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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

An Architectural Survey of the U12G Tunnel Historic District, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), proposes to demolish six buildings and three storage areas located at the U12g Tunnel portal area in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The buildings are 12-358 (Signal Vault); 12-201800 (Storage Quonset Hut); 12-202555 (Walker Shack); 12-868 (Pipe Assembly); 12-B100933 (Electrical Shop); 12-B100944 (Conference Room); and Storage Area 1; Storage Area 2; and Storage Area 3. The buildings and storage areas were selected for demolition as part of the DOE’s Real Property Efficiency Plan to reduce the footprint of unused and non-operational facilities on the NNSS. They are all vacant and have no proposed uses for current or upcoming NNSS missions. Demolition activities constitute an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. Identification efforts began with resources proposed for demolition in federal Fiscal Year (FY) 23. Four buildings were proposed to be demolished in FY23 (12-358, 12-868, 12-201800, and 12-202555). These buildings and the U12g Tunnel Historic District (SHPO No. D444) were recorded in Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Adverse Effect for the Proposed Demolition of Five Buildings in Area 12, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Menocal et al. 2023). Identification efforts indicated three buildings (12-358, 12-201800, and 12-868) supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. The fourth building post-dated the use of U12g Tunnel for nuclear testing activities. The report recommended that three of the four buildings (12-358, 12-201800, 12-868) and the U12g Tunnel Historic District may be eligible for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the three buildings and on the historic district. The Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) concurred with the report’s findings (Reed 2023). The U12g Tunnel was determined eligible as a historic district under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criterion A, at the local level, in the context of the Cold War as an underground testing environment for the development of nuclear weapons and to assess the effects of a nuclear explosion on materials and equipment with a period of significance from 1959 to 1971. It was also determined eligible under Significance Criterion C for embodying the distinctive characters of a horizontal tunnel complex used for nuclear testing and as a significant and distinguishable entity. The three buildings were determined to be contributing elements of the district. The undertaking was expanded with the addition of two buildings and three storage areas proposed to be demolished and located within U12g Tunnel Historic District in FY24. These five resources (12-B100933, 12-B100944, and Storage Areas 1, 2, and 3) were recorded in Supplemental Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Effect for Additional Proposed Demolition at U12g Tunnel, Area 12, Nevada national Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Brannan et al. 2024). Identification efforts indicated that the two buildings and Storage Area 1 supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. Storage Area 1 and Storage Area 2 post-dated the nuclear testing activities at U12g Tunnel and were not recommended as contributing elements to the district. The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the newly identified buildings and one storage area and on the historic district. The SHPO concurred that the expanded undertaking would result in adverse effects to historic properties (Reed 2025). To resolve these adverse effects, NNSA/NFO, in consultation with the SHPO, is following standard mitigation as stipulated in the 2024 Programmatic Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25554 Among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (hereafter referred to as the NNSS PA). The standard mitigation measures are outlined in Appendix D of the NNSS PA. As such, this architectural survey has been prepared in accordance with Appendix D of the NNSS PA and follows the report format outlined in Appendix F. It includes a historic context that describes the district’s origin, history, and support functions, its significance in the context of nuclear testing on the NNSS, and identifies contributing and non-contributing elements within the district. The report is accompanied by Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) forms for individual resources and a Historic District Resource Assessment (HDRA) for the U12g Tunnel Historic District. In total, this architectural report identified 32 primary resources within the district boundary. Six of the primary resources were previously identified as contributing elements. An additional 17 resources are recommended as contributing elements to the district for a total of 23 contributing elements. The other nine resources identified are recommended as non-contributing elements to the district.

12-201800↗
DOE OSTI2023

Examining the potential for detecting simultaneous noble gas and aerosol samples in the international monitoring system radionuclide network

The purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to establish a legally binding ban on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) is developing the International Monitoring System (IMS) that includes a global network of 80 stations to monitor for airborne radionuclides upon entry into force of the CTBT. All 80 radionuclide stations will monitor for particulate radionuclides and at least half of the stations will monitor for radioxenon. The airborne radionuclide monitoring is an important verification technology both for the detection of a radionuclide release and in the determination of whether the release event originates from a nuclear explosion as opposed to an industrial use of nuclear materials. Nuclear power plants and many medical isotope production facilities release radioxenon into the atmosphere. Low levels of a few particulate isotopes, such as iodine, may also be released. Detections of multiple isotopes are useful for screening the radionuclide samples for relevance to the Treaty. This paper examines the anticipated joint detections in the IMS of noble gas and particulate isotopes from underground nuclear explosions where breaches in the underground containment vents from low levels to up to 1% of the radionuclide inventory of the resulting fission products to the atmosphere. Detection probabilities are based on 844 simulated release events spaced out at 17 release locations and one year in time. Six different release (venting) scenarios, including two fractionated scenarios, were analyzed. When ranked by detection probability, 11 particulate isotopes and one noble gas isotope ( 133 Xe) appear in the top 20 isotopes for all six release scenarios. Using the 11 particulate isotopes and the one noble gas isotope, the IMS has nearly the same detection probability as when 45 particulate and 4 noble gas isotopes are used. Thus, a limited list of relevant radionuclides may be sufficient for treaty verification purposes. The probability that at least one particulate and at least one radioxenon isotope would be detected in the IMS from the release events ranged from 0.15 to 0.86 depending on the release scenario.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Incorporating civilian radioxenon background estimates in anomaly detection

A nuclear explosion screening exercise in 2023 (Maurer et al., 2023) found challenges with discerning anomalous radioxenon activity concentrations relative to elevated background concentrations. Research has continued into methods to detect anomalous radioxenon concentrations by comparing samples to estimates of atmospheric radioxenon background concentrations caused by releases at nuclear reactors or medical isotope production facilities. A new approach estimates the sample concentrations using time-varying radioxenon release rates obtained using optimization techniques that constrain the facility release rates to plausible amounts based on historical data or facility knowledge. The purpose of the optimization is to determine whether any combination of plausible release rates from emitting facilities can explain a series of radioxenon measurements at one or more sampling stations. A case study uses radioxenon data collected at three locations in western Europe for a month in 2021 and considers releases from 77 locations. Fewer samples are identified as being anomalous using a simplistic flagging rule than from an application of the current International Monitoring System (IMS) activity concentration-level rule.

Environmental sciences↗
DOE OSTI2023

Direct Alpha Spectrometry of Nuclear Fallout

Advanced instruments and methods are under development to allow direct alpha spectrometry of nuclear fallout debris near the point of collection, to support nuclear forensics (NF). New approaches are needed to support NF in order to accelerate the process for data generation and reduce the overall timeline for decision making. Fallout debris at short time periods following detonation can be difficult to work with for alpha spectrometry, due to the presence of intense beta radiation originating from significant quantities of high-activity fission products. Intense beta radiation can challenge traditional silicon-based high-resolution alpha spectrometers. Addressing this, single-crystal (sc) chemical vapor deposition (CVD) produced diamond semiconductors have been studied for use for alpha spectrometry for assaying nuclear fallout debris. Tests have been performed using scCVD sensors to assay a variety of actinide-bearing samples. Sample preparation, when done, has been limited to pulverization using a mechanical ball mill. To reduce measurement times, multi-chip arrays of scCVD diamond semiconductor have been developed in form factors suitable for field deployment in support of NF objectives. These arrays have been tested using high-beta-activity sol gel surrogate nuclear explosive debris (SNED) containing varying concentrations of uranium and plutonium. Results from the use of scCVD detectors with sol gel SNED will be presented.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗
DOE OSTI2025

127 Xe quantification method development and intercomparison exercise

Monitoring of the atmosphere for fission products ( 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe) is performed by various laboratories to detect nuclear explosions. Quantification of 127 Xe is not routinely performed by laboratories measuring atmospheric radioxenon because it is not a fission product. 127 Xe was recently detected by a ground-based beta-gamma air monitoring system. When measured using beta-gamma coincidence detector systems, such as those in use on the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 127 Xe can interfere with the quantification of fission product radioxenon due to overlap of the 127 Xe beta-gamma coincidence signatures with those of fission product radioxenon. Here, this work demonstrates quantification of 127 Xe at different laboratories with different measurement techniques. Production and purification of 127 Xe was performed by neutron activation of enriched 126 Xe. The purified 127 Xe was then split between laboratories, and detection and quantification methods were developed. At Idaho National Laboratory, a quantification method involving high purity germanium detectors was devised that included self-attenuation correction. At AWE, a beta-gamma coincidence counting method, as used in support of the IMS, was modified to enable the measurement and analysis of the 127 Xe samples. Corrections were made for self-attenuation, which showed a strong xenon volume dependency, for some coincidence signatures. The gas sample activity concentration was used as the comparison metric and it showed excellent agreement between the methods.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Possible impacts of molten salt reactors on the International Monitoring System

Molten salt reactors (MSRs) are gaining support as many countries look for ways to increase power generation and replace aging nuclear energy production facilities. MSRs have inherently safe designs, are scalable in size, can burn transuranic wastes from traditional solid fuel nuclear reactors, can store excess heat in thermal reservoirs for water desalination, and can be used to produce medical isotopes as part of the real-time liquid-fuel recycling process. The ability to remove 135 Xe in real time from the fuel improves the power production in an MSR because 135 Xe is the most significant neutron-absorbing isotope generated by nuclear fission. Xenon-135, and other radioactive gases, are removed by sparging the fuel with an inert gas while the liquid fuel is recirculated from the reactor inner core through the heat exchangers. Without effective abatement technologies, large amounts of radioactive gas could be released during the sparging process. This work examines the potential impact of radioxenon releases on samplers used by the International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect nuclear explosions. Here, atmospheric transport simulations from seven hypothetical MSRs on different continents were used to evaluate the holdup time needed before release of radioxenon so IMS samplers would register few detections. Abatement technologies that retain radioxenon isotopes for at least 120 d before their release will be needed to mitigate the impacts from a molten salt breeder reactor used to replace a nuclear power plant. A holdup time of about 150 d is needed to reduce emissions to the average level of current nuclear power plants.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

How Dynamic Time Warping Can Assist Conventional Cross-correlation

Waveform cross-correlation is a sensitive phase-matched filtering technique that can detect seismic events for nuclear explosion monitoring. However, there are outstanding challenges with correlation detectors, most notably a direct dependence on the completeness of the waveform template library. To ameliorate these challenges, we investigate how dynamic time warping (DTW) may make waveform correlation more robust. DTW analyzes the differences between two time series and attempts to “warp” one time series relative to another in a recursive manner. We apply DTW to synthetic earthquake and recorded explosion templates to expand the capability of correlation detectors. We explore what conditions (e.g., source, station distance, frequency bands) and/or DTW algorithms generate stronger correlation scores. We show that DTW performs well on noisy signals and can dramatically improve the cross-correlation coefficient between a template and data-stream waveform. We conclude with recommendations on how to utilize DTW in nuclear monitoring detection.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Applying Waveform Correlation and Waveform Template Metadata to Mining Blasts to Reduce Analyst Workload

Organizations that monitor for underground nuclear explosive tests are interested in techniques that automatically characterize mining blasts to reduce the human analyst effort required to produce high - quality event bulletins. Waveform correlation is effective in finding similar waveforms from repeating seismic events, including mining blasts. In this study we use waveform template event metadata to seek corroborating detections from multiple stations in the International Monitoring System of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. We build upon events detected in a prior waveform correlation study of mining blasts in two geographic regions, Wyoming and Scandinavia. Using a set of expert analyst-reviewed waveform correlation events that were declared to be true positive detections, we explore criteria for choosing the waveform correlation detections that are most likely to lead to bulletin-worthy events and reduction of analyst effort.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Introduction to the Consortium for Monitoring, Technology, and Verification (MTV) [Slides]

Our mission is to develop new technologies that detect and deter nuclear proliferation activities while training the next generation of nuclear professionals. The three technical thrust areas are: 1. Fundamentals of nuclear and particle physics, 2. Signals and source terms for nuclear nonproliferation, and 3. Nuclear explosion. There are opportunities for collaborations with university faculty, possible student and post-doc work, and posting job ads. Further, MTV hosts various workshops, symposiums.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

On the Radiation Effects of Strontium Ions on Satellite Solar Cells in Low Earth Orbits

This study focuses on the radiation effects 19 of Sr + ions—generated from high-altitude nuclear explosions (HANE)—on satellite solar cells in low-Earth orbits (LEO). Along four selected satellite orbits, ion fluences are sampled inside the evolving Sr + distributions for days, determined from our newly developed HANE environment model. These fluences, along with the help of radiation transport codes including the MULASSIS and SRIM models, enable us to quantify the radiation damages by determining the values of total ionizing doses and the equivalent 1 MeV electron fluences for displacement damages. Comparing the dose values to existing experimental data, we conclude that HANE-generated Sr + ions have limited darkening effects to quartz solar cell coverglasses in LEO with apogees of 100s to 1000 km. In addition, with the extremely high equivalent fluences, we also conclude that these Sr+ ions may cause severe or even fatal displacement damage to exposed solar photovoltaic (PV) cells on satellites in LEO. The radiation effects of Sr + ions are much less significant for the orbits with high apogees beyond ten thousand km. We also conducted model parameter sensitivity studies on the charge exchange cross-sections, neutral atmosphere density profiles and explosion local time positions, and the above conclusions stay unchanged. The methodology developed in this study can be extended to other HANE-generated heavy ion species in the future.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Manhattan Project Nuclear Science and Technology Developments at Los Alamos: A Special Issue of Nuclear Technology

The year 2020 marked the 75th anniversary of the Trinity experiment, the world’s first nuclear explosion, on July 16, 1945, near Alamogordo, New Mexico. Trinity was a vital proof step toward the culmination of the Manhattan Project and the end of World War II. The technical accomplishments made by scientists and engineers from the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada (some originating in Germany, Hungary, Italy, France, and other countries) were recognized by many events in 2020, including a visit to New Mexico’s Los Alamos National Laboratory by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) dignitaries; historical documentaries. The importance of Trinity as a foundational accomplishment for the broad nuclear science and engineering community is clear; indeed, New Mexico’s chapter of the American Nuclear Society (ANS) is referred to as the Trinity Section. The events surrounding Trinity have even entered into high culture with recent performances of John Adams’s opera Doctor Atomic in San Francisco, Amsterdam, Chicago, New York, and Santa Fe.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Applying Waveform Correlation and Waveform Template Metadata to Aftershocks in the Middle East to Reduce Analyst Workload

Organizations that monitor for underground nuclear explosive tests are interested in techniques that automatically characterize recurring events such as aftershocks to reduce the human analyst effort required to produce high-quality event bulletins. Waveform correlation is a technique that is effective in finding similar waveforms from repeating seismic events. In this study, we apply waveform correlation in combination with template event metadata to two aftershock sequences in the Middle East to seek corroborating detections from multiple stations in the International Monitoring System of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. We use waveform templates from stations that are within regional distance of aftershock sequences to detect subsequent events, then use template event metadata to discover what stations are likely to record corroborating arrival waveforms for recurring aftershock events at the same location, and develop additional waveform templates to seek corroborating detections. We evaluate the results with the goal of determining whether applying the method to aftershock events will improve the choice of waveform correlation detections that lead to bulletin-worthy events and reduction of analyst effort.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Thermodynamics of Liquid Immiscibility in Iron-Silicate Melt Systems: A Study of Nuclear Fallout Glass

In a ground-interacting nuclear explosion, elements derived from environmental and anthropogenic material, such as iron, silicon, and aluminum, can be incorporated into the fireball. When significant amounts of metals are entrained, the resulting melt may display immiscible textures. The composition of these textures is a record of the temperature of formation and cooling rates (or thermodynamic stability) of the melts and can provide unique constraints on the early cooling conditions of these events. Here, a thermodynamic approach using calculated phase diagrams, the CALPHAD method, is used to predict temperature and composition ranges where stable liquid immiscibility might result in the textures observed in nuclear fallout glass. Sensitivity of the immiscibility to the presence of relative Al, Ca, and Mg content is also explored and compared to fallout samples, and partition coefficients are introduced to understand the preferred distribution of components into each liquid phase.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Issues in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Ratification Debate: A 20 Year Retrospective

Two decades after the U.S. Senate declined in 1999 to give its consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty remains in legal and political limbo. Legally, the treaty cannot enter into force without U.S. ratification. However, the Senate’s rejection does not strip the treaty of its force as an element of customary international law or alter the will of other signatories to see it enter into force. Politically, the debate over the virtues and flaws of the treaty remains as strong as ever, with some CTBT advocates pushing energetically for U.S. re-review while some opponents seek ways to “un-sign” the treaty. Meanwhile, despite the Senate’s rejection of the treaty, the United States acts in a manner consistent with its main obligations by maintaining a moratorium on explosive nuclear testing and providing financial support (as well as technical expertise) to the CTBT Organization (CTBTO)—in particular the CTBTO’s International Monitoring System (IMS). The CTBT may well remain in such limbo for a long time to come, unless some catalytic event comes along to re-shape national perceptions and priorities, one way or the other. The treaty’s future, whatever it might be, will be determined in part by how much perspectives might have changed in light of interim developments. Our purpose is to shed light on some of those developments and to assess their relevance. The 1999 ratification debate addressed a large number of issues. Rejection was driven by various policy and technical judgments. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine those technical judgments in light of what has been learned over the following two decades. On some technical matters, there was explicit recognition of extant uncertainties, as well as a conviction and hope that time would dispel them. To be doubly clear, our purpose is not to recommend a way forward on CTBT ratification. The policy judgments of 1999 and 2020 are beyond the scope of this paper. This technical re-examination proceeds as follows. It begins with a short background section to introduce the key technical matters in discussion in the U.S. ratification process. Then it moves systematically through each of those topics with a review of relevant background information, a discussion of key points in debate, an analysis of subsequent experience, and a current assessment. The historical analysis draws on many sources including the primary documents of the Congressional debate, the official article-by-article interpretation by the Department of State, and the statements of key players in the process. We also relied on key technical reports and publications by subject matter experts that have addressed in more detail many of the issues in our focus. These sources include the 2002 and 2012 reports of the National Academy of Sciences as well as publications by senior technical staff of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) who were actively involved in the ratification debate, including then-Laboratory Director Bruce Tarter. We also conducted several interviews with government officials from the 1990s, past laboratory directors, and other members of the scientific community. But, except where individuals are specifically cited by name, the judgments offered here are our own and should not be attributed to any other individual or to LLNL as such.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Modeling of fission and activation products in molten salt reactors and their potential impact on the radionuclide monitoring stations of the International Monitoring System

Molten Salt Reactors (MSRs) are one of six Generation IV reactor designs currently under development around the world. Because of the unique operating conditions of MSRs, which include molten fuel and the continuous removal of gaseous fission products during operation, work was performed to analyze the potential impact of emissions on the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Simulations were performed to predict the production of IMS-relevant radionuclides in four MSR designs operating under two scenarios – (1) a sealed reactor with releases only during operational shutdown and (2) continuous reprocessing or sparging of the fuel salt. From these production estimates the radioxenon and radioiodine signatures were extracted and compared to three current reactor designs (PWR, BWR, RBMK). In the cases where continuous reprocessing of the fuel salt occurred both the radioxenon and radioiodine signatures are nearly indistinguishable from a nuclear explosion. Estimates were also made of the potential emission rate of radioxenon for three reactor designs and it was found that MSRs have the potential to emit radioxenon isotopes at a rate of 1015 – 8×1016 Bq/d for 133Xe if no abatement is used. An assessment was also made of activation products using a candidate fuel salt (FLiBe) mixed with corrosion products for the Thorium Molten Salt Reactor (TMSR-LF1)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Preliminary Analysis of Source Physics Experiment Explosion-Triggered Microseismicity Using the Back-Projection Method

A series of four chemical explosions were detonated in a deep borehole within the Yucca Flat Dry Alluvium Geology (DAG) at the Nevada National Security Site between 2018 and 2019. The two larger chemical explosions of 50 tons (DAG-2) and 10 tons (DAG-4) TNT equivalent yield triggered energetic aftershock sequences numbering 1392 and 347 microearthquakes, respectively, within the first 10 days. No significant aftershock activity was observed for the two smaller 1-ton explosions (DAG-1 and DAG-3). Here, we used a back-projection method based on travel-time migration and stacking of signal-to-noise ratio traces to detect, associate and locate aftershocks from a subset of 22-geophones within a larger 2 urn:x-wiley:21699313:media:jgrb54910:jgrb54910-math-0001 2 km seismic array surrounding the borehole. The aftershocks located within 300 m of the borehole and the depths were above the working points of 300 and 50 m depths of DAG-2 and DAG-4, respectively, ruling out triggering slip on geologic faults or disturbances beneath neighboring collapse craters. DAG-2 and DAG-4 aftershocks decayed at similar rates, with power-law exponents of p = 1.48 and p = 1.49, respectively. These decay rates are comparable to aftershocks sequences triggered by earthquakes and historical nuclear explosions at Yucca Flat. A smooth power-law aftershock decay within the first 10 days suggests a triggering mechanism from explosion generated stress relaxation due to the diffusion of high gas pressures in the cavity and radial fractures. A more random and episodic aftershock rate would be expected due to cavity collapse or falling rubble in chimney formation.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Fast neutron activation of ubiquitous materials

Nuclear explosions expose ubiquitous materials to large numbers of neutrons, producing a variety of radioactive isotopes. To simulate such phenomena from both fission and thermonuclear explosions, we irradiated 29 different targets with approximately 3 and 14 MeV neutrons and measured the beta-delayed gamma rays using germanium detectors. Therefore, for each neutron energy, the expected radioisotopes, half-lives, and gamma ray energies were deduced. From measurements of the ratios of activities of the radionuclides produced by neutron irradiations, we were able to identify several materials that are particularly sensitive to the neutron energy spectra.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Dose Coefficients for Internal Dose Assessments for Exposure to Radioactive Fallout

This paper presents values as well as the bases for calculating internal dose coefficients suitable for estimating organ doses from the exposure to radioactive fallout that could result from the detonation of a nuclear fission device. The 34 radionuclides discussed are the same as those given in a priority list of radionuclides for fallout dose assessments presented in a companion overview paper. The radionuclides discussed are those that are believed to account for a preponderance of the organ doses that might be received by intake by persons of all ages (including in utero and via breast feeding for infants) following exposure to radioactive fallout. The presented dose coefficients for ingestion account for age and include modifications for variations in solubility with distance as discussed previously in the literature, and those for inhalation similarly account for age, solubility, and particle sizes that would be relevant at various distances of exposure as discussed in a companion paper on ingestion dose methods. The proposed modifications peculiar to radioactive fallout account for systematic changes in solubility and particle sizes with distance from the site of detonation, termed here as the region of “local fallout” and the region “beyond local fallout.” Brief definitions of these regions are provided here with more detailed discussion in a companion paper on estimating deposition of fallout radionuclides. This paper provides the dose coefficients for ingestion and inhalation (for particle sizes of 1 μm, 5 μm, 10 μm, and 20 μm) for the region “local fallout.” These dose coefficients for “local fallout” are specific for particles formed in a nuclear explosion that can be large and have radionuclides, particularly the more refractory ones, distributed throughout the volume where the radionuclide has reduced solubility. The dose coefficients for the region “beyond local fallout” are assumed to be the ones published by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) in 1995. Comparisons of the presented dose coefficients are made with values published by the ICRP.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗