Results for “Failure mode and effect analysis” — Page 8

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the data processing system FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Data Processing System (DPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison is documented for the Orbiter DPS hardware.

Lowery, H. J.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the nose wheel steering subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed NASA post 51-L FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter NWS hardware.

Mediavilla, Anthony Scott↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the remote manipulator system FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison for the Orbiter RMS hardware are documented. The IOA product for the RMS analysis consisted of 604 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 458 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 45 FMEAs and 321 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 154 FMEAs which caused differences in 137 CIL items.

Tangorra, F.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the backup flight system FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Backup Flight System (BFS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and Potential Critical Items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter BFS hardware. The IOA product for the BFS analysis consisted of 29 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 21 Potential Critical Items (PCI) being identified. This product was originally compared with the proposed NASA BFS baseline and subsequently compared with the applicable Data Processing System (DPS), Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), and Displays and Controls NASA CIL items. The comparisons determined if there were any results which had been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. The original assessment determined there were numerous failure modes and potential critical items in the IOA analysis that were not contained in the NASA BFS baseline. Conversely, the NASA baseline contained three FMEAs (IMU, ADTA, and Air Data Probe) for CIL items that were not identified in the IOA product.

Prust, E. E.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the manned maneuvering unit

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contain within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Martin Marietta FMEA/CIL Post 51-L updates. A discussion of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. The results of this comparison for the Orbiter MMU hardware are documented. The IOA product for the MMU analysis consisted of 204 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 95 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 179 FMEAs and 110 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all 121 FMEAs which caused differences in 92 CIL items.

Huynh, M.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the auxiliary power unit

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter APU hardware. The IOA product for the APU analysis, covering both APU hardware and APU electrical components, consisted of 344 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 178 potential critical items being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA APU hardware FMEA/CIL baseline which consisted of 184 FMEAs and 57 CIL items. The comparison identified 72 discrepancies.

Barnes, J. E.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbiter main propulsion system FMEA/CIL, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to available data from the Rockwell Downey/NASA JSC FMEA/CIL review. The Orbiter MPS is composed of the Propellant Management Subsystem (PMS) consisting of the liquid oxygen (LO2) and liquid hydrogen (LH2) subsystems and the helium subsystem. The PMS is a system of manifolds, distribution lines, and valves by which the liquid propellants pass from the External Tank to the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). The helium subsystem consists of a series of helium supply tanks and their associated regulators, control valves, and distribution lines. Volume 1 contains the MPS description, assessment results, ground rules and assumptions, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Slaughter, B. C.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the main propulsion subsystem FMEA/CIL, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to available data from the Rockwell Downey/NASA JSC FMEA/CIL review. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets for MPS hardware items.

Holden, K. A.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the main propulsion subsystem FMEA/CIL, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to available data from the Rockwell Downey/NASA JSC FMEA/CIL review. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and includes the potential critical items list.

Holden, K. A.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the main propulsion subsystem FMEA/CIL, volume 4

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to available data from the Rockwell Downey/NASA JSC FMEA/CIL review. Volume 4 contains the IOA analysis worksheets and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Slaughter, B. C.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the hydraulics/water spray boiler subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler (HYD/WSB) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter HYD/WSB hardware. The IOA product for the HYD/WSB analysis consisted of 447 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 183 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 364 FMEAs and 111 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 68 FMEAs which caused differences in 23 CIL items.

Bynum, M. C.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the active thermal control system

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Active Thermal Control System (ATCS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the available NASA FMEA/CIL data. Discrepancies from the comparison were documented, and where enough information was available, recommendations for resolution of the discrepancies were made. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter ATCS hardware. The IOA product for the ATCS independent analysis consisted of 310 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 101 potential critical items (PCI) being identified. A comparison was made to the available NASA data which consisted of 252 FMEAs and 109 CIL items.

Sinclair, S. K.↗

DOE OSTI2023

Liquid hydrogen storage system for heavy duty trucks: Configuration, performance, cost, and safety

In this work, we investigate the potential of liquid hydrogen storage (LH 2 ) on-board Class-8 heavy duty trucks to resolve many of the range, weight, volume, refueling time and cost issues associated with 350 or 700-bar compressed H 2 storage in Type-3 or Type-4 composite tanks. We present and discuss conceptual storage system configurations capable of supplying H 2 to fuel cells at 5-bar with or without on-board LH 2 pumps. Structural aspects of storing LH 2 in double walled, vacuum insulated, and low-pressure Type-1 tanks are investigated. Structural materials and insulation methods are discussed for service at cryogenic temperatures and mitigation of heat leak to prevent LH 2 boiloff. Failure modes of the liner and shell are identified and analyzed using the regulatory codes and detailed finite element (FE) methods. The conceptual systems are subjected to a Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) and a safety, codes, and standards (SCS) review to rank failures and identify safety gaps. The results indicate that the conceptual systems can reach 19.6% usable gravimetric capacity, 40.9 g-H 2 /L usable volumetric capacity and $174-183/kg-H 2 cost (2016 USD) when manufactured 100,000 systems annually.

08 HYDROGEN↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the electrical power generation/fuel cell powerplant subsystem FMEA/CIL

Results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Generation/Fuel Cell Powerplant (EPG/FCP) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPG/FCP hardware.

Brown, K. L.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the extravehicular mobility unit, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort performed an independent analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware and system, generating draft failure modes criticalities and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to the most recent proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EMU hardware.

Raffaelli, Gary G.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the extravehicular mobility unit, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort performed an independent analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware and system, generating draft failure modes criticalities and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the most recent proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EMU hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets and contains the potential critical items list and NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross references and recommendations.

Raffaelli, Gary G.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the atmospheric revitalization pressure control subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL proposed Post 51-L updates based upon the CCB/PRCB presentations and an informal criticality summary listing. A discussion of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter ARPCS hardware.

Saiidi, M. J.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the ascent thrust vector control actuator subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Ascent Thrust Vector Control Actuator (ATVD) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter ATVC hardware. The IOA product for the ATVC actuator analysis consisted of 25 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 16 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 21 FMEAs and 13 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement.

Wilson, R. E.↗