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Enabling Deep Space Science Missions with Nuclear Thermal Propulsion

Nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) enables entirely new classes of deep-space science missions to yield scientific returns that, in most cases, are simply not possible with traditional architectures. NTP systems can yield dramatically reduced interplanetary travel times, deliver roughly 2- 3 times (or more) the mass that can be delivered by conventional chemical propulsion systems, or provide a combination of these advantages to further enhance scientific return. Present NASA and DoD-sponsored plans for NTP systems will mature the technology using prototype and flight demonstration engines to prove the designs. These prototype engines will have performance in the correct thrust range so as to permit use as a low-risk propulsion stage in support of high-payoff deep space science missions. Additionally, the use of low-enriched Uranium (LEU) fuels over highly-enriched Uranium (HEU) fuels reduce the costs of engine development, qualification, acceptance and launch, and lowers the risks associated with proliferation management.

Kurt A Polzin↗

Optimizing spacecraft design - optimization engine development : progress and plans

At JPL and NASA, a process has been developed to perform life cycle risk management. This process requires users to identify: goals and objectives to be achieved (and their relative priorities), the various risks to achieving those goals and objectives, and options for risk mitigation (prevention, detection ahead of time, and alleviation). Risks are broadly defined to include the risk of failing to design a system with adequate performance, compatibility and robustness in addition to more traditional implementation and operational risks. The options for mitigating these different kinds of risks can include architectural and design choices, technology plans and technology back-up options, test-bed and simulation options, engineering models and hardware/software development techniques and other more traditional risk reduction techniques.

risk↗

Probabilistic risk assessment of the Space Shuttle. Phase 3: A study of the potential of losing the vehicle during nominal operation, volume 1

This document is the Executive Summary of a technical report on a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of the Space Shuttle vehicle performed under the sponsorship of the Office of Space Flight of the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration. It briefly summarizes the methodology and results of the Shuttle PRA. The primary objective of this project was to support management and engineering decision-making with respect to the Shuttle program by producing (1) a quantitative probabilistic risk model of the Space Shuttle during flight, (2) a quantitative assessment of in-flight safety risk, (3) an identification and prioritization of the design and operations that principally contribute to in-flight safety risk, and (4) a mechanism for risk-based evaluation proposed modifications to the Shuttle System. Secondary objectives were to provide a vehicle for introducing and transferring PRA technology to the NASA community, and to demonstrate the value of PRA by applying it beneficially to a real program of great international importance.

Fragola, Joseph R.↗

Space Transportation System Liftoff Debris Mitigation Process Overview

Liftoff debris is a top risk to the Space Shuttle Vehicle. To manage the Liftoff debris risk, the Space Shuttle Program created a team with in the Propulsion Systems Engineering & Integration Office. The Shutt le Liftoff Debris Team harnesses the Systems Engineering process to i dentify, assess, mitigate, and communicate the Liftoff debris risk. T he Liftoff Debris Team leverages off the technical knowledge and expe rtise of engineering groups across multiple NASA centers to integrate total system solutions. These solutions connect the hardware and ana lyses to identify and characterize debris sources and zones contribut ing to the Liftoff debris risk. The solutions incorporate analyses sp anning: the definition and modeling of natural and induced environmen ts; material characterizations; statistical trending analyses, imager y based trajectory analyses; debris transport analyses, and risk asse ssments. The verification and validation of these analyses are bound by conservative assumptions and anchored by testing and flight data. The Liftoff debris risk mitigation is managed through vigilant collab orative work between the Liftoff Debris Team and Launch Pad Operation s personnel and through the management of requirements, interfaces, r isk documentation, configurations, and technical data. Furthermore, o n day of launch, decision analysis is used to apply the wealth of ana lyses to case specific identified risks. This presentation describes how the Liftoff Debris Team applies Systems Engineering in their proce sses to mitigate risk and improve the safety of the Space Shuttle Veh icle.

Mitchell, Michael↗

Fast Paced, Low Cost Projects at MSFC

What does an orbiting microsatellite, a robotic lander and a ruggedized camera and telescope have in common? They are all fast paced, low cost projects managed by Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) teamed with successful industry partners. MSFC has long been synonymous with human space flight large propulsion programs, engineering acumen and risk intolerance. However, there is a growing portfolio/product line within MSFC that focuses on these smaller, fast paced projects. While launching anything into space is expensive, using a managed risk posture, holding to schedule and keeping costs low by stopping at egood enough f were key elements to their success. Risk is defined as the possibility of loss or failure per Merriam Webster. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) defines risk using procedural requirement 8705.4 and establishes eclasses f to discern the acceptable risk per a project. It states a Class D risk has a medium to significant risk of not achieving mission success. MSFC, along with industry partners, has created a niche in Class D efforts. How did the big, cautious MSFC succeed on these projects that embodied the antithesis of its heritage in human space flight? A key factor toward these successful projects was innovative industry partners such as Dynetics Corporation, University of Alabama in Huntsville (UAHuntsville), Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU APL), Teledyne Brown Engineering (TBE), Von Braun Center for Science and Innovation (VCSI), SAIC, and Jacobs. Fast Affordable Satellite Technology (FastSat HSV01) is a low earth orbit microsatellite that houses six instruments with the primary scientific objective of earth observation and technology demonstration. The team was comprised of Dynetics, UAHuntsvile, SAIC, Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) and VCSI with the United States Air Force Space Test Program as the customer. The team completed design, development, manufacturing, environmental test and integration in one year. FastSat HSV01 also deployed a Poly Picosatellite Orbital Deployer (PPOD) for a separate nano ]satellite class spacecraft (Cubesat: Nano Sail Demonstration) in partnership with Ames Research Center. The Robotic lunar lander is a MSFC JHU APL partnership that led to the development of a flexible architecture for landers to support robotic missions to a wide range of lunar and asteroid destinations. The team started with the goal of meeting NASA agency directives that led to the creation of a test bed focusing on GN&C and software to demonstrate the descent and landing on any airless body for the final 30 to 60 meters. The team created a complex technology demonstration as well as Guidance Control and Navigation (GN&C) algorithms providing autonomous control of the lander. The team uses a green propellant of 90% hydrogen peroxide and has completed 18 successful test flights. The International Space Station (ISS) SERVIR Environmental Research and Visualization System (ISERV) is a technology demonstration payload to assist the SERVIR project with environmental monitoring for disaster relief and humanitarian efforts. The ISERV project was a partnership with TBE. The ISERV payload consists of a commercial off the shelf camera, telescope, and MSFC developed power distribution box and interfaces on ISS with the Window Observational Research Facility in the US Lab. MSFC has identified three key areas that enabled the low cost mission success to include culture, partnering, and cost/schedule control. This paper will briefly discuss these three Class D efforts, FastSat HSV-01, the Robotic Lunar Lander and the ISERV camera system, the lessons learned, their successes and challenges.

Watson-Morgan, Lisa↗

RIM: Reliability and Integrity Management/ASME BPVC Section XI Division 2

Prepared at the request of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and the Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management's SubCommittee on Risk Applications, this slide set presents an update on some recent Reliability and Integrity Management (RIM) Subgroup work to respond to industry questions on American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI Division 2. If approved, the briefing will be given at an upcoming workshop of the Nuclear Energy Institute (February 18-20, Washington, DC) and at an upcoming meeting of the Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management's SubCommittee on Risk Applications (February 25-26, College Park, MD).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NASA Human System Risk Assessment Process

NASA utilizes an evidence based system to perform risk assessments for the human system for spaceflight missions. The center of this process is the multi-disciplinary Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The HSRB is chartered from the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) at NASA Headquarters. The HSRB reviews all human system risks via an established comprehensive risk and configuration management plan based on a project management approach. The HSRB facilitates the integration of human research (terrestrial and spaceflight), medical operations, occupational surveillance, systems engineering and many other disciplines in a comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB considers all factors that influence human risk. These factors include pre-mission considerations such as screening criteria, training, age, sex, and physiological condition. In mission factors such as available countermeasures, mission duration and location and post mission factors such as time to return to baseline (reconditioning), post mission health screening, and available treatments. All of the factors influence the total risk assessment for each human risk. The HSRB performed a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30, where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research and, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit for 6 and 12 months, deep space for 30 days and 1 year, a lunar mission for 1 year, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary two-page assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence of that risk, available risk mitigations, traceability to the Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS) and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the Human Research Program, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets to provide the most economical and timely mitigations. The risk assessments were completed for the 6 DRMs and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB reviews each risk at least annually or when new evidence/information is available that adds to the body of evidence. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Francisco, D.↗

Systems Engineering and Integration (SE and I)

The issue of technology advancement and future space transportation vehicles is addressed. The challenge is to develop systems which can be evolved and improved in small incremental steps where each increment reduces present cost, improves, reliability, or does neither but sets the stage for a second incremental upgrade that does. Future requirements are interface standards for commercial off the shelf products to aid in the development of integrated facilities; enhanced automated code generation system slightly coupled to specification and design documentation; modeling tools that support data flow analysis; and shared project data bases consisting of technical characteristics cast information, measurement parameters, and reusable software programs. Topics addressed include: advanced avionics development strategy; risk analysis and management; tool quality management; low cost avionics; cost estimation and benefits; computer aided software engineering; computer systems and software safety; system testability; and advanced avionics laboratories - and rapid prototyping. This presentation is represented by viewgraphs only.

Chevers, ED↗

Management Approach for NASA's Earth Venture-1 (EV-1) Airborne Science Investigations

The Earth System Science Pathfinder (ESSP) Program Office (PO) is responsible for programmatic management of National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Science Mission Directorate's (SMD) Earth Venture (EV) missions. EV is composed of both orbital and suborbital Earth science missions. The first of the Earth Venture missions is EV-1, which are Principal Investigator-led, temporally-sustained, suborbital (airborne) science investigations costcapped at $30M each over five years. Traditional orbital procedures, processes and standards used to manage previous ESSP missions, while effective, are disproportionally comprehensive for suborbital missions. Conversely, existing airborne practices are primarily intended for smaller, temporally shorter investigations, and traditionally managed directly by a program scientist as opposed to a program office such as ESSP. In 2010, ESSP crafted a management approach for the successful implementation of the EV-1 missions within the constructs of current governance models. NASA Research and Technology Program and Project Management Requirements form the foundation of the approach for EV-1. Additionally, requirements from other existing NASA Procedural Requirements (NPRs), systems engineering guidance and management handbooks were adapted to manage programmatic, technical, schedule, cost elements and risk. As the EV-1 missions are nearly at the end of their successful execution and project lifecycle and the submission deadline of the next mission proposals near, the ESSP PO is taking the lessons learned and updated the programmatic management approach for all future Earth Venture Suborbital (EVS) missions for an even more flexible and streamlined management approach.

Guillory, Anthony R.↗

A Model-Based Systems Engineering Evaluation of the Evolution to an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System

In 2018, as result of a recommendation from the National Academies, NASA began to prototype an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System(IASMS). The purpose of the IASMS is to enable innovative aviation operations and greater heterogeneity of the overall National Airspace (NAS) by automating much of the safety monitoring, assessment, and risk and hazard mitigation functionspresent in today’s Safety Management Systems (SMS). NASA has worked together with early industry collaborators to understand how such a system might work and has published several early Concepts of Operation (ConOps) and other technical memoranda that illustrate the primary considerations for selected aviation domains. The shift from an SMS to an IASMS is predicated on several assumptions, including: 1.) automating safety functions will decrease the amount of time necessary for risk and hazard identification and analysis, making it more likely that safety concerns are understood ‘in-time’ to mitigate them, and 2.) an IASMS will allow easier tailoring of safety management processes to the particular risks and hazards inherent to that aviation operation. In this paper, we begin to validate these assumptions through the use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE).

In-time Aviation Safety Management System↗

A Model-Based Systems Engineering Evaluation of the Evolution to an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System

In 2018, as result of a recommendation from the National Academies, NASA began to prototype an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). The purpose of the IASMS is to enable innovative aviation operations and greater heterogeneity of the overall National Airspace (NAS) by automating much of the safety monitoring, assessment, and risk and hazard mitigation function present in today’s Safety Management Systems (SMS). NASA has worked together with early industry collaborators to understand how such a system might work and has published several early Concepts of Operation (ConOps) and other technical memoranda that illustrate the primary considerations for selected aviation domains. The shift from an SMS to an IASMS is predicated on several assumptions, including: 1.) automating safety functions will decrease the amount of time necessary for risk and hazard identification and analysis, making it more likely that safety concerns are understood ‘in-time’ to mitigate them, and 2.) an IASMS will allow easier tailoring of safety management processes to the particular risks and hazards inherent to that aviation operation. In this paper, we begin to validate these assumptions through the use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE).

IASMS↗

The MSFC Systems Engineering Guide: An Overview and Plan

As systems and subsystems requirements become more complex in the pursuit of the exploration of space, advanced technology will demand and require an integrated approach to the design and development of safe and successful space vehicles and there products. System engineers play a vital and key role in transforming mission needs into vehicle requirements that can be verified and validated. This will result in a safe and cost effective design that will satisfy the mission schedule. A key to successful vehicle design within systems engineering is communication. Communication, through a systems engineering infrastructure, will not only ensure that customers and stakeholders are satisfied but will also assist in identifying vehicle requirements; i.e. identification, integration and management. This vehicle design will produce a system that is verifiable, traceable, and effectively satisfies cost, schedule, performance, and risk throughout the life-cycle of the product. A communication infrastructure will bring about the integration of different engineering disciplines within vehicle design. A system utilizing these aspects will enhance system engineering performance and improve upon required activities such as Development of Requirements, Requirements Management, Functional Analysis, Test, Synthesis, Trade Studies, Documentation, and Lessons Learned to produce a successful final product. This paper will describe the guiding vision, progress to date and the plan forward for development of the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Systems Engineering Guide (SEG), a virtual systems engineering handbook and archive that will describe the system engineering processes that are used by MSFC in the development of complex systems such as the Ares launch vehicle. It is the intent of this website to be a "One Stop Shop" for our systems engineers that will provide tutorial information, an overview of processes and procedures and links to assist system engineering with guidance and references, and provide an archive of systems engineering artifacts produced by the many NASA projects developed and managed by MSFC over the years.

Shelby, Jerry A.↗

Space Station logistics policy - Risk management from the top down

Considerations are presented in the area of risk management specifically relating to logistics and system supportability. These considerations form a basis for confident application of concurrent engineering principles to a development program, aiming at simultaneous consideration of support and logistics requirements within the engineering process as the system concept and designs develop. It is shown that, by applying such a process, the chances of minimizing program logistics and supportability risk in the long term can be improved. The problem of analyzing and minimizing integrated logistics risk for the Space Station Freedom Program is discussed.

Paules, Granville↗

Recommendations on the Use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts for NASA Missions - Phase II

This assessment had two Phases. Phase I captured NASA Centers’ current practices for commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts 1 used in spaceflight systems and ground support equipment (available at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20205011579) [ref. 1]. The Phase II report provides guidance for selecting and using COTS parts in NASA missions. The approaches proposed in this report differ from current agency practices. This top-level executive summary touches on these new approaches for using COTS parts but does not provide the detailed information that is critical in understanding the rationale behind these new approaches. Readers will need to read the entire report to gain full understanding and effectively use the recommendations herein. NASA’s historical approach to selecting and applying parts has been to define certain parts, primarily specific classes of military specification (MIL-SPEC) parts, as “standard”, leaving all others, including COTS parts, as nonstandard. Standard parts typically are used without further testing (“use-as-is”). Nonstandard parts are subjected to initial screening and subsequent lot acceptance testing of representative samples from each procured lot per MIL-SPEC or similar requirements. Decades later, top-tier commercial part manufacturers have evolved significant manufacturing, statistical control, and technological improvements that can now provide parts as reliable or more reliable than MIL-SPEC parts, when used within their datasheet limits. Concurrently, the space science and exploration community’s needs demand technological advances unavailable with MIL-SPEC parts. This ongoing change necessitates using COTS parts for space missions. Properly selected COTS parts in appropriate applications can offer performance and supply availability advantages compared to MIL-SPEC parts. Their utility and demonstrated reliability result from large volumes and automated production and testing processes. However, careful review and a thorough understanding of their specifications (i.e., datasheet limitations) is needed, and verifying that manufacturer specifications and reliability meet space hardware application needs are necessary. This report recommends MIL-SPEC screening and non-radiation-related lot acceptance testing be reduced or eliminated in cases where evidence of sufficient quality and reliability exists for COTS parts. The extent of NASA's insight into COTS manufacturers and the amount and nature of the needed evidence will differ by mission and will likely be driven by a mission's resources and associated risk posture. To facilitate this goal, two new terminologies have been defined and described: “Industry Leading Parts Manufacturer (ILPM)” and “Established COTS parts.” An ILPM is a COTS manufacturer that produces high quality and reliable parts. Some parts produced by ILPMs, defined as Established COTS parts, do not need any additional MIL-SPEC or NASA screening and lot acceptance testing to be used in space applications. This report provides guidance for selecting, procuring, and applying COTS parts and for performing part-, board-, and system-level COTS parts verification. The recommendation to select Established COTS parts from ILPMs will assure those COTS parts will have comparable quality to corresponding MIL-SPEC parts. Selecting, applying, and verifying Established COTS parts from ILPMs requires a holistic team approach, engaging parts engineers, circuit designers, quality, reliability, and systems engineers, procurement specialists, radiation specialists, avionics leads, and program/project managers. A mission-specific approach tailored to a project’s Mission, Environment, Applications and Lifetime (MEAL) [ref. 2] requirements should be developed and approved by program/project managers. Any associated risks should be clearly identified, quantified, mitigated, and/or accepted. Different approaches are recommended according to program/project Risk Classes A, B, C, and D [ref. 3] and human-rated missions [ref. 4]: 1. Recommend Classes A and B and human-rated missions consider a “MIL-SPEC parts- based design” approach. ”MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach is one in which most parts are MIL-SPEC parts and Established COTS parts from ILPMs are used only when an equivalent MIL-SPEC part does not meet functional or size, weight, and power (SWaP) or performance requirements, or is not available. 2. Recommend Classes D and Sub-D missions consider a “System of COTS” approach. “System of COTS” approach is one which most parts are Established COTS parts from ILPMs. 3. Recommend Class C missions determine which approach is the best for their projects; that is, use either a “MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach, “System of COTS” approach, or a combined approach utilizing elements of both. This report intends to provide guidance in using COTS parts for NASA missions with risk classifications of A through D and human-rated missions; but it does not address the costs of using COTS parts. Costs of using COTS parts in different NASA mission classes can vary significantly even if the same parts are used in different risk postures, due to differing verification levels needed. The guidance does not distinguish between critical or non-critical systems, and a given project will need to apply the appropriate guidance based on their risk posture. The intended audience of this report are NASA personnel and commercial practitioners who support NASA’s spaceflight missions, including spaceflight program or project managers, parts engineers, parts manufacturers, radiation engineers, avionics engineers, system engineers, circuit design engineers, reliability engineers, safety and mission assurance (SMA) personnel, and parts procurement specialists. The NEPP Program will perform a pathfinder study to explore implementing the guidance in this NESC report. An ILPM verification process is not the same as conventional vendor qualification processes performed according to military standards and specifications. This NESC report intends to provide guidance in utilizing available parts data from ILPM manufacturers for parts assurance assessments needed for NASA missions. The report also captured the current practices from DoD and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in Section 10. Note each DoD and FAA report was provided by the corresponding agencies regarding their practices, which are independent from the NESC recommendations in the report.

Commercial-Off-The-Shelf↗

Zero to Integration in Eight Months, the Dawn Ground Data System Engineering Challange

The Dawn Project has presented the Ground Data System (GDS) with technical challenges driven by cost and schedule constraints commonly associated with National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery Projects. The Dawn mission consists of a new and exciting Deep Space partnership among: the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), responsible for project management and flight operations; Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC), spacecraft builder and responsible for flight system test and integration; and the University of California, at Los Angeles (UCLA), responsible for science planning and operations. As a cost-capped mission, one of Dawn s implementation strategies is to leverage from both flight and ground heritage. OSC's ground data system is used for flight system test and integration as part of the flight heritage strategy. Mission operations, however, are to be conducted with JPL s ground system. The system engineering challenge of dealing with two heterogeneous ground systems emerged immediately. During the first technical interchange meeting between the JPL s GDS Team and OSC's Flight Software Team, August 2003, the need to integrate the ground system with the flight software was brought to the table. This need was driven by the project s commitment to enable instrument engineering model integration in a spacecraft simulator environment, for both demonstration and risk mitigation purposes, by April 2004. This paper will describe the system engineering approach that was undertaken by JPL's GDS Team in order to meet the technical challenge within a non-negotiable eight-month schedule. Key to the success was adherence to an overall systems engineering process and fundamental systems engineering practices: decomposition of the project request into manageable requirements; definition of a structured yet flexible development process; integration of multiple ground disciplines and experts into a focused team effort; in-process risk management; and aggregation of the intermediate products to an integrated final product. In addition, this paper will highlight the role of lessons learned from the integration experience. The lessons learned from an early GDS deployment have served as the foundation for the design and implementation of the Dawn Ground Data System.

systems engineering↗

Cost Risk Analysis Based on Perception of the Engineering Process

In most cost estimating applications at the NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC), it is desirable to present predicted cost as a range of possible costs rather than a single predicted cost. A cost risk analysis generates a range of cost for a project and assigns a probability level to each cost value in the range. Constructing a cost risk curve requires a good estimate of the expected cost of a project. It must also include a good estimate of expected variance of the cost. Many cost risk analyses are based upon an expert's knowledge of the cost of similar projects in the past. In a common scenario, a manager or engineer, asked to estimate the cost of a project in his area of expertise, will gather historical cost data from a similar completed project. The cost of the completed project is adjusted using the perceived technical and economic differences between the two projects. This allows errors from at least three sources. The historical cost data may be in error by some unknown amount. The managers' evaluation of the new project and its similarity to the old project may be in error. The factors used to adjust the cost of the old project may not correctly reflect the differences. Some risk analyses are based on untested hypotheses about the form of the statistical distribution that underlies the distribution of possible cost. The usual problem is not just to come up with an estimate of the cost of a project, but to predict the range of values into which the cost may fall and with what level of confidence the prediction is made. Risk analysis techniques that assume the shape of the underlying cost distribution and derive the risk curve from a single estimate plus and minus some amount usually fail to take into account the actual magnitude of the uncertainty in cost due to technical factors in the project itself. This paper addresses a cost risk method that is based on parametric estimates of the technical factors involved in the project being costed. The engineering process parameters are elicited from the engineer/expert on the project and are based on that expert's technical knowledge. These are converted by a parametric cost model into a cost estimate. The method discussed makes no assumptions about the distribution underlying the distribution of possible costs, and is not tied to the analysis of previous projects, except through the expert calibrations performed by the parametric cost analyst.

Dean, Edwin B.↗

Lessons Learned for Responsible Use of Cloud in the Cirrus Project, Following the CrowdStrike Outage Event

A disruption in CrowdStrike’s Falcon cybersecurity platform on July 19th, 2024, caused worldwide chaos. This event highlights the imperative need for cloud security measures for networks that are critically reliant on cloud technology. This incident negatively impacted air travel, government networks, and critical infrastructure sectors such as hospitals and financial institutions. While no electric utilities had a physical impact, and few had an IT impact, there were issues created by loss of cloud services, and other interrelated industries. For utilities and energy distribution organizations, understanding and mitigating these risks is essential. The Cirrus tool offers a strategic solution engineered to weave cloud integration seamlessly into the fabric of operational management, thereby enhancing resilience and streamlining efficiency in the face of digital challenges.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Independent Assessment of Instrumentation for ISS On-Orbit NDE

International Space Station (ISS) Structural and Mechanical Systems Manager, requested that the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) provide a quantitative assessment of commercially available nondestructive evaluation (NDE) instruments for potential application to the ISS. This work supports risk mitigation as outlined in the ISS Integrated Risk Management Application (IRMA) Watch Item #4669, which addresses the requirement for structural integrity after an ISS pressure wall leak in the event of a penetration due to micrometeoroid or debris (MMOD) impact. This document contains the outcome of the NESC assessment.

Madaras, Eric I↗