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At least 145 records · Page 8

Environmentally Compatible Vapor-Phase Corrosion Inhibitor for Space Shuttle Hardware

USA-SRB Element is responsible for the assembly and refurbishment of the non-motor components of the SRB as part of Space Shuttle. Thrust Vector Control (TVC) frames structurally support components of the TVC system located in the aft skirt of the SRB (Solid Rocket Booster). TVC frames are exposed to the seacoast environment after refurbishment and, also, to seawater immersion after splashdown, and during tow-back to CCAFS-Hangar AF refurbishment facilities. During refurbishment operations it was found that numerous TVC frames were experiencing internal corrosion and coating failures, both from salt air and seawater intrusions. Inspectors using borescopes would visually examine the internal cavities of the complicated aluminum alloy welded tubular structure. It was very difficult for inspectors to examine cavity corners and tubing intersections and particularly. to determine the extent of the corrosion and coating anomalies. Physical access to TVC frame internal cavities for corrosion removal and coating repair was virtually impossible, and an improved method using a Liquid (water based) Vapor-phase Corrosion Inhibitor (LVCI) for preventing initiation of new corrosion, and mitigating and/or stopping existing corrosion growth was recommended in lieu of hazardous paint solvents and high VOC/solvent based corrosion inhibitors. In addition, the borescopic inspection method used to detect corrosion, and/or coating anomalies had severe limitations because of part geometry, and an improved non-destructive inspection (NDI) method using Neutron Radiography (N-Ray) was also recommended.

Novak, Howard L.↗

Environmentally Compatible Vapor-Phase Corrosion Inhibitor for Space Shuttle Hardware

USA-SRB Element is responsible for the assembly and refurbishment of the non-motor components of the SRB as part of Space Shuttle. Thrust Vector Control (TVC) frames structurally support components of the TVC system located in the aft skirt of the SRB. TVC frames are exposed to the seacoast environment after refurbishment and, also, to seawater immersion after splashdown, and during tow-back to CCAFS-Hangar AF refurbishment facilities. During refurbishment operations it was found that numerous TVC frames were experiencing internal corrosion and coating failures, both from salt air and seawater intrusions. Inspectors using borescopes would visually examine the internal cavities of the complicated aluminum alloy welded tubular structure. It was very difficult for inspectors to examine cavity corners and tubing intersections and particularly, to determine the extent of the corrosion and coating anomalies. Physical access to TVC frame internal cavities for corrosion removal and coating repair was virtually impossible, and an improved method using a Liquid (water based) Vapor-phase Corrosion Inhibitor (LVCI) for preventing initiation of new corrosion, and mitigating and/or stopping existing corrosion growth was recommended in lieu of hazardous paint solvents and high VOC / solvent based corrosion inhibitors. In addition, the borescopic inspection method used to detect corrosion, and/or coating anomalies had severe limitations because of part geometry, and an improved non-destructive inspection (NDI) method using Neutron Radiography (N-Ray) was also recommended.

Novak, Howard L.↗

Tool for Inspecting Alignment of Twinaxial Connectors

A proposed tool would be used to inspect alignments of mating twinaxial-connector assemblies on interconnecting wiring harnesses. More specifically, the tool would be used to inspect the alignment of each contact pin of each connector on one assembly with the corresponding socket in the corresponding connector on the other assembly. It is necessary to inspect the alignment because if mating of the assemblies is attempted when any pin/socket pair is misaligned beyond tolerance, the connection will not be completed and the dielectric material in the socket will be damaged (see Figure 1). Although the basic principle of the tool is applicable to almost any type of mating connector assemblies, the specific geometry of the tool must match the pin-and-socket geometry of the specific mating assemblies to be inspected. In the original application for which the tool was conceived, each of the mating assemblies contains eight twinaxial connectors; the pin diameter is 0.014 in. (.0.35 mm), and the maximum allowable pin/socket misalignment is 0.007 in. (.0.18 mm). Incomplete connections can result in loss of flight data within the functional path to the space shuttle crew cockpit displays. The tool (see Figure 2) would consist mainly of a transparent disk with alignment clocking tabs that can be fitted onto either connector assembly. Sets of circles or equivalent reference markings are affixed to the face of the tool, located at the desired positions of the mating contact pairs. An inspector would simply fit the tool onto a connector assembly, engaging the clocking tabs until the tool fits tightly. The inspector would then align one set of circles positioning a line of sight perpendicular to one contact within the connector assembly. Mis alignments would be evidenced by the tip of a pin contact straying past the inner edge of the circle. Socket contact misalignments would be evidenced by a crescent-shaped portion of the white dielectric appearing within the circle. The tool could include a variable magnifier plus an illuminator that could be configured so as not to cast shadows.

Smith, Christopher R.↗

Workmanship Standards Personnel Training and Certification Explained

This slide presentation reviews the standards that NASA requires for workmanship and discusses the rationale and the NASA-STD-8739.x standard series. The training and certification of inspectors and operators is to guarantee that workmanship is qualified for NASA applications. The NASA workmanship standard documents review the standards for: Polymeric Applications, Surface Mount Technology, Soldered Electrical Connections, Crimp, Cable and Harnesses, Fiber Optic Terminations, including ANSI and IPC standards for Electrostatic Discharge Safety, Space Applications Electronic Hardware and Requirements for Soldered Electrical and Electronic Assemblies. It also reviews the certification requirements for appropriate personnel. It also reviews the various levels of trainers for the various requirements. There is also a review of calibration requirements for training equipment. Some variations on the curriculum are allowed. NASA requires operators and inspectors to be certified by their employer to ensure that oversight is being performed.

Plante, Jeannette F.↗

Software Method for Computed Tomography Cylinder Data Unwrapping, Re-slicing, and Analysis

A software method has been developed that is applicable for analyzing cylindrical and partially cylindrical objects inspected using computed tomography (CT). This method involves unwrapping and re-slicing data so that the CT data from the cylindrical object can be viewed as a series of 2D sheets (or flattened onion skins ) in addition to a series of top view slices and 3D volume rendering. The advantages of viewing the data in this fashion are as follows: (1) the use of standard and specialized image processing and analysis methods is facilitated having 2D array data versus a volume rendering; (2) accurate lateral dimensional analysis of flaws is possible in the unwrapped sheets versus volume rendering; (3) flaws in the part jump out at the inspector with the proper contrast expansion settings in the unwrapped sheets; and (4) it is much easier for the inspector to locate flaws in the unwrapped sheets versus top view slices for very thin cylinders. The method is fully automated and requires no input from the user except proper voxel dimension from the CT experiment and wall thickness of the part. The software is available in 32-bit and 64-bit versions, and can be used with binary data (8- and 16-bit) and BMP type CT image sets. The software has memory (RAM) and hard-drive based modes. The advantage of the (64-bit) RAM-based mode is speed (and is very practical for users of 64-bit Windows operating systems and computers having 16 GB or more RAM). The advantage of the hard-drive based analysis is one can work with essentially unlimited-sized data sets. Separate windows are spawned for the unwrapped/re-sliced data view and any image processing interactive capability. Individual unwrapped images and un -wrapped image series can be saved in common image formats. More information is available at http://www.grc.nasa.gov/WWW/OptInstr/ NDE_CT_CylinderUnwrapper.html.

Roth, Don J.↗

Johnson Space Center: Workmanship Training

Special processes require special skills, knowledge and experienced application. For over 15 years, the NASA Johnson Space Center's Receiving, Inspection and Test Facility (RITF) has provided Agency-wide NASA Workmanship Standards compliance training, issuing more than 500 to 800 training completion certificates annually. It is critical that technicians and inspectors are trained and that they maintain their proficiency to implement the applicable standards and specifications. Training services include "hands-on" training to engineers, technicians, and inspectors in the areas of electrostatic discharge (ESD), soldering, surface mount technology (SMT), crimping, conformal coating, and fiber-optic terminations.

Patterson, Ashley↗

Workmanship Training Industry

Special processes require special skills, knowledge and experienced application. For over 15 years, the NASA Johnson Space Center's Receiving, Inspection and Test Facility (RITF) has provided Workmanship Standards compliance training, issuing more than 500 to 800 training completion certificates annually. It is critical that technicians and inspectors are trained and that they maintain their proficiency to implement the applicable standards and specifications. Training services include 'hands-on' training to engineers, technicians, and inspectors in the areas of electrostatic discharge (ESD), soldering, fiber optics, lithium battery handling, torque and wire safety, and wire wrapping.

Patterson, Ashley↗

Machine Learning Based AFP Inspection: A Tool for Characterization and Integration

Automated Fiber Placement (AFP) has become a standard manufacturing technique in the creation of large scale composite structures due to its high production rates. However, the associated rapid layup that accompanies AFP manufacturing has a tendency to induce defects. We forward an inspection system that utilizes machine learning (ML) algorithms to locate and characterize defects from profilometry scans coupled with a data storage system and a user interface (UI) that allows for informed manufacturing. A Keyence LJ-7080 blue light profilometer is used for fast 2D height profiling. After scans are collected, they are process by ML algorithms, displayed to an operator through the UI, and stored in a database. The overall goal of the inspection system is to add an additional tool for AFP manufacturing. Traditional AFP inspection is done manually adding to manufacturing time and being subject to inspector errors or fatigue. For large parts, the inspection process can be cumbersome. The proposed inspection system has the capability of accelerating this process while still keeping a human inspector integrated and in control. This allows for the rapid capability of the automated inspection software and the robustness of a human checking for defects that the system either missed or misclassified.

Sacco, Christopher↗

A Survey of NASA Standard Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE)

This document provides a comprehensive review to trace the evolution of NASA’s Standard nondestructive evaluation (NDE) flaw sizes provided in NASA-STD-5009B for fracture-critical metallic spaceflight hardware. A NASA Standard NDE flaw size is considered to be conservative such that most inspectors, trained and certified in the specific method, are expected to provide the required 90/95 probability of detection (POD) for that flaw size. As such, individual certified inspectors are not required to perform POD demonstration testing to be allowed to inspect fracture-critical hardware for that specific method.

Probability of Detection↗

An Eddy Current Case Study using NASA’s Transfer Function and Limited-Sample Probability of Detection Guidebooks

Probability of detection (POD) requirements for NASA fracture-critical human-rated systems can be met by (1) claiming ‘similarity’ to NASA Standard Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) flaw sizes or (2) by inspector-specific POD demonstration, known as NASA Special NDE. Standard NDE flaw sizes are intended to represent the detection capability of most qualified inspectors, and were primarily based on POD studies in the development of the Space Shuttle Program Orbiter fracture control plan. However, these Standard NDE flaw sizes were based on fatigue cracks in flat panels of one material alloy over a limited range of panel thicknesses. While the POD study was comprehensive, the inspection conditions are relatively narrow. An evaluation of similarity between the Standard NDE POD study and flight component conditions is required to apply Standard NDE to specific flight component inspections. A similarity evaluation may include differences in materials, surface finish, component geometry (e.g., curvature, corners, welds), and inspection access. Similarity is typically based on a qualitative engineering evaluation. Recently, NASA published a quantitative methodology to assess similarity. If similarity is not supported by test and analysis, then the methodology provides a transfer function of flaw size for Special NDE POD demonstration. NASA recommends that Special POD demonstrations use flaws that are flight-like or more difficult to detect than flight component flaws, which are commonly induced fatigue cracks. Often, it is not feasible to induce fatigue cracks in flight component geometry, and therefore, a simpler representative geometry is used, commonly a flat panel, for POD demonstration. Inducing cracks in simple geometry specimens can be time-consuming and expensive, and thus, minimizing the number of flawed specimens is desired. Traditionally, NASA Special NDE demonstration was limited to MIL-HDBK-1823A methods or the binomial point-estimate method (PEM), commonly known as 29/29. Recently, NASA published a limited-sample POD (LS-POD) methodology for signal-response NDE techniques (e.g., eddy current) that provides POD demonstration with fewer specimens than previous approaches. LS-POD suggests a minimum of 10 flawed specimens, compared to 29 in the PEM and the suggested minimum of 40 from MIL-HDBK-1823A. The methodology also includes new guidance on evaluating the probability of false calls. In this presentation, these new transfer function and LS-POD methodologies are described and illustrated through an eddy current detection capability of far-side flaws on thin welded panels. A geometry-based transfer function is developed using electro-discharge machined (EDM) notches in flight component and simple geometry to estimate the Special NDE flaw size that is representative of the critical initial flaw size required by the fracture analysis. Then, fatigue cracks are induced in simple flat panels of the transferred flaw size, and the LS-POD methodology is used for Special NDE demonstration.

P. A. Parker↗

Supplemental Systems for Unattended UF6 Cylinder Monitoring

Cylinder assay and mass measurements, the mainstay of enrichment plant verification efforts have historically been performed by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors using portable equipment. For the sake of efficiency, accuracy, and timeliness, such equipment is being supplanted by unattended measurement stations. Ancillary systems must be employed with such stations to ensure that measured parameters are properly recorded, cylinders are positively identified, operations occur according to procedure, and no tampering takes place in the inspectors’ absence. Depending on the facility, it may prove feasible to track cylinders from the measurement vicinity to their storage locations using surveillance. This paper will provide a cursory description of the various subsystems associated with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s Integrated Cylinder Verification Station and how inattention to the requirements of such systems could seriously diminish the capability of the integrated whole.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING USING LOCATION SPECIFIC AIR MONITORING IN BULK HANDLING FACILITIES

Since the introduction of safeguards strengthening measures approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors (1992-1997), international nuclear safeguards inspectors have been able to utilize environmental sampling (ES) (e.g. deposited particulates, air, water, vegetation, sediments, soil and biota) in their safeguarding approaches at bulk uranium/plutonium handling facilities. Enhancements of environmental sampling techniques used by the IAEA in drawing conclusions concerning the absence of undeclared nuclear materials or activities will soon be able to take advantage of a recent step change improvement in the gathering and analysis of air samples at these facilities. Location specific air monitoring feasibility tests have been performed with excellent results in determining attribute and isotopic composition of chemical elements present in an actual test-bed sample. Isotopic analysis of collected particles from an Aerosol Contaminant Extractor (ACE) collection, was performed with the standard bulk sampling protocol used throughout the IAEA network of analytical laboratories (NWAL). The results yielded bulk isotopic values expected for the operations. Advanced designs of air monitoring instruments such as the ACE may be used in gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEP) to detect the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or enrichments not declared by a State. Researchers at Savannah River National Laboratory in collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory are developing the next generation of ES equipment for air grab and constant samples that could become an important addition to the international nuclear safeguards inspector's toolkit. Location specific air monitoring to be used to establish a baseline environmental signature of a particular facility employed for comparison of consistencies in declared operations will be described in this paper. Implementation of air monitoring will be contrasted against the use of smear ES when used during unannounced inspections, design information verification, limited frequency unannounced access, and complementary access visits at bulk handling facilities. Analysis of technical features required for tamper indication and resistance will demonstrate the viability of successful application of the system in taking ES within a bulk handling location. Further exploration of putting this technology into practice is planned to include mapping uranium enrichment facilities for the identification of optimal for installation of air monitoring devices.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) for unannounced safeguards inspections.

The Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) is a collaborative effort between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). The joint project addresses specific requirements of redundant surveillance systems installed in two South American nuclear facilities as a tool to support unannounced inspections conducted by ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The surveillance covers the critical time (as much as a few hours) between the notification of an inspection and the access of inspectors to the location in facility where surveillance equipment is installed. ABACC and the IAEA currently use the EURATOM Multiple Optical Surveillance System (EMOSS). This outdated system is no longer available or supported by the manufacturer. The current EMOSS system has met the project objective; however, the lack of available replacement parts and system support has made this system unsustainable and has increased the risk of an inoperable system. A new system that utilizes current technology and is maintainable is required to replace the aging EMOSS system. ABACC intends to replace one of the existing ABACC EMOSS systems by the Secure Video Surveillance System. SVSS utilizes commercial off-the shelf (COTS) technologies for all individual components. Sandia National Laboratories supported the system design for SVSS to meet Safeguards requirements, i.e. tamper indication, data authentication, etc. The SVSS consists of two video surveillance cameras linked securely to a data collection unit. The collection unit is capable of retaining historical surveillance data for at least three hours with picture intervals as short as 1sec. Images in .jpg format are available to inspectors using various software review tools. SNL has delivered two SVSS systems for test and evaluation at the ABACC Safeguards Laboratory. An additional 'proto-type' system remains at SNL for software and hardware testing. This paper will describe the capabilities of the new surveillance system, application and requirements, and the design approach.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Suggestions for better election security.

Summary of Common Security Mistakes: (1) Electronic voting machines that fundamentally lack security thought and features, including an ability to detect tampering or intrusion, or to be reliably locked or sealed; (2) Failure to disassemble, inspect, and thoroughly inspect (not just test) a sufficient number of voting machines before and after elections in order to detect hardware or software tampering; (3) Assuming that tamper - indicating seals will either be blatantly ripped/smashed open, or else there is no tampering. In reality, even amateurs can spoof most seals leaving (at most) subtle evidence; (4) Inadequate seal use protocols and training of seal installers and inspectors. Failure to show examples of blatantly and subtly attacked seals to seal inspectors; (5) Over confidence in use of a voter verified paper record (VVPR), a VVPR is an excellent security countermeasure, but it is not a silver bullet, especially for an election organization with poor overall security; (6) Little or no insider thr at mitigation; and (7) A poor security culture, including denial and no a priori procedures for dealing with security questions or concerns.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DEVELOPMENT OF A TAMPER RESISTANT/INDICATING AEROSOL COLLECTION SYSTEM FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING AT BULK HANDLING FACILITIES

Environmental sampling has become a key component of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards approaches since its approval for use in 1996. Environmental sampling supports the IAEA's mission of drawing conclusions concerning the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities in a Nation State. Swipe sampling is the most commonly used method for the collection of environmental samples from bulk handling facilities. However, augmenting swipe samples with an air monitoring system, which could continuously draw samples from the environment of bulk handling facilities, could improve the possibility of the detection of undeclared activities. Continuous sampling offers the opportunity to collect airborne materials before they settle onto surfaces which can be decontaminated, taken into existing duct work, filtered by plant ventilation, or escape via alternate pathways (i.e. drains, doors). Researchers at the Savannah River National Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory have been working to further develop an aerosol collection technology that could be installed at IAEA safeguarded bulk handling facilities. The addition of this technology may reduce the number of IAEA inspector visits required to effectively collect samples. The principal sample collection device is a patented Aerosol Contaminant Extractor (ACE) which utilizes electrostatic precipitation principles to deposit particulates onto selected substrates. Recent work has focused on comparing traditional swipe sampling to samples collected via an ACE system, and incorporating tamper resistant and tamper indicating (TRI) technologies into the ACE system. Development of a TRI-ACE system would allow collection of samples at uranium/plutonium bulk handling facilities in a manner that ensures sample integrity and could be an important addition to the international nuclear safeguards inspector's toolkit. This work was supported by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Analysis of Probability of Detection of Plausible Diversion Scenarios at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants Using Advanced Safeguards

Over the last decade, efforts by the safeguards community, including inspectorates, governments, operators and owners of centrifuge facilities, have given rise to new possibilities for safeguards approaches in enrichment plants. Many of these efforts have involved development of new instrumentation to measure uranium mass and uranium-235 enrichment and inspection schemes using unannounced and random site inspections. We have chosen select diversion scenarios and put together a reasonable system of safeguards equipment and safeguards approaches and analyzed the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed safeguards approach by predicting the probability of detection of diversion in the chosen safeguards approaches. We analyzed the effect of redundancy in instrumentation, cross verification of operator instrumentation by inspector instrumentation, and the effects of failures or anomalous readings on verification data. Armed with these esults we were able to quantify the technical cost benefit of the addition of certain instrument suites and show the promise of these new systems.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Overview and Policy Context of UF6 Cylinder Tracking Program

Thousands of cylinders containing uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) move around the world from conversion plants to enrichment plants to fuel fabrication plants, and their contents could be very useful to a country intent on diverting uranium for clandestine use. Each of these large cylinders can contain close to a significant quantity of natural uranium (48Y cylinder) or low-enriched uranium (LEU) (30B cylinder) defined as 75 kg {sup 235}U which can be further clandestinely enriched to produce 1.5 to 2 significant quantities of high enriched uranium (HEU) within weeks or months depending on the scale of the clandestine facility. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) kicked off a 5-year plan in April 2011 to investigate the concept of a unique identification system for UF{sub 6} cylinders and potentially to develop a cylinder tracking system that could be used by facility operators and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The goal is to design an integrated solution beneficial to both industry and inspectorates that would improve cylinder operations at the facilities and provide enhanced capabilities to deter and detect both diversion of low-enriched uranium and undeclared enriched uranium production. The 5-year plan consists of six separate incremental tasks: (1) define the problem and establish the requirements for a unique identification (UID) and monitoring system; (2) develop a concept of operations for the identification and monitoring system; (3) determine cylinder monitoring devices and technology; (4) develop a registry database to support proof-of-concept demonstration; (5) integrate that system for the demonstration; and (6) demonstrate proof-of-concept. Throughout NNSA's performance of the tasks outlined in this program, the multi-laboratory team emphasizes that extensive engagement with industry stakeholders, regulatory authorities and inspectorates is essential to its success.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The Importance of Establishing and Maintaining Continuity of Knowledge during 21st Century Nuclear Fuel Cycle Activities

During this century, the entire nuclear fuel cycle will expand and become increasingly more global, taxing both the resources and capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to maintain an effective Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) and its ability to provide timely detection of diversion. Uranium that currently is mined and milled in one country will be converted, enriched, and fabricated into fuel for reactors in an expanding set of new countries. This expansion will make it harder to guarantee that regional activities stay regional and that diversion detection is timely unless new and sustainable tools are developed to improve inspector effectiveness. To deal with this emerging reality, the IAEA must increase its use of unattended monitoring and employ new tools and methods that enhance CoK during all phases of the fuel cycle. This approach will help provide useful information to aid in detecting undeclared activities and create opportunities for timely and appropriate responses to events well before they enter phases of greater concern (e.g., enrichment). The systems that maintain CoK of safeguarded assets rely on containment and surveillance (C/S) technologies. The 21st century fuel cycle will require increased use of these technologies and systems, plus greater implementation of unattended systems that can securely collect data when inspectors are not present.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗