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DOE OSTI2024

Demonstration and Verification of Thermo-Mechanical Bowing in a Limited Free-Bow SFR Concept Using MOOSE

Core bowing due to thermal gradients and irradiation induced swelling and creep introduces significant reactivity feedback effects in liquid metal-cooled fast spectrum reactors. During startup, normal operations, and transient events, differential thermal and flux gradients cause expansion, creep, and swelling, which results in bowing in preferential directions depending on local material properties and load-pad and restraint-ring design. The bowing phenomenon produces negative reactivity during accident conditions provided the restraint system has been properly designed to optimally guide the deformation outwards in the active core region. Under the Department of Energy Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation program, a Multiphysics Object Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE)-based multiphysics approach to model core bowing is being developed. The present work expands on previous modeling of simpler International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification problems with these tools by modeling IAEA Verification Problem 4, which involves a symmetric sector of a reactor core with ducted assemblies undergoing differential thermal expansion due to thermal gradients bowing outward with duct-to-duct contact. This model is available on the National Reactor Innovation Center Virtual Test Bed repository. This example was verified against benchmark participant results, which includes bowing deformation evaluation and duct-to-duct interactions at load pads with mechanical contact.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Acoustic Monitoring of Pyroprocessing for Safeguards

As pyroprocessing continues to be an attractive option for the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel worldwide, safeguards technologies are needed to address the monitoring capabilities that can help state level authorities, or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) maintain continuity of knowledge of the plant operations. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is studying the possibility of using acoustic monitoring as a means to monitor a pyroprocessing facility for safeguards purposes. This paper discusses the experimental design and some preliminary results of tests conducted at the Fuel Conditioning Facility, a pyrochemical capable facility, at INL.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

DOE OSTI2025

Hungary 908 Event - Risk Based Graded Approach to ITM

This presentation, Risk-Based, Graded Approach to Insider Threat Mitigation: Human Measures, introduces a structured framework for managing insider threat risk using internationally recognized guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Series No. 8-G (Rev. 1) and the Joint Statement on Mitigating Insider Threats (INFCIRC/908). The presentation emphasizes that effective insider threat mitigation (ITM) depends on both positional controls, which manage inherent risk based on access, authority, and knowledge, and human measures, which address residual risk reflected in behavior, motivation, and reliability. Using a risk-informed and graded approach, the presentation outlines methods for identifying and prioritizing high-risk positions, applying layered organizational controls, and integrating human reliability mechanisms such as the Behavior Observation Program (BOP), Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) evaluations, Employee Assistance Programs (EAP), and Nuclear Security Culture (NSC). The human-focused portion examines behavioral and organizational indicators of opportunity, vulnerability, motivation, and crisis, demonstrating how early detection, deterrence, and response can prevent insider events. The session concludes with a case review of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station incident involving engineer George Galatis. The case illustrates how weak leadership and a poor safety culture can create conditions for failure and how a comprehensive ITM framework could have altered the outcome. The objective of this presentation is to help practitioners apply a risk-based, graded philosophy to human factors and promote a culture of accountability, communication, and resilience within nuclear organizations.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Summary of the 5th IAEA technical meeting on fusion data processing, validation and analysis (FDPVA)

The purpose of the 5th International Atomic Energy Agency technical meeting on fusion data processing, validation and analysis (FDPVA) (Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium, 12–15 June 2023) was to provide a platform during which a set of topics relevant to FDPVA were discussed with the view of meeting the needs of next step fusion devices such as ITER. The validation and analysis of experimental data obtained from diagnostics used to characterize fusion plasmas are crucial for a knowledge-based understanding of the physical processes governing the dynamics of these plasmas. This paper presents the recent progress and achievements in the domain of plasma diagnostics data analysis and synthetic diagnostics reported at the meeting, including concept description of new devices; fusion databases; integrated data analysis; inverse problems; uncertainty propagation, verification and validation; probabilistic methods and machine learning. The relevant results underline trends observed in the current major fusion confinement devices.

fusion databases↗

DOE OSTI2021

Fork Experiments in the Hot Cell Using Spent Fuel Rods for International Nuclear Safeguards

This work leveraged the rare availability of 25 full-length pressurized water reactor spent fuel rods and 1 irradiated mixed-oxide rod at an Oak Ridge National Laboratory hot cell. This was done to collect measurement data with two Fork detectors to assess the detectors’ capability of verifying operator declaration data and detecting partial defects in spent fuel, which are the two primary goals of international safeguards on spent nuclear fuel. The data can also be used to benchmark the ORIGEN module, which has been adopted in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s)/European Atomic Energy Community’s (Euratom’s) Integrated Review and Analysis Program to predict the Fork detector count rates in real time. In this project, the authors first calibrated two Fork detectors—a standard one and a modified one—by using known strong neutron and gamma sources. Then, the authors measured all 26 fuel rods at multiple locations along the length. The fuel rods were then assembled into three arrays—2 × 2, 3 × 3, and 5 × 5—by using specially designed support grids to mimic fuel assemblies and measure the arrays with both detectors. For the 5 × 5 array, 4 and 8 fuel rods of the array were replaced in two separate cases with short stainless-steel rods to mimic two partial defect scenarios, and the arrays were measured before and after the replacements. Polyethylene blocks were used in this experiment to mimic water. The results show that the Fork detectors were able to verify operator declarations and detect partial defects in spent fuel, and the authors were the first to demonstrate this through experiments. A discovery was also made that determined the root cause of the nonlinear response to gamma dose in the ion chambers used in IAEA and Euratom’s Fork detectors. After the experiments, both detectors were retrieved from the hot cell for future use. The data collected in this project will be used in a parallel International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program (INSEP) project to enhance the safeguards in the Finnish spent fuel encapsulation plant, and the data will be useful to other projects in the future given the increased safeguards needs due to spent fuel transfer and disposal activities worldwide.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2022

A Review on the State of the Art of Machine Learning and Satellite Imaging: Detecting Scene Changes in Selected Nuclear Fuel Cycle Datasets

The timely detection of clandestine nuclear facilities is one of the greatest challenges faced by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA). Idaho National Laboratory is currently applying machine learning (ML) to existing satellite imagery (SI) datasets to find facilities within the nuclear fuel life cycle, with primary focus placed on identifying critical predecessor (i.e., fuel fabrication and fuel enrichment) and successor (i.e., nuclear power plants) facilities. This could provide a satellite image methodology that the IAEA could leverage to discover clandestine facilities. The work presented in this paper describes the evolution of a workflow developed by this team for object detection related to critical infrastructure by expanding that workflow for the purpose of identifying nuclear fuel cycle components and automating dependency assessments. This will be done using two methods housed within a single pipeline. The first method involves implementing a DenseNet161 convolutional neural network to classify the images and explain the results using Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (LIME). The second method implements You Only Look Once version 5 (YoloV5), to detect objects within images, provide a probability for the detection, and provide a bounding box that corresponds to the object of interest. The results of this work are anticipated to provide a clear picture of this portion of the nuclear fuel cycle and perform as a stand-alone tool for image assessment that can be expanded to additional fuel cycle components and implemented in international safeguards and national security domains. This capability addresses the IAEA’s need to detect undeclared nuclear materials and activities within a state while encompassing the entire nuclear fuel cycle.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2020

Benchmark Modeling and Simulation of the FFTF LOFWOS Test #13 Using SAM

The Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) was a 400 MW thermal powered, oxide-fueled, liquid sodium cooled test reactor, built to assist development and testing of advanced fuels and materials for fast breeder reactors. In July 1986, a series of unprotected Loss of Flow Without Scram (LOFWOS) transients were performed in FFTF as part of the Passive Safety Testing (PST) program. The LOFWOS Test #13, which was initiated at 50% power and 100% flow with the pump pony motors left off, has been chosen as a benchmark case by IAEA to support collaborative efforts within international partnerships on the validation of simulation tools and models in the area of sodium fast reactor passive safety in an IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP), launched in October 2018. The System Analysis Module (SAM) is an advanced and modern system analysis tool under development at Argonne National Laboratory for advanced non-LWR safety analysis. It utilizes the object-oriented application framework MOOSE to leverage the modern software environment and advanced numerical methods. The capabilities of SAM are being extended to enable the transient modeling, analysis, and design of various advanced nuclear reactor systems. To participate the IAEA CRP and enhance the SAM validation base for advanced reactor transient safety analysis, benchmark simulations of the FFTF LOFWOS Test #13 are performed using the SAM code. In this first phase of the validation effort, the thermal-hydraulic behavior of the reactor system is the focus and the reactor kinetics is not considered in the SAM FFTF model. Instead, the results of Argonne’s neutronics calculations are directly used, including the power shape of the active core region and the power history during the transient. The simulation results of FFTF at steady state agreed well with the measured data from the test. During the transient, reasonably good agreement were also obtained. Future work to improve the model will focus on introducing the reactivity predictions into the model, as well as better understanding or resolving the current discrepancies with the measured data.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Basis for Dose and Reactor Safety Design Criteria for Army Regulation AR 50–7 and DA Pamphlet

This report describes the basis used to develop the radiological dose acceptance and design criteria contained in the draft updates to Army Regulation 50–7 (AR 50–7) Army Reactor Program and its accompanying draft Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM), Army Reactor Program Procedures. These criteria will apply to Army nuclear reactors that fall under AR 50–7 and its accompanying DA PAM and ensure alignment with the overall objectives of the Army Reactor Program. The development basis for the radiological dose and design criteria supports a modern, technology-neutral, risk-informed, and performance-based approach to Army regulation of reactors and the demonstration of “adequate protection of the public.” To establish these criteria that support the Army’s unique operational requirements, multiple well-known and well-established standards and their supporting documentation were reviewed to ensure consistency with existing regulatory safety levels, including guidance from U.S. and international sources. These include the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) regulations and policy, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission’s (CNSC’s) regulatory documents, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) safety standards, as well as industry input that is tailored specifically to advanced microreactors. This report walks through the key definitions and associated references used for these criteria, which are outlined in Section 2.0. Based on these definitions, the dose acceptance criteria were established for various receptors for routine reactor operations (Section 3.2), design basis accidents (Section 3.3), and beyond design basis accidents (Section 3.4). Comparisons of multiple national and international dose limits are provided in these sections. Lastly, Section 4.0 outlines the reactor safety design criteria contained in the draft DA PAM and their associated bases.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Technical Basis for the International Export of Handheld Spectroscopy Detectors

The international export of handheld spectroscopy detectors by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to partner states will provide state regulatory authorities and nuclear material owners a way to improve accountancy for accidental gains of nuclear material, including the provision of reports to the IAEA, in order to meet their safeguards agreements. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements for non-nuclear weapons states requires accountancy for all nuclear material. As defined in Article XX of the IAEA statute, nuclear material includes source materials: "uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature," and special fissionable material: "plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233". For IAEA Member States to meet their requirements under comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA), safeguards are to be applied on "all source or special fissionable material," which "includes all nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards". Therefore, accidental gains and losses of nuclear material must be reported to the IAEA. An accidental gain occurs when a state unexpectedly adds nuclear material to their inventory by various means such as seizing smuggled material or the discovery of legacy items previously unaccounted for. The material type and quantity must be added to the State's inventory by updating domestic records and then communicated to the IAEA.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2024

Safeguards Considerations for Salt Fuel Fabrication

Molten salt reactors (MSR) with liquid fuel present a unique safeguards challenge whereby the current verification techniques have not been evaluated for effectiveness and applicability. While MSR operations have been the subject of prior studies, the front-end liquid fuel preparation activities have not been extensively evaluated. Reviewing the existing resources on fuel fabrication and evaluating the range of fuel fabrication process options available will allow safeguards analysts to identify the applicability of existing safeguards practices, identify gaps in capability, and identify opportunities where safeguards may be applied. There is no existing supplier of fuel salt for MSRs. In an extensive review of MSR technology, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA's) Nuclear Power Technology Development Section acknowledges the gap in existing capabilities for fuel salt fabrication, noting, simply, “if demand exists, supply will appear.” Salt reactor fuel has not been previously produced on an industrial scale in a non-nuclear weapon state. These characteristics of MSR fuel fabrication present high levels of uncertainty, but they also represent an opportunity to mature safeguards techniques alongside liquid fuel preparation technologies.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

MARS 2020 Contingency Planning Overview

Case study on contingency planning for the MARS 2020 rover launch. Intended as part of a training for international consequence management personnel for IAEA and/or NATO-sponsored training classes. Funded through NA-81

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI1996

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 3, July-September 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 181 Attitudes and Practices Regarding Disposal of Liquid Nuclear Waste at Clinton Laboratories in the Very Early Years: A Historical Analysis, S. H. Stow; 202 Off-Site Nuclear Emergency Management in Germany Under the Auspices of the Federal Structure, A. Bayer, S. Bittner, and H. Korn; DESIGN FEATURES: 211 Twenty-Fourth DOE/NRC Nuclear Air-Cleaning and Treatment Conference, R. R. Bellamy, J. J. Hayes, R. D. Porco, and M. W. First; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 222 Explosion in the Tomsk-7 Reprocessing Plant on April 6, 1993, M. L. Hyder, W. G. Lussie, and F. E. Witmer; 234 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 237 Assessment of Spent Fuel Cooling, J. G. Ibarra, W. R. Jones, G. F. Lanik, H. L. Ornstein, and S. V. Pullani; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 256 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 260 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1996; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 210 Tennessee Industries Week; 221 21st International Symposium on The Scientific Basis for Nuclear Waste Management; 259 IAEA Programme of Scientific Meetings for 1997; 270 PSAM 4 (International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management); 265 The Authors; 268 Errata.

05 NUCLEAR FUELS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Grimsel Test Site - A Successful International Underground Research Laboratory for Many Decades - 20429

For more than 35 years, Nagra and its partners from around the world have been conducting underground research projects at the Grimsel Test Site (GTS, www.grimsel.com) to contribute to the development and confirmation of safe geological disposal concepts and for the characterization of suitable host rock formations. Over the years, the results of this internationally recognized research program have been, and continue to be, incorporated directly into exploration programs, modelling, safety, and engineering feasibility studies on options for deep geological repositories. Each project of the GTS program involves field-testing, laboratory studies, design and modelling tasks, and integrates all scientific and technical aspects. Each project phase is planned with a duration of three to five years to facilitate practical and administrative aspects and allow flexibility for updating the overall project plans with the latest findings. Scientific and engineering interaction among the different projects is ensured via an international steering committee meeting. Hosting an IAEA level C radiation- controlled zone, which allows use of radionuclides, including actinides such as thorium, uranium, neptunium, plutonium and americium, in in-situ experiments is one of the reasons why GTS also developed as a center of excellence for work with radioactive tracers under realistic in-situ boundary conditions. Last year, a new five-year program (2019 to 2023) started which includes projects with a planning horizon of decades. The new five-year program includes a new phase of in-situ experiments using radionuclides such as migration experiments in the Colloid Formation and Migration project (CFM), the Long-Term Diffusion experiment (LTD) and the newly established C-14 and I-129 Migration in cement project (CIM). The 'High Temperature effects on Bentonite' (HotBENT) project is starting in the current phase and is studying the effects of elevated temperatures (>175 deg. C) on bentonite materials. As a generic underground research laboratory (URL) it is expected that the GTS will provide in the coming years a platform for international collaboration, knowledge development and knowledge transfer for the next generation of scientists and engineers in the area of radioactive waste disposal and geosciences. A key role regarding knowledge transfer and training is provided by the well-established Grimsel Training Center (GTC), which (beside many URL related issues) also covers many general aspects of radioactive waste management. In this paper we provide an overview of the current program at the GTS, focusing on the experiments that study the migration of radionuclides through engineered barrier materials and the geosphere. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

HTGR Simulation Methods & International Collaborations

ART-GCR “Methods” activity is split between Experimental Validation data from the ANL NSTF and OSU HTTF (next three presentations). HTGR core simulation (this presentation). International collaboration within OECD Generation-IV (Gen-IV) and USA/Japan bi-lateral agreements (this presentation) HTGR Simulation Methods No new NE-52 funding for HTGR Methods support in FY20; ~$200K FY19 carry-over funds only. Consists of international code-to-code benchmarks (IAEA CRP on HTGR UAM and OECD/NEA MHTGR-350) and refinement of a few-group Pebble Bed Reactor (PBR) cross section (XS) generation methodology. Funding will be requested in FY21 to produce the final reports for the two benchmarks and continue the development of the PBR XS generation methodology. Additional (non-ART) HTGR-related support work at INL NEAMS: HTR-Application work package at INL Create a benchmark for the pebble shuffling and depletion algorithms being developed for NEAMS Griffin code. iFOA award with X-Energy: Develop independent Monte Carlo model of Xe-100 design. Independent design confirmatory analysis of Xe-100 design using NEAMS tools Griffin and Pronghorn. Support X-Energy design team to use their own legacy design tools (VSOP99 and MGT). Support NEAMS Griffin and Pronghorn development team for the iFOA needs (received $50K additional funding for required development).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Overview of the OECD-NEA Working Party on International Nuclear Data Evaluation Cooperation (WPEC)

The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Working Party on International Nuclear Data Evaluation Cooperation (WPEC) was established in 1989 to facilitate collaboration in nuclear data activities. Over its thirty year history, different Subgroups have been created to address topics in nearly every aspect of nuclear data, including: experimental measurements, evaluation, validation, model development, quality assurance of databases and the development of software tools. WPEC has recently completed activities on fission yield evaluation, the general nuclear database structure (GNDS) to replace the ENDF-6 format, methods to provide feedback to evaluation, studies of specific capture cross sections, new methods in thermal scattering kernel evaluation and the Collaborative International Evaluated Library Organisation (CIELO) Pilot Project. Ongoing activities in GNDS application programming interface (API) development, methods for covariance evaluation and quality assurance in nuclear data validation using the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) database are complemented by the work of two Expert Groups that oversee the High-Priority Request List (HPRL) for Nuclear Data and the continuous development of the GNDS. New activities on the use of integral experiments for nuclear data validation and adjustment, as well as the use of the Shielding Integral Benchmark Archive and Database (SINBAD) for validation have begun and will be coordinated alongside future Subgroups. After three decades we will review the status of WPEC, how it integrates other collections and activities organised by the NEA and how it dovetails with the initiatives of the IAEA and other bodies to effectively coordinate international activities in nuclear data.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2020

How To Maintain Effective IAEA Safeguards While Reducing Facility Impact

For almost twenty years, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency have been visiting the K-Area Material Storage facility at the Savannah River Site where excess plutonium has been placed under IAEA safeguards as part of the United States Volunatary Offer Agreement. During that time, the mission of K-Area Complex has expanded from storage of nuclear matieral to glovebox operations in support of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plutonium Disposition program. With this change in mission, it is becoming increasingly challenging to manage facility staff radiation exposure and operating activities during the IAEA’s annual Physcial Inventory Verifications (PIV). This study has identified both near-term and long-term recommendations for IAEA monitoring protocols that would allow the IAEA to maintain effective safeguards of the material while decreasing the impact to the facility. A statisitical analysis has shown that reducing the number of containers measured during an annual PIV from 12 to 4 still ensures a high level of confidence in the confidence while reducing the inspector time in the facility amd with a corresponding significant reduction in personnel radiation exposure. A modified installation pattern of Remotely Monitored Sealing Arrays (RMSAs) is also proposed utilizing only the outer rows of arrays of stored material containers in the Stack Area (SA). The modified RMSA placement will provide equivalent protection, while significantly reducing personnel radiological exposure, manpower requirements and associated costs. With advances in technology, there are additional potential options in containment/surveillance and continuity of knowledge that would allow the agency to be outside of the facility during PIV measurements and have confidence in the accuracy and authencitity of the results.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2023

Quantum-enhanced Imaging and Spectroscopy and their Relevance to International Safeguards

As a follow-up to our previous report on quantum sensing for safeguards, here we delve deeper into quantum-enhanced imaging & spectroscopy and address their relevance to international safeguards. Much of the approaches rely on entangled photons, a quantum phenomenon not possible with classical physics, although just correlated photons will work for some applications, such as ghost imaging. We provide a comprehensive survey of quantum approaches, including multiple entangled photon ghost imaging and spectroscopy techniques. Entangled photons for noise reduction are also described, as well as Non-Line-Of-Sight imaging, compressive techniques, and squeezed light. Of particular interest is the generation of entangled photons with large wavelength separation, such as infrared/visible entangled photon pairs. Such entangled pairs would allow interaction with objects in the IR, such as in the molecular “fingerprint” wavelength region, while the recording device captures the visible photons, thus leveraging the high efficiency and lower cost of visible detectors. Unfortunately, entangled x-ray photons are not practical, which would have been useful for safeguards to interrogate shielded materials. Entangled gamma rays are even further beyond reason. We provide our assessment for application of quantum-enhanced imaging & spectroscopy for international safeguards, including suggested improvements to existing IAEA instruments and destructive assay measurements that are done at IAEA lab facilities.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

DOE OSTI2025

Incorporating the latest Neutron NDA analysis techniques into INCC6

International Neutron Coincidence Counting (INCC6) is the IAEA’s neutron NDA software. With FY25 SGTech support we implemented self-diagnostic features into INCC6. For FY26 we propose to implement advanced analysis methods that have been splintered into custom software for one-off instruments. Incorporating these capabilities in INCC6 will make them available for any new or existing application on the ubiquitous INCC6 platform, increasing safeguards efficiency and effectiveness.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗