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DOE OSTI2020

Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, UMTRCA Title I Disposal Site 35 Years Postclosure (1985-2020) - 20288

The DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, Disposal Site is a former uranium ore-processing site located in the borough of Canonsburg and an important part of US history. For 46 years (1911-1957), the site processed ore, for vanadium, radium and then uranium. Soils and groundwater beneath the site were contaminated by the milling operations. The 15-hectare (37-acre) site is owned by the US government and managed by LM, which serves as the federal land manager and steward of cultural, historical, and natural resources at Cold War legacy sites that have been successfully cleaned up to remedial standards. In 1978 Congress directed DOE to remediate 22 inactive uranium-ore processing sites under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA), in accordance with standards promulgated by the US Environmental Protection Agency in Title 40 CFR Part 192 (40 (CFR 192). Subpart B of 40 CFR 192 regulates the cleanup of contaminated groundwater at the processing sites. The radioactive materials were encapsulated in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved disposal cells, and the NRC general license for UMTRCA Title I sites is established in 10 CFR 40.27. Canonsburg was the first site to be remediated under UMTRCA. From 1983 to 1985, the Canonsburg site underwent cleanup under this US law that provides for the safe and environmentally sound disposal, long-term stabilization, and control of uranium mill tailings in a manner that minimizes or eliminates radiation health hazards to the public. The site is unique in that it is one of only two UMTRCA Title I sites in the eastern half of the United States, the other site being the Burrell, Pennsylvania, Title I Disposal Site, a vicinity property to the Canonsburg site. It has been 35 years since the disposal cell at the Canonsburg site was completed. This paper discusses the many efforts that have been taken to maintain the site and presents some of the lessons learned concerning the long-term care of the site. The discussion includes but is not limited to the following: (1) Preserving site history so the community can better appreciate and understand the site. (2) Community outreach efforts, and the importance of maintaining transparency of environmental monitoring results with the community. (3) Pursuing reuse opportunities that offer the potential for improving the community. (4) Remaining engaged with the local community. (5) Remaining proactive in the long-term care of the site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Packaging and Transportation Regulatory Inconsistencies and Challenges - 20485

This paper presents regulatory inconsistencies within and between various regulatory agencies. These inconsistencies relate to the packaging and transportation of radioactive materials typically encountered during decommissioning including mixed wastes that are required to be compliant with more than one regulatory agency during shipment. At least one possible solution is presented for consideration. The following four examples are presented: - Packaging discrepancies for radioactive material meeting the DOT definition of Radioactive LSA-I that also contain lead may be compliant when shipped unpackaged per Department of Transportation (DOT) rules in 173.427 paragraph C. However, since they contain lead, they are required to be shipped in a package per the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Hazardous Waste Manifest (HWM) instructions. - The difference between the units of measure used in 49 CFR Part 172.101 Appendix A and 40 CFR, Part 355, Appendices A and B. - The requirement for outer packaging for radioactive gauges meeting all other requirements of 49 CFR 173.424 and 173.425. - E-Manifesting EPA system difficult for waste materials containing both radioactive class 7 and PCBs. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Achieving the End State for the Pahute Mesa Corrective Action Units at the Nevada National Security Site - 20355

Underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) ended in 1992. To address the impact of radionuclide contamination from underground nuclear testing on the groundwater resources of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program created the Underground Test Area (UGTA) activity to characterize the radionuclides in groundwater, understand the nature and extent of radionuclide migration, and forecast the distribution of radionuclides in groundwater for 1,000 years. The UGTA activity is regulated by the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO), an agreement negotiated between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), DOE, and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). DOE is close to achieving the end state (closure in place with monitoring and institutional control) for three of the five UGTA corrective action units (CAUs) on the NNSS. A number of challenges remain to achieve the end state of the other two CAUs, both located on Pahute Mesa. Pahute Mesa was the location of 82 underground nuclear tests, less than 10% of the total number of tests on the NNSS. Yet, Pahute Mesa contains slightly more than 60% of the total radionuclides (in curies). Based on groundwater sampling in monitoring wells, two radionuclide plumes have migrated several kilometers (km) in groundwater from selected test cavities and have crossed the boundary of the NNSS (yet remain within the boundaries of Federally controlled land). The path to achieve the end state continues to evolve as more data are collected and a better understanding of radionuclide migration in groundwater is developed. DOE has invested in drilling and sampling more than 50 characterization and monitoring groundwater wells over the past 25 years. The data indicate that the primary radionuclide of concern is tritium as it is about 89% of the total radionuclide inventory (in curies). As well, only tritium has been measured in groundwater outside of cavities at concentrations exceeding the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) standard. For one of the tritium plumes that has migrated across the NNSS boundary, the average rate of migration has been measured as about 45 meters (m) per year with the rate of migration at the leading edge of the plume of about 85 meters per year. At that rate of migration, the tritium plume will decay to safe levels and not reach the publicly accessible environment at concentrations above the SDWA standard. Other radionuclides, at concentrations below the SDWA standards, will be monitored to ensure they remain at safe levels. Consequently, the end state path forward for Pahute Mesa has evolved to take full advantage of the data from the monitoring network to constrain uncertainty in model forecasts and to reduce reliance on probabilistic simulations. The focus of the end state approach relies on developing a monitoring well network that is protective of human health by increasing confidence that no radionuclide plume in the groundwater will migrate undetected to the accessible environment, located about 22 km from the nearest up-gradient underground nuclear test. Using the measured data to remove uncertainty, the evaluation of radionuclide migration from Pahute Mesa is directed toward meeting the goals of the end state. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

US EPA Superfund Remediation Program Update: Revisions to Risk and Dose Assessment Models - 20368

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Superfund remedial program is finishing up a significant number of revisions to its guidance for the risk assessment process at radioactively contaminated Superfund sites. The six Preliminary Remediation Goal (PRG) and Dose Compliance Concentration (DCC) internet-based calculators for radiation risk and dose assessment at Superfund sites are being reformatted to match the chemical calculators and improve the user experience, revised to add a new peak risk and dose output option, and to add some adjustment options for external exposure. A new Radon Vapor Intrusion Screening Level (RVISL) calculator is expected to be finished in 2020, will be similar to the Vapor Intrusion Screening Level (VISL) for chemical calculator that was finished in 2018. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Meteorological Tower Network Expansion Pilot Project Siting Considerations to Ensure Data Quality and Representativeness of Three New Meteorological Towers at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Associated with the Meteorological Tower Network Expansion Pilot Project by the Environmental Protection and Compliance (EPC) Compliance Programs (CP) Meteorology and Air Quality (MAQ) team, the purpose of this technical report is to establish requisite justification for the siting of three 10-meter high instrumented meteorological towers at three new locations on the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) site. These towers and their associated instrumentation are similar in scope to the existing 10-meter meteorological tower that is collecting meteorological data in Mortandad Canyon (MDCN). The conclusions and recommendations in this technical report will inform LANL management, EPC-CP MAQ staff, and other LANL divisions of the criteria employed for the selection of the final location for siting these three new towers. Meeting such comprehensive criteria will ensure that all data acquired will be spatially representative for meeting the diverse Safety Basis (SB), emergency management, and operations organizations programmatic needs and analytical data input requirements to its codes.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

US EPA Superfund Radon Vapor Intrusion Screening Level (RVISL) Electronic Calculator - 20340

Currently, there is no U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidance on correlating soil or groundwater levels of radon with indoor radon concentrations at Superfund sites. EPA is developing the Radon Vapor Intrusion Level Calculator (RVISL) Calculator which is an online tool. The RVISL calculator: (1) lists three radon isotopes (Rn-219, Rn-220 and Rn-222) known to pose a potential cancer risk through the inhalation pathway; (2) provides generally recommended risk and Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements (ARAR) based preliminary remediation goals (PRG) for groundwater, soil gas (exterior to buildings and sub-slab) and indoor air for default target risk and ARAR based levels and exposure scenarios; and (3) allows calculation of site-specific PRGs based on user-defined target risk and ARAR based levels and exposure scenarios. EPA developed the RVISL calculator to help risk assessors, remedial project managers, and others involved with risk assessment and decision making at radioactively contaminated sites. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2025

Reversible parts-per-trillion-level detection of perfluorooctane sulfonic acid in tap water using field-effect transistor sensors

Widespread, persistent and toxic per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) pose a major threat to water systems and human health. Current detection methods are relatively expensive, slow and complex, underscoring the need for more accessible alternatives to meet increasingly stringent PFAS regulations. Here, in this study, we present an ultrasensitive sensing platform for perfluorooctane sulfonic acid detection in tap water with a reporting limit ( ~ 250 parts per quadrillion) lower than the US Environmental Protection Agency’s regulatory standard (4 parts per trillion), using a remote gate field-effect transistor featuring β-cyclodextrin (β-CD)-modified reduced graphene oxide as the sensing membrane. The sensor exhibits excellent selectivity against common inorganic ions, natural organic matter and select organic pollutants in tap water. The reversible and rapid response ( < 2 min) indicates the potential of remote gate field-effect transistor for continuous in-line monitoring. Mechanistic studies using quartz crystal microbalance and molecular dynamics simulations reveal key roles of analyte adsorption and charge properties in sensing performance and offer insights for designing more selective PFAS capture probes.

Wang, Yuqin [University of Chicago, IL (United Sta↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 2: Hot Topics in US DOE Environmental Management

The well-attended Panel Session was chaired by Martin Schneider. The four panelists did not provide presentations. Rather the session was a discussion focusing on pressing issues facing US DOE Environmental Management (EM) sites and how the program is moving forward. The session began by momentarily reflecting on a success: the three Tank Waste Treatment Facilities will soon be coming online. These three facilities will treat as much waste in two years as was treated in the past 30 years. That is a significant milestone in progress. Also, safety enhancements at WIPP are a big success. The panelists noted that there will be challenges with the victories of the startup of the Waste Treatment Facilities. Treating tank waste is the last EM mission and will help with the relationships with the stakeholders, regulators and Congress. One of the biggest challenges will be moving back to full operation mode. Although the operation will increase productivity of reducing/managing the tank waste, it will decrease life cycle cost and lessen years of cleanup. The challenge will be having people understand that EM will be operating 24/7 and that maintenance will be key in keeping the operations. EM will be working together with the regulators to show tangible progress that will be effective and efficient. By working together, they can find opportunities/technologies for streamlining and accelerating cleanup. Recent changes to the regulatory framework between DOE-EM Los Alamos Field Office and New Mexico Environmental Department have helped cleanup in Los Alamos. Every year EM and the agencies review progress and come to agreements on the next work priorities. At Savannah River Site, the Federal Facility Agreement among EM, South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has developed a small core team that work are shared by together in resolving issues that come up. The discussion moved on to how progress can be made by sharing lessons learned among the contractors. An example of how these learned lessons can be shared is that key representatives from projects across the EM sites participate in various forums to review/contribute to the work planned. Other opportunities can be by temporary assignments of DOE staff to gain experience and by monthly EM Headquarters report that provide the lessons learned across the EM sites. The panelists discussed how skyline changes are the best examples of tangible progress. Decontamination and Demolition (D and D) of structures are the easiest tangible progress that can be seen. Whereas tank waste cleanup is the hardest to see. Disposal of waste onsite versus offsite is another challenge, and timely discussions are necessary to get to the best value to the government.

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DOE OSTI2023

Auto Stop-Start Fuel Consumption Benefits

With increasingly stringent regulations mandating the improvement of vehicle fuel economy, automotive manufacturers face growing pressure to develop and implement technologies that improve overall system efficiency. One such technology is an automatic (auto) stop-start feature. Auto stop-start reduces idle time and reduces fuel use by temporarily shutting the engine off when the vehicle comes to a stop and automatically re-starting it when the brake is released, or the accelerator is pressed. As mandated by the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is required to keep the public informed about fuel saving practices. This is done, in partnership with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), through the fueleconomy.gov website. The “Fuel-Saving Technologies” and “Gas Mileage Tips” sections of the website are focused on helping the public make informed purchasing decisions and encouraging fuel-saving driving habits. Here, in order to provide users with accurate information about the auto stop-start feature, experiments were conducted to determine its fuel economy effect. Four vehicles were tested both with and without the feature enabled under three test cycles: the Federal Test Procedure (FTP) city fuel economy test, the US06 high acceleration aggressive driving schedule that is often identified as the “Supplemental FTP” driving schedule, and the EPA New York City Cycle (NYCC). The results were compared to measure the fuel economy and consumption effects of using the auto stop-start feature. It was found that the fuel economy improvement varied significantly between drive cycles depending on the amount and percentage of idle time during the test. The largest fuel economy improvements were 7.27% and 26.4% for the FTP and NYCC, respectively.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Calculating Potential Radiological Emissions for Waste Management Activities at INL - 20068

At Idaho National Laboratory (INL), work involving radionuclides is evaluated for potential emissions from a project in order to comply with the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) regulations, 40 CFR 61 Subpart H. Emission calculations are documented in an Air Permitting Applicability Determination (APAD) to analyze unmitigated and mitigated emissions and determine if an Application to Construct (ATC) or continuous monitoring is required. To calculate the unmitigated and mitigated emissions, a spreadsheet was developed to provide ease in determining potential emissions by providing the maximum operating temperature and the material being used. The spreadsheet aids in determining the potential emissions for research projects and waste management activities at Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) and other locations across the INL site. Furthermore, it can also be used for periodic confirmatory measurements (PCM) to justify low emissions. Elements that factor into the unmitigated and mitigated calculations include the amount of each radionuclide used (in curies or grams), specific activity (if amount is given in grams), the temperature the material is heated to in Celsius, the dose conversion factor which is derived from Clean Air Act Assessment Package - 1988 (CAP-88) modeling, and the number of HEPA filters used for mitigated measures. The main drivers for calculating the unmitigated emissions for a project are the amount used per radionuclide, the maximum operating temperature, and the location of the work. The maximum operating temperature determines the airborne release factor which is dependent on the physical state of the radionuclide. Prior to October 2017, if the radionuclide was heated to greater than 100 deg. C, the radionuclide was assumed to be a gas, which has the highest airborne release factor. This assumption would be overly conservative for radionuclides with high melting and boiling points, which provided a challenge to demonstrate low emissions. In October 2017, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved an alternative method for INL. This method allows the airborne release factor to be determined by using the melting point and 90% of the boiling point of the radionuclide. This methodology was included in the spreadsheet to allow unmitigated emission calculations for APADs to be completed more efficiently and effectively. Results show a reduction in time completing air emission calculations as well as lower total emissions across all facilities at INL. MFC annual emissions were reduced by 62% from the previous year and Research and Education Campus (REC) facilities were reduced by 38% due to implementation of the approved alternative method. Time spent on APADs, PCMs, and documentation for the annual NESHAP report was also reduced significantly. The spreadsheet provided in Table I provides the potential emission calculations for the 'Advanced Retrieval and Disposition Techniques for Remote Handled Mixed Low Level Waste (RH MLLW) at the Radioactive Scrap and Waste Facility (RSWF)' project. Calculations show the Potential Effective Dose Equivalent (PEDE) at RSWF to be 7.27 E-04 mrem/yr (7.27 E-09 Sv/yr) which is well below the 0.1 mrem/yr threshold. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Approach to Quality Assurance for Complex Environmental Modeling - 20407

A strong Quality Assurance (QA) program for complex environmental modeling is essential for regulatory and public acceptance and trust, but it does not have to be onerous. Neptune and Company, Inc. (Neptune) has developed a strong QA program that improves transparency, traceability, reproducibility, and therefore, defensibility and trust. Neptune's QA program has evolved over the past 27 years, transitioning from an ad hoc QA program, to a program that is currently Nuclear Quality Assurance-1 (NQA-1) compliant, and will soon be NQA-1/DOE approved for DOE EM modeling work. In addition, Neptune is a qualified laboratory assessor and qualified auditor for reference materials, a proficiency testing provider, and fully complies with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) QA program. Neptune's President and CEO, Kelly Black, was recently named the Chairperson of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Technical Committee 69, Application of Statistical Methods. A strong QA program has been developed for Neptune's radiological performance assessment (PA) program. Although pieces of their QA program are currently in development, their current program includes document control using Subversion, issue tracking and work flow tracking using JIRA, and transparency and traceability via a system of 'calc sheets' for documentation of all data analysis and modeling combined with 'check print' documentation of QA checking, and rigorous model testing and configuration control. All work is reviewed by an independent subject matter expert who is not associated with the collection and assembly of information, for an internal peer review. The program is enforced with a handful of Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs), Work Instructions, QA Project Plans (QAPPs), and Quality Management Plans (QMPs) that are updated frequently, with required annual training and acknowledgment. In addition, effective communication of modeling approaches and results to clients and stakeholders are integral to their QA program. Many of their models are built using the GoldSim modeling platform, for which their models are well-known for their level of transparency, documentation, and QA traceability. This level of QA is also applied to their process-level models. Neptune has taken some lessons learned from the extremely rigorous QA program required for the Yucca Mountain Project (YMP), and imposed the YMP requirements of complete traceability, transparency, and reproducibility, but avoided the inflexibility of a QA program that likely contributed to the suspect e-mails in 2005 that resulted in loss of trust in the YMP, and in nuclear waste disposal (and nuclear power) in general. There are far too many examples of loss of public trust due to poor QA that could have been easily avoided with a simple and straight-forward QA program combined with stakeholder engagement. The purpose of this paper is to share features of Neptune's Radiological Performance Assessment program QA program, and some of their QA related lessons learned over the past 27 years of QA for complex environmental modeling. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Low Count and Background Radionuclides Analysis - 20488

The US Department of Energy (DOE) is often faced with the need to evaluate radionuclides at low concentrations. When site sample data are likely to be close to threshold activity concentrations of interest, then the means by which the radiochemical analysis is performed and reported is critical. This situation can occur when differentiating from zero (presence/absence) for radionuclides that do not occur naturally, close comparison with environmental background for naturally occurring radionuclides, close comparison with a risk- or dose-based threshold concentrations of interest, or even comparisons across studies. There are several analytical issues that are of concern, but the two that appear to cause incorrect decisions to be made most often involve establishing detection limits and subtracting ambient background conditions in the laboratory. These issues are not critical when radionuclide activity concentrations are large relative to thresholds of concern, but they seem to be poorly understood when it matters. When the comparisons are important and are likely to be close to a threshold of interest, then the general contract with the analytical laboratories needs to be changed so that the right or appropriate data are obtained. The concern is that important decisions are made incorrectly more often as greater scrutiny is placed on DoE's radionuclide cleanup or monitoring decisions by the public and other stakeholders. Examples are presented of problems that have been observed for different projects, both within and outside the realm of DOE and NRC remediation and radioactive waste disposal problems, and solutions are offered that should lead to better data from which important decisions need to be made. The first example is from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and involves radionuclide concentrations in soil and rock beneath LANL's Material Disposal Area (MDA) G. An initial review of the data led to a conclusion that americium and plutonium are a long way present beneath MDA G. A more thorough review of the data that accounted properly for ambient background and the detection limits that had been established led to the opposite conclusion. Another example is from the Nevada National Security Site where tritium results from one of the wells were unexpectedly high. Proper understanding and analysis of ambient background led to the conclusion that the increased concentrations were not so obvious, and that a different contract with the analytical laboratory was needed to provide more appropriate data to support a better determination. Other examples are used from regulatory review of projects in Nevada, where background levels and secular equilibrium for naturally occurring radionuclides are not established correctly because of analytical issues. The same basic issues have also been found to create difficulties analyzing historical data from the West Valley Demonstration Project. There is evidence in the data that the apparent lack of secular equilibrium where it is expected to exist is related to ambient background subtraction or other analytical issues. A final example is presented for analysis of Tc-99 in samples of depleted uranium. In this case, two different studies that were performed only three months apart provide quite different results. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established the data quality objectives (DQO) process in the mid-1980's to establish decision performance criteria for data collection. EPA guidance (EPA G-4, for example) clearly distinguishes between DQOs and measurement performance objectives (MQOs) that should be addressed for laboratory analysis of samples. The language of DQOs and MQOs has become confused over time it seems, and the subsequent effects seem to include a lack of attention to decision performance and a routine approach to measurement quality. In order to better address radionuclide sample analysis when the concentrations are close to thresholds of concern, which might be zero for some radionuclides, background for others, and risk-based thresholds for yet others, it is important that routine laboratory analysis methods are adjusted, and that the project team and the laboratory work closely together to ensure that the data meets the MQO requirements of laboratory analysis and reporting of results, and that the MQOs effectively support project-specific DQOs. This basic approach will be applied in Los Alamos in the coming year to the collection of moisture data from underneath MDA T that will be analyzed for americium and neptunium isotopes. Proper understanding of the radiochemistry methods and reporting, and of appropriate statistical methods is critical to the success of such projects, ensuring that the right decisions are made. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

235-F GoldSim Fate and Transport Model: Uncertainty Quantification

Building 235-F was configured with two missions in mind: Actinide Billet Line (ABL) and the fabrication of Pu-238 oxide for space program applications. ABL produced Np-237 billets for use in SRS reactors, whereas the design process, fabrication, and examination of Pu-238 oxide powder occurred within the following areas, respectively: Plutonium Experimental Facility (PEF), Plutonium Fuel Form (PuFF), and Old Metallography Lab (OML). By 1990 production ceased and by 2006 de-inventory occurred; however, assays have shown significant holdup remains within ABL and PuFF. As a result, 235-F is a Category 2 nuclear facility, with plans to undergo deactivation and decommission (D and D) via In-Situ Disposal (ISD). The purpose of this project is to ensure United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) groundwater radiation maximum contaminant level (MCL) and dosage standards are met during the D and D of 235-F by quantifying uncertainty through probabilistic modeling and evaluation of various ISD alternatives. GoldSim is a dynamic modeling software package with a graphical, object-oriented interface capable of capturing the influence of complex system input variability on probabilistic system outcomes. A GoldSim stochastic fate and transport model for 235-F was developed and matched with a PORFLOW deterministic model to simulate probabilistic release and flow of radionuclides from ABL and PuFF into the vadose zone, the Upper Three Runs (UTR) Aquifer, and UTR Creek. The GoldSim model was used to probabilistically evaluate four ISD scenarios against USEPA groundwater radiation MCLs and dosage standards. The deterministic 235-F GoldSim fate and transport model continues to be refined to match the results of the PORFLOW deterministic model to ensure the model accurately represents radionuclide movement through the groundwater system. The stochastic variables that are utilized within the GoldSim model are founded on the most current data; a conservative perspective is taken where needed. Alignment with the PORFLOW deterministic model, coupled with input stochastic variability, allows the probabilistic 235-F GoldSim model to capture the conservative breadth of possible outcomes for radionuclide fate within this particular system. This ensures that the USEPA MCLs and dosage limits hold even in the worst case scenarios.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Perspective on the Successes of the NNSS Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity - 20221

Between 1951 and 1992, 828 underground nuclear tests were performed at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Underground testing was done in five major testing areas, which included (1) Frenchman Flat, (2) Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, (3) Yucca Flat/Climax Mine (4) Central Pahute Mesa, and (5) Western Pahute Mesa. About one third of the underground tests were detonated near, at or below the water table, and thus radioactive contamination was introduced to the groundwater system. The U.S. Department of Energy's Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity was established in the late 1990's to address the fate and movement of residual radioactivity in groundwater, and characterize the risk that it may pose to NNSS workers and the offsite public. It has accomplished this goal through a process of iterative groundwater sampling and numerical groundwater flow and transport modeling, and long-term monitoring. The UGTA Activity draws on the expertise of scientists in the fields of geology, hydrology, radiochemistry, and risk assessment from the U.S. DOE staff, the lead contractor (currently Navarro) and many other organizations, in cooperation with the governing regulatory body, the State of Nevada's Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is one of the participating research organizations involved with the UGTA Activity. Under the direction of DOE and the lead contractor, LANL's role in UGTA has evolved over time from an initial focus on geologic characterization, to conducting field and laboratory experiments, and finally to its current role of providing modeling and geochemistry expertise to characterize the rates and directions of groundwater and radionuclide movement. In its current role, LANL has either developed or provided the numerical tools for developing flow and transport models in each of the four major testing areas. In addition, LANL has provided an independent assessment of future groundwater flow and transport behavior through the analysis of naturally-occurring geochemical and isotopic tracers in groundwater. The five major testing areas are now in different stages of investigation or closure: (1) Frenchman Flat is in its fifth year of post closure modeling; (2) The Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain Closure Report has been submitted to NDEP and is awaiting approval; (3) The Yucca Flat/Climax Mine Closure Report is under development; and (4) Central and (5) Western Pahute Mesa is still undergoing investigation and flow and transport model development. The success of the UGTA Activity in reaching or approaching closure in three of the five major testing areas is primarily due to the DoE's focus on regulatory closure requirements, but also is in part attributable to a rigorous internal review process and the involvement of NDEP and Nye County water professionals as participants and observers in the reviews. County and state involvement in the internal review process has promoted trust that the U.S. DOE is deeply committed to ensuring the present and future safely of NNSS workers and the surrounding communities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs.) An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. The xEMU shares similarities with the legacy Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuit that is currently used for ISS EVAs, however differences in the layup (e.g., materials, thicknesses, and layers) of the fabric environmental protection garment (EPG), portable life support system (xPLSS) and helmet required an extensive test program to determine ballistic performance. Over 100 hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for MMOD impacts. Additionally, over 50 low speed tests (< 1km/s) were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate BLEs for lunar ejecta impacts. Post testing, ballistic limit equations (BLEs) used to define the performance of the various regions on the xEMU spacesuit were developed from a generic set of BLEs. The HVI and low speed testing was performed to establish a physical basis for the equations with the coefficients and exponents of the generic BLEs adjusted to fit the test data. The xEMU BLEs were added to the NASA/JSC software application used for spacecraft MMOD risk assessments (BUMPER-3). A finite element model (FEM) of the xEMU spacesuit, which defines the size and shape of the spacesuit as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations, was created based on a solid model provided by the xEMU program office. Using the FEM file and added xEMU BLEs, BUMPER-3 assessments of the xEMU spacesuit for probability of no penetration (PNP) were performed. For the LEO assessment of a typical ISS EVA, the orbital debris and meteoroids environments were defined using the latest engineering models, ORDEM 3.2 and MEM-3 respectively. The lunar surface assessment again used the MEM-3 engineering model to define the meteoroid environment along with the current released lunar surface ejecta model, NASA SP-8013 (developed during the Apollo Program). The Space Team in the Natural Environments Branch at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will soon release the new Lunar Meteoroid Ejecta Engineering Model (LMEEM), at which time the xEMU lunar surface EVA will be reassessed. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds. Similar to the legacy EMU spacesuit, the majority of the MMOD risk (96% of the LEO EVA risk and 99% of the lunar surface EVA risk) is concentrated in regions of xEMU that are comprised primarily of softgoods (arms, legs, and gloves) rather than the hardgoods (xPLSS, hard upper torso and helmet).

Micrometeoroid↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Equation Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs.) An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. This paper will expand on the hypervelocity impact (HVI) testing and ballistic limit equation (BLE) definition work that was partially presented at the 2nd International Orbital De-bris (IOC-II) Conference held in Sugar Land, TX in December 2023. The xEMU shares similarities with the legacy Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuit that is currently used for ISS EVAs, however differences in the layup (e.g., materials, thicknesses, and layers) of the fabric environmental protection garment (EPG), portable life support system (xPLSS) and helmet required an extensive test program to determine ballistic performance. Over 100 hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for MMOD impacts. Additionally, over 50 low speed tests (< 1km/s) were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate BLEs for lunar ejecta impacts. Post testing, ballistic limit equations used to define the performance of the various regions on the xEMU spacesuit were developed from a generic set of BLEs. The HVI and low speed testing was performed to establish a physical basis for the equations with the co-efficients and exponents of the generic BLEs adjusted to fit the test data. The xEMU BLEs were added to the NASA/JSC software application used for space-craft MMOD risk assessments (BUMPER-3). A finite element model (FEM) of the xEMU spacesuit, which defines the size and shape of the spacesuit as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations, was created based on a solid model provided by the xEMU program office. Using the FEM file and added xEMU BLEs, BUMPER-3 assessments of the xEMU spacesuit for probability of no penetration (PNP) were performed. For the LEO assessment of a typical ISS EVA, the orbital debris and meteoroids environments were defined using the latest engineering models, ORDEM 3.2 and MEM-3 respectively. The lunar sur-face assessment again used the MEM-3 engineering model to define the meteoroid environ-ment along with the current released lunar surface ejecta model, NASA SP-8013 (developed during the Apollo Program). The Space Team in the Natural Environments Branch at Mar-shall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will soon release the new Lunar Meteoroid Ejecta Engineering Model (LMEEM), at which time the xEMU lunar surface EVA will be reassessed. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds. Similar to the legacy EMU spacesuit, the majority of the MMOD risk (96% of the LEO EVA risk and 99% of the lunar surface EVA risk) is concentrated in regions of xEMU that are comprised primarily of softgoods (arms, legs, and gloves) rather than the hardgoods (xPLSS, hard upper torso and helmet).

Micrometeoroid↗
DOE OSTI2020

Radiological Recovery Logistics Tool - 20161

Argonne is building and testing a tool, the Radiological Recovery Logistics Tool (RRLT), that can be used during the response and recovery from a radiological or nuclear incident to effectively allocate appropriate commercial and public works equipment to mitigate, remove, and contain radiological contamination. The requirements for this tool - as well as development of the resulting software - is overseen by a steering committee of stakeholders from DHS's National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). One essential requirement is for RRLT to support the efficient and appropriate allocation of resources for a radiological response. Subsequent discussions between ANL and stakeholders have solidified the nature of this support to include identification of the types of resources to be allocated. The study reported in this paper has both factored fundamental concepts and connections out of this identification process and created a Knowledge Base detailing support goals, response scenarios, and efficacy information on dozens of equipment types. In short, RRLT will dynamically apply these findings to situational conditions surrounding contamination incidents. RRLT's Domain, the model of elements, ideas and relationships with which the tool will work, draws concepts from technical reports and stakeholder vocabularies to connect response goals and scenarios to types of equipment that offer utility towards those goals in those scenarios. RRLT's Knowledge Base will contain details on dozens of equipment types and facilitate the operator's discovery and consumption of these details most pertinent to a dynamically selected subset of goals. The core of its Domain Model is based on a report authored by this team. This report [1] contains a comprehensive list of proposed equipment to accomplish various missions or scenarios that might arise after a large-scale radiological contamination incident in an urban environment or critical infrastructure. The report divides potential response and recovery efforts into five support goals: Survey and monitoring of the contaminated area; Mitigation of received dose to first responders: Decontamination (gross and final) of buildings, vehicles, roadways, parks, and other surfaces: Waste management of solid waste generated during recovery operations: and Containment of wastewater and other waste generated during the response and recovery phases. RRLT's development is driven by use cases. A use case is an intention with which a user approaches the software. Use cases are grouped into delivery increments to schedule development, testing, and presentation to stakeholders. This model partitions the system into seven increments: User Arrival and Authentication, Search and Navigation, Equipment Recommendation, Plan Management, Content Management, and Expanded Access. Once a user 15 authenticated, RRLT will present the user with a dashboard that allows them to explore or search RRLT's content. The dashboard will also include a 'Plan' panel for collecting decisions and relevant observations about an incident at hand to facilitate development of an equipment list. RRLT will offer three general modes of access to items in the knowledge base: - Keyword search for direct discovery of items, - Navigation along predetermined paths from recovery goal towards equipment types, and - Interactive guidance towards equipment types by an autonomous software agent: the Equipment Recommendation Wizard. This presentation will detail progress in the development of the RRLT and also discuss opportunities for those interested in providing feedback on its content and functionality. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Closure Report for the Project Shoal Area: Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 447 Shoal,Nevada, Site

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) has prepared this Closure Report for subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 447 at the Shoal, Nevada, Site, which was formerly called the Project Shoal Area. The Shoal site was the location of an underground nuclear test in 1963 that resulted in residual radionuclide contamination at the detonation depth of 1211 feet (ft) (DOE 2015a). The environmental restoration process and Corrective Action strategy are conducted in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (FFACO 1996, as amended) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) statues and regulations. Responsibility for the environmental site restoration was transferred from the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office, to LM on October 1, 2006. The Shoal site is south of U.S. Highway 50, approximately 30 miles southeast of Fallon, in Churchill County, Nevada (Figure 1). The site was selected for underground nuclear testing in 1961, as part of the Vela Uniform Program. Vela was a research and development program directed toward locating, detecting, and identifying underground and high-altitude nuclear detonations. The Vela Uniform program was specific to underground detonations (AEC 1964). The objective of Project Shoal was to detonate a nuclear device underground in an active seismic area to improve the United States’ ability to detect, identify, and locate underground nuclear detonations. The underground nuclear test at Shoal was a joint effort between the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which was the predecessor agency to DOE. Figure 1 is a map showing the site location.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗