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At least 145 records · Page 8

The 3He Supply Problem

One of the main uses for 3He is in gas proportional counters for neutron detection. Radiation portal monitors deployed for homeland security and non-proliferation use such detectors. Other uses of 3He are for research detectors, commercial instruments, well logging detectors, dilution refrigerators, for targets or cooling in nuclear research, and for basic research in condensed matter physics. The US supply of 3He comes almost entirely from the decay of tritium used in nuclear weapons by the US and Russia. A few other countries contribute a small amount to the world’s 3He supply. Due to the large increase in use of 3He for homeland security, the supply has dwindled, and can no longer meet the demand. This white paper reviews the problems of supply, utilization, and alternatives.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Compelling Research Opportunities using Isotopes

Isotopes are vital to the science and technology base of the US economy. Isotopes, both stable and radioactive, are essential tools in the growing science, technology, engineering, and health enterprises of the 21st century. The scientific discoveries and associated advances made as a result of the availability of isotopes today span widely from medicine to biology, physics, chemistry, and a broad range of applications in environmental and material sciences. Isotope issues have become crucial aspects of homeland security. Isotopes are utilized in new resource development, in energy from bio-fuels, petrochemical and nuclear fuels, in drug discovery, health care therapies and diagnostics, in nutrition, in agriculture, and in many other areas. The development and production of isotope products unavailable or difficult to get commercially have been most recently the responsibility of the Department of Energy's Nuclear Energy program. The President's FY09 Budget request proposed the transfer of the Isotope Production program to the Department of Energy's Office of Science in Nuclear Physics and to rename it the National Isotope Production and Application program (NIPA). The transfer has now taken place with the signing of the 2009 appropriations bill. In preparation for this, the Nuclear Science Advisory Committee (NSAC) was requested to establish a standing subcommittee, the NSAC Isotope Subcommittee (NSACI), to advise the DOE Office of Nuclear Physics. The request came in the form of two charges: one, on setting research priorities in the short term for the most compelling opportunities from the vast array of disciplines that develop and use isotopes and two, on making a long term strategic plan for the NIPA program. This is the final report to address charge 1. NSACI membership is comprised of experts from the diverse research communities, industry, production, and homeland security. NSACI discussed research opportunities divided into three areas: (1) medicine, pharmaceuticals, and biology, (2) physical sciences and engineering, and (3) national security and other applications. In each area, compelling research opportunities were considered and the subcommittee as a whole determined the final priorities for research opportunities as the foundations for the recommendations. While it was challenging to prioritize across disciplines, our order of recommendations reflect the compelling research prioritization along with consideration of time urgency for action as well as various geopolitical market issues. Common observations to all areas of research include the needs for domestic availability of crucial stable and radioactive isotopes and the education of the skilled workforce that will develop new advances using isotopes in the future. The six recommendations of NSACI reflect these concerns and the compelling research opportunities for potential new discoveries. The science case for each of the recommendations is elaborated in the respective chapters.

02 PETROLEUM↗

Federal Response Assets for a Radioactive Dispersal Device Incident

If a large scale RDD event where to occur in New York City, the magnitude of the problem would likely exceed the capabilities of City and State to effectively respond to the event. New York State could request Federal Assistance if the United States President has not already made the decision to provide it. The United States Federal Government has a well developed protocol to respond to emergencies. The National Response Framework (NRF) describes the process for responding to all types of emergencies including RDD incidents. Depending on the location and type of event, the NRF involves appropriate Federal Agencies, e.g., Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), United States Coast Guard (USCG), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Agriculture (USDA), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The Federal response to emergencies has been refined and improved over the last thirty years and has been tested on natural disasters (e.g. hurricanes and floods), man-made disasters (oil spills), and terrorist events (9/11). However, the system has never been tested under an actual RDD event. Drills have been conducted with Federal, State, and local agencies to examine the initial (early) phases of such an event (TopOff 2 and TopOff 4). The Planning Guidance for Protection and Recovery Following Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) incidents issued by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in August 2008 has never been fully tested in an interagency exercise. Recently, another exercise called Empire 09 that was situated in Albany, New York was conducted. Empire 09 consists of 3 different exercises be held in May and June, 2009. The first exercise, May 2009, involved a table top exercise for phase 1 (0-48 hours) of the response to an RDD incident. In early June, a full-scale 3- day exercise was conducted for the mid-phase response (48 hours +). A few weeks later, a one day full-scale exercise was conducted for the late phase (recovery) response to an RDD event. The lessons learned from this study are not available as of June 30, 2009. The objective of this report is to review and summarize anticipated Federal and State response actions and the roles and responsibilities of various agencies (DHS, EPA, DOE, NY-DEP, NY-DEC) with respect to decontamination issues that would arise from a radiological dispersion device (RDD), e.g., dirty bomb attack. These issues arise in the late phase of the response (48 hours and beyond) after the area has been stabilized and forensic information has been obtained. Much of the information provided in this report is taken directly from published guidance that is readily available.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Constructing a resilience index for the Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection Program

Following recommendations made in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, which established a national policy for the identification and increased protection of critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) by Federal departments and agencies, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2006 developed the Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection (ECIP) program. The ECIP program aimed to provide a closer partnership with state, regional, territorial, local, and tribal authorities in fulfilling the national objective to improve CIKR protection. The program was specifically designed to identify protective measures currently in place in CIKR and to inform facility owners/operators of the benefits of new protective measures. The ECIP program also sought to enhance existing relationships between DHS and owners/operators of CIKR and to build relationships where none existed (DHS 2008; DHS 2009). In 2009, DHS and its protective security advisors (PSAs) began assessing CIKR assets using the ECIP program and ultimately produced individual protective measure and vulnerability values through the protective measure and vulnerability indices (PMI/VI). The PMI/VI assess the protective measures posture of individual facilities at their 'weakest link,' allowing for a detailed analysis of the most vulnerable aspects of the facilities (Schneier 2003), while maintaining the ability to produce an overall protective measures picture. The PMI has six main components (physical security, security management, security force, information sharing, protective measures assessments, and dependencies) and focuses on actions taken by a facility to prevent or deter the occurrence of an incident (Argonne National Laboratory 2009). As CIKR continue to be assessed using the PMI/VI and owners/operators better understand how they can prevent or deter incidents, academic research, practitioner emphasis, and public policy formation have increasingly focused on resilience as a necessary component of the risk management framework and infrastructure protection. This shift in focus toward resilience complements the analysis of protective measures by taking into account the three other phases of risk management: mitigation, response, and recovery (Figure 1). Thus, the addition of a robust resilience index (RI) to the established PMI/VI provides vital information to owners/operators throughout the risk management process. Combining a pre-incident focus with a better understanding of resilience, as well as potential consequences from damaged CIKR, allows owners/operators to better understand different ways to decrease risk by (1) increasing physical security measures to prevent an incident, (2) supplementing redundancy to mitigate the effects of an incident, and (3) enhancing emergency action and business continuity planning to increase the effectiveness of recovery procedures. Information provided by the RI methodology is also used by facility owners/operators to better understand how their facilities compare to similar sector/subsector sites and to help them make risk-based decisions. This report provides an overview of the RI methodology developed to estimate resilience and provide resilience comparisons for sectors and subsectors. The information will be used to (1) assist DHS in analyzing existing response and recovery methods and programs at facilities and (2) identify potential ways to increase resilience. The RI methodology is based on principles of Appreciative Inquiry, which is 'the coevolutionary search for the best in people, their organizations, and the relevant world around them' (Cooperrider et al. 2005). Appreciative Inquiry identifies the best of 'what is' and helps to envision 'what might be.' The ECIP program and the RI represent a new model (using Appreciative Inquiry principles) for information sharing between government and industry (Fisher and Petit 2010). A 'dashboard' display, which provides an interactive tool - rather than a static report, presents the results of the RI in a convenient format. Additional resilience measures can be modeled to illustrate how such actions would impact the asset's RI value.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

National Security Science and Technology Initiative: Air Cargo Screening

The non-intrusive inspection (NII) of consolidated air cargo carried on commercial passenger aircraft continues to be a technically challenging, high-priority requirement of the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T), the Transportation Security Agency and the Federal Aviation Administration. The goal of deploying a screening system that can reliably and cost-effectively detect explosive threats in consolidated cargo without adversely affecting the flow of commerce will require significant technical advances that will take years to develop. To address this critical National Security need, the Battelle Memorial Institute (Battelle), under a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with four of its associated US Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories (Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, Idaho, and Brookhaven), conducted a research and development initiative focused on identifying, evaluating, and integrating technologies for screening consolidated air cargo for the presence of explosive threats. Battelle invested $8.5M of internal research and development funds during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. The primary results of this effort are described in this document and can be summarized as follows: (1) Completed a gap analysis that identified threat signatures and observables, candidate technologies for detection, their current state of development, and provided recommendations for improvements to meet air cargo screening requirements. (2) Defined a Commodity/Threat/Detection matrix that focuses modeling and experimental efforts, identifies technology gaps and game-changing opportunities, and provides a means of summarizing current and emerging capabilities. (3) Defined key properties (e.g., elemental composition, average density, effective atomic weight) for basic commodity and explosive benchmarks, developed virtual models of the physical distributions (pallets) of three commodity types and three explosive benchmarks combinations, and conducted modeling and simulation studies to begin populating the matrix of commodities, threats, and detection technologies. (4) Designed and fabricated basic (homogeneous) commodity test pallets and fabricated inert stimulants to support experiments and to validate modeling/simulation results. (5) Developed/expanded the team's capabilities to conduct full-scale imaging (neutron and x-ray) experiments of air cargo commodities and explosive benchmarks. (6) Conducted experiments to improve the collection of trace particles of explosives from a variety of surfaces representative of air cargo materials by means of mechanical (air/vibration/pressure), thermal, and electrostatic methods. Air cargo screening is a difficult challenge that will require significant investment in both research and development to find a suitable solution to ensure the safety of passengers without significantly hindering the flow of commodities. The initiative funded by Battelle has positioned this group to make major contributions in meeting the air cargo challenge by developing collaborations, developing laboratory test systems, improving knowledge of the challenges (both technical and business) for air cargo screening, and increasing the understanding of the capabilities for current inspection methods (x-ray radiography, x-ray backscatter, etc.) and potential future inspection methods (neutron radiography, fusion of detector modalities, advanced trace detection, etc.). Lastly, air cargo screening is still an issue that will benefit from collaboration between Department of Energy Laboratories and Battelle. On January 7, 2010, DHS Secretary Napolitano joined White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs and Assistant to the President for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security John Brennan to announce several recommendations DHS has made to the President for improving the technology and procedures used to protect air travel from acts of terrorism. (This announcement followed the 25 Dec'09 Delta/Northwest Airlines Flight 253 terror attack.) Secretary Napolitano outlined five recommendations DHS will pursue to enhance the safety of the traveling public. One of the five recommendations, read as follows: 'Establish a partnership on aviation security between DHS and the Department of Energy and its National Laboratories in order to develop new and more effective technologies to deter and disrupt known threats and proactively anticipate and protect against new ways by which terrorists could seek to board an aircraft.' In conclusion, it appears very timely that Battelle and its DOE lab partners initiated a serious collaboration on the air cargo topic, and that we should continue to work toward future collaboration in response to the government's needs.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

NASA Virtual Glovebox (VBX): Emerging Simulation Technology for Space Station Experiment Design, Development, Training and Troubleshooting

The International Space Station demonstrates the greatest capabilities of human ingenuity, international cooperation and technology development. The complexity of this space structure is unprecedented; and training astronaut crews to maintain all its systems, as well as perform a multitude of research experiments, requires the most advanced training tools and techniques. Computer simulation and virtual environments are currently used by astronauts to train for robotic arm manipulations and extravehicular activities; but now, with the latest computer technologies and recent successes in areas of medical simulation, the capability exists to train astronauts for more hands-on research tasks using immersive virtual environments. We have developed a new technology, the Virtual Glovebox (VGX), for simulation of experimental tasks that astronauts will perform aboard the Space Station. The VGX may also be used by crew support teams for design of experiments, testing equipment integration capability and optimizing the procedures astronauts will use. This is done through the 3D, desk-top sized, reach-in virtual environment that can simulate the microgravity environment in space. Additional features of the VGX allow for networking multiple users over the internet and operation of tele-robotic devices through an intuitive user interface. Although the system was developed for astronaut training and assisting support crews, Earth-bound applications, many emphasizing homeland security, have also been identified. Examples include training experts to handle hazardous biological and/or chemical agents in a safe simulation, operation of tele-robotic systems for assessing and diffusing threats such as bombs, and providing remote medical assistance to field personnel through a collaborative virtual environment. Thus, the emerging VGX simulation technology, while developed for space- based applications, can serve a dual use facilitating homeland security here on Earth.

Smith, Jeffrey D.↗

Security Management and Safeguards Office

The Security Management and Safeguards Office at NASA is here to keep the people working in a safe environment. They also are here to protect the buildings and documents from sabotage, espionage, and theft. During the summer of 2004, I worked with Richard Soppet in Physical Security. While I was working here I helped out with updating the map that we currently use at NASA Glenn Research Center, attended meetings for homeland security, worked with the security guards and the locksmith. The meetings that I attended for homeland security talked about how to protect ourselves before something happened, they told us to always be on the guard and look for anything suspicious, and the different ways that terrorist groups operate. When I was with the security guards I was taught how to check someone into the base, showed how to use a radar gun, observed a security guard make a traffic stop for training and was with them while they patrolled NASA Glenn Research Center to make sure things were running smooth and no one was in danger. When I was with the lock smith I was taught how to make keys and locks for the employees here at NASA. The lock smith also showed me that he had inventory cabinets of files that show how many keys were out to people and who currently has access to the rooms that they keys were made for. I also helped out the open house at NASA Glenn Research Center. I helped out by showing the Army Reserves, and Brook Park's SWAT team where all the main events were going to take place a week before the open house was going to begin. Then during the open house I helped out by making sure people had there IDS, checked through there bags, and handed out a map to them that showed where the different activities were going to take place. So the main job here at NASA Glenn Research Center for the Security Management and Safeguards Office is to make sure that nothing is stolen, sabotaged, and espionaged. Also most importantly make sure all the employees here at NASA are in a safe environment.

Bewley, Nathaniel M.↗

Facilitation of Third-party Development of Advanced Algorithms for Explosive Detection Using Workshops and Grand Challenges

The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has requirements for future explosive detection scanners that include dealing with a larger number of threats, higher probability of detection, lower false alarm rates and lower operating costs. One tactic that DHS is pursuing to achieve these requirements is to augment the capabilities of the established security vendors with third-party algorithm developers. The purposes of this presentation are to review DHS's objectives for involving third parties in the development of advanced algorithms and then to discuss how these objectives are achieved using workshops and grand challenges. Terrorists are still trying and they are getting more sophisticated. There is a need to increase the number of smart people working on homeland security. Augmenting capabilities and capacities of system vendors with third-parties is one tactic. Third parties can be accessed via workshops and grand challenges. Successes have been achieved to date. There are issues that need to be resolved to further increase third party involvement.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

DEVELOPMENT OF THE HS99 AIR TRANSPORT TYPE A FISSILE PACKAGE

An air-transport Type A Fissile radioactive shipping package for the transport of special form uranium sources has been developed by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) for the Department of Homeland Security. The Package model number is HS99 for Homeland Security Model 99. This paper presents the major design features of the HS99 and highlights engineered materials necessary for meeting the design requirements for this light-weight Type AF packaging. A discussion is provided demonstrating how the HS99 complies with the regulatory safety requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The paper summarizes the results of structural testing to specified in 10 CFR 71 for Normal Conditions of Transport and Hypothetical Accident Conditions events. Planned and proposed future missions for this packaging are also addressed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Forensics: A Capability at Risk (Abbreviated Version)

Nuclear forensics is important to our national security. Actions, including provision of appropriate funding, are needed now to sustain and improve the nation's nuclear forensics capabilities. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), working with cooperating agencies and national laboratories, should plan and implement a sustainable, effective nuclear forensics program. Nuclear forensics is the examination and evaluation of discovered or seized nuclear materials and devices or, in cases of nuclear explosions or radiological dispersals, of detonation signals and post-detonation debris. Nuclear forensic evidence helps law enforcement and intelligence agencies work toward preventing, mitigating, and attributing a nuclear or radiological incident. This report, requested by DHS, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the Department of Defense, makes recommendations on how to sustain and improve U.S. nuclear forensics capabilities. The United States has developed a nuclear forensics capability that has been demonstrated in real-world incidents of interdicted materials and in exercises of actions required after a nuclear detonation. The committee, however, has concerns about the program and finds that without strong leadership, careful planning, and additional funds, these capabilities will decline. Major areas of concern include: Organization. The responsibility for nuclear forensics is shared by several agencies without central authority and with no consensus on strategic requirements to guide the program. This organizational complexity hampers the program and could prove to be a major hindrance operationally. Sustainability. The nation's current nuclear forensics capabilities are available primarily because the system of laboratories, equipment, and personnel upon which they depend was developed and funded by the nuclear weapons program. However, the weapons program's funds are declining. Workforce and Infrastructure. Personnel skilled in nuclear forensics are too few and are spread too thinly. Some key facilities are in need of replacement because they are old, outdated, and not built to modern environmental, health, and safety standards. Procedures and Tools. Most nuclear forensics techniques were developed to carry out Cold War missions and to satisfy a different, less restrictive set of environmental, health, and safety standards. Some of the equipment also does not reflect today's technical capabilities. The Executive Office of the President established the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, to coordinate nuclear forensics in the United States. DHS's responsibility can only be carried out with the cooperation and support of the other agencies involved. The committee recommends that DHS and the other cooperating agencies should: 1. Streamline the organizational structure, aligning authority and responsibility; and develop and issue appropriate requirements documents. 2. Issue a coordinated and integrated implementation plan for fulfilling the requirements and sustaining and improving the program's capabilities. This plan would form the basis for the agencies' multi-year program budget requests. 3. Implement a plan to build and maintain an appropriately sized and composed nuclear forensics workforce, ensuring sufficient staffing at the national laboratories and support for university research, training programs, and collaborative relationships among the national laboratories and other organizations. 4. Adapt nuclear forensics to the challenges of real emergency situations, including, for example, conducting more realistic exercises that are unannounced and that challenge regulations and procedures followed in the normal work environment, and implementing lessons learned. The national laboratories should: 5. Optimize procedures and equipment through R&D to meet program requirements. Modeling and simulation should play an increased role in research, development, and planning. The nuclear forensics community should: 6. Develop standards and procedures for nuclear forensics that are rooted in the same underlying principles that have been recommended to guide modern forensic science. DHS and the other cooperating agencies should: 7. Devise and implement a plan that enables access to relevant information in databases including classified and proprietary databases for nuclear forensics missions. The Executive Office of the President and the Department of State, working with the community of nuclear forensics experts, should: 8. Determine the classes of data and methods that are to be shared internationally and explore mechanisms to accomplish that sharing.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Novel capabilities for examining and summarizing hierarchical and geographic resiliency profiles

The geospatial research and development team in the National and Homeland Security Division at Idaho National Laboratory was tasked with providing tools to derive insight from the substantial amount of data currently available - and continuously being produced - associated with the critical infrastructure of the US. This effort is in support of the Department of Homeland Security, whose mission includes the protection of this infrastructure and the enhancement of its resilience to hazards, both natural and human. We present geovisual-analytics-based approaches for analysis of vulnerabilities and resilience of critical infrastructure, designed so that decision makers, analysts, and infrastructure owners and managers can manage risk, prepare for hazards, and direct resources before and after an incident that might result in an interruption in service. Our designs are based on iterative discussions with DHS leadership and analysts, who in turn will use these tools to explore and communicate data in partnership with utility providers, law enforcement, and emergency response and recovery organizations, among others. In most cases these partners desire summaries of large amounts of data, but increasingly, our users seek the additional capability of focusing on, for example, a specific infrastructure sector, a particular geographic region, or time period, or of examining data in a variety of generalization or aggregation levels. These needs align well with tenets of in-formation-visualization design; in this paper, selected applications among those that we have designed are described and positioned within geovisualization, geovisual analytical, and information visualization frameworks.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Spread Spectrum Digital Communications Modeling in Electronic Warfare Modeling and Simulation Software

This artifact is an intern project poster. The subject matter is modeling spread spectrum digital communications in electronic warfare modeling and simulation software produced by National and Homeland Security. It contains images of communications coverage analysis from the software, link budget terms, and image depicting the Wireless Spectrum Communications (WSComm) underlay control channel (UCC), and an image of a filter bank multicarrier spread spectrum (FBMCSS) signal. INL National and Homeland Security Electronic Warfare Modeling and Simulation software (EWMSS) is capable of modeling several digital and analog signal types, but it does not currently support spread spectrum techniques such as filter bank multicarrier spread spectrum (FBMCSS). FBMCSS modeling requires "processing gain," which is not present in EWMSS' link budget. Wireless Spectrum Communications (WSComm) Underlay Control Channel (UCC), a product of INL, employs FBMCSS and is modeled in EWMSS for this project. This research shows that by manually accounting for FBMCSS processing gain, EWMSS calculates a link margin that is within 0.023 dB of a link margin in an existing WSComm link budget. These link margins were based on free space path loss, an ideal propagation model. EWMSS has the capability to include terrain and other sophisticated propagation models in its calculations, giving it the potential to provide realistic, location-specific models of WSComm UCC if processing gain is accounted for.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Status Update on the NCRP Scientific Committee SC 5-1 Report: Decision Making for Late-Phase Recovery from Nuclear or Radiological Incidents - 13450

In August 2008, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued its final Protective Action Guide (PAG) for radiological dispersal device (RDD) and improvised nuclear device (IND) incidents. This document specifies protective actions for public health during the early and intermediate phases and cleanup guidance for the late phase of RDD or IND incidents, and it discusses approaches to implementing the necessary actions. However, while the PAG provides specific guidance for the early and intermediate phases, it prescribes no equivalent guidance for the late-phase cleanup actions. Instead, the PAG offers a general description of a complex process using a site-specific optimization approach. This approach does not predetermine cleanup levels but approaches the problem from the factors that would bear on the final agreed-on cleanup levels. Based on this approach, the decision-making process involves multifaceted considerations including public health, the environment, and the economy, as well as socio-political factors. In an effort to fully define the process and approach to be used in optimizing late-phase recovery and site restoration following an RDD or IND incident, DHS has tasked the NCRP with preparing a comprehensive report addressing all aspects of the optimization process. Preparation of the NCRP report is a three-year (2010-2013) project assigned to a scientific committee, the Scientific Committee (SC) 5-1; the report was initially titled, Approach to Optimizing Decision Making for Late- Phase Recovery from Nuclear or Radiological Terrorism Incidents. Members of SC 5-1 represent a broad range of expertise, including homeland security, health physics, risk and decision analysis, economics, environmental remediation and radioactive waste management, and communication. In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident of 2011, and guided by a recent process led by the White House through a Principal Level Exercise (PLE), the optimization approach has since been expanded to include off-site contamination from major nuclear power plant accidents as well as other nuclear or radiological incidents. The expanded application under the current guidance has thus led to a broadened scope of the report, which is reflected in its new title, Decision Making for Late-Phase Recovery from Nuclear or Radiological Incidents. The NCRP report, which is due for publication in 2013, will substantiate the current DHS guidance by clarifying and elaborating on the processes required for the development and implementation of procedures for optimizing decision making for late-phase recovery, enabling the establishment of cleanup goals on a site-specific basis. The report will contain a series of topics addressing important issues related to the long-term recovery from nuclear or radiological incidents. Special topics relevant to supporting the optimization of the decision-making process will include cost-benefit analysis, radioactive waste management, risk communication, stakeholder interaction, risk assessment, and decontamination approaches and techniques. The committee also evaluated past nuclear and radiological incidents for their relevance to the report, including the emerging issues associated with the Fukushima nuclear accident. Thus, due to the commonality of the late-phase issues (such as the potential widespread contamination following an event), the majority of the information pertaining to the response in the late-phase decision-making period, including site-specific optimization framework and approach, could be used or adapted for use in case of similar situations that are not due to terrorism, such as those that would be caused by major nuclear facility accidents or radiological incidents. To ensure that the report and the NCRP recommendations are current and relevant to the effective implementation of federal guidance, SC 5-1 has actively coordinated with the agencies of interest and other relevant stakeholders throughout the duration of the project. The resulting report will be an important resource to guide those involved in late-phase recovery efforts following a nuclear or radiological incident. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Performance of B-10 based detectors

Helium-3 gas-filled detectors have been used in nuclear safeguards applications, in homeland security neutron detection modules and in research for over 30 years. With the current shortage of {sup 3}He gas, GE's Reuter-Stokes business developed a {sup 10}B lined proportional counter and a {sup 10}B hybrid detector, in which a small amount of {sup 3}He is added to a 10B detector to enhance the neutron sensitivity. In 2010, GE's Reuter-Stokes successfully developed a commercial alternative to 3He gas-filled detectors for homeland security neutron detection modules based on 10B lined proportional counters. We will present the concept behind the {sup 10}B neutron detection modules, as drop-in replacement to existing 3He neutron detection modules deployed, and the timeline and development needed to get a fully commercial application. To ensure the highest quality, each {sup 10}B neutron detection unit is put through a series of tests: temperature cycles from -40 deg. C to +55 deg. C, vibration testing at levels up to 2.5 g from 10 Hz to 50 Hz in every direction, neutron sensitivity reaching up to 4.5 cps/(ng {sup 252}CF at 2 m), and gamma insensitivity with field reaching 1 Sv/hr. In 2013, GE's Reuter-Stokes developed the B10Plus+{sup R} detector, in which a small amount of {sup 3}He is added to a {sup 10}B lined proportional counter. Depending on the amount of {sup 3}He added, the B10Plus+{sup R} can more than double the neutron sensitivity compared to a {sup 10}B lined proportional counter. {sup 10}B lined proportional counters and B10Plus+{sup R} have excellent gamma rejection and excellent performance even at very high neutron flux. The gamma rejection and high neutron flux performance of these detectors are comparable, if not better, than traditional {sup 3}He proportional counters. GE's Reuter-Stokes business modelled, designed, built and tested prototype coincidence counters using the {sup 10}B lined detectors and the {sup 10}B hybrid detectors. We will present these systems and their applications for non-destructive assay. We will also show other examples of applications where {sup 10}B lined proportional counters and B10Plus+{sup R} detectors can be used. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Compressing the Recovery Timeline for an Urban Contamination Event - 19539

This study identified equipment that has the potential to support mitigation activities associated with a radiological or nuclear release in the urban environment. Equipment capabilities, availability, and usefulness was assessed for potential deployment following the initial emergency phase of a response. The study was devised to connect emergency management and homeland security offices at the city, state, and federal agencies and discuss the availability and potential response capabilities of equipment reserves. This project focused on connecting with relevant emergency management and homeland security offices at the city, state, and regional level, including major cities across the United States, and with federal agencies. Within these offices, we consulted with subject matter experts (SMEs) in discussions via workshops, phone conversations, and small meetings. The result was a compilation and assessment of approaches to address realistic contamination scenarios and the types of equipment assets that would or could assist in the response and recovery activities. Recommendations on how current equipment reserves can be best used or modified to improve the resilience of a community during a radiological or nuclear contamination event were documented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

National Security Technology Incubation Strategic Plan

This strategic plan contains information on the vision, mission, business and technology environment, goals, objectives, and incubation process of the National Security Technology Incubation Program (NSTI) at Arrowhead Center. The development of the NSTI is a key goal of the National Security Preparedness Project (NSPP). Objectives to achieve this goal include developing incubator plans (strategic, business, action, and operations), creating an incubator environment, creating a support and mentor network for companies in the incubator program, attracting security technology businesses to the region, encouraging existing business to expand, initiating business start-ups, evaluating products and processes of the incubator program, and achieving sustainability of the incubator program. With the events of 9/11, the global community faces ever increasing and emerging threats from hostile groups determined to rule by terror. According to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Strategic Plan, the United States must be able to quickly respond and adapt to unanticipated situations as they relate to protection of our homeland and national security. Technology plays a key role in a strong national security position, and the private business community, along with the national laboratories, academia, defense and homeland security organizations, provide this technology. Fostering innovative ideas, translated into relevant technologies answering the needs of NNSA, is the purpose of the NSTI. Arrowhead Center of New Mexico State University is the operator and manager of the NSTI. To develop the NSTI, Arrowhead Center must meet the planning, development, execution, evaluation, and sustainability activities for the program and identify and incubate new technologies to assist the NNSA in meeting its mission and goals. Technology alone does not give a competitive advantage to the country, but the creativity and speed with which it is employed does. For a company to succeed, it must have sustainable competitive advantages in seven key areas: geography, products and businesses, distribution, sales and service culture, efficiency, brand, and most important, people. The four strategic goals of the plan are to: 1. Identify and recruit small businesses with technology applications for national security. 2. Design and implement a national security incubator program that provides incubator services and physical space for the targeted businesses. 3. Provide business assistance and technical leadership to NSTI clients to assist in bringing their products to market. 4. Construct a new multi-tenant facility with dedicated physical space for businesses with technology applications for national security.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Methodology for Assessing Radiation Detectors Used by Emergency Responders

The threat of weapons of mass destruction terrorism resulted in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security deploying large quantities of radiation detectors throughout the emergency responder community. However, emergency responders specific needs were not always met by standard health physics instrumentation used in radiation facilities. Several American National Standards Institute standards were developed and approved to evaluate the technical capabilities of detection equipment. Establishing technical capability is a critical step, but it is equally important to emergency responders that the instruments are easy to operate and can withstand the rugged situations they encounter. The System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER) Program (managed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Grants and Training, Systems Support Division) focuses predominantly on the usability, ergonomics, readability, and other features of the detectors, rather than performance controlled by industry standards and the manufacturers. National Security Technologies, LLC, as a SAVER Technical Agent, conducts equipment evaluations using active emergency responders who are familiar with the detection equipment and knowledgeable of situations encountered in the field, which provides more relevant data to emergency responders.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Risk assessment methodology applied to counter IED research & development portfolio prioritization

In an effort to protect the United States from the ever increasing threat of domestic terrorism, the Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T), has significantly increased research activities to counter the terrorist use of explosives. More over, DHS S&T has established a robust Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Program to Deter, Predict, Detect, Defeat, and Mitigate this imminent threat to the Homeland. The DHS S&T portfolio is complicated and changing. In order to provide the ''best answer'' for the available resources, DHS S&T would like some ''risk based'' process for making funding decisions. There is a definite need for a methodology to compare very different types of technologies on a common basis. A methodology was developed that allows users to evaluate a new ''quad chart'' and rank it, compared to all other quad charts across S&T divisions. It couples a logic model with an evidential reasoning model using an Excel spreadsheet containing weights of the subjective merits of different technologies. The methodology produces an Excel spreadsheet containing the aggregate rankings of the different technologies. It uses Extensible Logic Modeling (ELM) for logic models combined with LANL software called INFTree for evidential reasoning.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗