rates, increased processing time. The new defoamer is not only more effective at controlling foam but will shorten the batch processing time and lead to safer and more efficient processing by eliminating the production of flammable gases. Statement of industrial relevance Foaming is of great concern in many industrial processes involving three‐phase gas/liquid/fine‐solids systems, like in water evaporation, mineral floatation, air sparging in situ remediation techniques, and in those found in the paper industry.

Lambert, Dan P.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Calendar Year 2020 Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev. 1)

This report presents the results of monitoring conducted for water quality, water levels, and institutional controls in calendar year (CY) 2020 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM), at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. This report also presents analytical laboratory results (including results of quality assurance/quality control samples, such as field duplicates [FDs]), and verification of use restrictions (URs), institutional controls, and water usage. Groundwater samples were collected; water levels were measured; and well site surveillance was conducted in support of the Underground Test Area Closure Report (CR) for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (DOE/EMNV, 2020). Rainier Mesa (RM) was the site of 61 underground nuclear tests, and Shoshone Mountain (SM) was the site of 6 underground nuclear tests. As a result of these activities, which took place from 1957 to 1992, radionuclides (RNs) were released in the subsurface in the vicinity of the detonations. These 67 underground nuclear tests are associated with 66 specific corrective action site (CAS) numbers, as listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). Two tests, HURON LANDING and DIAMOND ACE (conducted simultaneously), are included within one CAS. The CR (DOE/EMNV, 2020) establishes the regulatory boundaries and regulatory boundary objectives, monitoring program, UR boundaries and URs, and other institutional controls agreed to by EM Nevada Program and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for closure of CAU 99. Regulatory boundaries for the RM/SM CAU were established to protect receptors of groundwater from RN contamination within the three downgradient groundwater basins that receive recharge from RM. The SM regulatory boundary was established to verify that RN contamination does not reach the lower carbonate aquifer below SM. The UR boundaries were established based on contaminant simulation forecasts from the flow and transport simulations with consideration of site-specific topographical controls. The URs associated with the UR boundaries were identified to protect onsite workers and the public from inadvertent exposure to contaminated groundwater as forecasted to occur assuming current conditions. The UR is intended to restrict activities that might expose workers to contaminated groundwater within the UR area. In addition to the URs, other institutional controls are established to monitor and limit access to groundwater. These include federal ownership and management in perpetuity, controlled access of the NNSS and surrounding areas, and reporting water use on the NNSS and surrounding hydrographic basins.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

2018 Long-Term Hydrologic Monitoring Program Report for Rio Blanco, Colorado, Site

This report presents the monitoring data collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) at the Rio Blanco, Colorado, Site (Figure 1). The Rio Blanco site was the location of an underground nuclear test during which three nuclear devices were detonated nearly simultaneously in a single borehole in 1973. The test resulted in residual radionuclide contamination at the detonation depths of 5840, 6230, and 6690 feet (ft) (DOE 2015). Monitoring includes the collection of samples from groundwater wells and surface water locations near the site to assess for any potential impacts that may be attributed to the Rio Blanco nuclear test. This report summarizes the laboratory analytical results obtained from the sampling event conducted in 2018. This annual report and previous reports are available on the LM public website at https://www.lm.doe.gov/rio_blanco/Sites.aspx. Data collected during this and previous monitoring events are available on the Geospatial Environmental Mapping System (GEMS) website at https://gems.lm.doe.gov/#site=RBL.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Initial Temperature Testing of Advanced Manufactured Melt Wire Package

As a part of the In-Pile Instrumentation Program, The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has recently established in-house capabilities to fabricate and test new advanced manufactured sensors for measuring the peak irradiation temperature inside a nuclear test reactor. Although nuclear test reactors can use standard methods of real-time temperature monitoring, such as thermocouples, the complexity of feedthroughs and attachment complications to collect real-time measurements greatly increases the cost of the experiment. Passive monitoring techniques may be utilized that exploit the melting point of well characterized material (standard melt wires), however, the limited space available for instrumentation during experiments is also a challenge. To accommodate the challenge, INL has expanded its temperature detection instrumentation capabilities paired with the advancement of in-house advanced manufacturing options to include printed melt wires for peak irradiation temperature measurement. The advanced manufactured melt wire package can determine peak temperatures in experiments that can fit the challenging space available during irradiation. Recent results and knowledge from this ongoing work have made it possible to develop unique temperature sensors that can accomplish user specific temperature ranges inside the harsh environments experienced during radiation testing. This report summarizes the initial temperature testing using fabricated melt wires with two different melting temperatures, silver (melting temperature of ~960 °C) and solder (melting temperature of ~160 °C), that were initially tested for their relative melting points using non-standard method of furnace and hot plate testing under normal air conditions. Future work will include more controlled way of testing printed melt wires under inert gas with multiple temperature measurements followed by comparison of standard melt wire package performance for baseline characterization.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗