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DOE OSTI2022

Progress on Near-Term Tasks for the Development of Advanced Reactor Mechanistic Source Term Modeling and Simulation Tools

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Integration of the NCRC Database and Other INL Databases

The Nuclear Computational Resource Center provides a portal by which industry professionals, educational staff, students, national laboratory employees, and others may request access to certain engineering software tools. As the tools provided through the Nuclear Computational Resource Center portal are not open-source and freely available, a set of approvals are necessary before access is granted. All code recipients must be associated with an institution that has a license with Idaho National Laboratory for the code requested. Information about these licenses is controlled by Idaho National Laboratory’s Technology Deployment organization and housed in a Technology Deployment database. Those requesting code access who are not citizens of the United States must also have a security plan, mandated by Idaho National Laboratory policy. Security plans are managed by the International Access Program and are stored in an International Access Program database known as IFacts. Granting access to software thus depends on information stored in the Technology Deployment database and IFacts. In the past, no connection between the Nuclear Computational Resource Center portal and these databases existed, making checking the status of license agreements and security plans time consuming and error prone. This report demonstrates that the Nuclear Computational Resource Center portal now connects to both the Technology Deployment database and IFacts, greatly improving the ease of use of the Nuclear Computational Resource Center system for administrators, which leads to a better overall experience for those requesting code access.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Progress on Long-Term Objectives for the Development of Advanced Reactor Mechanistic Source Term Modeling and Simulation Tools

To assist both the advanced reactor industry and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the pursuit of reactor design and licensing, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program has established a mechanistic source term (MST) research project under the auspices of the Multiphysics Applications technical area. MST analysis is central to the reactor licensing process and a focus of the NRC regarding their mission to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety and environment. The MST research project is a collaboration between Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) with a high-level objective to coordinate the development of comprehensive advanced reactor MST mod/sim capabilities to support risk-informed design and licensing decisions. As part of this effort, an MST mod/sim development pathway was developed in FY21, which outlines the high-level objectives and near-term tasks necessary to achieve the project objectives. Since publication of the development pathway, Argonne and SNL have focused initial efforts on addressing the “near-term tasks” outlined in the report, and the current work provides a status update of the progress achieved in FY22. This report is a progress update on 6 tasks supporting molten salt reactor (MSR) and sodium fast reactor (SFR) MST analyses which were initiated in FY22 as recommended high priority near-term tasks. These tasks were continued into FY23 as they also support previously recommended long-term development objectives to advance MST analyses for these advanced reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Basin-Scale Relicensing Opportunity

This dataset contains 1,261 hydropower facilities with associated Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) relicensing metrics. Anticipated FERC license renewal dates are summarized by river reach for observing areas of opportunities for basin-wide collaboration on environmental mitigations. Identifying rivers and basins with facilities that have similar anticipated Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) relicensing dates may be one potential indicator that multiple licensees within the same basin may be willing to collaborate on a basin-scale relicensing effort. The hydropower relicensing process requires long-term resource allocation by agencies, hydropower owner/operators, non-governmental organizations, and tribal, state, and federal governments. Basin-scale hydropower relicensing has begun to receive attention as a potential solution for reducing licensing timelines, costs, and uncertainty which can provide benefits to a broad spectrum of participants in the licensing process. This dataset contains one a data file in comma separated (*.csv) format, a data dictionary in *.csv format, and a user guide in *.pdf format. These data are also available as an interactive web map available at:

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2025

IM3 Open Source Data Center Atlas

IM3 Open Source Data Center Atlas Description This dataset contains locations of existing data center facilities in the United States. Data center locations were derived from OpenStreetMap (OSM), a crowd-sourced database. Data points from OSM are processed in various ways to determine additional variables provided in the data including: facility area (square feet), associated US county, and US state. This dataset can be used to identify areas of concentrated data center development and inform government and private sector planning strategies for future buildout of data centers and the infrastructure necessary to support it. Usage Notes Validation of OSM-derived data center locations is an ongoing development under the IM3 project, and the database will be updated as new information becomes available. In some instances, both the data center area (e.g., campus) and individual data center buildings are included as overlapping areas in the database. Both values are retained. Data center points, buildings, and campus areas are provided as separate layers in the downloadable data package. Note that data items are not necessarily complete across layers. That is, a specific data center may only be present as a single point geometry in the "point" layer while other data centers are represented in both the campus and building layers. In some cases, data center campuses and/or buildings straddle a county boundary line. Mappings to both counties are retained in the database as separate rows. These data rows will have the same data center id information, but each will have different county information. Crowd-sourced data, by nature, relies on individuals and communities to provide information. As a result, some data may be missing where it has not yet been reported. As we collect information on additional data center locations and as OSM receives additional contributions, the database will be updated to capture additional data points not yet shown. Technical Information Data is available for download under the following formats: GeoPackage (GPKG) CSV Geospatial data is provided in the WGS84 (EPSG:4326) coordinate reference system. The GeoPackage download contains the following layers. See usage notes for more information. "point" "building" "campus" The "point" layer includes all data from OSM that had POINT geometry type (i.e., individual coordinates). The "building" layer includes all OSM data that did not have POINT geometry and where the building tag in the OSM export was neither equal to "no" or null. Data that did not meet the "point" or "building" qualification was assumed to be a facility campus and included in the "campus" layer. The dataset contains the following parameters. Variables provided by OSM are labeled with (OSM-provided). id - unique identification number (OSM-provided with prefix of "node/", "relation/" and similar attributes removed) state - name of US state state_abb - two letter US state abbreviation state_id - state ID number county - name of US county county_id - county ID number ref - reference numbers or codes (OSM-provided) operator - the name of the company, corporation, or person in charge facility (OSM-provided) name - name of facility (OSM-provided) sqft - surface area of facility polygon, measured in square feet. Only available for "building" and "campus" layers lat - latitude of data centroid point lon - longitude of data centroid point type – represented spatial information. One of "point", "building", or "campus". geometry – POLYGON geometry of area footprint (in "campus" and "building" layers) or POINT geometry of locations (in "point" layer). This parameter is not included in the csv download. Attribution Data center locations were derived from OpenStreetMap, which is made available at openstreetmap.org under the Open Database License (ODbL). US state and county boundary information was collected from the US Census Bureau for the year 2024, which is made publicly available at https://www.census.gov/geographies/mapping-files.html Acknowledgment IM3 is a multi-institutional effort led by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and supported by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Science as part of research in MultiSector Dynamics, Earth and Environmental Systems Modeling Program. License The IM3 Open Source Data Center Atlas is made available under the Open Database License: http://opendatacommons.org/licenses/odbl/1.0/. Disclaimer This material was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the United States Department of Energy, nor the Contractor, nor any or their employees, nor any jurisdiction or organization that has cooperated in the development of these materials, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness or any information, apparatus, product, software, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof, or Battelle Memorial Institute. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof. PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORYoperated byBATTELLEfor theUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYunder Contract DE-AC05-76RL01830

Mongird, Kendall [Pacific Northwest National Labor↗

DOE OSTI2026

IM3 Open Source Data Center Atlas

IM3 Open Source Data Center Atlas Description This dataset contains locations of existing data center facilities in the United States. Data center locations were derived from OpenStreetMap (OSM), a crowd-sourced database. Data points from OSM are processed in various ways to determine additional variables provided in the data including: facility area (square feet), associated US county, and US state. This dataset can be used to identify areas of concentrated data center development and inform government and private sector planning strategies for future buildout of data centers and the infrastructure necessary to support it. Usage Notes Validation of OSM-derived data center locations is an ongoing development under the IM3 project, and the database will be updated as new information becomes available. In some instances, both the data center area (e.g., campus) and individual data center buildings are included as overlapping areas in the database. Both values are retained. Data center points, buildings, and campus areas are provided as separate layers in the downloadable data package. Note that data items are not necessarily complete across layers. That is, a specific data center may only be present as a single point geometry in the "point" layer while other data centers are represented in both the campus and building layers. In some cases, data center campuses and/or buildings straddle a county boundary line. Mappings to both counties are retained in the database as separate rows. These data rows will have the same data center id information, but each will have different county information. Crowd-sourced data, by nature, relies on individuals and communities to provide information. As a result, some data may be missing where it has not yet been reported. As we collect information on additional data center locations and as OSM receives additional contributions, the database will be updated to capture additional data points not yet shown. Data items will occasionally be removed from OSM if they are misidentified, if they no longer exist, if they are duplicates of another item, or similar. For that reason, updated versions of this database may not contain all data center locations included in previous versions. Technical Information Data is available for download under the following formats: GeoPackage (GPKG) CSV Geospatial data is provided in the WGS84 (EPSG:4326) coordinate reference system. The GeoPackage download contains the following layers. See usage notes for more information. "point" "building" "campus" The "point" layer includes all data from OSM that had POINT geometry type (i.e., individual coordinates). The "building" layer includes all OSM data that did not have POINT geometry and where the building tag in the OSM export was neither equal to "no" or null. Data that did not meet the "point" or "building" qualification was assumed to be a facility campus and included in the "campus" layer. The dataset contains the following parameters. Variables provided by OSM are labeled with (OSM-provided). id - unique identification number (OSM-provided with prefix of "node/", "relation/" and similar attributes removed) state - name of US state state_abb - two letter US state abbreviation state_id - state ID number county - name of US county county_id - county ID number ref - reference numbers or codes (OSM-provided) operator - the name of the company, corporation, or person in charge facility (OSM-provided) name - name of facility (OSM-provided) sqft - surface area of facility polygon, measured in square feet. Only available for "building" and "campus" layers lat - latitude of data centroid point lon - longitude of data centroid point type – represented spatial information. One of "point", "building", or "campus". geometry – POLYGON geometry of area footprint (in "campus" and "building" layers) or POINT geometry of locations (in "point" layer). This parameter is not included in the csv download. Attribution Data center locations were derived from OpenStreetMap, which is made available at openstreetmap.org under the Open Database License (ODbL). US state and county boundary information was collected from the US Census Bureau for the year 2024, which is made publicly available at https://www.census.gov/geographies/mapping-files.html Acknowledgment IM3 is a multi-institutional effort led by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and supported by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Science as part of research in MultiSector Dynamics, Earth and Environmental Systems Modeling Program. License The IM3 Open Source Data Center Atlas is made available under the Open Database License: http://opendatacommons.org/licenses/odbl/1.0/. Disclaimer This material was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the United States Department of Energy, nor the Contractor, nor any or their employees, nor any jurisdiction or organization that has cooperated in the development of these materials, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness or any information, apparatus, product, software, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof, or Battelle Memorial Institute. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof. PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORYoperated byBATTELLEfor theUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYunder Contract DE-AC05-76RL01830

Mongird, Kendall [Pacific Northwest National Labor↗

DOE OSTI2021

Quantitative Risk Analysis of High Safety Significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants using IRADIC Technology

This report documents the activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during fiscal year (FY) 2021 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) Risk Assessment project. In FY-2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems (IRADIC technology) was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the High Safety Significant Safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) develop an advanced risk assessment technology to support transition from analog to DI&C technologies for nuclear industry, (3) assure the long-term safety and reliability of vital HSSSR DI&C systems, (4) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the IRADIC technology is instructive for nuclear vendors and utilities to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify responding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the individual level, system level, and plant level, (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks; thus, to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). In this report, an approach for performing software CCF analysis, given limited data, is developed and demonstrated using a case study of a highly redundant digital reactor trip system. Consequence analysis is also performed based on different accident scenarios. Results indicate that plant modernization including the improvement of HSSSR DI&C systems will make great benefits to plant safety by providing more safety margins to accident management. In addition, a novel approach is proposed in this report for the quantification of software hazards when sufficient operational and testing data available. The method incorporates software development quality as well as strong analysis techniques to identify and link software defects to potential failure modes. The approach includes both semantic and test-based analysis to detect failures that can exist in different stages of the software development life cycle. This method is applied to an advanced human system interface relevant to reactor trip safety developed from the APR 1400 design.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

A Plan to Qualify New Fuel for the High Flux Isotope Reactor for Material Minimization

The High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is one of five high power research reactors the Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) Program, Office of Conversion is working to convert from using highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to using low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This effort stems from the primary objective within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to achieve permanent threat reduction by minimizing, and when possible, eliminating weapon-usable nuclear material around the world. Under M3’s Office of Conversion, the U.S. High Performance Research Reactor (USHPRR) Project is pursuing fuel qualification and licensing of LEU fuels to support the high-performance reactors. All high-performance reactors except HFIR will be converted to LEU monolithic uranium-molybdenum alloy fuel. HFIR will be evaluated for conversion to LEU using a uranium silicide fuel, namely, U3Si2-Al dispersion fuel. The mission of the USHPRR Project is to develop the technology needed to reduce, and eventually eliminate, worldwide use of HEU in civilian applications. The goal is to develop the technical means needed to use low enriched uranium (LEU) instead of HEU fuel in research and test reactors without significant penalties in performance, economics, or safety of the reactors. The USHPRR Project has four major elements, called Pillars: Fuel Qualification (FQ) managed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Fuel Fabrication (FF) managed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Reactor Conversion (RC) managed at Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne), and Cross-Cutting (CC) managed at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). FQ is responsible for the qualification of the fuel type. RC is responsible for supporting reactor conversion analysis and overseeing licensing submittals leading to conversions of domestic reactors to LEU fuel. For the FQ effort, FQ (INL) worked in collaboration with RC (Argonne) and ORNL to develop the plan for the uranium silicide fuel qualification for HFIR. The resulting HFIR Fuel Qualification Plan provides the general approach for the USHPRR team to move the selected uranium silicide fuel design for HFIR conversion through qualification. Authorization and use in HFIR will be approved through the DOE’s Office of Science. Uranium silicide fuel was previously qualified in NUREG-1313 at an approximate maximum heat flux of 1.4 MW/m2 and a maximum fuel section temperature of about 130°C. In addition to the different regulator process utilized by DOE, these upper limits will be exceeded in HFIR; therefore, further testing will be necessary to ensure the fuel can meet HFIR qualification requirements. The HFIR fuel loading may exceed 4.8 gU/cm3 which was determined in the NUREG-1313 safety evaluation to be acceptable for use in non-power NRC-licensed reactors provided there exist no other safety considerations. In addition, the uranium silicide fuel will need to be qualified in a HFIR-specific design. This plan includes the currently available information from the USHPRR Project Functions and Requirements document and expands these requirements to ensure that planned tests have traceable results providing evidence that the requirements have been met. Data collection methods are discussed as well as the process to show that the requirements have been met. This document is designed to provide a pathway for researchers to obtain data necessary and at the appropriate quality level for HFIR fuel qualification

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Risk Analysis of Various Design Architectures for High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants during Accident Scenarios

This report documents the plus-up activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing advanced risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions and diversity and redundancy applications, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the LWRS-developed framework instructs nuclear vendors and utilities on how to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). Adding diversity within system or components is the main means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases plant complexity and errors and may not address all sources of systematic failures. How to optimize the diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the framework provides: ? An integrated best-estimate, risk-informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, accurately, and efficiently in plan modernization progress, such as software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to efficiently predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems ? Technical bases and risk-informed insights to assist U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry to address and fulfill the risk-informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? An integrated risk-informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The plus-up research and development efforts of this project in FY 2022 are focused on methodology improvement of software CCF modeling and estimation, prevention analysis, importance analysis and risk analysis of various design architectures of HSSSR DI&C systems. This work greatly enhances the capability of the LWRS-developed framework for the risk assessment and design optimization of safety-critical DI&C systems. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the LWRS-developed framework, not for the evaluation of relevant systems. Results are obtained based on very limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Novel Approaches and Technologies for Aging Management

As part of the application process for license renewal and subsequent license renewal, nuclear utilities must perform an evaluation to confirm that they have appropriately considered aging effects on plant structures, systems, components within the scope of the license renewal. This effort within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability program’s Risk-informed System Analysis pathway is focused on risk-informed and performance-based approaches for aging management of buried piping, specifically managing selective leaching degradation phenomena. Selective leaching is a commonly occurring aging and degradation mechanism in buried pipes at nuclear power plants. To better understand the extent of selective leaching and its effect on the health of buried components, the licensees currently rely on visual inspections and destructive examinations which require extraction of multiple buried components. This research explores technological solutions that may replace or supplement existing inefficient, costly, and labor-intensive methods used in aging management.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act Title II DOE Due Diligence and Lessons Learned from a Previous Site Transfer - 20352

Title II of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) established that a government agency will provide perpetual care for closed uranium and thorium ore-processing sites that were operating under an NRC source material license in 1978 or were licensed thereafter. Commercial owners (licensees) operating under an NRC or agreement state specific license when UMTRCA was passed are responsible for conducting reclamation of any byproduct material remaining from uranium-ore processing operations in accordance with an NRC or agreement state approved reclamation plan. Reclamation includes both surface and groundwater remedies. Upon completion of reclamation and approval by NRC, the site is required to be transferred to either the host state or the DOE for long-term surveillance and maintenance. Since UMTRCA's enactment, six Title II sites have been transferred to DOE; an additional 24 Title II sites are anticipated to be transferred before 2050. DoE's role mandated under UMTRCA Title II as the long-term care custodian is to perform 'monitoring, maintenance, and emergency measures necessary to protect the public health and safety.' UMTRCA requires that the licensee pay a long-term surveillance charge 'sufficient to cover the annual costs of site surveillance.' However, at some sites such as the Bluewater, New Mexico, Disposal Site, this mandate has required additional effort and expense by DOE, beyond the originally anticipated and intended scope within UMTRCA, but within the authority of DOE under UMTRCA. In 1997, the Bluewater site became the second UMTRCA Title II site to be transferred to DOE. The site was the location of a uranium mill operated from 1953 until 1982. The specific licensee began site reclamation in 1991, and by 1995 all tailings and contaminated materials were encapsulated in two tailings disposal cells and other disposal areas. In addition to surface contamination, milling activities impacted groundwater in the two upper aquifers. In 1989, the specific licensee attempted active groundwater remediation; however, no significant reduction in contaminant concentrations was observed. As a result, the specific licensee applied to NRC for alternate concentration limits (ACLs) in 1990, which were approved in 1996 as being protective, after additional corrective actions were performed. Since transfer of the Bluewater site to DOE, unforeseen challenges have occurred, requiring additional actions. The first challenge is the occurrence of surface depressions located on the northern section of the main tailings disposal cell. The depressions were first observed during DoE's initial inspection in 1998; however, evidence of these can be observed on satellite images taken prior to transfer. Since being first observed, the depressions have continued to grow both in depth and areal extent. Due to the design of the main tailings disposal cell, the depressions impede storm water from being effectively shed off the 101- hectare (250-acre) top slope of the main tailings disposal cell. Instead, storm water accumulates in the depressions, forming a large ephemeral pond that has stored up to 16.3 x 10{sup 6} liters (4.3 million gallons) of stormwater. The ponding poses a potential risk to the integrity of the main tailings disposal cell in the case of a large storm event, with the potential to cause the pond to overtop and erode the cover material and underlying waste. DOE has taken a number of short-term actions to monitor, measure, and reduce the ponding and is currently working with the US Army Corps of Engineers to design and construct a repair. Additional challenges are associated with groundwater at the Bluewater site. Nine wells were present on the 1335-hectare (3300-acre) site upon transfer. Groundwater compliance was called into question after the State of New Mexico reduced its uranium groundwater standard from 5.0 to 0.03 milligrams per liter in 2004, and when an ACL for uranium was exceeded in a site monitoring well in 2010. Acquiring historical groundwater data and subsequent evaluations as well as additional DOE groundwater monitoring led to installing 10 new monitoring wells and performing additional site hydrogeology recharacterization. DOE continues to evaluate groundwater conditions at the site and works with the NRC to determine regulatory requirements and a path forward. As a result of lessons learned at the Bluewater site and other Title II sites, improved processes have been implemented at a programmatic level to increase due diligence before site transfer and prevent similar issues from occurring at other UMTRCA Title II sites under long-term management. DoE's due diligence process is documented in the Process for Transition of UMTRCA Title II Disposal Sites to DOE for Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance and is designed to ensure that DOE has no technical or compliance concerns with regulatory decisions that might compromise protectiveness following site transfer to DOE. Implementation of the due diligence process has increased DoE's role prior to site transfer and has been effective in identifying potential issues. Actions by NRC and specific licensees, in response to enhanced due diligence efforts by DOE, are expected to minimize, if not totally prevent, the need for unanticipated actions by DOE pertaining to the surface and groundwater remedies after site transfer. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2023

Sensitivity and Importance Measure Analyses for Various Design Architectures for High Safety-Significant Safety-Related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants

A transition from analog instrumentation and control (I&C) technologies to digital I&C technologies is taking place for license renewals of existing nuclear power plants and for operating licenses of new advanced reactors. This transition necessitates research on risk and economic assessments of digital I&C technologies to ensure the long-term safety and reliability of vital systems, reduce uncertainty in licensing costs in addition to timeline, support integration of digital I&C systems in the plant, and find the most efficient technology upgrades. Adding redundancy within systems or components is a common means of improving design safety; however, it can also make designs more prone to common-cause failures (CCFs). Introducing diversity into redundant systems or components is a way to mitigate and possibly eliminate CCFs, but it also increases plant complexity and may be costly. The balance between redundancy and diversity remains a challenge for digital I&C systems. This study performs sensitivity and importance analyses for four design architectures of two digital I&C systems—the reactor-trip system and the engineered safety features actuation system. For each system, two architectures are examined, including a redundant, non-diverse configuration and a redundant, diverse configuration. The sensitivity analysis will provide insights on the impact of introducing diversity to system reliability. The importance results will help identify risk-significant and risk-sensitive components and failure modes, which may be good candidates for future design improvement.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Promoting the regulatory acceptance of combined ion and neutron irradiation for material degradation in nuclear reactors

The Advanced Materials and Manufacturing Technologies (AMMT) program within the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy has developed its current recommendation for promoting the use of combined ion irradiation and neutron irradiation for the accelerated qualification of materials to be deployed in nuclear reactors. This plan is intended to provide a collaborative path forward that can be adopted by academia, national laboratories, and industry, and has been developed with input from the regulatory research arm of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). To deploy new materials or materials manufactured with new technologies, such as additive manufacturing, materials must be evaluated for reactor-induced degradation from the combination of harsh temperatures, corrosive environments, and radiation fields. However, rapid deployment of materials necessitates accelerated testing methods rather than relying on years of neutron irradiation in a material test reactor. Ion irradiation has demonstrated success in reproducing material microstructure and select property evolution resulting from neutron irradiation with three to four orders of magnitude reduction in time and cost, making it an ideal candidate for accelerated irradiation testing. This presentation provides context governing both the scientific and regulatory aspects of the proposed goal. The discussion is aimed at a broad audience including researchers from industry, national laboratories, and academia. The recommended path forward is presented as a conceptual framework of specific steps. In brief, the strategy entails developing an integrated ion and neutron irradiation test plan for the material property of interest based on the fundamental tenet of the linkage of microstructure and properties in materials. Physics-based modeling interprets ion irradiation data and predicts neutron irradiation microstructure and properties with uncertainty bounds. The first round of testing is sufficient for an initial licensing application using a risk-informed approach, while a minimum required neutron irradiation test plan reduces cost and time requirements. A surveillance program with witness specimens in-reactor provides additional data over time to improve model predictions to higher damage levels and further reduce uncertainty bounds, which can be used for license extensions or longer lifetimes in new license applications.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Relating Measured Component Damage to Assessed Component Reliability in Reliability Integrity Management (RIM)

There is currently no widely agreed detailed general method for licensing a novel plant incorporating novel materials (or materials being deployed in novel environments); in many such situations, there are no directly applicable engineering code cases for decision-makers (including regulators) to rely on. It may be possible to develop an approach to licensing such a plant that is based on the Reliability and Integrity Management (RIM) approach delineated in ASME BPVC Section XI Division 2. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.246, Rev.0, endorses, with conditions, the subject portion of the ASME Code. But that portion of the ASME code is written at a very high level, and there are fundamental technical challenges associated with applying it literally to licensing a real plant. In the RIM approach, applicants need to do the following (among other things): • Allocate target reliabilities to structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that collectively support the top-level plant safety and availability objectives; • Understand failure modes of those SSCs, and the degradation mechanisms that could lead to those failure modes; • Develop and propose a program of surveillances that will identify degradation prior to failure of SSCs; • Provide a means of reporting results, taking actions for anomalous or undesirable conditions, and give the regulator assurance of continued safe operations. Applying RIM in a specific case will call for advances in the state of practice of relating physical observables to functional reliability of certain component types. Except where a given level of damage corresponds to a failed (or nearly failed) state, it is not practical to establish a precise quantitative relationship between physical observables and reliability. This paper focuses on managing risk of passive component failures based on observable damage parameters. A simple approach to cumulative damage modeling will be illustrated with a view to possible use in RIM applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2025

ACCELERATED DEPLOYMENT OF NOVEL MATERIALS BASED ON RELIABILITY INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT USING CUMULATIVE DAMAGE MODELING

There is currently no widely agreed, detailed general method for licensing a novel plant incorporating novel materials (or materials being deployed in novel environments); in many such situations, there are no directly applicable engineering code cases for decision-makers (including regulators) to rely on. This paper discusses a framework for solving this problem that is based on the Reliability and Integrity Management (RIM) approach delineated in ASME BPVC Section XI Division 2. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.246, Rev. 0, endorses, with conditions, the subject portion of the 2019 ASME Code. The proposed framework is meant to support development of a licensing case by addressing certain remaining technical challenges. The framework discussed here is compatible with the Licensing Modernization Project, but applying it in a specific case will call for advances in the state of practice, if not the state of the art. The RIM approach calls for applicants to (a) allocate reliability targets to plant structures, systems, and components (SSCs), (b) show that they are able to relate the currently observed physical condition of each SSC in the program to its failure probability well enough to determine whether the target reliability allocations are being satisfied, allowing for uncertainty related to the novelty of the materials/designs/operating environments, and (c) be able to demonstrate that the proposed program of surveillances will reliably detect unacceptable degradation of an SSC before SSC failure occurs. A modeling approach potentially applicable to item (b), based on cumulative damage modeling rather than failure rates, is briefly illustrated.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Pilot Upgrade: Initial Scoping Phase Implementation and Lessons Learned

In May 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff provided a digital instrumentation and control (I&C) regulatory infrastructure integrated action plan to the NRC for approval. One of the objectives of that plan was to establish a clear regulatory structure with reduced regulatory uncertainty to enable the expanded safe use of digital I&C in commercial nuclear reactors while continuing to ensure safety and security. To achieve this end, the NRC, with collaboration from industry, developed a streamlined License Amendment Request Alternate Review (AR) process for safety-related (SR) digital I&C upgrades. In spite of this effort, the industry has remained reluctant to perform such I&C upgrades because of perceived regulatory and financial risks associated with being the first or an early adopter of the AR process for SR I&C upgrades. The U.S. Department of Energy Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program at the Idaho National Laboratory performed Initial Scoping Phase research to help break this impasse by supporting a SR I&C Pilot Upgrade, working with MPR Associates, ScottMadden Inc., and Exelon Generation. Exelon’s Limerick Generating Station (LGS) was selected as the target for this research. This paper summarizes the Initial Scoping Phase engineering and operations, licensing, and project management activities necessary to bound the scope, schedule, and estimated cost of the project sufficiently to enable utility management authorization of Conceptual Design Phase activities. These efforts and associated products are intended to provide a template to support larger industry efforts to perform similar upgrades as a foundation stone for a digital transformation that will improve plant safety, reliability, and operational performance while lowering plant total cost of ownership. As a result of the combined effort of Exelon Generation and research participants, Conceptual Design Phase activities for the subject upgrade at LGS were approved by Exelon. Further, the U.S. Department of Energy also awarded a $50 million cost share award to Exelon in order to pave the way for SR I&C modernization and associated control room upgrades across the U.S. nuclear fleet. Additional research reports are planned for the Conceptual Design Phase, Detailed Design Phase, and the Implementation Phase of the LGS project to document the process followed and promulgate lessons learned to industry.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2019

ANS Summary of Safety Design Strategy for the Versatile Test Reactor

This paper describes the unique challenges with developing and documenting the Safety Design Strategy for the Versatile Test Reactor in the following key areas: 1. Identification of the key safety goals in the VTR facility design and operation that are to ensure adequate protection of the public, workers, and environment as required by 10 CFR 830, “Nuclear Safety Management.” These goals are fulfilled by an approach that applies defense-in-depth (DID) by applying various layers (or levels) of protection to prevent the release of radioactive and hazardous materials. 2. Early identification of the hazards that are normally associated with a large fast reactor facility can result from postulated failure conditions in one or more of the reactor systems or from operational errors. 3. Identification of the key decisions that must be made during the initial project life cycle that will affect the eventual design and construction of the VTR and enable clarity in safety expectations. 4. Identification of the applicable regulatory framework requirements for demonstrating compliance with safety basis requirements in 10 CFR 830 Subpart B for the VTR. 5. Application of the proposed Licensing Modernization Program (LMP) recommendations for advanced non-LWR reactors as outlined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)-18-04, “Risk-Informed Performance-Based Guidance for Non-Light Water Reactor Licensing Basis Development.”

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor: Accident Analysis

Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) Risk Informed Approach Selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs) Frequency-Consequence Target LBE Cumulative Risk Targets Structures, Systems, and Components (SSC) Safety Categories Classification Evaluation of Defense in Depth (DID) Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) in LMP Process PRA Policy Statement American Nuclear Society (ANS) Non-Light-Water Reactor (non-LWR) PRA Standard

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗