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Nevada Higher Education Benefits from US Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program's Transfer of Geologic Samples - 20442

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site, was the location of 100 historic atmospheric and 828 historic underground nuclear tests from 1951 to 1992. Related to this historic nuclear testing, geologic and hydrologic studies of the site were conducted utilizing the skills and the expertise of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and national laboratories (Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), who were principal in leading the development of weapons and were responsible for specific underground testing programs. The subsurface samples and technical/scientific data associated with NNSS geologic studies (past and present) are preserved and stored at the USGS Mercury Core Library and Data Center located at the NNSS. Currently, the facility stores over 2,000,000 linear feet of cores and cuttings from more than 2,600 drill holes that can be accessed for study. Most of the samples and historic geologic work was focused directly on subsurface geologic settings that relate directly to historic underground nuclear testing. Since 1992, the United States has observed a unilateral moratorium on full-scale nuclear testing, and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program is now responsible for hydrogeologic characterization of the potential impacts to the natural groundwater systems that may have resulted from historic underground nuclear tests. As part of this effort, the EM Nevada Program Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity has drilled and completed over 58 deep (2,000 - 7,000 ft.) characterization wells, totaling in excess of 170,000 linear feet of cuttings and core samples. Cutting samples were collected as triplicate samples for each respective depth interval, to account for potential later nondestructive/destructive analysis and to preserve samples for regulatory purposes. Recently, it was recognized by the EM Nevada Program that opportunities may exist to reduce the cost and floor space required for the storage of geologic samples at the Mercury Core Library without impacting the integrity and representative nature of the samples necessary for project execution. An initiative was sponsored by EM Nevada Program to evaluate several options: 1) disposal of a portion of cuttings and cores in a land fill setting; 2) reduction in sample volume through skeletonizing core and cuttings from wells to a representative but much smaller number of samples; and 3) solicit potential interest in the academic community where other geoscientists could freely access the samples for studies. The Nevada state university system through the Nevada Bureau of Mines and Geology responded positively to the opportunity to receive these NNSS samples from the EM Nevada Program. In June 2019, approximately 17,000 geologic samples, representing greater than 170,000 linear feet of drilling and weighing over 20,000 pounds, were shipped from the NNSS to the Great Basin Science Sample and Records Library located in Reno, Nevada. The benefits resulting from this transfer were realized by the EM Nevada Program in terms of cost and space savings for geologic sample storage at the NNSS. The transfer did not impact the EM Nevada Program mission as access to representative geologic samples for regulatory and scientific purposes was preserved. Moreover, the Nevada Bureau of Mines and Geology acquired a significant resource of subsurface geologic samples and supporting technical data to support academic and scientific studies in a complex volcanic setting in southwest Nevada. (authors)

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Historic Context, Character-Defining Elements, And Photographic Record For A 26.45-Mile Segment Of The 138-Kilovolt Power Transmission System, Areas 3, 5, 6, And 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The subject of this report is the 138-kilovolt (kV) power transmission line on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (see Figure 1). The NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS), was the main continental nuclear test site for the United States between 1951 and 1992. Known as the battleground of the Cold War, the NNSS hosted a total of 928 nuclear tests during that period. It also served as the location of numerous scientific advancements in the fields of rocketry, big-hole drilling, nuclear waste management, and defense. From its construction in the 1960s through the present day, the 138 kV line has provided electrical power to the numerous buildings, facilities, experiments, and tests on the NNSS. The Department of Energy (DOE), in consultation with the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO), has determined that it may contribute to the character and significance of the Mercury Historic District (MHD) on the NNSS, as well as other historic districts that have not been recorded or evaluated yet. The purpose of this report is to fulfill two of the stipulations in the Memorandum of Agreement DEGM58-22NA25553 between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Installation of a 138-kilovolt Transmission Line from the Mercury Switching Station to the U1a Facility and the Removal of the Historic 138-kilovolt Transmission Line from the Mercury Switching Station to the U1a Facility in Areas 1, 3, 5, 6, and 23 of the Nevada National Security Site (MOA). The MOA was executed as part of the DOE’s obligations under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) to mitigate the adverse effects of two undertakings on historic properties. In particular, this report fulfills MOA Stipulations III.C.1-3, which state that the Department of Energy (DOE) will prepare the following: A historic context for the 138 kV transmission line and identification of the line’s characterdefining elements; High-quality digital images of the 26.45-mile segment of the 138 kV transmission line that is subject to the two undertakings for which the MOA was executed; and Photograph catalogs and map keys showing photograph viewpoints and directions.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2016

This Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2016 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and its two Nevada-based support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). NNSA/NFO directs the management and operation of the NNSS and six sites across the nation. In addition to the NNSA itself, the six sites include two in Nevada (NLVF and RSL-Nellis) and four in other states (RSL-Andrews in Maryland, Livermore Operations in California, Los Alamos Operations in New Mexico, and Special Technologies Laboratory in California). Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories are the principal organizations that sponsor and implement the nuclear weapons programs at the NNSS. National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), is the current Management and Operating contractor accountable for the successful execution of work and ensuring that work is performed in compliance with environmental regulations. The six sites all provide support to enhance the NNSS as a location for its multiple missions. The three major NNSS missions include National Security/Defense, Environmental Management, and Nondefense. The major programs that support these missions are Stockpile Stewardship and Management, Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism, Nuclear Emergency Response, Strategic Partnership Projects, Environmental Restoration, Waste Management, Conservation and Renewable Energy, Other Research and Development, and Infrastructure. The major facilities that support the programs include the U1a Facility, Big Explosives Experimental Facility (BEEF), Device Assembly Facility, Dense Plasma Focus Facility, Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research Facility, Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex, Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC), Radiological/Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Exercise Site, the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC), and the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS).

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A Section 106 Evaluation of the Mercury Bowling Alley, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada, with Photographic Documentation Addendums

The National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) anticipates demolition of the Mercury Bowling Alley (Building 23-517) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). This survey was prompted by plans to construct new facilities at the Bowling Alley location to support NNSS’s changing role in national security. The Bowling Alley has been largely vacant since the mid-1990s following the end of nuclear testing at what was then the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The building is suffering rapid decay. An Area of Potential Effects (APE) of 4.5 acres was surveyed, resulting in recording and evaluation of the Bowling Alley (SHPO Resource Number B14451) and one associated resource (AR1). The APE is located in Section 11 T15S R53E MDBM (projected) at the principal NNSS base of Mercury in Area 23. In 2010, the NTS name was changed to the NNSS, and will be referred to as such throughout this report. Fieldwork and report preparation were done by Desert Research Institute (DRI) cultural resources staff. Architectural descriptions and portions of this report specific to the architecture of the Bowling Alley were completed by Ron Reno, Ph.D., RPA who meets Secretary of the Interior’s Professional Qualifications Standards for Architectural Historian. Administration of the project was by Colleen M. Beck, Ph.D. Historical background regarding Mercury and the NNSS was developed by Maureen King. Beck photographed the building and its environs. Copies of the building form and report are on file in the Nevada Cultural Resources Inventory System at the Nevada State Office of Historic Preservation (SHPO); DRI, Las Vegas; and in the NNSA/NFO curation facility, Las Vegas.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Mitigation for roof alterations to building 06-cp-65 at the area 6 control point, nevada national security site, nye county, nevada

Building 06-CP-65 has been determined to be a contributing element to the Area 6 Control Point Historic District (O’Neill et al. 2021; Reed 2022). It contributes to the significance of the historic district under Criterion A as one of the principal buildings that supported timing and firing operations for nuclear testing on the NNSS from 1966 to 1992. As such, the building served as a major warehouse with office space within the district. It was used by both REECo, a long-time general contractor at the NNSS, as well as EG&G, which provided technical support to the national laboratories and the DOD. The building served as an important staging area and electrical power supply point for the NNSS diagnostic trailer fleet and its unique location immediately along Mercury Highway allowed easy accessibility to the forward areas of the NNSS. The building also contributes to the historic district under Criterion C as it is one of the large, unadorned, precast concrete buildings at the Control Point. These types of buildings were the prominent elements of the compound that convey the district’s overall utilitarian, military-industrial character. Building 06-CP-65 retains all aspects of integrity to a high degree and easily conveys its significance as a warehouse that supported Control Point operations. Building 06-CP-65 is not recommended eligible for listing in the NRHP as an individual resource. While it served an important support function as part of the Control Point Historic District, an archival and literature review did not reveal information linking it to any specific test, series of tests, programs, or for any specific role on the NNSS other than as a warehouse (Criterion A). It has no direct association with any important individual (Criterion B). It also is not architecturally significant in its own right beyond reflecting the overall aesthetic of the Control Point Historic District (Criterion C), and it does not have potential to yield information important to the history of nuclear testing beyond what can be learned from historic texts, drawings, and other documents (Criterion D).

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University-level Non-proliferation and Safeguards Education and Human Capital Development Activities at Brookhaven National Laboratory

BNL has offered Nuclear Nonproliferation, Safeguards and Security in the 21st Century,? referred to as NNSS, every year since 2009 for graduate students in technical and policy fields related to nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. The course focuses on relevant policy issues, in addition to technical components, and is part of a larger NGSI short course initiative that includes separate courses that are delivered at three other national laboratories and NNSA headquarters. [SCHOLZ and ROSENTHAL] The course includes lectures from esteemed nonproliferation experts, tours of various BNL facilities and laboratories, and in-field and table-top exercises on both technical and policy subjects. Topics include the history of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other relevant treaties, the history of and advances in international nuclear safeguards, current relevant political situations in countries such as Iran, Iraq, and the Democratic Peoples? Republic of Korea (DPRK), nuclear science and technology, instrumentation and techniques used for verification activities, and associated research and development. The students conduct a mock Design Information Verification (DIV) at BNL?s decommissioned Medical Research Reactor. The capstone of the course includes a series of student presentations in which students act as policy advisors and provide recommendations in response to scenarios involving a current nonproliferation related event that are prepared by the course organizers. ?The course is open to domestic and foreign students, and caters to students in, entering, or recently having completed graduate school. Interested students must complete an application and provide a resume and a statement describing their interest in the course. Eighteen to 22 students attend annually; 165 students have completed the course to date. A stipend helps to defray students? travel and subsistence expenses. In 2015, the course was shortened from three weeks to two weeks to streamline the material, standardize NGSI course length, and draw in a larger applicant pool. ?The international and interdisciplinary mix of students attending the course encourages discussions of the topics presented during the course. Information about the course is available at https://www.bnl.gov/nnsscourse/. While a complete analysis of course students has not been undertaken, BNL is aware of three individuals who worked at national laboratories after attending the NNSS course, one who worked at a national laboratory prior to attending NNSS, two who worked as federal employees after attending NNSS, three who were Nonproliferation Graduate Fellows before or after attending NNSS, and three who have participated in other NGSI activities.?Design Information Verification is an IAEA inspection activity that is implemented for the purpose of ensuring that the facility design is consistent with the declared use of a facility.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Simulating Regional Groundwater Flow in the Vicinity of the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada - 16104

The Death Valley Regional Groundwater Flow System (DVRFS) occupies an area of about 70,000 km{sup 2} in south-central Nevada and southeastern California. Interest in this system stems from the need to (1) understand the groundwater flow paths and travel times associated with potential migration of radioactive material from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) where underground nuclear testing was conducted from 1956 to 1992; (2) characterize the groundwater system in the vicinity of the proposed high-level radioactive waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nev.; and (3) address a variety of potential effects from NNSS activities on users down gradient from the NNSS and Yucca Mountain. A single groundwater flow model of the DVRFS has been developed that integrates data and results of two previous regional-scale models and supports Department of Energy (DOE) programs at the NNSS. The numerical model was constrained by organizing hydrogeologic data and interpretations in three-dimensional (3D) geographic information systems and constructing a digital three-dimensional (3D) hydrogeologic framework model (HFM) to represent 27 hydrogeologic units (HGUs) and major structures in the DVRFS region. The 3D hydrogeologic data sets were discretized to 1,500 meters (m) grid cell resolution for input arrays required for the model. The DVRFS was simulated using the USGS 3D groundwater-flow modeling code MODFLOW-2000. Two examples showing how the DVRFS regional model is used by the DOE as part of waste management activities at the NNSS: (1) use of the regional model to provide the boundary conditions for site-scale models, and (2) use of the regional model to assess changes in hydraulic gradient and flow paths in the regional flow system resulting from changes in pumping in various areas of interest. (authors)

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Achieving the End State for the Pahute Mesa Corrective Action Units at the Nevada National Security Site - 20355

Underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) ended in 1992. To address the impact of radionuclide contamination from underground nuclear testing on the groundwater resources of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program created the Underground Test Area (UGTA) activity to characterize the radionuclides in groundwater, understand the nature and extent of radionuclide migration, and forecast the distribution of radionuclides in groundwater for 1,000 years. The UGTA activity is regulated by the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO), an agreement negotiated between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), DOE, and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). DOE is close to achieving the end state (closure in place with monitoring and institutional control) for three of the five UGTA corrective action units (CAUs) on the NNSS. A number of challenges remain to achieve the end state of the other two CAUs, both located on Pahute Mesa. Pahute Mesa was the location of 82 underground nuclear tests, less than 10% of the total number of tests on the NNSS. Yet, Pahute Mesa contains slightly more than 60% of the total radionuclides (in curies). Based on groundwater sampling in monitoring wells, two radionuclide plumes have migrated several kilometers (km) in groundwater from selected test cavities and have crossed the boundary of the NNSS (yet remain within the boundaries of Federally controlled land). The path to achieve the end state continues to evolve as more data are collected and a better understanding of radionuclide migration in groundwater is developed. DOE has invested in drilling and sampling more than 50 characterization and monitoring groundwater wells over the past 25 years. The data indicate that the primary radionuclide of concern is tritium as it is about 89% of the total radionuclide inventory (in curies). As well, only tritium has been measured in groundwater outside of cavities at concentrations exceeding the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) standard. For one of the tritium plumes that has migrated across the NNSS boundary, the average rate of migration has been measured as about 45 meters (m) per year with the rate of migration at the leading edge of the plume of about 85 meters per year. At that rate of migration, the tritium plume will decay to safe levels and not reach the publicly accessible environment at concentrations above the SDWA standard. Other radionuclides, at concentrations below the SDWA standards, will be monitored to ensure they remain at safe levels. Consequently, the end state path forward for Pahute Mesa has evolved to take full advantage of the data from the monitoring network to constrain uncertainty in model forecasts and to reduce reliance on probabilistic simulations. The focus of the end state approach relies on developing a monitoring well network that is protective of human health by increasing confidence that no radionuclide plume in the groundwater will migrate undetected to the accessible environment, located about 22 km from the nearest up-gradient underground nuclear test. Using the measured data to remove uncertainty, the evaluation of radionuclide migration from Pahute Mesa is directed toward meeting the goals of the end state. (authors)

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An Architectural Survey of the Test Cell C Historic District, Area 25, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) has authorized an updated recording and evaluation of Test Cell C. This facility is part of the former Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) in Area 25 of Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada (formerly the Nevada Test Site [NTS]). Future alterations to the facility are anticipated to meet current and future National Weapons Science, Global and Homeland Security Programs, and Environmental Management mission requirements. Therefore, this survey was done to comply with requirements of Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act and its implementing regulations, 36 C.F.R. Part 800. An architectural survey of 35.75 acres was completed by Desert Research Institute (DRI). This area also represents the potential Test Cell C Historic District and is identified by NNSA/NFO as the Area of Potential Effect (APE) within which the undertaking may directly cause alterations to the character of historic properties. One resource, Building 25-3210 (SHPO Resource No. B2444), within this area was previously surveyed by DRI. It was found eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP or National Register) under Criteria A and C, and Consideration G. Mitigation of this building was completed prior to its demolition. The APE for reasonably foreseeable effects that may indirectly cause alterations later in time, be farther removed in distance, or be cumulative is the unrecorded NRDS historic district. The present survey updates the previous survey to present standards and expands it to include the entire Test Cell C complex. This includes updated recording and evaluation of the remains of 25-3210 and its 32 previously unrecorded and unevaluated Accessory Resources. The entire complex was recorded as the Test Cell C Historic District (SHPO Resource No. D346), which is eligible for the National Register at the National Level under Criteria A, C, and D. All nine architectural resources in the district are recommended as contributing elements of the Test Cell C Historic District (Figure 2). Of these, four (25-3210 Resource No. B2444, 25-3220 SHPO Resource No. B18110, 25-3226 SHPO Resource No. B18111, and 25-3230-32 SHPO Resource No. B18114) are recommended as individually eligible to the National Register under Criteria A and C, and one (KIWI-TNT [Transient Nuclear Test] SHPO Resource No. S2287) is recommended as individually eligible under Criteria A, C, and D. The remaining four resources (25-3214 SHPO Resource No. B18109, 25-3228 SHPO Resource No. B18112, 25-3229 SHPO Resource No. B18113, and 25-3233 SHPO Resource No. 18115) are not recommended as individually eligible. In addition, the Test Cell C Historic District is regarded as a contributor to the potential national significance of the NRDS Historic District. In 2010, the NTS became the NNSS. Because of the nature of the discussion in the Historic Context below, “NTS” is used throughout that section, otherwise “NNSS” is used to refer to the site. The survey area is located in unplatted sections of T13S R51E Mount Diablo Baseline and Meridian (projected) in Area 25 of the NNSS. It is within the NRDS in Jackass Flats, which has long been recognized as a potential historic district. An oblique aerial photo of the Test Cell C complex is shown on the cover of this report.

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Tribal Revegetation Project Final Project Report: 92-Acre Area, Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

Nuwu (Southern Paiute), Newe (Western Shoshone), and Nuumu (Owens Valley Paiute) are linguistically related, Numic-speaking peoples who are part of the broader Uto-Aztecan language group. Numic peoples view the land as a holistic, living, sentient being with feelings and purpose. The land is personified with human characteristics and it needs to be experienced to be understood through “learning by doing.” Numic peoples do not support ground disturbing activities within their ancestral lands, including activities tied to the storage of low-level radioactive waste or classified materials on the NNSS, which they view as culturally inappropriate. These deep-rooted ancestral connections are the impetus for reinforcing Numic responsibility for healing disturbed areas by integrating respect and patience with consistent Tribal interaction. Tribal Ecological Knowledge (TEK) is the science of describing Tribal approaches for understanding natural resources. Numic TEK is embedded in traditional teachings learned incrementally over time though experience and it evolves through lessons learned and responses to environmental changes over millennia. Therefore, TEK can broaden and enhance Western scientific knowledge associated with revegetation, especially in highly disturbed areas. The project blended TEK with Western scientific ecological methods to create a vegetative cover within test plots on the 92-Acre Area located at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) located in Area 5 on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The vegetated test plots were systematically created for the Department of Energy (DOE) in tandem with the existing Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) with the Nevada Department of Environmental Protection (NDEP). Three previous contractor-lead attempts at revegetation, one targeting full cover revegetation and two targeting test plot revegetation, did not achieve the anticipated results at this location. When presented to the 16 American Indian Tribal nations and affiliated groups with cultural and historical ties to the NNSS, the group appointed a Tribal Revegetation Committee (TRC) that included six expert Tribal knowledge holders to collaborate with an ethnoecologist/cultural anthropologist and two biologists. Project design, planning, seed and outplant selection, spiritual land preparation, and methodology were guided by the TRC and an ethnoecologist/cultural anthropologist from Portland State University (PSU) and biologists from Desert Research Institute (DRI). Using TEK, the TRC recommended a specific seed mixture that contained nine native plant species and three species of outplants. The revegetation effort included preparing and planting thirty 10 m × 10 m (32.8 ft × 32.8 ft) seeded plots, twelve of which also included outplants; and eight 10 m × 100 m (32.8 ft × 328 ft) plots that only received outplants, all atop a waste cell cover. The TRC and the project team creatively adapted TEK with Western scientific methods so that the planned revegetation efforts could occur within the safety and security parameters of the RWMC. Test plots were subjected to one of five soil treatments with varying combinations of straw or mulch applications, soil amendment, and/or outplant planting and one of two watering treatments (watered or unwatered). Planting was divided into two events: one in the fall season and another during the subsequent spring season based on TEK and a corresponding recommendation from the TRC. Monitoring and spiritual management was conducted by the TRC to evaluate plant progress on a monthly basis (in conjunction with the biologist and anthropologist) during each respective growing season for a period of three years after planting. This approach allowed Tribal members the opportunity to conduct traditional blessings and other culturally appropriate activities to restore balance to the land in accordance with Tribal protocols. Following TEK-guided methods, successful plant establishment from seed stock and outplants was observed in many plots. Overall, plots planted in the spring, as recommended by the TRC, showed higher rates of outplant survival and native seedling emergence than those planted in the fall. This finding is significant because it is contrary to the original guidance and previous approaches provided for planting in this region. The TRC believes the frequent co-occurrence of native seedlings near surviving outplants indicates an important symbiotic relationship understood by Tribal communities and overlooked by others. Watered outplants displayed much higher survivability than unwatered plants, even after watering was reduced after the plants were established. Soil amendments and mulch created higher densities of native plants from seed. Many native seedlings showed significant delays in germination, which is considered a normal adaptation to desert climates. Some native plants did not germinate until the third growing year, whereas others germinated during the first growing year, which demonstrates the complexity of the desert environment. Evidence of native insects, reptiles, mammals, and birds, as well as native plants that were not part of the planted species, were noted and considered culturally significant. Despite the presence of non-native plants, native outplants continued to thrive and the incidence of native plant germination from seed increased over time. These successful revegetation results where previous efforts were unsuccessful reinforce the importance of integrating regionally appropriate, TEK-guided methodology with Western science to achieve positive results and the necessity of integrating Tribal involvement in all stages of the revegetation effort. Expanded approaches coupled with Tribal knowledge and tools from Western science addressed a complex problem tied to revegetating atop a low-level radioactive waste cell. The level of Tribal participation serves as a progressive model for building collaborative relationships and addressing ecological challenges on the NNSS.

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UAS Radiological Sensing – Nevada National Security Site

In the aftermath of a hazardous incident, there is limited information and almost no means to access the area safely. There is a need to quickly obtain accurate information regarding the extent and severity of the incident. One way to quickly assess the environment is by flying over the dangerous area with unmanned aerial systems followed by remotely operated ground vehicles. The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) provides a repeatable environment to simulate operations for dangerous and dirty situations. An unmanned aircraft system (UAS) has the advantages of fast deployment and low-altitude flying, which enhances sensitivity and wide-area coverage, eliminates radiation exposure health safety restrictions, and gives the ability to access highly hazardous or radioactive areas, etc. A UAS can be configured with the nuclear detecting sensor optimized to measure the radiation associated with the event. A multi-UAS has advantages over a single UAS, especially in time-critical tasks such as detecting nuclear radiation. UAS may be helpful in plume definition, ground deposition, moving source, and static or moving spills. Assessing any situation that is dangerous, in hazardous areas (dirty), needs to be repeated (dull), or unreachable (deep), is a candidate for an unmanned system. In addition, the NNSS is in a unique location to conduct isolated, secured, and controlled high-risk experiments. We attract international customers along with domestic agencies due to the unique environmental conditions that have evolved over the past 65 years. The NNSS employs a talented group of operational scientists and engineers with a long history of applied research in radiation/nuclear science. We often collaborate with other national laboratories and universities in addressing unique problems. The NNSS has conducted UAS missions for over 25 years and has established a UAS program to address the difficult challenges in using unmanned systems for national security missions.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Understanding long-term groundwater flow at Pahute Mesa and vicinity, Nevada National Security Site, USA, from naturally occurring geochemical and isotopic tracers

Abstract Recently collected naturally occurring geochemical and isotopic groundwater tracers were combined with historic data from the Pahute Mesa area of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada, USA, to provide insights into long-term regional groundwater flow patterns, mixing and recharge. Pahute Mesa was the site of 85 nuclear detonations between 1965 and 1992, many of them deeply buried devices that introduced radionuclides directly into groundwater. The dataset examined included major ions and field measurements, stable isotopes of hydrogen (δ 2 H), oxygen (δ 18 O), carbon (δ 13 C) and sulfur (δ 34 S), and radioisotopes of carbon ( 14 C) and chloride ( 36 Cl). Analysis of the patterns of groundwater 14 C data and the δ 2 H and δ 18 O signatures indicates that groundwater recharge is predominantly of Pleistocene age, except for a few localized areas near major ephemeral drainages. Steep gradients in sulfate (SO 4 ) and chloride (Cl) define a region near the western edge of the NNSS where high-concentration groundwater flowing south from north of the NNSS merges with dilute groundwater flowing west from eastern Pahute Mesa in a mixing zone that coincides with a groundwater trough associated with major faults. The 36 Cl/Cl and δ 34 S data suggest that the source of the high Cl and SO 4 in the groundwater was a now-dry, pluvial-age playa lake north of the NNSS. Patterns of groundwater flow indicated by the combined data sets show that groundwater is flowing around the northwest margin of the now extinct Timber Mountain Caldera Complex toward regional discharge areas in Oasis Valley.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Distribution of Natural Radionuclides at the Nevada National Security Site

According to the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) publications, contributions of terrestrial gamma doses are mainly from the presence of 40 K, and of 238 U and 232 Th together with their progeny in various rocks and soils. A survey of soil distributions of radionuclides 40 K, 238 U, and 232 Th was performed at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) using in situ gamma-ray spectrometry with a high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector. The average activity concentrations of 40 K, 238 U, and 232 Th in natural soils at the NNSS are 867 Bq kg -1 (range from 150 ± 8 to 1297 ± 56 Bq kg -1 ), 50 Bq kg -1 (range from 29 ± 3 to 74 ± 8 Bq kg -1 ), and 56 Bq kg -1 (range from 11 ± 2 to 96 ± 10 Bq kg -1 ), respectively. The concentration at each location is significantly associated with its geological lithology. The terrestrial gamma dose rates around the NNSS were estimated from 26 to 144 nSv h -1 with mean value of 93 nSv h -1 . In conclusion, our results provide useful information about the natural background radiation and radiological effects of naturally occurring radionuclides at the NNSS.

environmental assessment↗

4th Quarter and Annual Transportation Report FY2018

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) in Area 5. This report summarizes the fourth quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2018 and serves as an annual report for the following types of shipments: Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLW); Mixed Low-Level Radioactive Waste (MLLW); Classified Non-Radioactive (CNR) Waste; Classified Non-Radioactive Hazardous (CNRH) Waste; Tabular summaries are provided that include the following: Number and external volume of LLW, MLLW, and CNR/CNRH shipments; Waste generators for LLW, MLLW, and CNR/CNRH shipments to and on the NNSS; Carriers for LLW, MLLW, and CNR/CNRH shipments to and on the NNSS; Waste generator shipments by quarter; Highway routes used by carriers; Incident and accident data applicable to LLW, MLLW, and CNR/CNRH shipments. In this report, shipments are accounted for upon arrival at the NNSS, while disposal volumes are accounted for upon waste burial. Volume reports showing cubic feet (ft 3 ) generated using the Low-Level Waste Information System may vary slightly due to rounding conventions for conversions from cubic meters to cubic feet. Shipments are transported by motor carriers that are either identified on the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Motor Carrier Evaluation Program (MCEP) list, have been evaluated in a manner similar to the MCEP process, or are government vehicles. Government vehicles are not evaluated using the MCEP process but are fully compliant with all transportation regulations and requirements.

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Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site, Radioactive Waste Management Complex (Q3 Transportation Report, FY 2019)

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) in Area 3 and Area 5. This report summarizes the third quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2019 and serves as a quarterly report for the following types of shipments: • Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLW), • Mixed Low-Level Radioactive Waste (MLLW), • Classified Non-Radioactive (CNR) Waste, and • Classified Non-Radioactive Hazardous (CNRH) Waste. Tabular summaries are provided that include the following: • Number and external volume of LLW, MLLW, and CNR/CNRH shipments, • Waste generators for LLW, MLLW, and CNR/CNRH shipments to and on the NNSS, • Carriers for LLW, MLLW, and CNR/CNRH shipments to and on the NNSS, • Waste generator shipments by quarter, • Highway routes used by carriers, and • Incident and accident data applicable to LLW, MLLW, and CNR/CNRH shipments. In this report, shipments are accounted for upon arrival at the NNSS, while disposal volumes are accounted for upon waste burial. Volume reports using the Low-Level Waste Information System showing cubic feet (ft 3 ) of waste generated may vary slightly due to rounding conventions for conversions from cubic meters to ft 3 .

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Section 106 Evaluation of Building CP-1, Area 6, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

On December 17, 2015, the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) vacated Building CP-1 (Building 06-CP-1) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. Starting in 1951, nearly all nuclear tests during the Cold War were controlled from this building on the facility, known as the Nevada Test Site for most of its years of operation. The test site was renamed the NNSS in 2010. CP-1 was the command and control center where decisions about NNSS activities were sought and made; where authorization for movements about the areas forward (north) of Mercury base camp were coordinated, granted or declined, and monitored; and where problems and emergencies in the forward areas were communicated and relayed to the appropriate agencies for solution. Some of the testing duties for the Control Point included the timing and firing of nuclear tests, air operations, security, communications, weather monitoring, and radiation safety. During tests, communications were maintained through various channels to receive and pass instructions or information to the numerous testing operations, to Washington, D.C., the national laboratories, and overhead aircraft monitoring the tests. At one time, the Security Control Center, a Class A Weather Station, and the Radiation Safety Headquarters were located in CP-1, which also contained a cafeteria, a dining area, and bunk rooms. This survey was prompted by recognition that closure of the building in place creates a situation where CP-1 is vulnerable to decay in its present and unused condition. Activities at CP-1 have been reduced gradually over time since the end of nuclear testing in 1992. The Area of Potential Effects (APE) was determined by NNSA/NFO to be a two-acre area historically considered the space directly associated with CP-1 and available to CP-1 personnel for use. The APE is bounded on the south by an unnamed main paved road into the guarded Control Point area, on the west by the edge of the parking lot for adjacent Building CP-9, on the east by the edge of the bladed cut-and-fill terrace for CP-1, and on the north by a barbed wire security fence (Figure 2). All of this lot is either bladed or covered with asphalt. Contained within the lot are eight Accessary Resources (AR) which are much more closely aligned with CP-1 than with adjacent buildings. AR are defined by the Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) (2013) as “…related but subordinate to the principal building. Accessory resources would not exist were it not for the principal resource.” The Visual APE was determined by NNSA/NFO to be the same as the APE used for intensive survey because no exterior modifications to the resource are anticipated. The APE is located in Section 34 T11S R53E MDBM (projected) within the NNSS base called the Control Point in Area 6. It is on the 1986 Yucca Lake USGS 7.5 min. series topographic quadrangle. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) surveyed the APE with the assistance of National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), resulting in recordation and evaluation of CP-1 (SHPO Resource Number B14490) and eight accessory resources (AR1-AR8). This recording of CP-1 was done in three sessions. Copies of the building form and report are on file at Nevada Cultural Resources Information System (NVCRIS), DRI, and with the NNSA/NFO, Las Vegas, Nevada. Control Point refers to the support facilities of which Building CP-1, with its 126 rooms, is the most important part (Campbell et al. 1983:165). CP-1 refers to the entire building but it also is the designation for the first phase of construction, i.e. the original building. There were three major subsequent phases of additions to the building. The first two were called CP-1A (the east wing) and CP-1B (the west wing with the new War Room). A final phase filled in the hyphen between CP-1 and CP-1B with a Field Office. For convenience this last phase is called CP-1C in this report. Hence, CP-1 can refer either the entire building or to the first phase of the building exclusive of additions. The context makes clear which of the two meanings is intended in the various sections of this report. There were also two minor expansions consisting of a small battery room and a shelter for an emergency exit.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions (CY 2019)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this source dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas.

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Mosquito Distribution and West Nile Virus Surveillance Results on the Nevada National Security Site in South Central Nevada

A 10-year study (2004-2013) was conducted to determine mosquito distribution and the prevalence of West Nile Virus (WNV) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in south central Nevada. Mosquito traps baited with dry ice were set overnight at sites where standing water provided potential breeding sites for mosquitoes. Captured mosquitoes were identified to species and tested for WNV. A total of 556 mosquitoes representing 6 species were captured and identified at 20 sites around the NNSS during 124 surveys. A vast majority (89%) of mosquitoes were Culex tarsalis. None of the mosquitoes tested were positive for WNV although 2 samples, both Culiseta inornata, were suspect for WNV in 2005 and 2006, both from Well 3 Pond. Additionally, 24 birds representing 5 species were opportunistically collected and tested for WNV with no positive results. Results from this study reveal patterns of mosquito distribution across the NNSS and suggest that NNSS workers have a very low risk of being exposed to WNV.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗